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ABSTRACT 
 
Dopo la rottura tra Stalin e Tito del 1948, la partnership jugoslavo-statunitense, che 
venne a crearsi negli anni cinquanta, rinforzò la svolta della Jugoslavia verso 
l’Occidente. L’amministrazione Eisenhower formulò in seguito la “strategia del cuneo”, 
atta a “mantenere Tito a galla” istigando instabilità nel blocco sovietico e legando il 
regime jugoslavo e le sue istituzioni politiche, economiche e militari agli Stati Uniti. 
Concepita quale effetto collaterale delle sue politiche neutraliste e quale presupposto per 
la modernizzazione industriale del paese, la rinnovata collaborazione jugoslava con i 
partner americani è stata in prevalenza studiata nei suoi risvolti economici e politici. 
Cercando di colmare lacune storiografiche precedenti, questa ricerca esplora come 
l’amministrazione statunitense adoperò l’apertura jugoslava verso l’estero per installarvi 
un’estesa rete di strumenti soft power, attuati tramite agenzie e agenti della diplomazia 
pubblica come la United States Information Agency (USIA), le postazioni locali della 
United States Information Service (USIS) e il Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs (CU). Nel contesto della Guerra Fredda culturale degli anni cinquanta e 
sessanta, i centri culturali USIS, i padiglioni americani alle fiere di Zagabria e Belgrado, 
le trasmissioni della Voice of America, i tour di musicisti classici, jazz e rock e di gruppi 
teatrali finanziati dal CU e dal Dipartimento di Stato americano, e il travolgente 
programma di una cinquantina di scambi culturali, funsero da polo di attrazione per la 
leadership accademica, intellettuale, artistica e politica jugoslava, veicolando lezioni 
sulla democrazia, libertà, sapere tecnologico, e prosperità economica americane. 
Basandosi su un confronto tra le fonti americane e jugoslave, la ricerca ha rivelato gli 
ambiti di negoziazione, accettazione e rifiuto di questi contenuti e prassi culturali, 
offrendo pertanto nuove conoscenze sulla porosità del confine tra libertà e coercizione, 
tra ciò che era permesso e ciò che era sottointeso nel regime comunista di Tito. Al 
termine dell’analisi si asserisce che la soft power statunitense abbia avuto, nel contesto 
delle evoluzioni di liberalizzazione del regime negli anni sessanta nonché nei risvolti di 
dissidenza interna, il ruolo di input esterno a movimenti di riforma ispirati alla 
decentralizzazione federalista, alle pratiche di democrazia partecipativa e alla maggiore 
liberalizzazione del mercato interno. Inoltre, la penetrazione nella dirigenza jugoslava di 
medio e basso livello e la creazione di reti, contatti e cooperazioni con numerosi 
intellettuali, accademici e artisti, permisero di rafforzare tendenze pro-americane e 
occidentali sia a livelli politici esecutivi che nell’opinione pubblica. Infine, la 
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fluttuazione della dirigenza comunista – a livello federale, repubblicano e locale – tra le 
ricezioni positive e gli atti di coercizione nei confronti degli agenti della diplomazia 
pubblica americana rivelò l’arbitrarietà dei confini tra libertà e coercizione del regime 
titoista e l’insostenibilità della “poliarchia” jugoslava, il cui “esperimento” si sarebbe 
rivelato, a lungo andare, fallimentare. 
 
In the aftermath of the Yugoslav rupture with the Soviets in 1948, the Eisenhower 
administration conceived the “wedge strategy” to “keep Tito afloat.” While supporting 
Yugoslav independence, its primary goal was to instigate instability in the Soviet bloc 
by tying the Yugoslav regime and its political, economic and military institutions to the 
United States. Since the early 1950s, the Yugoslav-U.S. partnership reinforced the 
Yugoslav turn to the West. Regarded as a side effect of its neutralist policies and a 
prerequisite for the industrial modernization of the country, the renewed Yugoslav 
cooperation with the American partners has been mainly studied in its economic and 
political implications. By filling previous historiographical gaps, this research explores 
how the U.S. administration used Yugoslav openness to foreign countries in order to 
establish an extensive network of soft power channels implemented by public 
diplomacy agencies and agents such as the United States Information Agency (USIA), 
the posts of the United States Information Service (USIS) and the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). Here it is shown that, in the context of the 
cultural Cold War between the Unites States and the Soviet Union, the USIS cultural 
centers, the American pavilions at fairs in Zagreb and Belgrade, the broadcasts of the 
Voice of America, the tours of classical, jazz and rock musicians and theater groups 
funded by the State Department’s CU, and the overwhelming program of fifty cultural 
exchanges, acted as a magnet for Yugoslav academic, intellectual, artistic and political 
leadership, by conveying lessons on democracy, freedom, modern technical knowledge 
and economic prosperity. Based on a comparison between American and Yugoslav 
archival sources, this research has revealed the negotiations, acceptance and rejection 
processes of these cultural practices, thus providing new insights into the porosity of the 
border between freedom and coercion, between what was permitted and what was 
implicitly forbidden by Tito’s communist regime. According to the analyzed data, the 
research shows that the U.S. soft power has had, in the context of the regime’s 
liberalization trends in the 1960s as well as for internal dissident movements, the role of 
an external input for reforms inspired by federalist decentralization, participatory 
democracy and market economy. Moreover, the penetration into the Yugoslav middle 
Waging Public Diplomacy – Carla Konta – April 2016 
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and lower-level leadership and the creation of networks, contacts, and cooperation with 
numerous intellectuals, academics, and artists, strengthened pro-American and Western 
tendencies both at the executive level and in the public opinion. Finally, the fluctuation 
of the communist leadership – at the federal, republican and local level – between 
positive receptions and acts of coercion of the American public diplomacy agents and 
agencies revealed the arbitrariness of the margins of freedom and oppression in the 
Titoist regime, and the unsustainability of Yugoslav “polyarchy,” whose “experiment” 
would result, in the long run, in failure. 
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NOTES ON TRANSLATION, PRONUNCIATION AND 
ARCHIVAL REFERENCES 
 
The translations from Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, French and Italian are mine. The 
title of documents originally in Cyrillic are always provided in the Latin alphabet. In the 
text I use original acronyms in Serbo-Croatian, with the English translations, as well as 
the diacritic signs of the Serbian (Latin) and Croatian alphabet. For the translation of 
Serbo-Croatian acronyms, see homonym section. Serbo-Croatian is completely regular 
in pronunciation, and there are no silent letters. Eight Serbo-Croatian consonants do not 
feature in English, and four consonants appear identical but are pronounced differently. 
They are: 
Č is ch in ‘church’; ć is t in ‘mixture’; dž is j in ‘jam’; dj is d in ‘duke’; š is sh in 
‘shoe’; ž is s in ‘treasure’; lj is ll in ‘million’; nj is n in ‘new’; c is ts in ‘Tsar’; j is y in 
‘yet’; and h and r are always pronounced. Of the remaining consonants, g is always hard 
(as in ‘gag’), and so is s (as in ‘sack’). The vowels in Serbo-Croatian sound as follows: 
a in ‘father’; e in ‘pet’; i in ‘machine’; o in ‘hot’; u in ‘rule’.1 
In order of uniformity of archival references, I opted for the U.S. National Archives 
criteria, which follows the exactly opposite sequence of the Archives of Yugoslavia, the 
City of Belgrade and the Croatian State Archives criteria. This means I gave the 
references in the following sequence: the type and title of the item, originating office, 
addressee, date, file number, box and/or files by name and number, series or entry 
title/name of the collection, record group, and name of the repository. This rule has been 
respected in all cases, except for the records of the SKJ’s Central Committee, which 
have a special identification number (a sequence of Roman and Arabic numbers) that 
has been inserted between the box number and the entry title. At the time that I accessed 
the series of the Republican Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries 
of SRH, located in the Croatian State Archives, the record group was still unregulated. 
Therefore, I refer to it by the Archives’ temporary references. For any further update, 
consult the archival reference room. 
  
                                                 
1 L. Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, 2nd edition (Hound mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), x–xi. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“No event could be more momentous for the attainment of our [U.S.] foreign policy 
objectives than the permanent alienation from the Soviet Union of this key regime.”3 
These words, pronounced by American counselor Reams in Belgrade only a few days 
after the Tito-Stalin split of June 1948, seemed to capture perfectly the profound 
significance of that moment. The news about the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party (KPJ) from the Cominform erupted on the front-page of worldwide newspapers.4 
Borba, Vjesnik and Politika – as the main Yugoslav Party’s “spokespersons” – 
expressed consternation and disbelief.5 Very soon, it became clear that the breakup was 
                                                 
3 Reams, Chargé in Yugoslavia, to the Secretary of State, June 30, 1948, Foreign Relations of the United 
States (hereafter FRUS), 1948, Vol. IV, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union, 1078. The Information Bureau of 
the Communist and Workers’ Parties, more commonly Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), 
was founded in September 1947, as a political response to the Marshall Plan, in order to unify the 
European communist parties under Soviet auspices. Apart from the Soviet representatives, the delegates 
from Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, as well as the envoys of the 
Italian and French Communist Parties, participated at the founding meeting in Szklarska Poręba, Poland. 
After the expulsion of Yugoslavia (June 28), the Cominform headquarters moved to Bucharest. The 
organization was dissolved in 1956 following the improved relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviets 
in the post-Stalin era (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli and Russian Center of Conservation and Study 
of Records for Modern History, eds., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences, 
1947/1948/1949, vol. 24, Annali 30 (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 1994). 
4 “Main Part of Text of Cominform’s Declaration on the Yugoslav Party Chieftains,” The New York 
Times, June 29, 1948; Harold Callender, “Yugoslav ‘Revolt’ Held Peril to the Reds,” The New York 
Times, June 30, 1948; “La svolta della Jugoslavia; Tito sconfessato dal Cominform,” Corriere della Sera, 
June 29, 1948. 
5  “Projekt programa Komunističke Partije Jugoslavije,” Borba, June 30, 1948; “Izjava Centralnog 
komiteta KP Jugoslavije povodom Rezolucije Informacionog biroa Komunističkih partija o stanju u 
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a point of no return and with long-term consequences. The Soviet-Yugoslav rupture 
would lay ground for the Yugoslav “way to socialism,” the ideology and policy of 
Yugoslav exceptionalism.  
More decisively, searching for new geostrategic partnerships, alliances and military 
backing, Yugoslavia would turn towards the United States, and the United States 
towards Yugoslavia. The early 1950s would sanction the Yugoslav-American new 
economic and political partnership, transforming Tito’s regime into the “American 
Communist ally,” as in the words of Tvrtko Jakovina.6 
Walter Bedell Smith, U.S. ambassador in Moscow during those ‘stormy’  days of 
1948, rightly observed that the “Cominform resolution, which the Yugoslav Communist 
Party has now rejected, indicates [the] first really serious crisis in the new ‘family’ of 
Soviet states erected since the war’s end, and will be a God-send to our 
propagandists.”7 
In a way, this study starts from Smith’s “God-send propaganda issue.” Indeed, 
Yugoslavia became the first Communist-ruled State that defied Soviet domination and 
deviated from the Soviet model. As Rusinow remarkably explained, Yugoslav 
experimented with the market mechanism and gradually replaced a command economy 
with decentralized decision-making, wider personal freedom, new forms of political 
participation, an open frontiers policy and a wide-ranging integration into the Cold War 
international arena.8  By the early 1950s, Yugoslavia had embraced the doctrine of 
“active peaceful cooperation”9 with foreign countries, including the Western countries’, 
foremost the United States; its foreign policy strategy turned towards neutralism and, 
then, by the end of the decade, towards non-alignment. 10  However, the Yugoslav 
                                                                                                                                               
KPJ,” Vjesnik, June 30, 1948; “Izjava o stanju u CK KPJ povodom Rezolucije biroa Komunističkih 
partija o stanju u KPJ,” Politika, June 30, 1948. 
6  Tvrtko Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke 
Države 1945.-1955. (Zagreb: Profil, 2003). 
7 Smith, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, to the Secretary of State, Moscow, July 1, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 
IV, 1082. The emphasis is of the author. 
8 Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978); Dennison I. Rusinow, Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights and Observations, ed. Gale Stokes 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008). 
9 Edvard Kardelj, “Nova Jugoslavija u savremenom svijetu,” Komunist, no. 1 (January 1951): 1–32. 
10 Rinna Kullaa has questioned the presumption that the non-alignment strategy arose in the aftermath of 
the 1955 Bandung Conference, which, contrary to what is usually implied, had no Yugoslav participation, 
and of Tito’s Brioni meeting with Nasser and Nehru (1956). Instead, Kullaa argues that during Koča 
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inclination towards “bold and imaginative” experimentation, opened a series of 
dilemmas on how economic modernization could coexist without the institutional or 
social breakdown of the communist regime, and how would, consequently, individual 
and national freedom relate to these modernization processes.11 Internally, the regime 
pioneered a decentralized self-management socialism that, together with the 
neutralist/non-alignment stance, would embody the “Yugoslav way to socialism.” 12 
During the Cold War era, Yugoslav leadership internally, and Tito’s personal diplomacy 
towards international actors, would foster the ideology of Yugoslav exceptionalism, 
about which more shall be said in relation to the U.S. public diplomacy towards 
Yugoslavia. 
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations adopted a policy of “keeping Tito 
afloat,” conceptually related to the “wedge strategy” that, while developed for foreign 
policy use in Europe and Asia as well, was a combination of nationalism and U.S. 
                                                                                                                                               
Popović’s serving as the State Secretary (1953-1965), Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy first adopted a 
neutralist stance as an alternative international position that would balance its partnership with the Soviet 
Union. When, after the Hungarian crisis, the 1955-1956 appeasement with the Soviet Union disappeared, 
Tito turned to its non-aligned partners by the late 1950s (Egypt, India, Indonesia) with whom he founded 
the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (Rinna Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: 
Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012). This revisionist 
position has also been contemplated in Vladimir Unkovski-Korica, The Economic Struggle for Power in 
Tito’s Yugoslavia: From World War II to Non-Alignment (London: I.B.Tauris, forthcoming). The 
Yugoslav positioning between the two Blocs is described in John C. Campbell, Tito’s Separate Road 
(Joanna Cotler Books, 1967); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World, 2nd ed. 
(Princeton University Press, 2015); and Tvrtko Jakovina, Treća strana Hladnog rata (Zagreb: Fraktura, 
2011). Lately, new scholarly interest has arisen over European neutralism during the Cold War. For this, 
see Sandra Bott et al., eds., Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the 
Blocs? (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2016). 
11 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, vii. 
12 According to Dejan Jović, besides self-management and non-alignment, the third pillar of the new 
Yugoslav official identity was the “confederalized federalism.” The three pillars were inspired by the 
desire to be different from interwar Yugoslavia and the USSR (Dejan Jović, “Communist Yugoslavia and 
Its ‘Others,’” in Ideologies and National Identities : The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, 
by John Lampe and Mark Mazower, Hors Collection (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2013), 277–302, http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2438). For an overview on these issues, see Dejan 
Jović, Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2008). 
While the Yugoslav disintegration and political legitimacy will not be addressed in this study and 
literature review, it is worth mentioning some excellent scholarly works, particularly Sabrina P. Ramet 
and Ljubiša S. Adamović, Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered 
Community (Colorado: Westview Press, 1995); Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration Of 
Yugoslavia From The Death Of Tito To The Fall Of Milosevic, 4th ed. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2002); Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005, 
Annotated ed. (Washington, D.C. : Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006); Dejan Djokić, 
Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992 (London: Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2003); and Lenard 
J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso, State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on 
Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (West Lafayette, Indian: Purdue University Press, 2007). 
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pressure and support to create divisions between the Soviet Union and other communist 
countries. The “wedge strategy,” argues Lorraine Lees, consisted in supporting 
Yugoslav nationalism as an example for other, Soviet dominated, communist states, but 
was jeopardized by, what she defines as, futile attempts to change Tito’s regime.13 
Nonetheless, Tito’s regime changed. Whilst a liberalization shift seemed more obvious 
with the abandonment of Stalinism by the mid-1950s, it continued to change 
institutionally with the 1953, 1963, and 1974 Constitutions, and socially and culturally 
through the import of Western-like models, such as in jazz, rock music and films, 
household appliances, culinary arts, urban architecture, American-style advertising and 
supermarkets, and so forth. Scholars have usually distinguished between these two 
pattern-type changes, hence recognizing their different inspirational sources. Yet, in the 
Cold War “battle for hearts and minds,” these changes show themselves as being 
profoundly interrelated. 
Yugoslavia became a top priority for Washington’s public diplomacy creators after 
1950. This research explores an undiscovered, and, until today, untold story, about the 
U.S. “battle for the hearts and minds” of the “jugoslaveni/jugosloveni,” the Yugoslav 
citizens. It aims to identify, examine and comprehend the U.S. public diplomacy 
channels, agencies, and agents in Yugoslavia from 1950 to 1972, their capacity to 
penetrate Yugoslav Party leadership, intelligentsia, students, and public opinion, to 
change attraction patterns, and influence policy outcomes. Using the communication 
channels opened by the U.S. military, technological and economic aid,14 from the early 
1950s onwards, the Department of State, and the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) from 1953, envisioned a long-term policy aimed at exerting cultural but, most 
of all, political influence in Yugoslavia by means of soft power. 
                                                 
13 Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). For a general overview of the wedge strategy, look 
into John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 152–94. Gaddis was the first to identify the wedge strategy as an 
innovative and essential aspect of Truman’s and Eisenhower’s administration. 
14 Tvrtko Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2002) and Američki 
komunistički saveznik. Hrvati, Titova Jugoslavija i Sjedinjene Američke Države 1945.-1955. (Zagreb: 
Profil, 2003); John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, Yugoslav-American 
Economic Relations Since World War II (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Dragan Bogetić, 
“Jugoslavija i svetsko tržište kapitala. Američka finansijska podrška jugoslovenskim razvojnim 
programima krajem 50-tih godina,” Tokovi Istorije 3, no. 3 (2010): 89–102. 
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According to the State Department’s Dictionary of International Relations Terms, 
public diplomacy “entails government-sponsored programs intended to inform or 
influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, 
motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.” 15  Apart from this quite 
traditional definition, more recently, public diplomacy was defined as 
the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It 
encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation 
by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and 
interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; 
communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign 
correspondents; and the process of intercultural communications.16 
The analyzed U.S. and Yugoslav archival sources and periodicals, as well as the 
written and oral testimonies collected for this study, reveal a wide network of lobbies 
and operations conceived by the USIA from its headquarters in Washington D.C. and 
implemented by the United States Information Services (USIS) in Belgrade and Zagreb 
and, from there, in Yugoslav territory. Beginning with Joseph Nye’s definition of soft 
power as a country’s “ability to obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics” and “to 
shape the preferences of others” through the attractiveness of its values, prosperity and 
openness, 17  this research aims at reconstructing the role of American ‘visible’ and 
‘invisible’ networks among Yugoslav citizens and leaders. In 1945 the U.S. government 
opened its USIS post in Belgrade, in 1948 in Novi Sad, and in 1951 in Zagreb (the 
American centers in Ljubljana, Skopje and Sarajevo were opened in the 1970s). These 
American information centers housed a public library and reading-room that provided 
American journals and specialized periodicals, lectures, exhibits, concerts and English 
lessons. Together with the State Department and its Bureau of Cultural and Educational 
Affairs, the USIS arranged the Cultural Presentation Program that provided the arrival 
in Yugoslavia of American artists, choirs, jazz, blues and classical music performers, 
vanguard theater groups, and painters, sportsmen, and academic lecturers. By 
broadcasting the Voice of America (VOA), the U.S. government reached thousands of 
                                                 
15 “Public Diplomacy,” Dictionary of International Relations Terms (Department of State Library, 1987). 
16  Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy before Gullion. The Evolution of a Phrase,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Public Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (New York; London: Routledge 
Taylor&Francis, 2009), 19. 
17 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, 2nd ed. (Public Affairs, 2009), 
21–22. 
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Yugoslav citizens. Likewise, the U.S. pavilions at the Zagreb and Belgrade International 
Trade Fairs further enhanced the idea of American wealth, knowledge and technological 
expertise. What is more, the Cultural Exchange Program, by including an extraordinary 
variety of more than fifty exchange platforms, such as the Leader’s Exchange, the 
Fulbright and the Ford, provided by public, private or state-private funds, generated 
intense interest and impact on the part of Yugoslav politicians, academics and university 
students, by introducing an alternative and, for them, insidious forma mentis. 
We shall look at public diplomacy in Yugoslavia as a balancing policy factor in 
shaping the Yugoslav-U.S. foreign relations, as well as a framework for bilateral 
downturns and crises. We shall examine how the U.S. interests in Yugoslavia, as well as 
the response strategy to Yugoslav internal policy restrictions, shaped Washington’s 
public diplomacy. How did U.S. protagonists challenge the rather indisposed Yugoslav 
government officials, at micro and macro level, and hit the targeted population? By 
which methods of induction, cooptation and influence did they fulfill their operational 
goals and by which political and symbolical key words? What were the Yugoslav 
attitude patterns towards the American propaganda in Yugoslavia? How did the 
communist hierarchy and the USIS field officers embody Yugoslav-U.S. cooperation 
and dissimilarities? The basic assumptions of this study are: 
1. the U.S. soft power resources are never monolithic, unidirectional, and 
uncritically received; 
2. the U.S. public diplomacy uses both official, state-directed channels of 
communication, attraction and influence, and private actors speaking for 
governmental goals; 
3. the U.S. public diplomacy efforts were not perceived, in most cases, as 
mere propaganda by the end-receivers (the Yugoslav Party leaders, 
intelligentsia, students and uncategorized public), but were despised by its 
observers (the Party analysts);  
4. the U.S. cultural missions in Yugoslavia represented, in the collective 
imaginaries of Yugoslavs, an iconic United States and its American way of life; 
5. ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ indicate relations between the USIS operational 
centers and the circulation of the U.S. programs within the Yugoslav territory 
(the Socialist Republics); they point to the reactions of Yugoslav officials from 
the executive centers of communist power to the local councils of culture, 
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education and science; they elucidate the relations between the USIA and the 
Department of State with field operations; 
6. the USIS centers, geographically immobile and stationary, relied on the 
Voice, the exchange programs, the cultural exhibitions and lectures, the 
bookmobiles and the mobile movie theaters for rural propagation; 
7. the relations of “intercultural communication” between the United States 
and Yugoslavia cannot be reduced to a simplistic transmission-reception criteria; 
the story of the USIA-USIS networks in Yugoslavia is, as in the Polish case as 
well, “a history of decoding and encoding messages, of interpreting, and 
eventually, appropriating various American voices for people’s own purposes in 
order to oppose, undermine, and maybe even shake off the shackles of the 
system.”18 
While the Chapters 2 to 6 discuss the chief USIA and State Department channels in 
Yugoslavia, Chapter 7 interrogates whether the large span of U.S. public diplomacy 
activities had reached their end policy goals, and if so, how they might be measurable 
from the short, middle and long term perspective. In spring 1980, Ivan Pongračić 
entered the American Library in Zagreb and found on its desk Russell Kirk’s The 
Conservative Mind. Fascinated by the author, he returned looking for more books. Soon 
after, he applied to an international conference organized by Kirk in Pennsylvania, 
which he found out about in another American Library’s magazine. In the United States, 
Pongračić became first Kirk’s friend, then his assistant, and, ultimately, ended his career 
as Professor Emeritus of Indiana University. 19  This example, among many others, 
suggests that the impact of public diplomacy often transcends the main reason for which 
it was established. We shall look at the attractiveness of a resource and the outcome of 
behavior in the public diplomacy efforts in Yugoslavia, through the perspective of the 
sender (the U.S. government and its private partners), the receivers (Yugoslav citizens, 
                                                 
18  Andrzej Antonszek and Kate Delaney, “Poland: Transmissions and Translations,” in The 
Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, and Anti-Americanism After 1945 (Berghahn Books, 
2007): 232–233. 
19 Ivan Pongračić and Russell Kirk, “Prolog,” in Politika razboritosti (Zagreb: Večernji list, 2015), 11–16. 
In the “Prologue” of Russell Kirk’s Croatian translation The Politics of Prudence, Pongračić reveals that 
he was a member of the American Library since his Law Studies in 1961, and usually borrowed music 
magazines and disks. 
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especially the cultural exchange grantees), and the observers and receivers (Yugoslav 
officials and Party leaders). Finally, what do the USIA messages abroad tell us? Whilst 
revelatory of the U.S. Cold War instances such as the containment, the New Look, and 
the Johnson’s and Nixon’s détente strategy, the State Department, the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) from 1961, and the USIA, searched for solutions 
of soft power that would include a proper strategy and a wanted outcome. Their position 
presumed knowing the final recipient of power and communicating in his terms, while 
not trespassing the established framework of the political diplomacy strategy. 
Yugoslav diplomats, like Leo Mates, interpreted Yugoslav openness as the ‘starting 
grid’ of Yugoslav exceptionalism.20 Indeed, as Miroslav Perišić suggests, after 1950 the 
Yugoslav policymakers used the country’s cultural avant-garde as a soft power 
instrument to affirm the Yugoslav image, prestige and value, in other words its 
distinctive “way to socialism” or “socialism with a human face,” at the international 
exhibitions, festivals, and contests in the Western European cultural capitals.21 In many 
notable studies on different subjects pertaining to Yugoslav history, scholars have used 
the Yugoslav “exceptionalist model” to comprehend the Yugoslav boundary position 
between East and West, capitalism and communism, the “Coca-Cola” socialism, and the 
“socialism on the American grain.” By unifying two opposite qualities of the Yugoslav 
regime, which at least symbolically appertained to two opposite ideologies, they 
enhanced the idea of a Yugoslav oxymoron. So, for instance, Patrick H. Patterson and 
Igor Duda examined the socialist consumer and well-being of society; 22  Hannes 
                                                 
20 Leo Mates, Međunarodni odnosi Socijalističke Jugoslavije (Beograd: Nolit, 1976); on the Yugoslav 
Non-Aligned “exceptionalism,” see Ranko Petković, Nesvrstana Jugoslavija i savremeni svijet. Spoljna 
politika Jugoslavije 1945-1985 (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1985). In another context, yet speaking in terms 
of exceptionalism, Slavenka Drakulić, the most world-known Yugoslav feminist, affirmed: “the system of 
‘self-management’ Yugoslavia was so proud of was a ruse, invented to make you believe that […] it was 
the most perfect system among the one-party states, set up to internalize guilt, blame, failure or fear, to 
teach you how you yourself should censor your thoughts and deeds and, at the same time, to make you 
feel that you had more freedom than anyone in Eastern Europe” (Slavenka Drakulić, How We Survived 
Communism and Even Laughed (New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991), 6). 
21  Miroslav Perišić, Diplomatija i kultura. Jugoslavija: prelomna 1950. (Beograd: Institut za noviju 
istoriju Srbije, 2013) and Od Staljina ka Sartru. Formiranje jugoslovenske inteligencije na evropskim 
univerzitetima 1945-1958. (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike, 2012). 
22 Patrick H. Patterson, Bought and Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011); Igor Duda, “Konzumerizmom do konzumizma? Potrošačka kultura u 
Hrvatskoj od 1950-tih do 1980-tih,” in Potrošačka kultura i konzumerizam, ed. Snježana Čolić (Zagreb: 
Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2013), 83–105; Igor Duda, Pronađeno blagostanje: svakodnevni 
život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj 1970 - ih i 1980 - ih, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014); Igor 
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Grandits and Karin Taylor studied the ideological role of mass, Western-like, tourism in 
shaping the Yugoslav worker; 23  Tvrtko Jakovina emphasized the Yugoslav nation-
building process on the “American grain” 24  while Radina Vučetić wrote about the 
“American dream in the Yugoslav way.”25 
Seen as “exceptional” by its authors and as an “exception” by its scholars, the 
Yugoslav exceptionalist model does not work for this study. The insights into the U.S. 
public diplomacy networks within the Yugoslav experiment suggest that a pragmatic, 
realpolitik, and identity policy was involved. Dejan Jović’s assessment is very helpful in 
this scenario. He argues that there were two main “Others” against which Yugoslav 
socialism tried to construct itself, the liberal representative democracy and the Soviet-
style socialism, both antipodes and “mirror images.” These potential threats had their 
domestic representatives in, on the one hand, the “liberals” and “techno-managerial 
forces,” and, on the other, “dogmatists,” “unitarists,” “bureaucrats” and “Stalinists.” 
Several circumstances, which Jović extensively analyzes, led the Yugoslavs to declare 
the Soviet-type statist socialism as their main threat and danger. Consequently, the 
Yugoslav political elite opposed with much less vigilance the liberal democrats and the 
pro-Western groups and, when the Soviet Union collapsed, they were left without the 
existence of the Soviet Other on which they constructed their own identity. Ultimately, 
liberalism, together with nationalism, “entered the Yugoslav identity-making arena and 
emerged victorious.” 26  This research aims to analyze how this liberal democracy 
“Other” evolved in Yugoslavia through the U.S. public diplomacy agents and agencies, 
how it appealed to its target groups, how its messages were explored, negotiated, and 
                                                                                                                                               
Duda, U potrazi za blagostanjem: o povijesti dokolice i potrošačkog društva u Hrvatskoj 1950 - ih i 1960 
- ih, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014). 
23 Hannes Grandits and Karin Taylor, eds., Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism 
(Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2010). 
24 Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici; Jakovina, Američki komunistički saveznik. 
25 Radina Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslavenske popularne kulture šezdesetih 
godina XX veka (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012). 
26  Moreover, Jović claims that the Yugoslav elites’ “commitment to Marxism prompted them to 
underestimate the chance for liberal democracy or nationalism to compete with socialism as a vision of 
the future society. By declaring alternative models of socialism, especially the Soviet model, as the only 
real threat (since socialism was “the only game in town”), they ended up exactly where they did not want 
to be, more dependent than ever on the existence of the Soviet Other.” (Dejan Jović, “Communist 
Yugoslavia and Its ‘Others,’” 277–302). 
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rejected, and finally, to what extent it crafted the Yugoslav experiment between 1950 
and 1972. 
1.1 The Historical Background of Public Diplomacy: From the 
OWI to the USIA 
 
Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people who are uninformed, 
or misinformed, or unconvinced. Our task is to-reach them in their daily lives, 
as they work and learn. [….] Our task is to show them that freedom is the way 
to economic and social advancement, the way to political independence, the 
way to strength, happiness, and peace. The task is not separate and distinct 
from other elements of our foreign policy. 
President Truman, April 20, 195027 
 
The experience of World War I changed the attitudes towards propaganda within 
the United States. With the Committee on Public Information (the Creel Committee), 
Woodrow Wilson’s administration entered into information activities abroad. After the 
conflict, the post-Wilsonian isolationist policy dismantled the governmental backing of 
“propaganda” that instead continued to rely on private initiatives such as the 
Rockefellers’ and Ford Foundations.28 The arena of cultural diplomacy was already 
imbued with the Bolsheviks radio propaganda of the 1919 Comintern. In 1926, Fascist 
Italy opened its first Italian Cultural Institutes overseas, while Great Britain, by 
establishing in 1934 the British Council, planned “to save democracy by teaching 
English and organizing lectures on Shakespeare.”29 The point of caesura in the history 
of the U.S. domestic and foreign propaganda was the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
presidency. 30  Whatever its economic merits, Roosevelt’s New Deal engaged in 
successful publicity initiatives such as the presidential radio “fireside chats,” logos and 
                                                 
27 Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, The Overt International Information and 
Educational Exchange Program of the United States, March 31, 1952, Box 2245, Central Decimal Files 
(hereafter CDF) 1950-1954, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG), National Archives at College Park, 
Maryland (hereafter NACP). 
28  Sarah Ellen Graham, Culture and Propaganda: The Progressive Origins of American Public 
Diplomacy, 1936-1953 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2016), 17–48. 
29 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and 
Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9–11. 
On Italian Fascist propaganda in the United States, see Matteo Pretelli, La via fascista alla democrazia 
americana. Cultura e propaganda nelle comunità italo-americane (Viterbo: Sette Città, 2012). 
30  Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U. S. 
Foreign Policy (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
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posters, rallies and parades. In 1934, his administration created an office within the 
National Executive Council called the United States Information Service (USIS) for the 
purpose of publicizing the New Deal, whilst in July 1939, FDR created the Office of 
Government Reports (OGR), which included the USIS and a new press survey function. 
After the war broke out in Europe, President Roosevelt engaged in an overall effort to 
pawn the effects of Axis propaganda. To counteract German and Italian propaganda in 
Latin America, he entrusted Nelson Rockefeller to the newly established Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.31 Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
and Germany’s declaration of war against the Unites States, the State Department 
inaugurated the Voice of America (February 1942). Within a few months, broadcasts 
extended from German to French, Italian, and English. In June, Roosevelt founded the 
Office of War Information (OWI) with its overseas component becoming the United 
States Information Service (USIS) in many countries.32 For the first time in U.S. history, 
ideas and images of the United States not only “mattered to foreign policy,” they were 
the U.S. foreign policy, as Justin Hart suggests.33 
On the flow of an expanding foreign propaganda, the years between 1943 and 1945 
saw a tremendous increase of American libraries abroad: Sydney, Melbourne, 
Johannesburg, Wellington; then Madrid, Cairo, Stockholm, Paris, Baghdad, New Delhi, 
Bombay, Beirut, Damascus, Moscow, Calcutta, Istanbul, Ankara, Rome, Brussels, 
Florence, Oslo, The Hague, Copenhagen, Athens, Bern, Manila, Naples, Milan, 
Belgrade, Sofia, Bangkok, and even Leopoldville had one. 34  Established for the 
“reorientation of people in occupied areas,” from 1945 onwards the U.S. Military 
Government in Germany, the U.S. Armed Forces in Austria and Korea, and the U.S. 
Allied Powers in Japan, started Information Center Libraries in those countries.35 
                                                 
31 Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, The Overt International Information and 
Educational Exchange Program of the United States, March 31, 1952, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 
59, NACP. 
32 Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office 
of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 3–6 (hereafter Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967); Jack K. 
McFall to Edwin C. Johnson, Senator, Aug. 22, 1950, 511.00/8-950, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, 
NACP. 
33 Hart, Empire of Ideas. 
34 Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, 3–6. 
35  Kathleen R. Hooper, Designing Democracy: Re-Education and the America Houses (1945-1961) 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014). 
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In the immediate post-war context, the OWI propagandists, demonstrates Hart, 
played “a seminal role in theorizing the place of propaganda in a democratic society,” 
and in the relationships between foreign relations and domestic affairs, propaganda and 
psychological warfare, and public and private actors.36 The increased Cold War tensions 
and the conviction over Soviet superiority in the war of ideas, convinced Congress that 
the VOA was necessary and legitimate even in peacetime.37 The controversial U.S. 
Information and Education Exchange Act of January 1948 (Public Law 402), popularly 
referred to as the Smith-Mundt Act, legalized peacetime propaganda, but restricted the 
State Department, (and later the USIA) officials involved with public diplomacy from 
engaging in strategic communications or information operations within the United 
States or its territories.38 In 1950, President Truman launched the Campaign of Truth to 
combat Communist propaganda. In June 1952, he reorganized the information and 
exchange program under the new U.S. International Information Administration (IIA), 
in order to multiply and intensify psychological deterrents to Soviet Communist 
aggression; to stimulate confidence in the U.S. Government, especially in Western 
Europe; to combat neutralism, particularly in Asia and the Middle East; and to maintain 
the hope of an “ultimate liberation” of the Iron Curtain countries.39 
                                                 
36 Hart, Empire of Ideas, 72. Apart from Hart’s study, for valuable scholarly accounts on the origins of 
public diplomacy in the pre-Cold War period, see Sarah Ellen Graham, Culture and Propaganda; Wilson 
P. Dizard Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 1–62; Allan M. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of 
War Information, 1942-1945 (Yale University Press, 1978); David F. Krugler, The Voice of America and 
the Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953 (University of Missouri Press, 2000). 
37  Krugler, The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles. Indeed, explains Gregory 
Tomlin, “Many American policymakers doubted that a democratic country should continue to maintain a 
robust propaganda effort after World War II. Some liberals feared that, like Nazis and Japanese fascists, 
U.S. government officials might begin to direct propaganda toward American citizens. […] Others, on 
both the political right and left, believed that the post-war stature of the United States alone would entice 
the rest of the world to reject communism, without the government spending a single taxpayer’s dollar to 
explain its policies. Many influential policymakers believed that everyone would want to emulate the 
United States based on the freedom, social mobility, and superior quality of life enjoyed by those 
pursuing the American dream” (Gregory M. Tomlin, Murrow’s Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the 
Kennedy Administration, (Potomac Books - University of Nebraska Press, 2016), Kindle edition, 
Introduction. 
38 Proposed by Senator Alexander Smith and Congressman Karl Mundt, its purpose was “to promote the 
better understanding of the United States among the people of the world and to strengthen cooperative 
international relations” (Psychological Board Briefings, Nov. 6, 1950, 511.00/11-650, Box 2238, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP). See also, Tomlin, Murrow’s Cold War, Introduction. 
39 Department of State Departmental Announcement No. 4, Jan. 16, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, II, 2, doc. 
292; Howland H. Sargeant, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, The Overt International Information 
and Educational Exchange Program of the United States, March 31, 1952, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, 
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In May 1953, the Subcommittee on Overseas Information proposed the creation of 
“a new, independent information and propaganda agency at the sub-cabinet level.” The 
Reorganizational Plan no. 8 launched the United States Information Agency (USIA) on 
August 1, 1953. Under the USIA umbrella, President Eisenhower merged the IIA, the 
Mutual Security Agency (MSA), and the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), 
but left the exchange programs within the State Department.40 In its tormented history, 
during which it struggled for a “deserved place” in the executive level, the USIA would 
became the spokesperson and interpreter of the American foreign policy, and the 
promotor of anti-communist stances and positive themes about the United States.41 It 
would become the first global agency with the capacity to disseminate information 
before any private company was able to do so.42 It pursued “media control projects” that 
consisted of planting news in newspapers, placing programs on local television 
channels, and using personal contacts to inﬂuence the perspective of foreign journalists 
and inﬂuential opinion leaders. Such obscured operations prove the USIA partial 
engagement in covert propaganda, claim Nelson and Izadi.43 
In addition, Senator McCarthy’s investigations hardly hit the inceptions of the 
USIA. On February 18, 1953, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations called author Howard Fast, a reputed 
                                                                                                                                               
RG 59, NACP; Department of State Publication 3927, Aug. 1950, 511.00/9-2250, Box 2238, CDF 1950-
1954, RG 59, NACP; 1954-1955 USIS Mission Prospectus, Dec. 3, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2246, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
40 Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Senator, to John F. Dulles, Secretary of State, May 9, 1953, 511.00/5-953, 
Box 2248, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. These changes brought into the USIA the previous IIA 
divisions: International Broadcasting, Overseas Information Centers/Information Center Service, Private 
Enterprise Coordination Staff, Information Media Guaranty Program, and International Motion Pictures 
(Ninth Semiannual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, Feb. 2, 1954, 511.00/3-
2554, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP). 
41 Among the anti-communist themes, there were communist ideological contradictions, forced labor 
camps, absence of freedom, and the lack of consumer goods. Among the American virtues, the USIA 
publicized the U.S. economic and technical assistance programs, scientiﬁc and technological advances, 
and the free trade unions. The USIA “sold” the American dream abroad through cultural propaganda, 
celebrated the democratic values and practices, and advocated consumer capitalism. In this, the Voice was 
one of the prime weapons of inﬂuence. See as examples, Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: 
U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010) and Greg 
Barnhisel and Catherine Turner, eds., Pressing the Fight: Print, Propaganda, and the Cold War 
(University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). 
42 Nicholas J. Cull, The Decline and Fall of the United States Information Agency: American Public 
Diplomacy, 1989-2001 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
43  Richard Nelson and Foad Izadi, “Ethics and Social Issues in Public Diplomacy,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Public Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor (Routledge, 2008), 336. 
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communist, for questioning. But the real target was the IIA directive on the use of books 
by “controversial authors” in the overseas libraries, which stated that “the content of the 
book, regardless of authorship, should be the criterion which determines its availability 
for inclusion in USIS libraries.”44 The IIA tried to placate McCarthy by replacing the 
directive with the one that banned any material by “controversial persons, Communists, 
[and] fellow travelers.” This latter created confusion for the ICS personnel and 
librarians abroad. On April 4 1953, McCarthy’s assistants Roy Cohn and David Schine 
flew to Paris for a ten-day tour of the European U.S. information centers. They 
inspected Bonn, Frankfurt, Munich, Vienna, Belgrade, Athens, Rome, and London.45 
Between February 19 and July 8, the State Department issued as many as ten separate 
confidential directives concerning materials in overseas libraries.46 By June 23, 319 
titles (38 anthologies and 281 individual titles by 144 authors) were removed from one 
or more of the U.S. Information Centers overseas. 47  The charges of book burning 
inevitably resulted in a loss of prestige and credibility that surrounded the USIA’s 
inception.48 Indeed, the McCarthy era has been righteously considered one of the most 
inflammatory and controversial periods in 20th Century American history that had a 
large worldwide echo. 49  Interestingly, the Yugoslav authorities and newspaper 
editorials, were rather uninterested in McCarthyism, hence maintaining a “strategic 
                                                 
44 Airgram 218 from Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Feb. 3, 
1953, 511.00/2-353, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
45 For an in-depth view on the IIA McCarthy investigations, see Cull, The Cold War and the United States 
Information Agency, 82–94; Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 56–57; Frances Stonor Saunders, The 
Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: The New Press, 2001), 190–
196; Hart, Empire of Ideas, 178–197; and Craig Campbell and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War, 
Reprint ed. (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 122–138, 363–365. 
46 Louise S. Robbins, “The Overseas Libraries Controversy and the Freedom to Read: U.S. Librarians and 
Publishers Confront Joseph McCarthy,” Libraries & Culture 36, no. 1 (2001): 28–29. 
47 Memorandum Prepared in the United States International Information Agency, June 30, 1953, FRUS, 
1952-1954, II, 2, doc. 336. 
48 Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, 3–6. 
49  The scholarly debate over the McCarthyism era is extensive. For some noteworthy analyses are 
recommended: David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and 
Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Albert Fried, McCarthyism, The Great American Red 
Scare: A Documentary History, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Richard M. Fried, 
Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991); 
David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal 
Government, (Chicago, Illinois: University Of Chicago Press, 2006); David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy 
So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Ellen 
Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1998). 
For a provocative perspective, see Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold 
War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003).  
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silence,” and gave “impressively brief, lacking in detail” accounts on it, at least until 
May 1952. The American officers in Belgrade were convinced that the Yugoslav press 
received instructions “that nothing openly derogatory shall be published.”50 Certainly, 
because of the intense Yugoslav-American negotiations over economic aid to 
Yugoslavia between 1949 and 1952, the anti-American narratives about the McCarthy 
“witch hunt” did not last long, from mid-1952 to the end of 1953, thus proving the very 
pragmatic stance of Yugoslav leaders.51 
The USIA history, as the history of the CIA’s psychological covert warfare, relied 
on private cooperation that involved the use of American nongovernmental 
organizations, businesses, and ordinary citizens in the publicity campaign to cultivate a 
positive image of the United States. Many private American citizens wrote to the State 
Department asking to be voluntarily involved in anti-communist campaigns, 52  or 
proposed covert operations like flying kites and balloons to be launched beyond the Iron 
Curtain.53 In addition to the USIA’s mostly overt public diplomacy programs, the CIA 
attempted to target the public of the USSR and its satellites through the Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty. As Frances Saunders showed, a number of foundations were 
claimed to be the source of these broadcastings to cover the CIA involvement. 
Moreover, the Intelligence Agency sponsored numerous covert public diplomacy 
initiatives, including subsidizing non-communist labor unions, journalists, political 
parties, politicians, and student groups. 54  However, since the psychological warfare 
                                                 
50 USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP. 
51  More crucially, the Yugoslav press’ accusations defined McCarthyism as “anti-liberalism,” hence 
implicitly assuming liberalism as a positive value, contradictorily to what was a common communist 
narrative, which associated liberalism with “bourgeois” capitalism (Carla Konta, “Antiamericanismo e 
titoismo. Gli anni Cinquanta e la «zona grigia jugoslava»,” Contemporanea XVI, no. 1 (2013): 76–78). 
52  Millard E. Tydings, Chairman of U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Service, to Jack K. McFall, 
Assistant Secretary of State, Nov. 1, 1950, 511.00/11-150, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
53 Ferdinand Kaufman, New Orleans, to Senator Allen J. Ellender, Nov. 13, 1950, 511.00/11-1650, Box 
2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
54 In Western Europe, for instance, it was the Congress for Cultural Freedom. The scholarship on the CIA 
involvement in the cultural Cold War in Europe through private, sometimes a-political actors is in 
expansion. Amongst others, see Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War; Luc van Dongen, 
Stéphanie Roulin, and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., Transnational Anti-Communism and the Cold War: 
Agents, Activities, and Networks (Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Giles Scott-Smith, 
The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Political Economy of 
American Hegemony 1945-1955 (London ; New York: Routledge, 2001); Helen Laville and Hugh 
Wilford, eds., The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State-Private Network 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2006); Giles Scott-Smith, Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc 
 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
16  Carla Konta - April 2016 
activities were substantially destined to the Soviet Union and its satellites, not to 
Yugoslavia, they shall not be addressed in this study. 
1.2 Soft Power and Public/Cultural Diplomacy 
 
One of the reasons reciprocation can be used so effectively as a device for 
gaining another’s compliance is its power. The rule possesses awesome 
strength, often producing a “yes” response to a request that, except for an 
existing feeling of indebtedness, would have surely been refused. 
Robert B. Cialdini55 
 
From the early 1990s, historians Akira Iriye and Frank Ninkovich pioneered the 
rise of a cultural analysis within the fields of diplomatic history. Iriye defined culture in 
the study of international relations “as the sharing and transmitting of consciousness 
within and across national boundaries, and the cultural approach as a perspective that 
pays particular attention to this phenomenon.” 56  In over 25 years, historians have 
investigated various aspects of culture in the Cold War, and its transatlantic relations,57 
networks,58 intercultural exchanges,59 intellectuals,60 its entrenchment in international 
                                                                                                                                               
Network: Cold War Internationale (Basingstoke ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); and Scott 
Lucas, Freedom’s War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union (New York: New York 
University Press, 1999). 
55 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence. The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 34–35. 
56  Akira Iriye, “Culture and International History,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign 
Relations, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael Hogan (1: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 215; see also 
Akira Iriye, “Culture,” Journal of American History 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 99–107; Frank A. Ninkovich, 
The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 (Cambridge Eng. ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Shame on U.S.? Academics, 
Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War: A Critical Review,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 3 (July 1, 2000): 
465–94, doi:10.1111/0145-2096.00227. For recent discussion, look into Frank Costigliola and Michael 
Hogan, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (2: Cambridge University Press, 
2016); Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, eds., Culture and International History (New 
York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004). 
57 Hans Krabbendam and Giles Scott-Smith, eds., The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe, 1945-60 
(London: Routledge, 2004); Peter Romijn, Giles Scott-Smith, and Joes Segal, eds., Divided 
Dreamworlds?: The Cultural Cold War in East and West (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 
2012). 
58 Walter L. Hixon, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997). 
59 Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, And Transformed American Culture 
Since World War II, Reprint ed. (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998). 
60 Hilton Kramer, The Twilight of the Intellectuals: Culture and Politics in the Era of the Cold War 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000); Volker R. Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: 
Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
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relations, economy and culture,61 and between music and art,62 while many studies have 
approached it as a national framework.63 
Crucially, the USIA utilized culture for gaining public abroad in three main ways: 
people’s way of life (customs, values, ideals), elite artistic expression (literature, fine 
arts, performing arts), and popular culture (the products of the commercial 
entertainment industry).64 In this study, we endorse Nicholas J. Cull’s definition of 
public diplomacy as “an international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign policy by 
engaging with foreign public” through five core components: listening, advocacy, 
cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting.” 65  While 
scholars have usually interchanged the terms public and cultural diplomacy as 
synonyms, especially in the case of private or state-private actors, here we shall use 
cultural diplomacy as a sub-category of the U.S. public diplomacy efforts.66 When, on 
the other hand, cultural diplomacy becomes a broad term that includes its “public” 
function, three “schools of thought” emerge, as Jessica Gienow-Hecht synthesizes. The 
first contemplates “the use of culture as ‘an instrument of state policy’ with limited 
                                                 
61  Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 
1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) and Victoria de Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s 
Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2006). 
62 Penny Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Clare H. Croft, Dancers as Diplomats: American Choreography 
in Cultural Exchange, (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), Kindle edition. 
63 Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (Berkeley; Los Angeles; 
London: University of California Press, 1993); Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold 
War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria After the Second World War (University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000); Charles A. Hobbie, The Time of the Monkey, Rooster, and Dog: A Peace 
Corps Volunteer’s Years in Korea (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2011); Francisco Javier Rodriguez Jimenez, 
Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, and Nicholas J. Cull, eds., US Public Diplomacy and 
Democratization in Spain: Selling Democracy? (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Simona 
Tobia, Advertising America. The United States Information Service in Italy (1945-1956) (Milano: LED 
Edizioni Universitarie, 2009). 
64 Martha Bayles, Through a Screen Darkly: Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America’s Image 
Abroad (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2014), 5. 
65 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, xv. More traditionally, Hans Tuch 
defines public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communication with foreign public in an attempt 
to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and its culture, as well as its 
national goal and current policies” (Hans Tuch, Communicating with the World: U. S. Public Diplomacy 
Overseas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 3. 
66 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 489–492. For example, Patricia M. Goff 
defines cultural diplomacy as the action of “bridging differences and facilitating mutual understanding” in 
a way “that differs from what official policy would imply” (Patricia M. Goff, “Cultural Diplomacy,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, ed. Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 421). 
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private participation.” The second comprehends “the use of cultural diplomacy as an 
instrument to work at the exclusion of politics.” Finally, a third school defines cultural 
diplomacy as being beyond the realm of the state, where non-state actors attempt to 
accomplish a change in foreign relations in the name of a nation or people they claim to 
represent.”67 Interested in the state actors with minor private participation, this research 
follows the first definition of cultural diplomacy. 
Finally, the research covers historiographical lacunas in two ways: primarily as a 
case study of the political role of culture, neglected today in the U.S.-Yugoslav foreign 
and bilateral relations;68 secondly, as a statement on fluid relations between information 
and propaganda and unintended effects propaganda can produce beyond the control of 
both producers and receivers. 69  This study rejects the presumption that the U.S. 
propaganda in Yugoslavia was an avowal of cultural imperialism, as Tomlinson and 
others have argued, 70 somehow underestimating the capacity of negotiation and refusal 
as well as of reciprocal cultural ‘creolization’. 71  Neither is the question of 
‘Americanization’ as a concept addressed, which prevents us from grasping the multi-
polarity of cultural and political relations between the United States and Yugoslavia.72 
                                                 
67 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “What Are We Searching for? Culture, Diplomacy, Agents, and the 
State,” in Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, 
(New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), Kindle edition. 
68 Besides the already discussed Jakovina works, other authors have inquired the Yugoslav-U.S. relations 
under the frame either of economic relations (Lampe, Prickett, and Adamović, Yugoslav-American 
Economic Relations Since World War II; Bogetić, “Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971”); of Cold 
War strategy (Lees’s, Keeping Tito Afloat) or traditional diplomatic relations (Nick Ceh, U.S. Diplomatic 
Records on Relations with Yugoslavia during the Early Cold War (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), Dragan Bogetić in Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971. (Beograd: Institut za 
savremenu istoriju, 2012), Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi u vreme bipolarnog detanta 
1972-1975 (Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike - Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2015) and Darko Bekić, 
Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu. Odnosi s velikim silama 1949-1955 (Zagreb: Globus, 1988)). 
69 Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 5–11. 
70 John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction (A&C Black, 2001). See also, Christian 
G. Appy, Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945-1966 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000). 
71 Mel van Elteren, “Rethinking Americanization Abroad: Toward a Critical Alternative to Prevailing 
Paradigms,” The Journal of American Culture 29, no. 3 (September 2006): 345–67. 
72 Volker R. Berghahn, “The Debate on ‘Americanization’ among Economic and Cultural Historians,” 
Cold War History 10, no. 1 (February 2010): 107–30. 
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Here, we agree with Nye’s argumentation that soft power is cultural power, 73 
however, by throwing in Hayden’s assertion that soft power is “a translation of 
Gramsci’s hegemony thesis [as] a relatively value-neutral concept for policymakers.”74 
Indeed, while Neil Ferguson declined soft power as not being really a ‘power’ as it was 
“too soft”,75 Janice Bially Mattern explained that attraction, as a socio-linguistically 
constructed “representational force,” makes soft power a continuation of hard power, 
only by different means.76 In fact, as Samuel Huntington has emphasized,  
Soft power is power only when it rests on a foundation of hard power. Increases in hard 
economic and military power produce enhanced self-confidence, arrogance, and belief in the 
superiority of one’s own culture or soft power compared to those of other peoples and greatly 
increase its attractiveness to other peoples. Decreases in economic and military power lead to 
self-doubt, crises of identity, and efforts to find in other cultures the keys to economic, military, 
and political success. As non-Western societies enhance their economic, military, and political 
capacity, they increasingly trumpet the virtues of their own values, institutions, and culture.77 
                                                 
73 Nye, Soft Power, 29–30. In this sense, Changhe explains, “Soft power is a useful component of foreign 
policy. It can be used in all areas and different levels in diplomacy. The state can achieve its goals by 
resorting to coercive or co-optive means; however, the coercive use of power by government has not been 
encouraged and has even been restrained greatly, whether at the level of domestic political culture or at 
the level of international norms and rules. This prompts governments to use soft power to achieve what 
they want” (Su Changhe, “Soft Power,” in The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies, ed. Jonathan 
Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 553. 
74 Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Lanham, Md.: 
Lexington Books, 2011), 27–76. For more discussions, look into Philip Seib, Toward a New Public 
Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) and Jan Melissen, 
The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005). 
75 Niall Ferguson, “Think Again Power,” Foreign Policy, February 2003. 
76 Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic 
Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 33, no. 3 
(June 2005): 583–612, doi:10.1177/03058298050330031601. Nye partially solved critics by introducing 
the concept of smart power, the combination of hard power and soft power strategies (Nye, The Future of 
Soft Power, 16–17). 
77 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 141. And continues, “Communist ideology appealed to people 
throughout the world in the 1950s and 1960s when it was associated with the economic success and 
military force of the Soviet Union. That appeal evaporated when the Soviet economy stagnated and was 
unable to maintain Soviet military strength. Western values and institutions have appealed to people from 
other cultures because they were seen as the source of Western power and wealth. […] Similarly, when 
non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, they invoked Western values of self-
determination, liberalism, democracy, and independence to justify their opposition to Western 
domination. Now that they are no longer weak but increasingly powerful, they do not hesitate to attack 
those same values which they previously used to promote their interests. The revolt against the West was 
originally legitimated by asserting the universality of Western values; it is now legitimated by asserting 
the superiority of non-Western values” (141–142). 
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1.3 On Sources, Methodology and the Case Studies 
This study is based on the comparison of several international archival sources: the 
records of the State Department and the USIA (National Archives of the United States, 
College Park, MD); of the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and the 
Bureau of Cultural and Education Affairs (University of Arkansas Libraries and 
Roosevelt Study Center Microfilm Collection, The Netherlands); of the Central 
Committee and the Presidency of the Yugoslav League of Communists, the Federal 
Executive Council, the Socialist League of Working People of Yugoslavia, the 
Commission for Educational Exchange between the SFRJ and the United States,78 the 
Federal Secretariat for Education and Culture, the Yugoslav Council of Academies for 
Science and Art, the Council for Science and Culture of the Federal People’s Republic 
of Yugoslavia, and the Federal Council for Education and Culture 1960-1971 (Archives 
of Yugoslavia, Belgrade); of the Cabinet of the President (Archives of Josip Broz Tito, 
Belgrade); of the Belgrade City Assembly Secretariat for Culture and the City 
Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (Historical Archives of Belgrade); 
of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, the Presidency of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Parliament 
Republican Council and Executive Council, the Socialist League of Working People of 
Croatia, the Secretariat for Science, Education and Culture, 79  the Commission for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the Council for Foreign Relations of the 
Executive Council of the Parliament (Croatian State Archives, Zagreb).80 Interviews, 
collected both orally and by e-mail, testimonies from former officials placed in 
Belgrade, and newspapers and periodicals, are used to evince the wider possible 
perspective on the U.S. public diplomacy encounters with Yugoslav public and elites. 
                                                 
78 Otherwise known as the Bi-national Fulbright Commission for Yugoslavia. 
79 This government department had several different names in the period covered by this study. It was the 
Ministry for Science and Culture (1950-1951), the Council for Education, Science and Culture (1951-
1956), the Council for Culture and Science (1956-1961), the Council for Education (1961-1963), the 
Republican Secretariat for Culture (1963-1965), and, finally, the Republican Secretariat for Education, 
Culture and Physical Culture (1965-1979). 
80 The archival documentation relating to the Socialist Republic of Serbia was not taken into account 
mainly for two empirical reasons: firstly because the American public and cultural diplomacy in 
Yugoslavia was an issue of federal interference; and, secondly, because in the case of Belgrade the 
competence over these policies relied on city secretariats and party organizations. 
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Yugoslavia comprised of six socialist republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces 
(Vojvodina and Kosovo) with Belgrade as the Federation’s capital. The USIS post in 
Belgrade and Zagreb are symptomatic case studies that help comprehend how decision-
making power circulated through the Yugoslav governmental institutions, in top-to-
bottom directions. With its executive well-built apparatus, its economic attractiveness 
on the South-East European region, Belgrade and Zagreb held, with Ljubljana, the best 
universities and research centers. Between 1950 and 1972 (the chronological range of 
this study), the cities grew into the USIA’s major operational centers covering, 
respectively, the north-west and the southeast of the country. As ‘epicenters’ of public 
and cultural diplomacy, they irradiated and permeated, as a sort of territorial-based 
network, other republics and their main cities. 
While being rather traditional, the timeline borders of this research prove functional 
to the context we are trying to understand. In 1950, the United States and Yugoslavia 
established a new foreign relation ‘conduit’ and ‘bilateral orbit.’ Here, the 1950s are 
seen as the ‘long decade,’ spanning from the end of World War II to the affirmation of 
Johnson’s détente policy.81 1972, the closing year, symbolically points to the USIA 
conservative shift with Nixon at the White House, the opening of three new American 
Libraries in Ljubljana (1970), Skopje (1972) and Sarajevo (1973), and the Yugoslav 
increase of dissidence movements as the Croatian Spring (1971) and the Serbian 
Liberals (1972). 
In this study, the USIS syntax referred to as the American library, reading room, 
information center, and/or cultural center, lexis that are used as synonyms, either by the 
USIA, the Yugoslav policymakers, and the interviewees. Because they contemplated the 
U.S. economic and technological assistance to Yugoslavia, the following exchange 
programs are excluded from this research: the UN exchange programs (such as the 
UNESCO scholarships), the Yugoslav government-funded industrial and technical 
grants, and the Mutual Security Agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, the 
                                                 
81 For the application of the “long 1950s,” see Andrea Carosso, Cold War Narratives: American Culture 
in the 1950s (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 11-12; Robert H. Bremner and Gary Reichard, Reshaping 
America: Society and Institutions, 1945-1960 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1982), and 
Stephan Kieninger, Dynamic Détente: The United States and Europe, 1964–1975 (Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2016). 
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Agency for International Development, the International Cooperation Agency, and the 
Public Law programs.82 
 
On 31 January 1946, a Constitution proclaimed the Federative Peoples’ Republic of 
Yugoslavia, embodying six constituent republics and five constituent peoples (Serbs, 
Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins and Macedonians). The Five Year Plan, adopted on 28 
April 1947 (the Marshall Aid was rejected in June), set grandiose targets for growth. A 
wholesale nationalization of the economy occurred by the end of 1946, including the 
seizing of all foreign assets. Industrial production was scheduled for five and agriculture 
for a 150 percent increase, while 200 major investment projects were planned.83  
The Cominform blockade of credits and help changed the cards on the table. The 
Yugoslav famine crisis turned out to be very serious, and on November 10 1950, the 
State Department announced the U.S. food relief to Yugoslavia. Before asking Congress 
for an official grant-aid program, the Department decided to employ the EXIM Bank, 
the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Defense Aid funds to send an initial $30 million for 
food purchase. The U.S. policymakers accentuated the humanitarian aspects and 
covered up the self-evident strategic importance of an independent Yugoslavia.84 On 
May 23 1951, the Policy Advisory Staff of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs underlined how crucial it was to publicly dismantle every suspect of U.S. 
support for Tito’s regime or pressure on Tito for military alliances.85 
In mid-1950, the State Department commissioned the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT) to create a special project on how American information could get 
through the Iron Curtain and reach Russian people. The Project TROY, named after the 
legendary wooden horse operation to the Greek city of Troy, brought together 21 
                                                 
82 Even if having a confident and positive impact for bilateral relations, their impact on Yugoslav public 
opinion and leaders was limited because they mostly involved industrial specialists, construction or 
chemical engineers, physicians, managers of manufacturing plants, planners, inventors, and agricultural 
technicians. 
83 L. Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, 2nd ed. (Hound mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 89–91. 
84 Telegram 2896 from the Department of State to certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
Nov. 9, 1950, 511.00/11-950, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
85 Special Guidance 91 for the Mutual Security Program, May 23, 1951, enclosed in memorandum from 
Block to several Department of State offices, Oct. 24, 1951, Box 2243, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP: 
7. 
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scholars from MIT and Harvard, who gathered for the first time in October 1950.86 
Submitted on February 1 1951, the final report “urged for unification of political 
warfare” at “our national power, political, economic,” and military level.87 The section 
dedicated to Tito’s Yugoslavia is of foremost interest. The report appreciated Tito’s 
regime because it had the most success, economically, politically and socially, of all the 
Soviet-dominated satellites. The value of Tito’s Yugoslavia was multifold. Firstly, Tito 
could not become an “American puppet,” but the Americans welcoming him in the 
Western camp of international affairs without obligation to change his ideology, was of 
foremost relevance for the U.S. general strategy. Secondly, there were “some 
indications that the Tito regime may slowly be growing less doctrinaire,” as for the 
decentralization of industry, the abolition of special privileges for Party members, and 
admission of foreigners into the country, “all point to a general liberalization.”88 While 
partly inaccurate, and partly overestimating the chance for the regime’s prompt 
liberalization, the Project TROY stated a core point of the U.S. strategy towards 
Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s, namely that Yugoslavia should be given “every 
possible support in developing an economic and political life independent of Russia.”89 
On these premises, the U.S. public diplomacy entered the Cultural Cold War in 
Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia. 
                                                 
86 Hixon, Parting the Curtain, 16–17. 
87 Project TROY Report to the Secretary of State, vol. I, Feb. 1, 1951, 511.00/2-151, CDF 1950-1954, 
NACP: 1. 
88 Ibid, 58. 
89 Ibid, 61. 
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2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
THE USIA-USIS NETWORK 
The primary purpose of the United States Information Agency […] shall be to 
persuade foreign peoples that it lies in their own interest to take actions which 
are also consistent with the national objectives of the United States. The goal 
should be to harmonize wherever possible the personal and national self-
interest of foreigners with the national objectives of the United States. This 
will require that the United States find out what other peoples want, relate 
their wants to those of this country, and explain these common goals in ways 
that will cause others to join with the United States in their achievement. 
Proposed National Security Council Directive to the USIA, 
Washington, July 15, 195390 
 
The Yugoslavs need the technical knowledge which the West has. 
Moreover, they could not entirely prohibit our activities in this country without 
forfeiting their claim to independence of both East and West. Consequently, 
there has been certain relenting in their resistance to the spread of information 
about the United States in Yugoslavia. Their own need for us, however 
grudgingly admitted, opens a narrow but indispensable door in the wall of 
ideological hostility – and through this door ideas can pass. 
Letter from Inspector Lawrence S. Morris to USIA Director George V. Allen,  
Belgrade, November 20, 195991 
 
The history of U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia is a Cold War history. The 
history of the USIA-USIS network in Yugoslavia is framed between the Yugoslav post-
                                                 
90 Walter A. Radius and Howland H. Sargeant to Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 
July 15, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, II, 2, doc. 343. 
91 Morris to Allen, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 1954-1962, USIA 
Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP. 
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1948 Cold War positioning, its neutralist policy towards the Soviet Union and its non-
alignment developed from the late 1950s on. The USIA mission in Yugoslavia echoes 
Yugoslav relentment in their resistance to the United States and foreign cultural 
influence. Finally, USIS missions in Belgrade and Zagreb reflect Washington’s 
policymaking on what Cull defined as the “listening,” the “advocacy,” the “international 
broadcasting,” the “cultural diplomacy” and the “exchange diplomacy” factor of the 
USIA.92 
It is impossible to understand USIA’s Cold War mission without understanding its 
ideological boundaries. As historian David C. Engerman argues, 
With no hopes of transforming the antagonists themselves, the American– Soviet conﬂict 
became a bipolar one in which the poles themselves were off limits. […] Thus the story of the 
Cold War was the story of boundaries, establishing the outer limits of each sphere of inﬂuence 
and competing for those who had not yet pitched their tents in one camp or the other. […] The 
conﬂict was ideological precisely because the two sides measured their own positions in terms 
of their ability to replicate their social systems around the world. Yet, at the same time, the 
superpowers pursued ideological aims in the broadest possible terms […] and thus to give a 
great deal of leeway to allies who did not ﬁt their ideological precepts. Soviet leaders worked 
with “bourgeois” or military regimes in the name of furthering Communism and world peace, 
while American leaders supported dictators and cartels in the name of democracy and free trade. 
[…] The Cold War was fought on neutral ground or, more precisely, to make neutral ground 
less so.93 
The effort of making neutral ground less so and supporting dictators in the name of 
anti-communism coincided with the U.S. early Cold War policy in Latin America (by 
the support of Venezuela, Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay, Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic dictatorships), in Franco’s Spain and in the Titoist/communist dictatorship of 
Yugoslavia. 
President Truman is mostly recalled by Cold War historians as the initiator of the 
containment strategy towards the Soviet Union. This doctrine, conceived by U.S. master 
diplomat George Kennan, alleged that “the main element of any United States policy 
                                                 
92 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and 
Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xiv–xv. 
93 David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962,” in The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Reprint edition, vol. 1, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 33. For an excellent overview on the ideological 
struggle between the two superpowers and its meaning for geopolitical, technological, national 
reconstruction and decolonization in Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, look into 
Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter, eds., Origins of the Cold War: An International History, 2 
edition (New York: Routledge, 2005). 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
26  Carla Konta - April 2016 
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient, but firm and vigilant, 
containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”94 After Kennan’s “long telegram” from 
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in February 1946 and Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain” 
speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March, Truman and his advisers embraced the 
containment doctrine to suppress Soviet expansionist policies in Germany, Italy, 
Turkey, the Eastern Mediterranean and Asia.95 
The continuation of the American warfare propaganda by the Truman 
administration, as during World War II, was closely linked to the embracing of 
containment.96 On 31 August 1945, President Truman signed the Executive Order 9608, 
wrapping up the Office of War Information (OWI) and transforming it first into the 
Interim International Information Service (IIIS), and then into the Office of 
International Cultural Affairs (OIC) with a separate International Press and Publication 
Division. In late August 1945, the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, persuaded his 
friend William B. Benton, an expert from the world of advertising, to accept the post of 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations.97 Truman retained the 
wartime information apparatus as a resource for postwar U.S. foreign policy and 
decided to use American power to forge an international environment conducive to the 
                                                 
94 Diane P. Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade. American Foreign Relations During the 
1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 1. 
95 Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952,” in The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Reprint edition, vol. 1, 3 vols. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 72. There is huge scholarly production on the 
containment strategy, on its successful and less efficacious outcomes. Hixson, for example, claims that 
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“rested in too great a degree of fear of communism and an exaggerated perception of the potential for the 
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intentions, and virtual abandonment of negotiations” (Walter L. Hixson, George F. Kennan: Cold War 
Iconoclast (Columbia University Press, 1989), 308, xi). Contrariwise, Gaddis’s updated version of 
Strategies of Containment elucidates how Reagan used an asymmetrical containment strategy (that meant 
avoiding the costs, risks and frustrations of competing on terms set by the Soviet Union) to enlist Soviet 
leader Gorbachov in the task of altering his own regime (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, (New York: Oxford 
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American way of life. “The new president believed that the United States was God’s 
country, the city on a hill, the exemplar of a superior civilization based on personal 
freedom, private property, entrepreneurial opportunity, and limited government.”98 
In early 1947, the Truman administration began preparations for a prolonged 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, and the White House soon introduced a National 
Security Bill to establish a Central Intelligence Agency, a National Security Resources 
Board, a Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a single Defense Department. Above all, the newly 
created National Security Council (NSC) would become the key senior figure in foreign 
and defense policy to coordinate the U.S. foreign relations approach.99 
Under the Assistant Secretary George V. Allen, the work of the OIC developed into 
the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange (OIE). Then, from 
1950 to 1951, Truman led the way to a major overseas propaganda drive that he called 
“the Campaign of Truth.” The Campaign was launched on April 20, 1950 (within just 
two to three weeks of reading NSC 68), in a speech in front of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in which he asked for an unprecedented expansion of the Voice of 
America. As he explained to the Society, the Cold War “is a struggle, above all else, for 
the minds of men,” and went on arguing that the propaganda used by the “forces of 
imperialistic communism” could be overcome by the “plain, simple, unvarnished truth.” 
On the home front, he urged the press to enlist in the campaign by informing the 
American people “well and completely.”100 For Edward W. Barret, the author of the 
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campaign, the Campaign of Truth would be a “worldwide war of ideas” fought as a 
“dirty street-corner battle” countering the “Big Lie with the truth.”101 
William Benton, in 1950 already the former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, 
sponsored a Senate resolution for “a Marshall Plan in the field of ideas,” in recognition 
“that the central issue of our time is intellectual and spiritual, and that the heart of the 
present conflict is a struggle for the minds and loyalties of mankind.” After the Korean 
War began, Truman submitted an appropriation request in July for $89 million to 
implement the campaign; after the House of Representatives reduced the amount by 
over $20 million, he pressed in August for his original allocation.102 
Edward W. Barrett was appointed after Benton as the Assistant Secretary of State 
for Public Affairs, directing what was then called the United States International 
Information and Educational Exchange Program (USIE). The final year of the Truman 
administration saw a belated effort to respond to the mounting pressure to remove U.S. 
information from the Department of State, therefore the President tried the semi-
autonomous U.S. International Information Administration (IIA or USIIA). 103  The 
move toward the creation of an independent agency to handle U.S. information 
programs was supported by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, created to 
recommend changes in information and educational exchange programs. The new 
agency was patterned along lines recommended by President Eisenhower’s Committee 
on International Information Activities (the Jackson Committee) and the U.S. Senate’s 
Special Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs (the Hickenlooper 
Committee), which investigated whether the IIA program should remain within the 
Department of State.104 John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower’s Secretary of State 
from 1953 to 1959, strongly advocated an independent information agency and 
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“engaged in ceaseless talk about the American duty to protect the “free world” from 
communism.”105 
The Jackson Committee provided important recommendations for the new agency: 
to adapt all broadcasting and information activities to the needs of each target country; 
to avoid self-praise and emphasis on material achievements by the United States; and to 
use non-attribution tactics.106 The United States Information Agency came into being on 
August 1 1953, with Ted Streibert as its first director, a former assistant dean of 
Harvard Business School and a successful broadcasting executive who kept the USIA 
linked to the White House and the NSC.107 
On July 10 1953, the Operation Coordinating Board of the National Security 
Council,108 approved the Doctrinal Program of the USIA. It proclaimed the intention to 
break down the worldwide intellectual basis of international communism represented in 
Marxists, socialists, academics, students and scientists. The main operational aim of the 
document was to find a way to translate American moral, spiritual and philosophical 
beliefs on liberty into terms “which are both attractive and acceptable to intellectuals.” 
What means of political, economic and social knowledge could “foster worldwide 
understanding and acceptance of traditions and viewpoints of the United States?” The 
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OCB policymakers proposed books and periodicals as “the most effective means of 
influencing the attitudes of persons who are themselves critically occupied in an 
exposition of social, political, philosophic and economic ideas.”109 In February 1955, 
the Board again stressed that the USIA ideological program was “directed toward the 
present and potential leaders of the intellectual and official life abroad and through them 
to the wider public who look to them for guidance.” The OCB’s report highlighted how 
the U.S. mission was to convince those uncommitted and communist-dominated people 
that their aspirations could be best achieved in a free society. 110 In Yugoslavia, this 
meant to emphasize the ideological aspect of the East-West struggle, the defense against 
Soviet aggression and the maintenance of independence from the Soviets. So that 
“every effort be made to present a sober and true picture of the U.S., to the end that the 
Yugoslavs shall respect and understand us, rather than with the objective of selling 
freedom to them, since the latter objective connotes the subversion of their system, with 
the likely risks to U.S. security interests.”111 
On September 11 1956, Eisenhower launched People-to-People at a large White 
House reception which coveted that “every U.S. citizen – man, woman and child – can 
do [something] to help make the truth of our peaceful goals.”112 Prominent leaders in 
the field of private endeavor gathered to discuss how individuals and private institutions 
– backed by USIA experience and guidance – could participate in the exchange 
programs with countries beyond the Iron Curtain. 113  The private network would 
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become, as Conger Reynolds, chief of Office of Private Cooperation, proposed, an 
extension of the successful USIA program of personal contacts.114  
In fact, psychological warfare, propaganda and public diplomacy efforts during the 
Cold War were not of the exclusive province of USIA or the CIA. As Kenneth Osgood 
demonstrated, dozens of agencies including the National Security Council, the White 
House, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of Defense, the 
Army, and the foreign economic assistance agencies (such as the Mutual Security 
Agency, the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Agency for International 
Development) participated in Cold War propaganda campaigns. In other cases, agencies 
mainly concerned with domestic policy like the Departments of Labor and Agriculture 
as well as private organizations, foundations, business, non-profit educational societies, 
and many ordinary Americans contributed to U.S. propaganda campaigns. 115  By 
working with both prominent and ordinary citizens, “civic organizations, women’s 
groups, labor organizations,” the psychological warfare planners hence blurred any 
distinction between domestic and international propaganda and highlighted still 
unexplored areas of American life in the 1950s.116 
This chapter will, however, deal with a narrower perspective of USIA’s program in 
Yugoslavia, outlined by the first years of the person-to-person contact policy of the 
USIS posts in Belgrade and Zagreb and by the post-1948 Yugoslav turnover. This 
framework will, notwithstanding, expand, politically and operationally, through the 
1950s and, moreover, the 1960s. Bolstered by the Press and Publication and the Motion 
Picture Services, the Office of Private Cooperation and the Office of Plans and 
Programs, all divisions inherited from the IIA, the USIE/USIA would conceive a long-
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range program attempted for the first time at the American Library in a post-bellum 
shattered city of Belgrade in March 1945. This is exactly where our story begins. 
2.1 Information, Persuasion and Cooptation  
“Information is power,” pointed out Joseph Nye, and the power of information 
relies on “getting others to want the outcomes you want”; it represents soft power 
because it “rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.”117 For the USIA 
policymakers, such soft power was to be carried out  
by explaining and interpreting […] to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the 
United States Government; by depicting imaginatively the correlation between U.S. 
policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world; by unmasking and 
countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the 
United States; by delineating […] life and culture of the people of the United States [to] 
facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United 
States.118 
 
For the U.S. Advisory Commission, these missions to foreign countries involved “a 
great deal of patriotic self-sacrifice for men and women who [were] highly-skilled and 
highly-paid professionals to leave their long-range posts and to come into governmental 
service under condition of uncertainty.”119 As if they were religious missioners, the 
American officials abroad were called on total commitment and national self-
identification. “You are the United States to hundreds, perhaps millions of people,” 
solicited “to line up enthusiastically with the United States in the perpetuation of 
freedom and peace,” and “to nullify and overcome Russian propaganda.”120 
The U.S. libraries abroad were the direct product of Washington’s public 
diplomacy. The first infant steps of the library program took place in 1942. The 
American Library Association (ALA) and OWI quietly placed open-access libraries in 
all the world’s major cities. “Undertaken without an expression of national will, with 
fragile support from a divided Congress, with little thought to long-term costs, and 
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again with a strong push from Rockefeller, the libraries were a unique American 
achievement.”121 In Yugoslavia and other developing world countries, USIS centers 
were “demonstration models and training-centers.” “Like the fresh new US embassies,” 
argued life-long USIA officer Richard Arndt, “libraries themselves showcased an aspect 
of U.S. democracy. Their content, access, user-friendly classification systems, 
furnishings, ample lighting, knowledgeable and cheerful staff, open shelves, alternative 
or critical viewpoints, and free lending, showed how a free citizenry gets its 
information.” Indeed, the USIS libraries made a strong political statement about 
America. Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, haunting USIS libraries in Nigeria as a youth, 
learned that books are “objects of terror to those who seek to suppress the truth.” On the 
other hand, Umberto Eco, like other young intellectuals all around the world, devoured 
every book in his USIS library in Milan, tasting free access to a wealth of books, 
including those critical of U.S. government.122 
From 1950 to 1951, the activities related to the USIS libraries, such as the users and 
registered borrowers, reference questions, and the circulation of materials, doubled, and, 
in case of the Near East region, even trebled. Europe accounted for about half of the 
total activities with the number of European users augmenting from 435 970 in July 
1950 to 1.4 million in December 1951.123 Despite the Streibert cuts of 1953, when, with 
a budget of only $86 million, he dismissed 2849 members of staff, of whom 763 were 
Americans, and cut the USIS posts from 255 in 85 countries to 217 in 76 countries, the 
worldwide numbers of USIS posts still surged.124 In 1951 there were 109, increasing to 
201 posts in 1954.125 Among the 86 countries where USIS operated in 1954, there were 
26 European countries with 57 running posts (Germany and Austria excluded).126 After 
1954, the numbers continued to rise: in 1957 there were 162 USIS posts in 63 countries 
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and 75 Binational centers in 25 countries (mainly in the Near and Far East, South Asia, 
Africa and Latin America), for a total of 237 posts in 88 countries.127  
Contrariwise to global trends, the USIA’s “investments” in Western Europe 
declined after the mid-1950s, especially after the 1956 Hungarian crises, when there 
were 47 centers left in 16 countries (6 percent of total), although library visitors 
represented some 39 percent of 28 million of worldwide visitors.128 This downturn was 
mainly due to the reinforcement of Eisenhower’s New Look defense strategy towards 
Third World actors, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the 
Baghdad Pact (later the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), and new security 
alliances with Pakistan and Taiwan. As a defense strategy, the New Look consisted in a 
series of assumptions about the indispensability of nuclear weapons as mostly reliable 
deterrents to Soviet expansion. It relied on the role of the Central Agency and its 
espionage, sabotage and covert operations. Eisenhower, Foster Dulles, and other top 
decision makers wanted gradually to substitute allied for U.S. manpower in such key 
areas as Western Europe. For the propaganda strategy, psychological warfare, and 
public diplomacy, it meant more investments in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 
and in worldwide tours and trade expositions in Asia, Africa and Latin America.129 
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2.1.1 Policy-Making between Washington and the Field 
The history of the USIA is a history between Washington’s headquarters and the 
field. Moreover, it is a history of the USIA interrelating with other U.S. government 
agencies, such as the CIA, the NSC, the Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
headquarters, and numerous private encounters. By now, there is no scholarly account 
backing the argument of USIA’s covert support of CIA’s operations, although there are 
some indicators of some kind of “operative” interaction between the two agencies. For 
example, Henry Loomis, one of Streibert’s closest cooperators, founder of the USIA’s 
Office of Research and Intelligence, was formerly staffed at the PSB and the CIA 
representative of the Jackson committee. Streibert’s line was, notwithstanding, that 
“under no circumstances was the agency to be used as cover for any CIA personnel, as 
exposure would destroy the USIA’s credibility.” Regardless, rumors that the USIS staff 
were actually CIA agents recurred, and according to Cull, such rumors were true in the 
case of Vietnam. Additionally, some “CIA agents were apparently integrated into the 
Joint United States Public Affairs Office apparatus with a USIA affiliation.”130 In 1956, 
Streibert asked and obtained that USIA deputy director, Abbott Washburn, “have 
cleared access to the special intelligence materials available through the [CIA] Office of 
Current Intelligence.”131 In the words of agency veteran Walter Roberts, the connections 
between USIA and the CIA were distant (“the CIA people were not always very open 
with us”), and later, in 1954/1955, Streibert found out about the “USIS payroll, who 
were basically employees of the Central Intelligence Agency,” he agreed with Allen 
Dulles, head of the Central Agency, that the “USIA would not, in the future, house CIA 
operatives.”132 Edward Murrow, USIA director from 1961 to 1963, took further steps to 
define the relationship between the USIA and the CIA. He required that USIA needed to 
                                                 
130 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 97–98, and 98, note 79. 
131  USIA Special Intelligence Clearances, March 5, 1956, CREST: 25-Year Program Archive, CIA 
Library (available online at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIARDP80B01676R0010002000
52 -4.pdf). 
132  Taplin, Mark. “Walter Roberts: Relations With State, CIA - ‘Most of the People in the 
Department...Were Happy to Get Rid of the Information Program.’” Global Publicks, February 1, 2015. 
http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/ 2015/02/walter-roberts-relations-with-state-cia.html. 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
36  Carla Konta - April 2016 
know what the CIA was doing, and “felt very strongly that if any USIA men were 
caught helping the CIA in any country, it would ruin the program.”133 
The debate on USIA-USIS relations as between headquarters and the field persisted 
during all of its history between the position arguing for decentralized authority to the 
field (and therefore field supremacy) and a more balanced view.134 For Richard A. 
Humphrey, acting ICS Chief in 1952, Washington had to expect “strong program 
initiatives, comprehensive recommendations, […] and decisive local action” from the 
field, while the field had to expect Washington decisions regarding the worldwide 
program, the determination of psychological objectives, the operating budget and the 
program priorities.135 Two arguments persisted for the selection of the target groups 
ranging between the mass audience approach (“a democratic information program must 
reach everyone”) and the leaders’ selective approach.136 
In the “war of ideas against [communist] totalitarianism,” claimed an USIA early 
report, the USIS overseas libraries were essentially “instruments of persuasion,” 
appealing to leadership and opinion-molding groups. The American library was 
simultaneously a place and an idea for an accustomed community that could attract 
those persons in position to influence others. In Yugoslavia, the occupational target 
categories “included editors seeking background information for articles, translators, 
public officials, teachers and officers of the uniformed services.”137 
From the 1960s on, the USIA established six area directors, “acting for the Director 
of the Agency” with the assistance of their small number of staff to “administer and 
direct the Agency’s worldwide overseas operations” that were responsible for the 
information programs in their respective areas, deciding on their content and method, 
and their effectiveness. Furthermore, the Media directors and services, with the 
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concurrence of the area directors, the Office of Policy and the Office of Administration, 
developed and supervised the broadcasting, press and publications, motion picture and 
television programs in support of Agency and country objectives.138 The USIA Country 
Plan (or Paper) was the operative document containing fundamental policy guidelines, 
shaped between the Agency, the State Department and field recommendations. It 
established the priority objectives, tasks, targets groups, favorable and unfavorable 
factors involved in country’s operations, and media communication channels.139 The 
Plan was supported by the Country Program, a “schedule of information and 
educational exchange activities, projects and products adopted as means of 
implementing the Country Plan.”140 
 Finally, highly engaged in the USIA policy programs, was the Loomis’s Office 
of Research and Intelligence that, as “the jewel of the new agency,” was founded in late 
1954. By providing detailed analysis of particular trends in world opinion and responses 
to major events, and “synthesizing the wisdom of agency staff in the field for further 
dissemination within the wider apparatus of U.S. foreign policy making,” the USIA 
research reports found their way to the White House desk.141 
The first use of the expression “United States Information Centers” ascends to 
1950, and from then it was used both for the American libraries and reading rooms, 
Amerika Hauser in Germany and Austria, the Bi-National Centers in Latin America 
(like Lincoln Library in Buenos Aires or Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City), in 
Africa and the Near East.142 The usage of both center and service to define the USIS 
nature, utilized as synonyms, indicates how USIA policy planners had a varied 
perception of what were the Agency’s tasks: a combination of service and center, a 
                                                 
138 Robert R. Elder, The Information Machine. The United States Information Agency and American 
Foreign Policy (Syracuse University Press, 1968), 178, note 1. 
139 Official USIE Country Papers, Jan. 19, 1951, 511.00/1-1951, Box 2239, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, 
NACP. 
140 Airgram 1188 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
Feb. 12, 1953, 511.00/2-1253, Box 2246, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
141 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 97; A Study of USIA Operating 
Assumptions, Institute of Communication Research, Inc., Dec. 1954. 
142 Foreign Service Serial 1100, Nov. 3, 1950, 511.00/11-350, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
In May 1952, the IIA Field Division (IFI) established that all foreign posts would be denoted as the 
United States Information Services that, in terms of office space and plant, would provide “library rooms, 
lecture hall, film theater, music rooms, exhibit space, conference room, storage space […] [and] working 
room” (William C. Johnstone to IFI officers, May 12, 1952, 511.00/5-1252, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP). 
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syncretic union of library program, amusement, education, information, and finally a 
weapon of Cold War persuasion.143 
2.1.2 The Country Plan for Yugoslavia 
 
Such economic assistance as we have given Yugoslavia […] in support [of] its 
resistance to Soviet Union and satellite pressure is [a] small price [to] pay for 
benefits already enjoyed and expected from Yugoslav independence of Kremlin 
dictation […]. This independence from west as well as east is, in my opinion, 
essential to our immediate purpose of promoting disharmony in ranks of world 
Communism and thus weakening [the] Kremlin’s aggressive power. We 
therefore should, I believe, guard against temptation, try to push [the] regime 
into [a] position which world Communists […] could interpret as 
compromising dependence on [the] west. 
George Allen, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, to the Secretary of State, 
Acheson, April 20, 1950144 
 
For Yugoslavia, that after the Tito-Stalin rupture proclaimed a neutralist stance, 
however ideologically tied with the Soviet Union, the U.S. efforts were directed towards 
“official circles in order to increase [Yugoslav] orientation toward the foreign policy 
objectives of the United States.” 145  According to Assistant Secretary Barrett, 
Yugoslavia, along with Japan, Germany, and Spain, was of special interest for the U.S. 
foreign agenda. In his words, USIS cultural mission in Belgrade was to develop 
awareness over a common ground of understanding with Yugoslavia, the advantages of 
participation in the “common defense of the free world,” and in the American-modeled 
economic welfare.146 
Issued for the triennium 1950-1952, the first USIE Country Plan for Yugoslavia 
stated that since the United States and its “democratic way of life” had many admirers 
among the Yugoslav people, the “VOA broadcasts, printed matter, films and pictorial 
material [of USIE] should reflect the fundamental long-range objective of U.S. policy 
toward Yugoslavia,” that was 
                                                 
143 Frederic O. Bundy, IFI/F, to John T. Reid, IFI/A, May 12, 1952, 511.00/5-1252, Box 2245, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
144 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State, April 20, 1950, FRUS, Vol. IV, 1950, 
doc. 799, 1404–1405. 
145 Foreign Service Circular 32, April 10, 1952, 511.00/4-1052, Box 2244, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, 
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the real emergence of that country as a democratic, independent member of the 
world community, cooperating with and adhering to the United Nations, and willing to 
contribute fully to the establishment of international peace and wellbeing. On the other 
hand, our immediate tactical objective, in the light of Tito’s defiance of Stalin and our 
view that Titoism should continue to exist as an erosive and disintegrating force within 
the Soviet power sphere, is to extract the maximum political and propaganda advantage 
from this quarrel within the Communist family. Thus we should strive to foster Tito’s 
independence of the USSR, strengthen his resistance to Soviet pressure, and provide an 
example to those dissatisfied elements in the Communist parties of the Cominform 
countries of what they too might enjoy if they embark on Tito’s course.147 
Still, discussions over the Country Plan’s guidelines aroused several idiosyncrasies. 
Supporting Titoism in short term range would not achieve democracy in the long term. 
In the view of Embassy’s representatives in Belgrade, “the present Yugoslav 
government would lose much of its appeal to international Communist elements if 
criticism of the capitalist West should disappear from the Yugoslav press,” while, by 
ceasing “our criticism of Tito’s totalitarian methods,” USIS would lose its credibility. 
The Embassy, together with the USIS posts, disagreed with IIA refusal of anti-Titoist 
rhetoric. For USIS, the criticism of Yugoslav totalitarian policies was much needed to 
“help keep alive democratic aspirations, and […] show the international communist 
movement that Yugoslavia has not became a puppet of the U.S.”148 
Notwithstanding, the IIA embraced a policy of neutralism against the failings of the 
Yugoslav regime in observing fundamental human rights, decisively “conveyed our 
[general] distaste for totalitarian practices,” and focused propaganda in “associating the 
United States [...] with [favorable] trends in Yugoslavia.” For the IIA policymakers, the 
communist regime in Yugoslavia had no serious political alternative (except for smaller 
groups of dissidents like peasants and former aristocracy), as its young middle class was 
mostly consensual to the regime. 149  Despite that, both Washington and the field 
conveyed that the American cultural mission was to “encourage the Yugoslav people’s 
democratic and independent aspirations,” and their desire for “freedoms and the 
                                                 
147 USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia enclosed in circular 2 from Belgrade to the Department of State, 
July 3, 1950, 511.68/7-350, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP (hereafter USIE Country Paper – 
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148 USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia, July 3, 1950. 
149 IIA Plan for Yugoslavia 1951-1952, Jan. 15, 1952 enclosed in Despatch 946 from Belgrade to the 
Department of State, April 9, 1952, 511.68/4-952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
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material advantages of Western forms of government and society.”150 That “an apparent 
dilemma exist[ed] in respect of the U.S. policy of supporting the Tito regime on one 
hand, with military and economic assistance,” and on the other by fostering, through 
IIA/USIA, the cultural contacts which could “result in more or less political disaffection 
and contribute towards weakening the loyalty of party members,” 151  continued to 
preoccupy the public diplomats in Washington through the decades to come. 
The IIA and USIS uncertainty reflects a wider asset of U.S.-Yugoslav relations 
during the Truman presidency. Because of Tito’s willingness to resist Stalin and slacken 
its posture towards the West, the United States (and its international aid agencies) 
assured economic aid, so much needed to withstand the pressure from the Cominform. 
Possible Soviet reprisal provided the United States and its allies the reasons for military 
assistance to Yugoslavia. But, as Lorraine Lees underscored, such an arrangement was 
full of tensions. In 1950 for instance, when Acheson informed the Yugoslav 
government that the recognition of Ho Chi Minh government of North Vietnam would 
provocatively disrupt the American public opinion and maybe lead to negate 
extraordinary aid, Tito lost his temper. “Yugoslavia had refused ‘to bow to the Soviets’ 
or to the West and would not ‘beg’ Washington for loans,” said the Marshall at a pre-
election speech in Titovo Užice.152 The U.S. ambassador George Allen grasped that the 
continuation of Yugoslav independence would remain an essential tenet of the wedge 
strategy, even if the Department’s policymakers could not foresee the role of Tito in a 
possible European war or Western defense system.153 
                                                 
150 USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia, July 3, 1950. 
151 IIA Plan for Yugoslavia 1951-1952, Jan. 15, 1952 enclosed in Despatch 946 from Belgrade to the 
Department of State, April 9, 1952, 511.68/4-952, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
152 M.S. Handler, “Tito Warns Against Pressure,” The New York Times, February 19, 1950; Lorraine M. 
Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War (University Park, 
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153 The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Secretary of State, April 20, 1950, FRUS, Vol. IV, 1950, 
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As a high-policy priority, the 1952 joint USIS-MSA154 Country Plan, focused on 
Yugoslav official acquiescence, even though “grudging and slow,” to American cultural 
penetration. As the Department of State recognized, the Yugoslav “openness” 
consequently followed the U.S. economic and military support, together with the 
famine-relief aid, to Yugoslavia. By playing the role of “ambassador[s] of good will,” 
the U.S. military items, textbooks, lectures, specialists, trainees, journals, or CARE 
boxes, proved American “genuine interests” in assisting Yugoslavia.155 
In order to sustain such openness, the Plan prioritized target groups such as the 
communist party activists, the youth, the non-communist officials, the rural population, 
the religious groups and Army officers, in addition to the industrial workers and 
educators.  
The USIS channels of “transmission” consisted in books, magazines, newspapers, 
exhibitions and movies, USIS materials for the Yugoslav press, contacts with U.S. non-
governmental organizations and the English teaching program. The Voice of America 
was appealing to a massive audience, whilst agricultural bulletins were specifically 
prepared for rural audiences.156 With 17 American officers and 41 local employees in 
Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad, the USIS libraries produced and distributed SAD157, the 
first Yugoslav variant of Soviet periodical Amerika and predecessor of Pregled 
[Horizons].158  
We shall observe, in the following paragraphs, how the USIS policies in Belgrade 
and Zagreb were shaped by the contours of Yugoslav-American foreign relations in the 
                                                 
154 The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) program merged within the USIS post in 1952 when it had one 
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1950s and by the Yugoslav internal ideological adjustments. Seen as long-term 
investments whose dividend would increase by time, the U.S. Ambassador Allen and 
his staff just could not believe what “tremendous interest and response of [the] 
Yugoslav population [was] in [USIS] activities.” In only three months, from April to 
June 1952, around 50,316 Yugoslavs entered the USIS Belgrade post, and this number 
would not stop growing.159 
 
2.2 The USIS Posts in Belgrade and Zagreb and the Soft Power 
Revenue 
 
That place was a vanguard home for the Belgrade’s intellectual circles. 
Petar Nikolić, former employee of USIS Belgrade160 
 
In a certain way, we went there as on a pilgrimage, the place was so important. 
Sonja Bašić, professor emeritus of Zagreb University161 
 
The eagerness of Yugoslav people to learn about America continues to 
astonish us here. Our information centers on [the] main streets of Belgrade, 
Zagreb and Novi Sad, with libraries, photo and exhibit rooms, American 
newspapers and magazines are very literally small windows through which 
Yugoslavs can and do, in ever increasing numbers, see America. […] Ample 
evidence that our VOA radio program is heard comes to us daily through 
letters from every nook and corner of the country. America is reaching directly 
into homes of Yugoslavs in villages and hamlets from Slovenia to Macedonia. 
[…] My experience in Belgrade has given me one impression above all others 
- we must fight armed aggression with armed might, we can only fight bad 
ideas with better ones. […] This is what USIE is trying to do and is doing with 
increasing success in Yugoslavia. 
Letter of Ambassador George V. Allen to the State Department,  
Belgrade, June 19, 1951
162 
 
George Allen substituted Bill Benton at the head of the information agency 
(OIC/OIE) in 1948 and held the post till 1949 when he departed to his ambassadorship 
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mission to Belgrade (remaining there until 1953). It was not a coincidence that 
Eisenhower sent him, in post-1948 Yugoslavia, to settle up the USIS mission and 
negotiate with the government the delicate process of supporting Yugoslav 
independence from the Soviets. Allen’s 1951 letter to the State Department testifies an 
extraordinary and unexpected success of USIS mission in Belgrade throughout the 
1950s. Staff numbers support this statement; in August 1951, only 10 persons were 
staffed at the American center in Belgrade of whom two Americans and eight 
Yugoslavs, while one was staffed at the Novi Sad library.163 After the USIA opened the 
new post in Zagreb in 1953, the numbers increased to 17 Americans and 41 local 
employees in 1953. 164  At the end of the decade, the Zagreb center alone had 11 
American officers, 28 local employees, six drivers and one courier.165  
As Cull discovered, the members of the USIS field staff were veterans of the IIA, 
ECA, and even OWl programs, most of them senior journalists. The field staff included 
a small number of African Americans (not in Yugoslavia), “whose presence did 
something to counteract America’s deserved reputation for bigotry.”166 
The United States Information Service of Belgrade was located in Čika Ljubina 
Street at n. 19167 in the central pedestrian zone, at the crossroad of the historical Knez 
Mihaila and Čika Ljubina. It was sited, not just by coincidence, in the eminent business 
and university district, in proximity of the Republican Square (Trg Republike), the 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Filozofski Fakultet) and the Serbian 
Academy of Sciences and Arts. Opened in March 1945, 168  before WWII officially 
ended, it continuously operated till 1998169 (except in 1946 during the political incident 
                                                 
163 Despatch 166 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 20, 1951, 511.68/8-2051, Box 2472, 
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following the breakdown of two U.S. C-47 planes while overflying Yugoslav territory 
near the Austrian borders). 170  The American Center in Zagreb was not lacking in 
elegancy and city-center adjustment compared to the one in Belgrade. Opened in May 
1953 in the fancy and aristocratic Zrinjevac green area, the old park of Zagreb’s high-
town, it was intersecting Hebrang and Braće Kavurića Street n. 13 (today Zrinjevac 
Street).171 Situated within the General Consulate’s building, the USIS posts appeared 
vis-a-vis the Modern Gallery and, transversely, the Croatian Academy of Sciences and 
Arts (HANU). The imposing three floor building was previously occupied by a well-
known Zagreb bookstore, Knjižara Vasić, a leading publisher in the 1920s and 1930s.172  
USIS Zagreb surpassed by far the post’s area availability. Owned by the U.S. 
government, it consisted of 403 square meters located on the ground floor, 10 rooms 
and a 40-seat reading room. On the contrary, the American Belgrade’s center was leased 
by USIS, and its second flat (with exhibit windows on the first floor) consisted of 9 
rooms, 70 seats and 290 square meters.173 The cultural centers were open six days a 
week, twice a day, which was, for the Yugoslav customers, an unusual opening hour 
pattern. Both the centers were opened during the morning and evening (USIS Belgrade 
from 9 am to 1 pm, and 3.30 pm to 7.30 pm; USIS Zagreb from 8 am till 12.30 pm and 
from 4 pm till 7.30 pm), a circumstance that provided enough time for both working and 
retired people, university students, white-collar workers and academics, to visit the 
center.174 
As for the American library in Novi Sad, its small spaces and reduced staff, made it 
Belgrade’s branch and not an information center. 175  Notwithstanding, it owned a 
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privileged geostrategic position as Novi Sad was the capital of the autonomous region 
of Vojvodina, situated on the left bank of the Danube in the vicinity of Rumanian and 
Hungarian borders, culturally a reference point of Serbian national identity. Again, the 
library was situated in the central National Heroes Square (Trg Narodnih Heroja) n. 5, 
reopened (after restauration) in November 1952, in a “modern and attractive form.”176 
The closing of Budapest’s and Bucharest’s American centers, issued in the late 
1940s by the communist parties of Romania and Hungary, was crucial for the 
enlargement of the American libraries in Belgrade and Zagreb, recalls Nada Apsen-
Pintarić,177 since their holdings were then all sent to Yugoslavia.178 
It was the Department’s policy for the information program – conceived as a 
combination of policy strategy and culture persuasion – to house the USIS offices in 
whole or in part within the same building as the diplomatic mission (contrariwise to the 
British Council’s separate status abroad). Part of the American cultural strategy was to 
locate the American centers in positions of easy access by public means of 
transportation and arrange ground-floor exhibit rooms. The strong point of the libraries 
consisted both in their large collections of periodicals, publications, leaflets, films, 
photos, as well as in radio receivers, monitors and mechanical production equipment, 
playbacks, film strips and projectors, recording equipment and specialized supplies for 
libraries. The USIS personnel had, or at least required, broad competence skills, from 
public relations, press and publication, library, film and exhibition management, to 
radio programming and exchange of persons. Besides their library routine work, the 
USIS centers organized movie evenings and lectures, arranged thematic exhibits, 
produced radio broadcasts, and distributed books and leaflets through the extension 
                                                 
176 Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of 
State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
177 I met Nada Apsen in Zagreb on May 31, 2014, where we had a four-hour interview on her role in the 
American Center in Zagreb during her 40-years career. She entered in service as an office administrator 
on January 5, 1953, and retired in 1996. She was first appointed to Librarian and Head Librarian 
positions. After the war exploded in former Yugoslavia, Apsen was nominated Political Adviser of the 
first Croatian ambassador, Peter W. Galbraith, and became responsible to send Croatian newspaper 
reports (named by her as Nadiagrams) to the State Department and Pentagon between 1991 and 1995 
(Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb; Warren M. Christopher, the Secretary of 
State, to Nada Apsen-Pintarić, Official Recognition and Appreciation of the Department of State, January 
1993, Nada Apsen Private Collection). 
178 In April 1950, 38 pouches of books arrived to the American library in Belgrade from Bucharest (USIE 
Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, 
NACP). 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
46  Carla Konta - April 2016 
services. The officers in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad were engaged in organizing 
translations of American authors, coordinating the arrival of American classical artists 
and jazz performers, welcoming U.S. specialists, and searching for candidates for 
exchange programs.179 
The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) was the leader and front-runner of every USIS 
mission. He reported to the ambassador and was among his principal cooperators. 
Responsible for the realization of the U.S. cultural policy objectives, the PAO could 
confirm or modify the Country Plan.180 As the Chief Public Relations Officer of the 
Ambassador, he had three primary roles including the setup of the country’s cultural 
policy lines (the Plan and the Program/schedule of implementation), the administration 
of his staff and the representation of the USIS with the Yugoslav government.181 With 
his staff, he analyzed the country’s social structure and detected target groups and 
means of communicating with them.182 But what is even more important, he was in 
charge of managing the USIS budget, also for the branch posts.183 
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Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Telegram 1462 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, May 
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2.2.1 1950-1953: “Business is booming at USIE…”184 
Between 1950 and 1953 many Cold War factors – both in bilateral relations and 
internal Yugoslav developments – resulted the USIE/USIS “business booming.” 
Scholars agree in the appraisal of Truman’s success in sustaining Tito and drawing his 
country closer to the West. 185  During Eisenhower’s election campaign, his future 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, articulated his anti-containment critics as timid 
and sterile. But “Dulles’s passionate rhetoric,” underlined Tony Smith, 
was not always matched by action. In the case of Eastern Europe, Dulles followed the precedent 
of the Truman administration and worked to encourage the example of Yugoslavia’s 
independence from Moscow. The fact that Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito was a communist 
who was thoroughly opposed to democracy was not the issue. Priority should be given to 
breaking up of the Soviet empire, if not through democracy then by encouraging the self-
determination of the nations of Eastern Europe.186 
Eisenhower and Dulles backed a “New Look” in foreign policy which consisted in 
a more forceful response to communist aggression and affirmation of U.S. nuclear 
superiority. 187  The Eisenhower and Dulles wedge strategy, as conceived after the 
Korean War ended and Soviet threat to Yugoslavia vanished, was more aggressive and 
“envisioned more military and political gains for the West. Tito would be enticed to join 
NATO; […] Tito would also be convinced to inspire, if not lead, a Titoist liberation 
movement in the satellites.”188  
But the optimistic Tito’s military ties to the West through the Balkan pact that 
seemed to place him in a neutralist pro-Western context, were shaken by the after-effect 
of Stalin’s death in March 1953. The latter led to the reapproachment of Yugoslavia 
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188 Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat, 122; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, Chapter 5. 
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with the Soviet Union, culminated in the underwriting of the Belgrade (1955) and 
Moscow (1956) Declarations. The mid-1950s meant for the Yugoslav foreign policy 
leaders a search for alternatives that Tito shifted towards Third World nations with 
whom he engaged in intense personal diplomacy (as in the case of his extensive trip to 
India and Burma in 1954, and Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, and 
Egypt in 1958/1959).189 
Better U.S.-Yugoslav relations in early 1950s soon resulted in declining of the anti-
American narratives in the Yugoslav public sphere and by party leaders. Bruce Buttles, 
the USIS PAO in Belgrade, reported on crowds previously just staring at the USIS 
exhibit windows or visiting only the exhibit section (because “comfortable anonymity” 
was “politically safe”) that suddenly began visiting the Library and taking books 
away.190 The crescendo trends extremely enhanced between 1950 and 1953. A 1950 
report shows that in January 3,019 Belgrade citizens visited the post in Čika Ljubina 
and borrowed 701 books.191 In June, they were already 4,061.192 Then the visitor’s 
number jumped to 9,730 in October 1951, and to 16,494 in October 1952 with more 
than 2,955 books circulating.193 
Between 1951 and 1952, an unusual increase, from USIS point, occurred with the 
new registered borrowers (to be registered in USIS library was politically unadvisable 
even if not prohibited) whose numbers increased from 152 in 1950 to 705 new 
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registered borrowers in 1952.194 USIS testified in its many reports of university, high 
school and junior high school students, coming to their place to learn English, borrow 
children’s books, American literature, study for their exams in architecture, agriculture 
and medicine.195 
The library extension service, inaugurated in 1949, meant USIS servicing of 
Yugoslav institutions, faculties and learned societies with press and publication 
materials. In this way, the American center could reach eminent Yugoslav institutions 
such as the Academy of Sciences and Arts, the Bibliographic Institute, and most 
importantly the University with its scientific and technical faculties (Machinery, 
Technology, Veterinary, Mathematics, Agriculture, and Pharmacy) and human and art 
sciences (Applied Arts, Architecture and Philosophy). Surprisingly, the American 
Library in Belgrade also supplied Yugoslav government institutes and ministries with 
law materials, and industrial plants (the chemical Hempro, the glass factory Pančevo, or 
aircraft factory in Zemun) with technical bulletins. But then periodicals such as Tehnika 
Narodu! (Technology to the People), Prosveta (Education), Narodna Krila (People’s 
Wings), and newspapers Republika, Borba, Politika, publishing houses such as Kultura, 
regularly received press materials.196 
As public interest grew, the lack of personnel became so obvious that Alex 
Draginich, as the Belgrade’s PAO, complained repeatedly to the State Department.197 
Bruce Buttles, who inaugurated the USIS bolder strategy, substituted Draginich on May 
1 1951.198 In his extensive 1952 report, he evaluated the program in Yugoslavia as 
“flexible and modest,” identical to those in Western Europe programs except for the 
missing exchange programs. Only in the case of the Voice broadcastings, he underlined, 
Yugoslavia was comparable to Eastern Europe, with a higher level of emissions. The 
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CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
196 USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP. 
197 USIE Report 397 for Feb. and March 1950, April 11, 1950, 511.68/4-1150, Box 2472, CDF 1950-
1954, RG 59, NACP. 
198 Despatch 166 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 20, 1951, 511.68/8-2051, Box 2472, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
50  Carla Konta - April 2016 
success of the American cultural program in Yugoslavia, remarked Buttles, was 
indirectly due to Yugoslav antipathy towards the Stalinist regime. Consequently, whilst 
the USIS was “carefully avoiding anti-communist propaganda,” it could extensively 
market “much anti-Soviet material in volume to the Yugoslavs.” He, therefore, 
concluded that as “long as Yugoslavia remains a communist state, it is patent that the 
free circulation of Western ideas is inimical to the maintenance of control by the 
regime,” which for the USIS program included “continuous frustrations, interruptions 
and delays stemming from the resistance of communists inside and outside the 
government.”199 Yugoslavia presented a “cyclical atmosphere for USIS operations” that 
varied from active official resistance to relaxations that sometimes approached 
cooperation.200 
“Tremendous response to the program” was the USIS Zagreb experience. 
According to the first report after the re-opening in Brace Kavurića Street, USIS staff 
was enjoying “stimulating and invaluable experience” with the public, while “greater 
understanding [was] deepening […] the friendship between Americans and 
Yugoslavs.”201 An average daily attendance of about 1000 persons had some 100 books 
circulating every day. In June 1953, the post had 3,116 registered borrowers, and 
because of unexpected crowds the initial program of magazines and newspapers 
circulation was stopped. 1953 saw the extension service established providing the 
possibility for out-of-town borrowers from Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
to lend the books by mail. 
To the old and new potential borrowers, the American library sent a cautionary 
letter of information inviting them to ask for books without any postage fee and 
proposing special subject lists to particularly interested borrowers. The response was 
immediate and wide-ranging. Of the 250 extensive borrowers in June 1953, 150 were 
from Ljubljana, so USIS Zagreb decided to donate more than 100 books to their 
University. The widest interest, reported the Library’s desk, was in periodicals such as 
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Life, Time, and Newsweek, The Saturday Evening Post, House Beautiful and fashion 
magazines, in addition to specialized magazines on movie making, theatre, or radio.202 
The pro-western paces of Yugoslav foreign relations in 1953, such as the sign of 
the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey (and externally with NATO), 203  and the 
Marshall’s official visit to London between March 16 and 21 (his first visit ever to a 
Western European capital, concurrent with Stalin’s death on March 6) proved to be 
positively supportive of the USIS mission in Yugoslavia.204 
And indeed, when on October 8, 1953, the ambassadors of the United States and 
United Kingdom declared that military occupation of Zone A would soon cease and the 
territory pass to Italy, the Trieste question became an international incident, thus 
proving to be a Cold War hot spot par excellence, and provoked an immediate down 
turning of USIS activities.205 Nada Apsen recalled her memories on the protests directed 
to the American center in Zagreb, “the demonstrators gathered around the building 
yelling “Trst je naš!” (Trieste is ours) and “Dole Papa, dole Rim i Pella skupa s njim!” 
(Down with the Pope, down with Rome and Pella together with them); then they threw 
torches on the library, broke the exhibit windows and set fire causing books and shelves 
to be destroyed.”206 After the London Memorandum was signed, on October 5, 1954, 
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the political environment surrounding the American Libraries in Belgrade, Zagreb, and 
Novi Sad, returned to normality and routine. The latter, in the years to come and 
solicited by an outstanding reception, would mostly concentrate on perpetuating a 
personal contact policy and on establishing a wide network outside the perimeters of the 
capital cities. 
2.2.2 1954-1959: The Inspection Practices in the Field 
There was scarce investigation of the USIS posts by Washington’s information 
agencies in the early 1950s. The first inspection of the Yugoslav posts was conducted in 
Belgrade by the USIA inspector Robert S. Byrnes from May 23 to 27 1954, when he 
discussed the USIS problems with Joseph Kolarek, the Yugoslav PAO, and Ambassador 
James W. Riddleberg. The Byrnes report testified to “USIS program [that] was gaining 
ground within Yugoslavia,” to quite good relations between USIS and Embassy staff, 
and to a need for a Joint Administrative Service to regulate work issues between the 
cultural and diplomatic sections. Moreover, inspector Byrnes brought up the lack of 
housing facilities as a chronic, but insolvable, problem of the American staff in 
Yugoslavia, one that would persist for more than a decade. It concluded with the 
statement over damage that the 1953 riots made to USIS program in Yugoslavia, when 
many funds allotted by the Agency for the fiscal year 1953, were simply returned to 
Washington because of the temporarily closure of the program.207 
In January 1955, the USIA established the Inspection Staff as a successor of the 
former Foreign Service Inspection Corps of the State Department that would in future 
provide regular biennial overseas inspections.208 But it was only with the directorship of 
George V. Allen at the USIA that the evaluation of USIS work became a matter of high 
priority. Under his management, the Agency began a major series of in-depth 
investigations, including non-government members as well. 
Part of these series was the 1959 inspection completed both in Belgrade and Zagreb 
by Lawrence S. Morris and the Agency’s auditor Robert L. Beliveau. The general 
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situation in Yugoslavia was again described as fluctuating and complex, since 
“Yugoslavia must constantly resorts to balancing off East against West, and which way 
the pendulum swings depends upon whether it is her hunger for technology or her fear 
of becoming a «battleground of the Cold War».” 209  The report stressed that when 
American cultural material was “satisfying Yugoslav hunger on new technologies” it 
was permissible, but then controls were tightened when the USIS recounted on Russia 
and China totalitarian practices.210 The balance of Yugoslavia between neutralism from 
1949 to 1958, and the shift towards non-alignment, becoming definite in 1958/1959, 
meant for the Yugoslav foreign policymakers a constant balance. 211  Or as Walter 
Roberts remembers about the Yugoslav Foreign Office telling him in 1960, “They told 
us, ‘confidentially,’ that this was done to rein in the Soviets. I personally had no doubt 
they told the Soviets that they did it in order to rein in the Americans.”212 
Roberts’s point then correctly outlines what the Investigation report of 1959 
mentioned as Soviet pressure. “They have examined,” noted Morris, “the books on the 
shelves of the USIS Library in Belgrade,” and protested to the Yugoslav authorities on 
“dissemination in a friendly country of anti-Soviet propaganda.” The USIS staff rightly 
felt, as we shall observe in the final section, that they had to balance between 
advancements and retreats, as “we never know how far we can go.” In other words, the 
game was “to determine the point at which the other will be provoked to drastic action.” 
As the USIA primary cultural focus was to bring about the process of “first true 
understanding, then sympathy and finally adaptation,” weak Soviet’s position in 
Yugoslav society, and by the U.S. economic aid, formal or informal, keep Yugoslav 
“standard of living rising above that of the satellite countries […] to show the 
Yugoslavs themselves the advantages of dealing with the West.”213 
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 Therefore, the report emphasized four major tasks for the U.S. cultural mission 
in Belgrade and Zagreb, and that was to encourage Yugoslav independence by the 
United States example; explain the democratic motivations of Washington’s foreign 
policy; demonstrate the U.S. political, economic and cultural dynamism and freedom; 
and elaborate a peaceful and prosperous future assured by U.S. scientific advancements. 
These propositions were shaped in the 1959 Country plan approved by the USIA on 
September 29, 1959. The new plan provided an additional tool for the American cultural 
effort, the Monthly Themes, which were monthly cadence projects on which the entire 
USIS team had to work and shape its exhibits. The Pregled periodical, started in 
January of the same year, would reflect, with smiles and in cheerful tones, themes 
related to the entire span of the American way of life, from education and university, to 
the benefits of the free enterprise system, the supermarkets and advertising industry, the 
mass media creativity, the social welfare services, and the advantages of a bipartisan 
political system. 
 Despite the fact that USIA materials were poorly accepted on Yugoslav 
national radio and television, inspector Morris evaluated the American program in 
Yugoslavia as being “developed with vigor and imagination,” appraised the PAO 
attitude as assertive and the relationships with Yugoslav leaders as mostly positive. 
Indeed, the USIS major success would prove to be the penetration of the program 
among influential Yugoslavs and the Party’s top bureaucracy.214 Above all and mostly 
essentially, it was “contributing to a gradual process of westernization in 
Yugoslavia.”215 
2.2.3 The Cultural Approach and the Personal Contacts Policy 
In USIA language, a psychological objective was defined as a “political purpose 
capable of realization through influencing of attitudes and behavior,” while the 
psychological task was described as a “subsidiary objective designed to create or 
maintain attitudes and behavior that will contribute to the realization of political 
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purpose […] through the resources available at USIS.” The program activity was 
therefore directed to the Priority Target Audience Groups, capable of fulfilling the 
country objectives because of their influence on political and social structure. 216 In 
every group, three type of leaders were distinguished: the opinion creators “whose 
prestige causes them to influence the opinion of the group,” the controllers of 
communication “who control […] a group’s special channels” and the decision-makers 
or action-takers “who are empowered to act for the group,” also known as the prime 
movers. The propaganda itself, embraced three types of operations: direct operations 
focused through the mass media on the whole constituency; indirect operations to the 
constituency through the communication leaders; and finally operations seeking to 
influence the leaders regardless of their constituency.217 
For Joseph C. Kolarek, who became Belgrade’s Public Officer in 1954, reaching 
Yugoslav intellectuals, opinion molders, and party prime movers would became a 
priority policy. Following Eisenhower’s and Dulles’s bolder strategy against 
communism, Kolarek initiated a more aggressive policy in the field.218 He started the 
so-called “Personal Contact File” campaign in which each USIS officer, after 
approaching any influential communist official, would create an information card on his 
career, interests, attitudes and friends. Among these lists, some Yugoslavs would be 
chosen as Pregled or Bilten recipients, or otherwise as invitee of cultural exhibitions 
and movie evenings at the posts. Obviously, the chief targets remained the highly 
ranked communists, from whom USIS could learn where the political decisions were 
made, by whom and why.219 
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Having Yugoslav media under strict government control, culture was a free channel 
that approached and attracted cultural leaders, academics, film producers, painters, 
writers, and students. To reach them, USIS used different communication approaches: 
first, those informal, interpersonal contacts with individuals; then meetings, 
conferences, lectures for a group (i.e. the jazz concerts at the posts); then the messages 
mediated through mail or telegraph (the extension service); and finally those related to a 
massive audience, such as the Voice of America.220 
The American public diplomats were concerned with the Yugoslav managerial 
class, the Djilas’s “New Class,” in other words partisans ranks who made vital decisions 
but possessed little technical knowledge and education; then scholars and educators not 
fully in harmony with the regime; the art leaders and personalities (considered “those 
best prepared to listen”); and the university students considered, by the 1959 Country 
Plan, “the only true hope for greater democratization.”221 
As oral interviews and archival records confirm, the USIS posts in Belgrade and 
Zagreb symbolized, indeed, a reference point of the city’s cultural vanguard, academia 
and intellectual leaders. Many, nowadays famous, Croatian cultural leaders were 
assiduous visitors of the American Information Center from the 1950s and onwards: 
young persons that afterwards became eminent personalities like the professor and 
linguist Stjepko Težak; the writer and literature professor Tomislav Sabljak (nowadays 
member of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, HAZU); the painters Josip 
Vaništa and Mirko Rački; the composer Bruno Bjelinski; the film director Obrad 
Gluščević whose wife Maja worked in the library as well, and his colleague Krsto 
Papić; the cinematographer Goran Trbuljak; the music critics Dražen Vrdoljak and 
Mladen Raukar; the writers Branislav Glumac and Luko Paljetak (whose wife used to 
order literature for him by phone since he lived in Dubrovnik); the lawyer Vladimir 
Ibler; the painter and sculptress Milena Lah; the art historian and academy professor 
Vera Horvat-Pintarić; the ballet artists and married couple Ana Roje and Oskar Harmoš; 
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the jazz musicians Boško Petrović and Dubravko Majnarić (of whom the latter received 
the supreme Croatian national cultural award, the Vladimir Nazor Award for Lifework, 
in 2014); the pop-singer Đurđica Barlović, the first singer of the pop group Novi Fosili, 
later a soloist; the deaf-mute mime actor Zlatko Omerbegović; the writer Igor Mandić; 
the well-known academic and intellectual Predrag Matvejević; many professors of the 
English Department like Željko Bujas, the author of the major English-Croatian 
dictionary; prominent doctors, and some priests.222 
The majority of them belonged to the young generation, while the scientists and 
artists that were communist oriented, rarely, and almost never came to the American 
center.223 “Some of them came only once, and fearfully asked to be cancelled from the 
evidence” recalls Zdenka Nikolić.224 The former Library director, Nada Apsen, added 
other relevant names: Franjo Durst, famous gynecologist and professor; leading 
personalities from the Meteorological Institute; the painter Ivo Vojvodić from 
Dubrovnik; the directors of Strossmayer Gallery, Ljubo Babić and Vinko Zlamalik;225 
the political scientist Štefica Deren-Antoljak; Anton Bauer, former director of 
Glyptoteque Museum (the HAZU sculpture museum) who saved the Ban Josip Jelačić 
sculpture by hiding it in the museum’s basement;226 the art historian and professor 
Radovan Ivančević; the professor of international law Radovan Vukadinović (who in 
1970/1971 occupied a senior fellow position at the Research Institute on Communist 
Affairs at Columbia University); the jazz conductor, composer and drummer Silvestar 
Silvije Glojnarić and many more.227 
 According to memories, the Belgrade’s post was often visited by Vida 
Ognjenović, Serbian theater director, writer and diplomat, who in 1989 was among the 
                                                 
222 Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb. 
223 This fundamental detail was confirmed by all the former employees of USIS Yugoslavia to which I 
spoke to. 
224 Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb. 
225  The Strossmayer Gallery of Old Masters (Strossmayerova Galerija Starih Majstora) is a fine art 
museum in Zagreb, exhibiting the collection donated to the city by Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer in 
1884. Today, it belongs to the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HANU). 
226 The statue of the Croatian Ban (viceroy) was removed from the main Zagreb Ilica Street in 1947 when 
the new communist government of Yugoslavia denounced Jelačić as a “servant of foreign interests.” Ban 
of Croatia between 23 March 1848 and 19 May 1859, Jelačić was a member of an old Croatian noble 
family, a noted army general, remembered for his military campaigns during the revolutions of 1848; he 
served under Ferdinand I and Franz Joseph I of Austria. He is also recalled for the abolition of serfdom in 
Croatia. 
227 Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb. 
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founders of the Democratic Party, the first opposition party in Serbia. It was a favored 
place of Olja Ivanjicki,228 the well-known Serbian contemporary artist, of film director 
Branko Bauer, and of many students of the Belgrade musical schools.229 
 The policy of personal contacts was practiced both inside and outside the 
American centers. Sometimes, personal connections were made by the local USIS 
employees themselves: in 1950 for example Slavko Todorović travelled to Rijeka where 
he surprisingly discovered numerous personalities interested in collaborating with the 
American Center; the Radio Rijeka for radio scripts exchange, the head of the Scientific 
Library for book donations, the Rijeka hospital for medical films.230 
Welcome attitudes expressed by ordinary people to U.S. cultural representatives 
were experienced as well. For example, when Bruce Buttles attended the l05 th 
foundation anniversary of the “Žika Popović” People’s Library in Šabac (at that time a 
1eading commercial town located in the North-West central Serbia) in November 1952, 
he was received with such audience enthusiasm “that the ceremony master had to curtail 
the applauses to go on with the rest.” “It was obvious,” asserted the USIS final report, 
“that the audience, which consisted of students and town’s people, was pro-
American.”231 USIS Zagreb also encountered good relationships with external Croatian 
organizations: for example the Končar Factory where the American cultural center, 
invited by the Trade Unions, provided English teaching lessons, films, recordings, 
periodicals, and newspapers.232 
Working for the American Center in Belgrade and Zagreb was not an easy task in 
the Yugoslav communist society. The employees often felt overwhelmed by work and 
the expanding services.233 Over the years, the USIS local employees often suffered 
                                                 
228 After she experienced a cultural exchange under the Ford Foundation auspices, Ivanjicki brought the 
pop-art in Yugoslavia and inspired a whole generation of young artists (Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam, 
253-258). 
229 Interview with Petar Nikolić, July 5, 2014, Belgrade. 
230 Despatch 152 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 1, 1950, 511.68/9-150, Box 2472, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
231 Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of 
State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
232 Despatch 267 from Zagreb to the Department of State, April 10, 1953, 511.68/4-1053, Box 2472, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
233 Field Evaluation Report Belgrade, April 9, 1954, Box 38, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 
306, NACP;  Robert S. Byrnes, IOA, to Jack Kolarek, PAO, June 1, 1954, Box 38, USIA Master Budget 
Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP; 
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harassments, some of them were briefly jailed, while during the 1953 riots they were 
even socially marginalized for being “associated with the Americans.” According to 
Petar Nikolić, the first Yugoslav USIS employees were fierce anti-Communists, looking 
with sympathy to the United States and in high suspicion of their own government. 
They belonged to the pre-war middle and high bourgeoisie and aristocracy, many of 
them had relatives shot and their property confiscated after the war. 
I remember those old ladies in elegant and somehow aristocratic outfits, coming to work with a 
poodle, [one of them] very distressed because the communists nationalized her family’s 
enterprises, […] this is why they profoundly hated communism. A lady called Ruža Todorović 
was such a women, always wearing a cocktail dress and with fresh coiffure.234 
Many of these employees, after ending their experience at the American center, 
encountered difficulties in finding a job elsewhere. “After being employed in the 
American Library […] I was looking for a job elsewhere because working hours were 
tough, but after an unsuccessful search, I gave up. And our phone was tapped until 
1990.”235 Notwithstanding, Yugoslav employees of USIS enjoyed some other privileges 
such as higher salaries, and received nicer, colorful outfits from the United States.236 
Suzanne Hildenbrand defined librarianship as a field dominated by women, a 
“gendered history.” 237  Not surprisingly, the majority of Yugoslav employees at the 
American Library were women who shaped the library into an unconventional space of 
domesticity with a smile and “accessibility to all.” 238  In 1964, of 11 Yugoslav 
employees at the American Center in Zagreb, eight were women.239 This gender shift 
contributed to make the American Libraries in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad, 
“accepted community institutions,” building “a visible U.S. presence and an 
institutional base for furthering U.S. objectives.” Indeed, the USIS libraries were not 
like the ordinary public ones where records were kept in order to see the collection 
grow. As “special purpose” libraries, they selected materials and designed services for 
the purpose of reaching specific audiences and reader groups; as community centers 
                                                 
234 Interview with Petar Nikolić, July 5, 2014, Belgrade. 
235 Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb. 
236 Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb. 
237 Suzanne Hildenbrand, Reclaiming the American Library Past: Writing the Women in (Norwood, N.J.: 
Ablex Publications, 1996). 
238 Interview with Zdenka Nikolić, June 3-27, 2014, Zagreb. 
239 Spisak osoblja Američke Čitaonice u Zagrebu, March 3, 1964, 56/2-02, Box 29, Republički protokol, 
IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
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they served the local needs.240 What is more, they were “true circulating libraries,”241 
which meant that when new collections arrived from Washington, the old ones were 
donated to museums, universities, town libraries or prominent cultural leaders. In such a 
way, ideas took individual, uncertain, everyday life paths, and “persons capable of 
taking political or economic actions […] or capable of transmitting the information”242 
got the occasion to circulate the books from hand to hand. 
 
2.3 Communicating In and Within the Field 
 
Some books leave us free and some books make us free. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
A good novel tells us the truth about its hero; but a bad novel tells us the 
truth about its author. 
Gilbert K. Chesterton 
 
Presentations depicting America’s cultural life were distributed to the Yugoslav 
republics, their executive governments, Councils for Science and Culture, their 
universities, high schools, cultural institutes, newspapers and publishing houses, then 
theatres, film studios, and so forth. From Zagreb, the USIS covered Croatia, Slovenia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Belgrade concentrated its efforts on Serbia, Macedonia, 
and Montenegro.243 
The Information Center Service from USIA headquarters provided guidelines to 
USIS cultural officers, directors, English teachers and librarians, coordinated the 
Agency’s program with the overseas missions and other U.S. government and non-
government agencies, and supplied the installations abroad with books, magazines, 
music, English teaching materials, library equipment, exhibits, and related materials.244 
                                                 
240 Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA 
Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 1. 
241 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 
1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 31. 
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This background support helped USIS on the ground to send ready-made messages in 
implicit codes and innovative audio and visual languages which nurtured audiences’ 
imagination and created problematic needs for those wishing to emulate them. As Laura 
Belmonte demonstrated, carefully constructed cultural narratives of freedom, progress 
and abundance were means of the U.S. protecting its national security. 245  But by 
presenting the American way of life to audiences abroad, the U.S. representatives 
introduced new, politically challenging points of reference. 
Whether as movies, news, scientific reviews or radio broadcast, the USIS 
information was centered over “one important basic idea,” understandable to large 
audiences, even to those with a lower literacy level. It appealed to emotions and to 
intellect. It had to “give hope for the future,” “strengthen foreign countries’ national 
pride,” and “avoid giving the impression of [U.S.] self-interest.”246 
 As we shall find out in Chapter 3, the core focus of American cultural policies 
in Yugoslavia relied on major essential topics connected with democracy, capitalism 
and freedom. The monthly and running themes were transversely delivered throughout 
the USIS program activities and the subjects stressed by the program content. 
Transposed in cyber-language, USIS activities were the hardware components of the 
program (the library and its books, the English program, the Music, Film and Exhibit 
Section, the Information Media Guarantee Program, the P.L. 480 Translation Program), 
while its content served as software input. In the next section we shall observe how the 
hardware components served the goals of the U.S. ideological struggle by establishing 
the USIA-USIS network in the whole of Yugoslavia. 
2.3.1 Reading, Listening, and Watching 
Jürgen Habermas has argued that during the eighteenth century the growing middle 
classes sought to influence the emerging public sphere by creating their own institutions 
and sites, mostly through newspapers, periodicals and books.247 Above all, libraries and 
                                                 
245 Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: 
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reading rooms were those public spaces capable of political influence and activism. 
Libraries, argues Yale sociologist Jeffrey Alexander, can also function as sites where 
political and social dissent is articulated.248 In the Yugoslav experiment, the American 
libraries had a double leitmotiv: being a place of alternative culture, a source of 
otherwise unavailable knowledge, a socializing catalyzer, and a place of “politically 
compromising” effect (not dissent in action). 
                                                                                                                                               
2013), 27. On how the Cold War and its cultural struggle framed U.S. libraries at home and abroad, look 
into Louise Robbins, Censorship and the American Library: The American Library Association’s 
Response to Threats to Intellectual Freedom, 1939-1969 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996) and The 
Librarian Spies: Philip and Mary Jane Keeney and Cold War Espionage (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 2009). A revealing hidden story of the distribution book program in the Eastern Europe financed 
by the CIA and destined to leadership and intellectual elites is the Alfred A. Reisch’s Hot Books in the 
Cold War. The CIA-Funded Secret Western Book Distribution Program Behind the Iron Curtain 
(Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2013). 
248  Alexander provides a bridge between place and the social nature of reading by asserting that 
“communicative institutions” in civil society regulate the public discourse so as to make available 
information that exerts influence on political questions (Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Civil Sphere (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 53–92. 
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Figure 2-1: Visitors at reading room of the American Library in Zagreb in 1953 (Courtesy of the 
National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Enclosure 3 in despatch 4 from the American 
Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 3, 1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP. 
In early 1953, USIS Belgrade passed a major reorganization, the library was 
amplified with a shiny periodical room, two spacious reading rooms and a work 
room.249  With their exhibit windows on the ground floor, the Library’s open book 
shelves on the second, the Information Office on the third, and the Music and Film 
Section on the fourth, USIS Belgrade offered a full cultural experience.250 On the other 
hand, Zagreb had its Library, with a Reference and Technical section, and the reading 
room, on the ground floor. Here, behind a large desk, crowds waited to pick up their 
                                                 
249 Despatch 44 from Belgrade to the Department of State, July 13, 1953, 511.68/7-1353, Box 2472, CDF 
1955-1959, NACP. 
250 Manuscript for USIE Newsletter enclosed in despatch 189 from Belgrade to the Department of State, 
Aug. 24, 1951, 511.68/8-2451, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
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Figure 2-2: Crowds waiting for the distribution of the daily Bulletin/Bilten in 1953 in front of the 
American Library in Zagreb (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). 
i re - : r s iti  f r t e istri ti  f t e il  lleti / ilte  i   i  fr t f t e 
eric  Library in Zagreb (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: 
Enclosure 3 in despatch 4 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 3, 
1953, 511.68/7-353, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
copy of the daily Bilten while glancing at the colorful exhibit windows. 251  Almost 
preannouncing the newest trends in library layouts, the USIS posts had their children’s 
corner with low shelves, bright book displays, and two small benches.252 
The Radio Daily Bulletin and other in loco USIS publications would not exist 
without the effective USIA’s Press and Publication Service (also known as the 
International Press and Publication Service or Division). This service sent to posts all 
over the world wireless and air bulletins, newsletters, magazine reprints and pictures. As 
years passed, the service came to include pamphlets, pilot models, and “background and 
action kits,” USIS Technical Newsletters, transcripts of the President’s speeches, 
official texts, and summaries of congressional activities, glossy prints, and exhibit 
                                                 
251 In Zagreb, the Consulate offices were on the second floor, whilst Film and Music Section, together 
with the Cultural Affairs Officer, occupied the third floor (Photograph No. 3, “View of the new American 
Consulate Building and U.S. Information Center in Zagreb, Yugoslavia,” June 6, 1953, Box 2472, CDF 
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layouts. Washington’s bulletins included current developments of U.S. science, 
medicine, economy and culture, and commentaries from The World Today, U.S. This 
Week, or Behind the Curtain. 
Extremely useful for visual presentations were the photographic features of the 
United States, included titles that included The Town Library of the U.S., 50 years of U. 
S. Auto Industry, Typical U.S. High School Student, This is the United States – Cities 
and towns, Rural Youth in the U.S. – Vermont Farm Boys, New Machinery for U.S. 
Farmers, etc. 253  The Film Section relied on pre-fab Filmstrip Lectures, Kits and 
Program, which consisted of still-picture frames created for screen projection, while the 
Film Information Guides suggested the type of audience, story background and policy 
relationship. 254  Pamphlets of the highest paper quality had to send a message of 
prosperity, prestige and “standards of excellence,” and to endure the hand-to-hand 
process.255 
To counter deliberate misrepresentations of the United States and to depict the 
fundamental democratic processes of the American life, was the main “story” of the 
press and publication program. Although many IPS materials came unrequested from 
Washington, many other times it was the post that demanded specific content. For 
instance, in 1949, while the Yugoslav government was undertaking an enormous plan of 
road-building, USIS requested Washington to send “airmail photos of [U.S.] highway 
and roads construction methods,” “equipment for cement, asphalt paving,” workers 
“clothing, and particularly protective footwear,” because Belgrade was rebuilding its 
streets “but using primitive methods.”256 
The American Library served as a sort of research center too, providing Politika 
and Republika journalists the statistic material they needed. USIS was proud to be a 
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reference for the Yugoslav technical periodical Narodna Krila (People’s Wings),257 the 
Slovenski Porocevalec of Ljubljana258 and Vestnik of Maribor.259 From the 1950s the 
press feature Šta ima novog u SAD (What is New in the U.S.) was sent to Zagreb, 
Ljubljana and Tanjug (Yugoslav Press Angecy).260 
But the most significant, extremely popular, and far reaching, was certainly Bilten. 
Issued daily in Serbian, Croatian and English, it was personally delivered to foreign 
officials, eminent individuals, and picked up at the posts. In 1959, it was published in 
about 11,000 copies.261 Another important local publication was the Review of the News 
in 13,000 copies, of which 8,600 were mailed to persons all over Yugoslavia. 
Background for editors were also sent personally to leading Yugoslav government 
officials, as well as the list of new books sent monthly to 5,000 persons. But receiving 
these publications was not always easy: receivers of the Bulletin were sometimes 
subject to harassments by postal officials and police, while, at other times, local 
officials were more zealous than their superiors in Belgrade and returned the approved 
material.262 
Besides the press and publications services, the American Libraries offered a 
completely free of charge English teaching program. Beginning in 1939, the English 
program was established by the Public Law 335 within the State Department’s 
exchange programs between the U.S. and the American republics. With the Fulbright 
Act (1946) and the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) the program was launched world-wide.263 
Basically, it was envisioned “to reach national teachers of English” and encourage them 
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to “include information on the United States in […] language instructions.” The English 
teaching textbooks were accessible either at the USIS Libraries or donated to local 
cultural institutions.264 For this purpose, in late 1952, the Belgrade MSA launched two 
projects, the Rapid Language Instruction that generated a wave of English learning 
among apprentices in small shops, radio mechanics, and auto mechanics; and the 
Georgetown University Language training.265 
Then, in July 1957, the USIA launched another pioneer program with the motion 
picture Teaching English Naturally (1957). Filmed at the American University campus, 
it had a twenty minute narration, live dialogues and presented an informational-drill 
technique for teaching conversation by a graphic presentation method.266 Direct English 
teaching by USIS employees was discontinued in 1959, however, the Library continued 
to provide technical advice and materials to Yugoslav universities. Even though it was a 
USIA decision, direct English teaching was not dropped in Zagreb because of its 
extraordinary popularity and participation. Taught on a full time basis to teachers, 
doctors, and lawyers, a sprinkling of engineers, economists, newspapermen and 
architects, the English teaching classes attracted more than 70 people (although the 
applicants were much higher).267 As Sonja Bašić revealed, the American officers were 
especially concerned to serve the English department of the Zagreb and Belgrade 
Universities, its students and professors, to pay them for international conferences 
abroad, or to obtain for them new books, copies of journal articles or bibliographical 
references.268 
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2.3.2 American Crazy Sounds 
 
Young Yugoslavs love American jazz, and any afternoon in the music 
library is like a little stateside jam session. 
USIE Report, July 27, 1950, Belgrade269 
 
The U.S. and Yugoslav archives do not conserve many details about the Music 
Program of the American cultural centers. Nevertheless, their primate as the first Music 
Library in Yugoslavia makes them worthy of some mention. According to the USIA 
policymakers, the first and foremost aim of the Music Section abroad was to stimulate 
the “world-wide interest in and knowledge of American music.”270 But that was an 
understatement. As scholars have recently shown, music was a Cold War weapon 
appealing to emotions, excitement and delirious attractions (just to recall the 
extraordinary success of the jazz ambassadors, Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, and 
Duke Ellington, on their State Department sponsored tours abroad).271 
The musical records in USIS, both in Belgrade and Zagreb, may not have had such 
a “delirious” impact, nonetheless they attracted youngsters, students, jazz lovers, rock n’ 
roll fans and classic musicians. Basically, they contained both the commercial long-
playing phonograph records and the printed scores of American compositions. The 
recordings were usually used for concerts, although we know they were loaned to those 
interested in American music, pianists, musicians, soloists, choirs, and symphonies. 
Almost analogously, as for the IMG program, the ICS secured the performance rights 
and renting of unpublished works. 272  Further, the Music Library also included 
nonmusical recordings, documentaries, poetry, short stories, novels, drama and 
humor.273 
                                                 
269 USIE Report 62 for June 1950, July 27, 1950, 511.68/7-2750, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, 
NACP. 
270 Airgram 3319 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
April 24, 1953, 511.00/4-2453, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
271  Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). Music performances of jazz and classic within their 
political frames are discussed in Chapter 5. 
272 ICS of the USIA, Dec. 4, 1957, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP. 
273 Message 3184 from USIA to all principal posts, June 19, 1958, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 
1953-1964, RG 306, NACP. 
Chapter 2: The Establishment of the USIA-USIS Network 
Carla Konta - April 2016   69 
Since the early 1950s, the Belgrade Music Library held 406 recordings, of which 
366 were received from Bucharest after the Romanian post was dismantled. Apart from 
having the possibility of borrowing recordings and taking them home, the library 
offered an exclusive milieu: records could also be listened to on-site. In the same way as 
the IPS furnished press material to Yugoslav editors, the American Music Section 
furnished Yugoslav radio stations: Negro Spirituals, Mozart, Bach and Grieg274, and 
jazz, Percy Faith, Tchaikovsky, George Gershwin, Jerome Kern, Aaron Copeland, 
Verdi, Rossini, and other artists that would visit Yugoslavia during the 1950s and 1960s 
within the Cultural Presentation Program of the Bureau of Cultural and Educational 
Affairs of the State Department.275 But not all the portions of the Music Library turned 
out to be successful; except for the jazz tapes and records, most of the other 
acquisitions, such as comedies, transcripts, recorded plays, were banned by the 
Yugoslav authorities.276 
2.3.3 Book Translations, IMG and the P.L. 480 Programs 
American authors and bestsellers made it outside the American Libraries’ walls, 
too, thanks to a specifically crafted “Book Translation” program. As a by-product of the 
cultural Cold War, the program begun in 1947 under IIA, when the U.S. Army proposed 
that American authors be translated into German and Japanese for their occupied areas, 
and then incorporated into USIA in 1953. The USIA provided Yugoslav publishers with 
copyrights, translations and printing papers, thus guaranteeing the final very low (even 
lower than the Yugoslav average) book price. In 1953, it already involved 32 Yugoslav 
publishing houses, mostly from Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. By 1959, it aided the 
publication of more than 90 American authors in the languages of Yugoslavia. 
Nonetheless, the program dealt with restrictions by both the Yugoslav and American 
                                                 
274 So for instance in December 1949, Radio Belgrade played 13 hours, Radio Skopje 2.50, and Radio 
Ljubljana 30 hours of American music (USIE Report 178, Dec. 1949-Jan. 1950, Feb. 28, 1950, 511.68/2-
2850, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP). 
275 USIE Report 397, Feb.-March 1950, April 11, 1950, 511.68/4-1150, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 
59, NACP. 
276 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 19. 
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side. Every title had to be approved by the editorial board of Jugoslovenska knjiga 
(Yugoslav book) state publishers.277 
Almost analogously, the Informational Media Guarantee Program (IMG), 
administered through July 1952 by the MSA and then by USIS, made widely available 
American books, periodicals, films, but also projectors, school equipment, printing 
papers. In order to overcome Yugoslav dollar shortages, the IMG converted dinars 
owned by the U.S. government at the Yugoslav National Bank (obtained through the 
Surplus Sales Agreement)278 and payed in dollars for American copyrights.279 In fact, 
the exchange rate was very favorable. While the real exchange scale was 750 dinar for 
$1, the Yugoslav dinars were exchanged at rate of 300 to $1 (at least until 1962 when 
the rate jumped to 600 dinars for $1).280 For example, the guarantee coverage for 1958 
in Yugoslavia was of 1 million dollars281, rising in 1963 to 300 million.282 Published 
through the IMG and approved by Jugoslovenska knjiga for books, and for the movies 
by Jugoslavija film, the National Radio-TV, the republican film centers, or the Federal 
Center for the Educational and Cultural Film (Savezni centar za prosvetni i kulturni 
film), American books, periodicals, newspapers and movies arrived at universities, 
colleges, and any cultural institution requesting them.283 The distributors of Yugoslav 
film were the heaviest users of this program to the extent that “all American commercial 
films [were] imported thanks to this assistance.” The Yugoslav government discouraged 
                                                 
277 Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za 
međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ; Pismo američke čitaonice izdavačkim poduzećima, 
March 7, 1952, 23-1952, Box 317, Sektor za visoke škole, nauku i umetnost – Veze sa inostranstvom, 
Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ. The Books Translation Program officers selected 
American books, identified a local publisher, arranged for a favorable transfer of foreign rights to the title, 
paid the rights fee, hired a translator, purchased copies for the local U.S. Information Center, and sent the 
customary royalty to the American publisher. “What seems at first like an unremarkable subsidiary-rights 
arrangement was in reality generously underwritten by the middlemen, the US government,” argues Greg 
Barnhisel in Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015), 169–171. 
278 See The “Case” of Senator Fulbright in Yugoslavia, 242. 
279  9th Semiannual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, p. 17, Feb. 2, 1954, 
511.00/3-2554, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
280 Koča Popović, State Secretary of DSIP, to SIV, Jan. 18, 1962, 9223, Box 640, Međunarodni odnosi 
1953-1970, Savezno Izvršno Veće (hereafter SIV) 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
281 ICS of the USIA, Dec. 4, 1957, Box 9, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, NACP. 
282 Walter R. Roberts, Cultural attaches, to Milan Bulajić, DSIP, May 21, 1964, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i 
Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
283 See Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 
318, AJ. 
Chapter 2: The Establishment of the USIA-USIS Network 
Carla Konta - April 2016   71 
publicity on the subject with the result that many Yugoslavs were not aware “they may 
order any American book they wish, and pay for it in dinars,” stated Joseph Kolarek to 
the USIS inspector in 1959.284 Hence, the IMG had its transnational aspect of cultural 
collaboration and made the Yugoslav authorities collaborate with famous American 
publishing and film houses, such as McGraw Hill, Hall &Co. New York, Wiley & Son, 
Pocket Book Publishers, Princeton University Press, Curtis Circulating Co. and for the 
films the Guaranteed Pictures Inc., Motion Picture Export Association. 285 
Henceforward, in the 1960s the collaboration was extended to U.S. news services as the 
CBS/ITN News film Service, the NBC, and the United Press TV.286 
So, were there specific selection criteria for these two programs? Initially, the U.S. 
agents could only reject a publisher’s application for IMG or Book Translation coverage 
of a specific title. However, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 tightened the criteria and 
excluded hobby books, cookbooks, travel guides not focused on the United States, and 
fashion publications. More importantly, it proscribed that materials “patently lewd or 
salacious, [or that] conveyed political propaganda inimical to the best interests of the 
U.S.” would not be eligible. In 1954, the USIA stated that ineligible would be 
“Materials advocating or supporting an unlawful purpose;” “Materials prepared or 
distributed in order to convey, disseminate, or reinforce Communist propaganda;” 
“Materials of a salacious or pornographic;” and “materials of a sensational, cheap 
character.”287 In conclusion, it was the Public Law (PL) 480 program that, mainly by 
                                                 
284 Thanks to this program also few copies of Time, Life, Newsweek, and the New York Times were 
available at Kiosks where they could be actually bought (Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 
1959: 30; 46). 
285 Yugoslav Embassy Washington to the Savet for Science and Culture, June17, 1952, 136, Box 7, 
Poverljive veze sa SAD i Kanadom 1950-1952, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ; Bogo 
Pregelj to the Yugoslav Embassy Washington, June 9, 1952, 317-99-852, Box 99, Veze sa SAD i 
Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ; Vera Ćuković to the Yugoslav Embassy 
Washington, Nov. 4, 1952, 1952, 317-99-1101, Box 99, Veze sa SAD i Kanadom, Savet za nauku i 
kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ. 
286 Nabavka američkih filmova za 1960 godinu sredstvima IMG programa, Dec. 23, 1959, 23-944, Box 
237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ; 
Informacija povod raspodele za uvoz knjiga, July 20, 1961, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, 
Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
287  Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists, 163–164; Study of USIS libraries, Aug. 1967, E-4-67, Box 1, 
Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 34–35; 
Report on the Book and Library Program, July 1953, 53-07-001, Box 1, Interagency/Congressional 
Reports, USIA Office of Administration, RG 306, NACP. Because IMG had no annual appropriation, it 
ran debts that were charged to the USIA. The latter borrowed the money from the Treasury Department. 
Then the program underwent an extensive review in the late 1950s, after which Congress imposed much 
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financing the translation of American textbooks’, allowed “American influence into the 
Yugoslav universities.”288 The program helped Yugoslav schools and universities to 
open up to international study resources. Operationally, Yugoslav universities submitted 
lists of books and reference titles to the Yugoslav Technical Assistance Office, which, 
therefore, forwarded them to USIS, and USIS to the USIA. 289 
Although the PL 480 program had other purposes beside the financial support of 
the USIA cultural program, when it was initiated in 1954, it launched an aid program 
based on the sales of U.S. agricultural surpluses for dinars. Very soon, Yugoslavia 
became one of the largest recipients of food by the PL 480. Thanks to the American 
loans, AID, counterpart and TCA programs, Yugoslavia undertook a large 
industrialization agenda. The U.S. financial support was fundamental in many cases, as 
for the procurement of diesel locomotives (popularly called “kenedijke” by John F. 
Kennedy), for the installations of the fertilizers factory in Pančevo, for the factory of 
chemical products and plastics in Zagreb, for the steel mill in Sisak and the thermal 
power plants in Kosovo. Likewise, through ICA, TCA, counterpart funds and CARE 
programs American books and textbooks (for universities, high schools, and research 
institutes) were also translated or purchased in Yugoslavia. However, further historical 
research has to be done to understand their impact on Yugoslav society and Party 
policymaking in both the 1950s and 1960s, and their relations with cultural policy-
making of the American Centers in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad. 
2.4 The “Menace” of American Propaganda 
 
On this issue we cannot wave. It was decided to introduce the control system. 
For this reason a regulation has been prescribed. However, political 
opportunity avoided the prescription of the regulations. The back down was 
linear. The Westerns came out as winners. For that reason the question of 
[foreign cultural missions in Yugoslavia] had to be treated as of high policy. 
Every measure has to be inspected for its consequences. […] We think it would 
be better to have less measures, but more decisiveness to carry them out. 
                                                                                                                                               
stricter criteria for title election. Despite these measures, it was dropped by Congress in 1968. (Barnhisel, 
Cold War Modernists, 164–166). 
288 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 33. 
289 Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam, 52– 53; for a general overview consult John R. Lampe, Russell O. 
Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1990). 
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 Report of the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade,  
June 3, 1953290 
 
Such American propaganda, as it is today, according to our opinion is 
becoming a huge political problem, which we as UDBA, and only with our 
measures, aren’t able to resolve. The Americans today want to penetrate every 
pore of our political and social life, especially […] among the youth, 
throughout schools, universities, organizations of the People’s Front, etc. 
What is more, they are trying to enter the JNA and our press. 
 UDBA report, May 20, 1953291 
 
When they wanted to lay accusations against [me] because I am 
campaigning for Americans, because I said that Tito, now that he is with the 
Americans, will give a better life to the people and will come over to the West 
[…]. I was in UDBA (security police) for three months and then brought to 
court. They asked me did I say that, and I said, Yes I did. We are not in 1947 
when Tito was with the Russians and they would chop off my head; but we are 
in 1950, and Tito is with the Americans, and we are no more afraid of you, I 
said. So they let me go home. 
 Letter of a Yugoslav villager, to USIS, Belgrade, 
March 1953292 
 
The Yugoslav communist policymakers were highly troubled by the margins of 
liberty the foreign “propaganda missions” enjoyed in their country. Paradoxically, the 
apprehension over “foreign propaganda” persisted despite the mounting opening trends 
of Yugoslav society during the 1950s. In a narrative that evoked but did not emulate the 
anti-American tones of the late 1940s293, the Yugoslav policymakers considered the 
U.S. propaganda as reactionary western infiltration and called for active resistance and 
more restricted law regulations.294 But why was this the case since between 1952 and 
                                                 
290 Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije 
za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije (SSRNJ), RG 142, 
Arhiv Jugoslavije (AJ): 18. 
291 UDBA Report, May 20, 1953, XI-109-VI-36, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze 1945-1990, 
Centralni komitet SKJ (CK SKJ), RG 507, AJ. 
292 Despatch 727 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, March 16, 1953, 
511.68/3-53, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, NACP. 
293 In the hardcore anti-American lexicon antecedent the Tito-Stalin split, the United States were defined 
as the forefront of capitalist imperialism, warfare and psychotic, and the American libraries as residences 
of Yugoslav enemies (Neki problemi u vezi sa političkim stanjem i ratno-huškačkom propagandom u 
Beogradu, 1947, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet 
Saveza Komunista Srbije (hereafter SKS), Istorijski arhiv Beograda (hereafter IAB); Carla Konta, 
“Antiamericanismo e titoismo. Gli anni Cinquanta e la «zona grigia jugoslava,”” Contemporanea XVI, 
no. 1 (March 2013): 69–76). 
294 On this point I disagree with Radina Vučetić when she argues that, after the 1949-1950 Yugoslav 
appeasement with the United States, the USIS in Belgrade and Zagreb continued undisturbed its cultural 
operations (Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih,” 129-130). Instead, 
archival investigations have brought up how several Yugoslav executive agencies struggled for years to 
find the right counteraction policy to limit foreign propaganda efforts. 
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1966, as Spehnjak and Cipek recalled,295 the Yugoslav regime reached a high degree of 
consolidation and consent? Can it be that this protean nature of Yugoslav reception 
entailed a lack of coordination in its internal policymaking? 
2.4.1 The USIS Margins of Liberty 
In 1953, an inter-committee composed of members of the Yugoslav State 
Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (DSIP) and the State Secretariat of Internal Affairs 
(DSUP) produced a long report about American, British, and French missions in 
Yugoslavia and their “political propaganda against our country.” They critically stressed 
that foreign propaganda was vigorously growing with the compliance of Yugoslav 
apathy and laissez-faire. By means of political influence, the “reading rooms and 
cultural centers” were intervening in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Schools, cultural 
institutions, “and even the Army,” collaborated with the propaganda missions by 
playing their movies or dispatching their magazines. The report recalled an informal 
permission that Yugoslav authorities conceded to foreign diplomatic corps during the 
Yalta Conference on which foreign missions were repeatedly evoked. “Protests of 
diplomatic corps often prevented us from undertaking ulterior restraint,” declared the 
commissionaires.296 “For several sacks of books that we import by diplomatic mail on 
behalf of the Embassy, they import several wagons; for our weekly newsletters of a few 
hundred copies, they issue daily bulletins in total circulation of 20,000 copies,” 
ironically complained the inter-committee report on the theoretical reciprocity of the 
cultural propaganda. However, it was the lack of law regulations over the import of 
foreign books and the free play of foreign concerts, movies and theatre pieces that the 
Yugoslav policymakers deemed to be most problematic.297  
The SSRNJ’s Commission for Foreign Relations criticized the English teaching 
courses as “political propaganda against our country” because they allowed foreign 
professors to induce Zagreb, Belgrade and Ljubljana University students by “easy and 
                                                 
295 Katarina Spehnjak and Tihomir Cipek, “Disidenti, opozicija i otpor - Hrvatska i Jugoslavija,” Časopis 
za suvremenu povijest 39, no. 2 (2007): 259–260. 
296 Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije 
za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 14. 
297 Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije 
za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
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cheap leisure, by jazz music.”298 Similarly, the Committee for Science and Culture of 
the Republic of Croatia prohibited in 1952 the public ceremonies of the USIS book 
donations, usually performed at the Zagreb University with high representatives of the 
Republican authorities, the Dean, and the Embassy representatives, thus delegating the 
arrangements of the program to the Bibliography Institute.299 
In the context of the Yugoslav strategy towards American propaganda, the role of 
UDBA, the Yugoslav secret policy, deserves particular attention.300 On August 31 1953, 
UDBA stated that, although the American cultural missions had increased the copies of 
their publications, several covert interventions succeeded in dropping the USIS 
subscriptions of many political and social institutions (of 1,550 subscriptions, 203 
unsubscribed after UDBA pressures). But, if under UDBA pressures, 1,302 people 
rejected USIS materials in August 1953, another 1,500 new subscribers asked for USIS 
magazines. Despite strong field efforts, the process of combatting American propaganda 
in the rural areas had contradictory effects: in Niš the number of receivers decreased 
from 200 to 12, in Svetozarevo from 100 to 10, while elsewhere, like in Kragujevac, 
Čačak and Zrenjanin it rose respectively from 33 to 105, from 20 to 70 and from 40 to 
147. Additionally, the report complained that USIS Zagreb started the Radio News 
Bulletin/Bilten with 8,000 copies (when initially the post had only 2,000-3,000 copies 
from Belgrade) and that the Agricultural Bulletin increased from 4,000 to 7,000 copies. 
It seemed profoundly concerned because “the Americans were sending publications into 
the rural interior by train,” because “they exploited personal contacts with journalists to 
                                                 
298 Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za 
međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. SSRNJ stands for Socialist League of the Working 
People of Yugoslavia (Socijalistički Savez Radnog Naroda Jugoslavije), formerly National Front 
(Narodna Fronta). 
299 Kratak osvrt na propagandnu delatnost inostranih ustanova, 1952, Box 86, Sektor za visoke škole, 
nauku i umetnost – Veze sa inostranstvom 1946-1952, RG 317, AJ. 
300 UDBA (or UDB-a) is the acronym of Uprava Državne Bezbednosti (The Administration of National 
Security). The archives of the temerarious Yugoslav secret services are until today, except for Slovenia, 
classified and inaccessible to researchers and general public. Fortunately, several UDBA reports can be 
found within the historical files of other Yugoslav institutions where they were sent for information. In 
spite of these archival limitations, the historical files produced by Yugoslav executive and consultative 
institutions on American propaganda report miniscule information over USIS posts, with high probability 
obtained by UDBA field officials in the libraries or by some local Yugoslav employees. What is more, 
Yugoslav archival documentation confirms that the letters from and to the USIS centers were opened and 
controlled. 
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insert pro-American materials in the Yugoslav press,” and because they reached Skopje 
with 4960 copies of American publications.301  
UDBA’s major concern were the “politically very sensitive groups” that the USIS 
was reaching in Yugoslavia: students, professors, and intellectuals. They abhorred the 
book donation program as a means of exerting personal contacts and despised the 
American exhibits for their affirmation of American political and economic superiority 
and their underscoring the U.S. aids to a deprived Yugoslav population. By attracting 
more than 4,000 visitors per day, the American exhibits were dangerous because they 
implied “that in the event that Yugoslavia had a similar [capitalist] system, it would 
enjoy all the benefits of it.”302 The fact that the American publications reached even the 
smallest Yugoslav villages – where the Yugoslav newspapers could not arrive as in the 
example of Krupanj, Negotin, Sremska Mitrovica, Titovo Užice, Kusejev, Veliko 
Gradište, Šapac, Čajetina and Bajina Bašta – was highly frustrating to UDBA officers. 
According to their sources, in some rural districts villagers discussed more “about life in 
the USA and England” and felt more “enthusiastic about the degree of Western 
agricultural development” than about the Yugoslav internal policies. The most 
disturbing fact above all was certainly that some of the receivers of American 
publications were members of the Communist Party.303 
The Yugoslav secret service did not spare either the USIS PAO, Bruce Buttles, who 
was defined as the “the biggest enemy of Yugoslavia in the American Embassy,” 
particularly since  his employees, according to their sources, were members of former 
monarchist Yugoslavia parties (in that case Slavko and Radmila Todorović), regarded 
as reactionary anti-Yugoslav elements.304 
Even three years later, in 1956, UDBA’s report on “hostile activities” and “enemy 
propaganda,” condemned a large number of students that were connected with 
                                                 
301 Propaganda zapadnih kapitalističkih zemalja (UDB FNRJ III odeljenje), Aug. 31, 1953, 723/53, Box 
44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
302 Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za 
međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
303 Ibid. 
304 UDBA Report, May 20, 1953, XI-109-VI-36, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze 1945-1990, 
Centralni komitet SKJ (CK SKJ), RG 507, AJ. 
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foreigners in Belgrade and fostered enemy propaganda through the “foreign reading 
rooms.”305  
1956 resulted in being very important for improvement of Yugoslav control over 
the foreign missions: an ad-hoc Commission gathered and proposed to establish statutes 
of the information centers, coordinate their activities towards the Yugoslav public and 
behave inflexibly in pursuing Yugoslav interests. They acknowledged that foreign 
publications did not direct attack “against our country, but a large anticommunist 
propaganda was developed.”306 Soon after, a new regulation was introduced. It was 
again decided that the foreign press, publications and books could be distributed in 
Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Rijeka only by the state enterprise Jugoslovenska 
knjiga and in numbers decided by the Secretariat of Information and the DSIP. Content 
supporting criminal and harmful education of the young and inimical positions towards 
Yugoslavia were forbidden and retracted by official Yugoslav organizations.307 In 1957 
a survey on Politika, Borba and other republican daily newspapers, proved that foreign 
press materials, including those of USIS, were spreading sensational, unaesthetic, and 
tasteless views and developing feelings of “inferiority and colonialism” in the minds of 
Yugoslav audience.308 Consequently, they urged to be stopped. 
In 1957, the Ideological Commission, chaired by Veljko Micunović, a leading 
Yugoslav communist and government member, discussed foreign propaganda in some 
softer tones, affirming that some degree of cultural contact with foreign countries 
cannot be avoided. Yet, the commission concluded that higher restrictions were 
necessary, as it was a priority to establish a Yugoslav institution that would perform as a 
foreign cultural center. 309  Following these recommendations, the Belgrade Cultural 
Center (Kulturni Centar Beograd) was established in 1956 as an information-
propaganda institution in order to neutralize foreign propaganda activities. Its activities 
                                                 
305 Pregled neprijateljske aktivnosti u 1955 do sada – UDB FNRJ II Odeljenje, Feb. 20, 1956, 1529/1, 
Box 44, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
306 Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za proučavanje pitanja primene propisa o inostranoj propagandi, June 15, 
1956, 1651/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
307 Pravni položaj stranih kulturnih institucija – Pravni savet DSIPa, 1956, 1651/1, Box 55, Materijali 
komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
308 Uticaj inostrane propaganda u jugoslavenskoj štampi, 1957, 1839/1, Box 55, Materijali komisije za 
međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
309 Sastanak ideološke komisije CK SKJ, June 28, 1957, VIII/II/2-b-(85-98), Box 5, Ideološka Komisija, 
CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ. 
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began partly in 1957, and then expanded in 1958. While planned as a reading room 
supplying foreign periodicals, the Belgrade Center remained still at an infant stage in 
the late 1950s (even if provided by a Photo, Audio, Film and Art section), mostly for 
financial reasons. The Film Section was the most vivid one since it borrowed foreign 
movies of the USIS Movie Section (and other foreign cultural centers) to interested 
Yugoslav institutions.310 
In September 1958, the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs introduced new 
limitations: the publications of the foreign centers needed to be approved by the 
Republic’s Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SUP); all movie plays could be publicized 
only by sending personal invitations (these limitations were established for the Soviet 
and American cultural centers specifically); and the USIS was forbidden to donate 
printing paper to Yugoslav publishing houses for the publication of American books in 
translation. In November 1958, further restrictions were applied: all published or 
imported press material had to be sent to the State Secretariat of Internal Affairs 
(DSUP) for control (in late 1958 USIS Belgrade sent two pamphlets, The USA on 
Disarmament and The Reward of Independency, both were rejected); the names of the 
English teaching students had to be reported to the authorities; all the movies could be 
rented to Yugoslav institutions only, through the Federal and/or Republican Center for 
Schooling and Cultural-Education Film (or through the Belgrade Cultural Center for the 
capital region), and only after they were approved by the Federal Commission for Film 
Review or the DSUP. So even if many Yugoslav cultural and educational institutions 
continued to refer to the foreign centers to borrow films, this latter restriction reduced 
the lending activities of USIS Zagreb by more than 30 percent.311  
The fact that the American reading room published 20,000 copies of the daily 
Bilten in 1957, that the USIS movie section possessed 60 movie projectors and 8,000 
                                                 
310 The major difficulty encountered by the Cultural Center in the eyes of the Belgrade’s public, was that 
its service weren’t free as in the case of the American or Soviet cultural centers (Informacija o Kulturnom 
centru Beograda, 1956, Box 537, Materijali o radu kulturno-prosvetnih institucija 1950-1968, Gradski 
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movies were disseminated all over the country concerned the authorities312 and made 
them consider a “long-term, intensive and organized ideological struggle to affirm our 
views and our praxis, to paralyze ideological and propaganda influence from both sides 
[the U.S. and the Soviet].”313  
As the final point of these efforts the Secretariat of Information presented, in late 
1960, a draft of the Press Law and other Views of Information for discussion in the 
general Federal Assembly. 314 The new regulations formally declared that the import of 
foreign press was free, except for materials “expressly destined for the Yugoslav people 
[…] and, therefore, […] propaganda”315. The articles 67-79 related to the foreign press 
and they copied the regulations already introduced in 1958 adding a new one which 
prescribed that foreign bulletins could only contain information related to the specific 
foreign country (forbidding therefore American negative critics on the Soviet Union). 
Articles 100-115 related to the foreign information institutions, contained far more 
recently edited regulations yet obliged them to register as cultural institutions and 
respond to the Yugoslav government for expenses and activities. In addition, they were 
prohibited from being placed within a diplomatic mission and the control of their movie 
program was delegated to the Secretariat of Information (whose responsibility was to 
release permissions to play a film in the USIS centers). Finally, article 52 established 
the criteria for censorship by prescribing that political offenses “against the people and 
state” of Yugoslavia, materials “abusing moral” and those offending “the citizens and 
insult[ing] the public order and peace” should be censored.316 The law was approved 
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and became operational on November 9, 1960, with the information centers having six 
months to adapt and negotiate the new rearrangements with the Foreign Affairs.317  
Interestingly, the Yugoslav margins of liberty for USIS in Belgrade, Zagreb and 
Novi Sad had a general decreasing trend, while, in the meantime, Western cultural 
artifacts and styles – jazz and rock popular music, Hollywood movies, household 
appliances and the culinary arts, urban architecture, advertising and American 
supermarkets – gained territory in the Yugoslav everyday culture.318. However, there are 
no indications that the restriction policies described above are related in any way to 
“westernization” of Yugoslav everyday life. 
Besides the negative trends described above, there were Yugoslav voices outside 
the country that asked for relent. For example, when Milan Bartoš, the Counselor for 
Law Affairs at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, wrote to the DSIP stressing that, 
concerning our cultural policy “our system must relax and adapt to the international 
standard.”319 Although this was more a single case than a shared position. 
2.4.2 Yugoslav Patterns of Resistance and its Cold War Positioning 
From their establishment in the late 1940s, the USIS activities in Yugoslavia 
encountered varying degrees of official political opposition, but the subsequent analysis 
will show that the reasons for Yugoslav bias and counteractions depended on several 
key factors: an anti-American attitude inherited from the late 1940s, the Yugoslav 
positioning as a neutralist, independent country in the Bloc’s competition, and opposite 
internal policy views as to what was the “Yugoslav way to socialism,” especially after 
the Sixth KPJ/SKJ Congress of 1954. 
For this argumentation the triennium 1951-1953 represents a valuable example. In 
early 1951, the Yugoslav Army’s Chief of Staff, Koča Popović, arrived in the United 
States to secretly discuss military aid to Yugoslavia in order to enhance what 
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Eisenhower defined as the “South NATO wing.” The Military Assistance Pact, signed 
on October 1951, included the Yugoslav Army in the Mutual Defense Aid Program thus 
providing T-33A aircraft, artillery, machine guns, radars and electronic equipment, but, 
above all, training that transformed the Army from a guerilla-like one to an ordinary 
one. 320  The U.S. economic aid through international agencies started as early as 
September 1949, when the Export-Import Bank granted Yugoslavia’s request for a $20 
million credit, whilst the International Monetary Fund approved a $3 million drawing 
for Tito’s government. From the early 1950s on, Yugoslavia became the protagonist of 
Eisenhower’s “wedge strategy” in order to “keep Tito afloat,” as Lorraine Lees notably 
analyzed. The strategy tied Yugoslavia to NATO through the Balkan Pact with Greece 
and Turkey signed in 1953.321 From 1950 on, the U.S. aid played a crucial role in the 
economic recovery of Tito’s regime. For Lampe, Prickett and Adamović, for the period 
1950-1964 the “American assistance, broadly defined, covered 60 percent of 
Yugoslavia’s payment deficits on the current account,” and “added perhaps 2 
percentage points to a rate of growth in national income during the 1950s which 
averaged 7.5 percent.”322 
However, these positive trends in the arena of foreign policy and economic 
relations were not followed by analogous internal attitudes towards USIS cultural agents 
and agencies. In September 1951, Omladina, the official organ of the League of 
Communist Youth of Yugoslavia (SKOJ), alarmingly stated that there was a 
tremendous Western infiltration happening in the Yugoslav press (Western 
sensationalist news were “petit bourgeois,” “bizarre” and non-educational) and called 
for anti-Western pressures on editors. Furthermore, Politika attacked the weekly 
magazine on politics and society, NIN, charging its editorial board of anti-communism. 
Things escalated in February 1952, reaching a peak in April. On February 20, a fire 
attack produced by three small bottles making up a bomb, were thrown against the 
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Belgrade USIS post.323 On April 1, the Belgrade municipal authorities initiated an anti-
USIS campaign by warning the KPJ members against using the American reading room 
(because of “improper […] bad influence” and boogie woogie dancing floors in its 
Music Section).324 The next day the Politburo member Blagoje Nešković, defined by the 
charge d’affaires Jacob Beams as the “most intolerant communist,” visited the USIS 
exhibit room and completely scrutinized every bulletin, map, picture, and display.325 
The next day a Belgrade woman was arrested and held for 24 hours because of carrying 
in her hand a copy of Bilten. The USIS officers interpreted this as a counteraction for a 
favorable VOA listeners’ survey carried out months before.326 
Later, on April 22, Beams was called to the DSIP where Jakša Petrić, responsible 
for the Western Hemisphere and British Commonwealth Affairs, complained about the 
distribution of Atomic Energy for War or Peace pamphlet and “inappropriate” movies 
sent to Yugoslav schools. 327  A negative trend again appeared on June 13, when 
Miroslav Radojčić, Politika’s journalist, condemned the American cultural activities as 
inimical and inacceptable.328 
In 1952 and 1953 similar suppressions were repeated. In summer 1952 Zagreb’s 
Cultural Affairs Officer (CAO), Thereza Mravintz, was prohibited from participating at 
the Novi Vinodolski summer session for English teachers. 329  On March 10, 1953, 
Milorad Peršić, president of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Federation of 
Students, criticized those “reactionary students” – who “use and expand various 
Western propaganda literature,” and “have connections with their libraries.”330 In June 
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Duga and Omladina eliminated Western supplied materials, while Petar Menac, director 
of the Consular Section of the IVS, rejected a request of the Zagreb Movie section to 
attain a mobile unit tour in Croatia.331 Timok, Zaječar’s newspaper published an attack 
on William King, information officer of USIS Belgrade, calling to American 
propaganda “aggressive,” “cruel,” “damaging,” “insolent,” and “misusing our 
democracy.”332 
Additionally, on July 12, Politika published an article entitled “Wax Dummies” 
where, with heavy handed and surly humor, it denoted USIS visitors as old, ignorant 
and anti-regime,333 while Borba reported Djilas anti-American speech given in north-
east Montenegro’s town Bijelo Polje (White Field), declaring that “certain weaklings 
and men without character […] do not hesitate to [spread] foreign, bourgeois, anti-
socialist, anti-Yugoslav ideas for foreign money.”334 
The Yugoslav political attitudes towards USIA-USIS public diplomacy platforms 
drastically changed from one program to another. So, for example, the American 
participation at the Yugoslav trade fairs and the exchange programs with American 
universities were more than appreciated and both formally and informally supported. 
The U.S. cultural presentation program was equally welcomed. Yugoslav authorities 
were mostly reluctant when coming to the USIS field activities and the broadcasts of the 
Voice of America. Why was this the case? The reasons are stratified. The U.S. 
participation at the Yugoslav trade fairs, as observed in Chapter 4, was a matter of 
prestige for the organizers, a chance for improved economic relations and for gaining 
precious technological know-how. The U.S. cultural presentation program was not 
perceived as a political danger, as it invaded a space of the politically neutral. The 
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Yugoslav standpoint over the cultural exchange program, which counted some fifty 
different programs between state and private initiatives (as the Ford, Fulbright, Leader’s 
Exchange programs among the most effective), appeared more controversial. 
Nonetheless, since it covered cultural aspects and was limited to restraint groups of 
cultural (the academics and scientists) and political (of middle-high and middle rank 
positions) leaders, it was especially welcomed as a Yugoslav modernizer and a channel 
for Yugoslav affirmation in the United States. 
The stance towards USIS field operations (and VOA broadcastings as well)335 was 
more conservative. Both in the 1950s, but also in the 1960s (as Chapter 3 proves), the 
American cultural centers in Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad remained a “nail in the 
head” and “thorn in the side” of the Yugoslav mass organizations like the SSRNJ, as 
they personally contacted large masses instead of carefully picked categories, as was the 
case of the exchange programs. And since the Voice reached even larger groups of 
population, it was considered more politically dangerous. The USIS regarded its work 
as successful both because of its popularity among the audience and because of the 
liberal cultural trends that, following the approbation of the 1953 Constitution, left them 
more liberty in working with the Yugoslav cultural leaders. 
As previously stated, the Yugoslav authorities constrained USIS operations on a 
pre-1948 anti-American ideological ground, but also because of its political positioning 
that Rinna Kullaa called the “Yugoslav neutralism based on the Finnish example.” By 
definition, the latter was a “commitment to minimizing security risks to the Soviet 
Union along its European political border and to not interfere in the Soviet domination 
of domestic politics elsewhere in Europe.”336 The Yugoslav policymakers defended the 
restrictions on the foreign cultural missions, even if in a veiled manner, by affirming 
Yugoslav independence in internal policy and neutralism in foreign policy. Indeed, 
USIS officers were convinced that the motivation for “harassments” on the USIS posts 
were “Yugoslav […] hyper-sensitivity vis-à-vis Russians and Chinese,” and their way 
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to show “that all countries must obey the same laws.” 337  Nevertheless, further 
investigations could better show if this was the case. 
Finally, to understand Yugoslav attitudes toward USIS ground operations, the 
1950-1953 constitutional and economic reforms are crucial. Between the Fifth and the 
Sixth Congress of the KPJ/SKJ (1948-1952), the Yugoslav leadership conceived the 
idea of a self-managed socialist society. In the years that span between 1950 and 1953 
Slovenian leaders Edvard Kardelj and particularly Boris Kidrič, conceived an economic 
reform that would strengthen the autonomy of the working councils and leave the 
enterprises, while remaining state-owned, to partially dispose of their profits.338 For 
Boris Kidrič, “These changes [would] put the enterprises in a freer market competition 
where, exempted from state planning, they would gain profit.”339 
At the Sixth Congress in 1952 the Yugoslav Communist Party changed its name in 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez Komunista Jugoslavije, SKJ), the 
National Front became the Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia and 
more power was given to the local, now SKJ, party organizations. The 1953 
Constitution endorsed the partial abandonment of centralism, reinforced the autonomy 
of republics, and introduced the self-management for many organizations, as 
institutions, hospitals, universities and enterprises. It was a “historical turnover” in 
which “state-owned and bureaucracy monopole” conceded “larger autonomy of 
economic and political subjects as well as local and regional communities.” In the 
meantime, other opening cracks appeared following the Yugoslav abandonment of the 
Stalinist line. In 1951, the Forth Central Committee Plenum condemned the “dogmatic 
politics of education,” whilst in 1952 the Congress of Writers expanded the framework 
for freer “intellectual and spiritual production.” However, by accepting the self-
management conceptions, argues Croatian historian Dušan Bilandžić, the Yugoslav 
leaders created a discrepancy between existing social relations built on autocratic and 
centralistic assumptions and the new anti-statistic and anti-bureaucracy conceptions of 
the KPJ/SKJ. And, while according to the spirit of the Sixth Congress, the Party had to 
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become an “educator” and not “ruler of the masses, many leaders did not know how to 
act, while others interpreted these trends as power-losing.”340 The Party was assigned 
the role of the controller on what Tito called “the influence of certain negative Western 
ideas,” when speaking up about young intellectuals at the Sixth Congress of the League 
of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia.341 
Discrepancy about what was permitted and what was controlled by official 
censorship or auto censorship in cultural production appears in many U.S. reports from 
Belgrade. In a 1956 memorandum, Stephen E. Palmer (second secretary of the 
Embassy) claimed that his recurrent meetings with painter Milica Lozanić-Petrović and 
vanguard sculptors Ana Bešlić and Jovan Soldatović, convinced him of the fact that 
Yugoslav artists enjoyed a highly privileged position to “express themselves in the way 
they wish,” while others such as screen writers – dealing with sensitive content for large 
masses – were submitted to censorship.342 
USIS Belgrade very soon captured how crucial were the processes of 
decentralization affecting cultural institutions like theatres, cinemas, public libraries, 
and publishing houses. 343  In 1958, Seventh Congress of the SKJ promised to 
“emancipate creative arts from dogmatism and pledge[d] to exempt art and science from 
being used as instruments of political interests.” 344  In 1959, Politika and Borba 
defended modernist art against the attacks of the “dogmatists,” and requested a more 
democratic treatment of art in Yugoslavia. In 1960, Miroslav Krleža, prominent 
Croatian writer and Tito’s friend, whilst welcoming Jean Paul Sartre in Yugoslavia, 
proudly declared that the Seventh Congress “liberated art from even the most 
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insignificant administrative influence.” 345  Indeed, in its 1963 report, the USIA 
accentuated what recent contemporary historiography has proven: the Yugoslav fine arts 
and literature enjoyed a “measure of freedom unparalleled in any other communist-ruled 
country, except Poland.” The only limitation was that artists, writers and journalists 
“were prohibited from making direct attacks upon, or from questioning, the domestic 
and foreign policy of the Tito government.”346 A position that Zagreb’s drama theatre 
director, Pero Budak, confirmed to General Consul Edward Montgomery, asserting that 
only few in Yugoslavia “adhered to the school of socialist realism,” and that “Yugoslav 
artists were eclectic […], uncommitted to any school.”347 
From October 1953 to January 1954, Milovan Djilas published 19 articles on SKJ’s 
newspaper Borba arguing that a new ruling oligarchy formed by party bureaucrats had 
established its power in Yugoslavia. Later his thoughts were collected in the first world-
known Yugoslav dissident bestseller, The New Class, that forced him to his first (six 
years-long) imprisonment.348 The Djilas case unveiled the duality of Yugoslav reform 
system that, while withdrawing from Stalinism, established an experiment that never 
abandoned its totalitarian-ending perspective and autocratic drifts. 
2.4.3 Just Student “Mensa” Protests or Signs of Change? 
It was a sunny afternoon of May 11, 1959, when 3000 Zagreb University students 
came to the downtown streets of the capital city. The main reason of their demonstration 
was the bad conditions of the food served at the University “Mensa,” the mess hall. 
Events precipitated when the University administration decided that the Hotel 
Esplanade (today a glamourous and luxury Zagreb hotel), under catering contract, 
would serve 2,000 students instead of 1,000. In addition, when the mess hall was partly 
closed for the preparation of the UDBA convention on May 13, the regular meal 
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services declined even further. The grumbling and dissatisfaction reached its 
culmination on May 11. First around 1.30 pm 200 students went to the major Većeslav 
Holjevac.349 Then they carried on to the Law Faculty chanting “Živio Tito – Hrana” 
(Long live Tito – we want food), “Živio Bakarić – Kruha” (Long live Bakarić – Bread), 
“Mi smo gladni” (We are hungry). When the large crowd moved towards Vladimir 
Bakarić’s office,350 the demonstrators were blocked by the police trucks and a physical 
fight occurred. During the clash two persons died, while 150 students were injured, 
many of them arrested.351 According to Dougal L. Stewart’s sources, first Secretary of 
Information of the British Embassy, the disillusionment of the student body, which had 
long been propagandized regarding the atrocious behavior of the pre-war Royalist 
police, was such that, in his opinion, the regime had lost major student support even 
from those firmly declared communists. The same sources reported that many students 
had suffered heavy blows from police truncheons, in the aftermath many lost their 
scholarships, and many were expelled from the University and the Party following the 
demonstration. 352  Analogous “mess hall” protests occurred in the same months in 
Belgrade, Skopje and Rijeka, but according to Marković they were complaining about 
bad living conditions not questioning communist legitimacy. 353  But for the U.S. 
Consular officers, these first autonomous, non-governmental protests were deciphered 
as a signal of disagreement and dissidence. Indeed, the fact that these demonstrations 
led, as the similar 1954 protest march, to arrests and imprisonments, ultimately proved 
how the police authorities considered them to be politically dangerous. For the U.S. 
officers the student marches revealed that the Yugoslav society at the end of the 1950s 
was changing and raising voices of discordance. 
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The American mission in Yugoslavia relied on the cultural opening trends to 
promote an affirmative extensive network of its agents and activities. It provided the 
USIS libraries with methods of dissemination for books, periodicals, magazines and 
newspapers, as well as for its movies, concerts and cultural activities. By the end of the 
1950s USIS Belgrade created Pregled, a new colorful periodical whose contents 
improved the engaging narratives on American freedom, democracy and economy, and 
in which its citizens lived full, happy lives in a classless society and shared economic 
bounty. In the next chapter, focusing on several study cases regarding the growth of the 
USIA-USIS field network, we will observe how “the astounding flexibility and 
adaptability of the Yugoslavs and [their] often bewildering willingness to experiment,” 
would frame the Yugoslav third way, in other words to regard its openness both as its 
major strength and weakness, as suggests the Yugoslav attitude towards the American 
centers in Belgrade and Zagreb.354 
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3 AND THE WINNER IS …: THE 
EVOLUTION OF THE USIA-
USIS NETWORK AND THE 
1960S REVENUE 
Chapter 3 explains the evolution of the U.S. public diplomacy networks in 
Yugoslavia using three case studies; the American Library content, the impact of USIS 
movies in the territory, and the USIA narrative of the African-American Civil Rights 
movement. These case studies focus on three USIA priority policies and practices; the 
persuasion rhetoric on democracy, capitalism and freedom; the USIS capacity of 
bringing the American way of life on screen in the most abandoned Yugoslav village; 
and the mission of converting world audiences to pro-U.S. outlook on the domestic race 
issues. Chronologically, the cases span from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s. 
In the last section, the focus again returns to framing the linkages of the USIA-
USIS policies to the Yugoslav-U.S. foreign relations in the Kennedy and Johnson years 
when the arousing debate on détente and the emergence of the global South, required 
new public diplomacy efforts to persuade foreign audiences abroad. While affirming 
itself as a Non-Aligned protagonist, internally Yugoslavia balanced between 
progressive economic pro-market reforms, institutional decentralization, and cultural 
liberalization on the one hand, and coercion and violent responses over multisource 
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reform requests (intellectuals, literates, students, liberal party leaders) on the other. We 
shall observe how often unpredictable Yugoslav policies on the USIA-USIS missions 
would, in the aftermath of the 1961 Press Law, reshape the USIA Country Plan for 
Yugoslavia towards a leaders-directed one, with long-term consequences for the 
Yugoslav young political generation and Yugoslav-U.S. cultural exchange cooperation. 
3.1 Democracy, Capitalism, and Freedom on Bookshelves in 
Yugoslavia 
 
[W]hen the enemy endeavored to cut off his communication by sea, he was 
forced to divert that danger by setting fire to his own ships, which, after 
burning the docks, thence spread on and destroyed the great library [of 
Alexandria]. 
     Plutarch, c. AD 46 – AD 120355 
 
I ransack public libraries, and find them full of sunk treasure. 
Virginia Woolf 
 
The truth is libraries are raucous clubhouses for free speech, controversy and 
community. 
      Paula Poundstone 
 
There is something profoundly fascinating in the invisible journeys that library 
books take from home to home, hand to hand, from readers’ pages to magic literary 
places. Indeed, libraries encompass a duality; associated with silent reading and 
absorbing knowledge, and to dynamic questioning and engaging discussions. For an 
average Yugoslav customer, in Belgrade, Zagreb or Novi Sad, the American Libraries 
were more than that. Students and professors found there foreign scientific and technical 
monographs, exam textbooks, and academic journals, whilst others came to read The 
Times, Life, Better Homes and Gardens, or the daily New York Times. Sometimes they 
ordered a new book, other times prepared a reference research or simply sat down and 
studied. The reading room made up a gathering community of people, intellectuals, 
scientists, doctors, students, retirees, and ordinary citizens, occasionally knowing each 
other, with an eye beyond the frontier and irritations towards the system inside.356 
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The U.S. books and magazines program abroad was an outcome of the Cold War, 
but its origin dates back to WWII period. Since the early 1940s, the Council on Books 
in Wartime, a publishers’ trade group, collaborated with OWI to disseminate 
information “about books, about the war and the war aims of the U.S. and its allies for 
libraries and bookstores, holding book forums and fairs, and utilizing radio and films to 
promote its message.” So, books, as “weapons in the war of ideas,” became the core 
theme of the U.S. anti-Nazi propaganda.357 
In the new Cold War circumstances, the books could provide “the fullest (and most 
favorable) portrait of American culture.” 358  Although capable of persuading “other 
people to adopt a predetermined set of American views,” the books, asserted Dan Lucy 
in 1956, were “tool[s] [for] the reader to serve his own ends.” 359 Furthermore, the 
impact of books was somehow dissimilar from other types of cultural mediums. As a 
1968 USIA study underlined, “People tend to buy books for longer-range informational 
purposes and to absorb the material in books at a slower and more reflective pace.” 
Accordingly, mass media had a “short cycle of life,” while books tended “to have a long 
cycle,” particularly outside the United States.360 In other words, books served long-term 
propaganda purposes. 
The IIA/USIA book program would not merely replicate the OWI projects. From 
1953 on, the USIA established a subsequent tightening of the book-selection criteria, 
the choice of what the government could send abroad was reduced, and the purpose of 
the program “veered from fostering international understanding of American culture to 
actively promoting American policies.” By primarily targeting foreign elites and 
intellectuals, the book programs had a “pedagogical self-understanding” to “teach about 
                                                 
357 Greg Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015), 151. By the same author, see “Cold Warriors of the Book: American 
Book Programs in the 1950s,” Book History 13, no. 1 (2010): 185–217, doi:10.1353/bh.2010.0010; and 
“Perspectives USA and the Cultural Cold War: Modernism in Service of the State,” 
Modernism/modernity 14, no. 4 (2007): 729–54, doi:10.1353/ mod.2007.0080. 
358 Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists, 153. 
359  Dan Lacy, “The Role of American Books Abroad,” Foreign Affairs 34, no. 3 (1956), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ articles/united-states/1956-04-01/r-le-american-books-abroad. 
360 Study of USIA Book Publishing Programs, January 1968, S-4-68, Box 24, Special Reports 1953-1997, 
USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP: 6. 
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America” and, through the promotion of modernist authors, showcase American artistic 
achievement and prestige.361 
By comparing U.S. public diplomacy narratives after the 9/11 tragedy with those of 
the USIA in the Cold War, Laura Belmonte argues that – while structure and modality 
has changed – “a shared belief in the universality of American freedom, democracy, and 
free enterprise links U.S. information experts from the era of Harry S. Truman to that of 
George W. Bush.”362 Such universality and its linked topics, imbue the content of USIS 
libraries in Yugoslavia.  
USIS books on Yugoslav shelves were, indeed, of a general nature and related to all 
human interests such as fine arts, literature, education, public opinion, history, 
architecture, economy, industrial achievements, famous American personalities, and so 
forth.363 They included ideas, facts or promises in order to accomplish “a psychological 
task.”364 The USIA cultural messages were encoded, translated and transmitted to fit the 
triad of the American liberal tradition of democracy, capitalism, and freedom, hence 
associating these words with concrete material experiences. Freedom was freedom to 
choose a job, a book, or friends, to vote according to one’s own personal convictions 
and to gripe about unjust wages. 365  This said, through which authors were liberal 
philosophical concepts explained to presuming Marxist readers in Yugoslavia? To what 
extent was the program shaped by audience preferences and to what extent by policy 
objectives? How could the latter be achieved since the USIA policy in Yugoslavia opted 
for no criticism of Yugoslav communism? 
3.1.1 American Modernism and USIA Selection Policy 
The USIS library content and its movie program fostered strong images of the 
American way of life. USIA’s Guideline Paper on Policies and Operations of USIS 
Centers emphasized their role in projecting “the image of a democratic, dynamic, 
                                                 
361 Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists, 153–156. 
362 Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 23; Elisabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s 
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363 Circular 41, May 20, 1952, 511.00/5-2052, Box 2245, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
364 Airgram 398 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
April 3, 1953, 511.00/4-353, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
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socially humane, and culturally significant United States.” While portraying Americans 
“as responsible and mature,” respectful “of the mind and the spirit,” the American 
Libraries would extol “the quality of American life, achievements, and ideals, for its 
intellectual vigor and creativity,” and foster the understanding of U.S. policy goals. 
USIS could “reap political benefits without being political in content” because in the 
centers “‘information’ and ‘culture’ meet, interact, and become one program.”366 The 
Guideline highlighted that the Library was not “a merely recreational reading oasis, nor 
yet a narrowly conceived scholarly research center, although it should have aspects of 
both.” “As a living organism, continuously responsive to new ideas and changing 
demands,” the American Center had, with the exception of certain classics, no 
permanent book shelf.367 
More than anything, the USIA book program was very concerned to select the 
authors which best matched its program goals. The IIA issued its first directive in early 
1950s stating that “controversial authors could be included if the works in question 
supported the mission of positively presenting the United States to the world.” Since 
McCarthy wanted authors with questionable political affiliations rooted out, the IIA 
revised its order and librarians abroad were obliged to remove materials by “any 
controversial persons, Communists, fellow travelers, etc.’”368 
As a result of the McCarthy investigations, the IIA released the Instructions for 
Selection and Detection of Material in Book and Library Program in July 1953, which 
would remain effective throughout the 1960s as well. The instructions stated that: 
works of avowed communists, persons convicted of crime involving a threat to the 
security of the United States, or persons who publicly refuse to answer questions of 
Congressional committees regarding their connections with the communist movement, 
shall not be used even if their content is unobjectionable, unless it is determined that a 
particular item is clearly useful for the special purpose of the program.369 
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Henceforward, anxious USIS librarians pulled books by authors such as Howard 
Fast, W.E.B. Du Bois, Lillian Hellman, and Dashiell Hammett.  McCarthy’s 
investigations slowed the pace of book arrivals abroad from 120,000 to 400 monthly. 
However, almost contradictorily, the investigations brought major attention to the book 
program and reestablished their centrality “as critical weapons in the war of ideas.”370 
Up until Frank Shakespeare’s directorship of the USIA (1969-1973) and onwards, 
the ICS’s Bibliographical Division identified and reviewed books of possible usage 
abroad, while occasionally involving private companies such as the Services of 
Operations and Policy Research Inc. in 1969. American Centers abroad received book 
recommendations with regular cadence: monthly Subject Bibliographies, bi-monthly 
Program Book List, and occasionally additional files.371 For instance, a 1957 subject 
bibliography contained the books on American democracy; the Culture of the American 
Indian; American Nobel Prize Winners; Medical and Public Health; 150 Years of 
American Art; Woodrow Wilson; the Supreme Court and Constitution; Elections and 
Parties in America; Economics in American Life; Religious Values; Christmas; 
Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy; and so forth.372 
The books were distinguished by those “available for discretionary use” and those 
“available for program use whenever needed,” and could be “supplied on request” or 
“recommended to the field.” 373  When Public and Cultural Officers, or the Library 
Director, needed books on a specific subject, they could consult –apart from the Subject 
Bibliographies – the Books Recommendation for the Overseas Program, known as the 
Blue Book, or write direct requests to Washington.374 
The major figures of early American literature such as Washington Irving, Herman 
Melville, and Nathaniel Hawthorne, joined by the major writers of the later nineteenth 
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century such as Whitman, Dickinson, Twain, found their way onto the Yugoslav 
bookshelves. Histories of American literature such as Wyck Brooks’s Flowering of New 
England (1936) and Robert E. Spiller’s The Cycle of American Literature (1955) 
provided narratives of an evolving literacy tradition and the grand American nation. Yet 
Greg Barnhisel suggests that the most innovative USIA accomplishment through the 
book program was its “modernism” agenda. Indeed, Washington’s cultural 
policymakers bolstered a Cold War modernist project aimed at a “liberal understanding 
of American history.” These narratives captured the centrality of freedom and 
individualism, cooperation between private enterprises and government, the rule of 
cultural diversity and the certainty that history evolves towards greater freedom and 
fulfillment, through the framework of the book program.375 Predictably, another core 
theme concerned the anti-communist literature, such as Czeslaw Milosz’s Captive 
Mind, a formerly leftist poet who had worked for the Polish government; Arthur 
Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, and George Orwell’s Animal Farm and Nineteen-Eighty 
Four. Other anti-communist books focused on the most ominous characters of Soviet 
communism such as the gulags, the Great Terror, and the arbitrary imprisonments. 
Frank Tannenbaum’s Philosophy of Labour and Frederick Lewis Allen’s The Big 
Change: America Transforms Itself 1900-1950 attempted to dispel the harsh image of 
the United States’ capitalism abroad. Books such as Learned Hand’s Spirit of Liberty; 
Carleton Coon’s Story of Man; Robin M. Williams’s American Society: A Sociological 
Interpretation, Carl Bridenbaugh’s Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America 1743–1776, 
and Arthur Breston’s The Restoration of Learning, had intellectual and sociological 
pretensions.376 
Since Poe was among the few American writers held in high esteem by the 
European literary critics, the USIA book program initiated a literacy agenda to 
purposely explain classic and contemporary American literature. ICS lists favored 
classics such as Twain, Hawthorne, Dickinson, Henry James, and Melville in addition 
to contemporary titles like Willa Cather, William Dean Howells, Henry James and F. 
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Scott Fitzgerald. Hemingway appeared less acceptable (but not forbidden), whilst the 
works by and about Ezra Pound, a controvert expatriate American poet, were forbidden 
in all programs after 1953. Among the modernists, it was William Faulkner who played 
the biggest part in the book program and whose ascendance solidified the “cultural 
dominance of literary elitism and liberal anti-Communism.”377 By the early 1960s, the 
U.S. cultural diplomats and USIS officers suggested that it was their effort abroad that 
won general audiences and critical opinion in Europe. Still, the USIA book program 
lacked anything by Wallace Stevens, William Carlos Williams, Gertrude Stein, and Hart 
Crane; and predictably of John Dos Passos, Clifford Odets, and Langston Hughes 
because of their earlier communist associations.378 
3.1.2 USIS Periodical Collection and the ‘Invaluable’ Pregled 
 
Magazines play a vital role in the process of communications. They are the 
vanguard of serious analysis […] the springboard for introducing new ideas in 
the sciences, literature, and the arts. They link the realm of instant 
communications with the world of books.379 
 
The USIA administration was particularly proud of the “richness and diversity of 
American periodical literature.”380 The Agency obtained the information on the kind of 
books and periodicals the audiences mostly preferred from two sources: the survey 
reports and the ICS statistical reports. The ICS List of Periodicals Recommended for 
Program Use was a selection guide for the foreign posts and included titles pertaining 
to the fields of political, international, cultural, educational and economic affairs, as 
well as entertainment and fashion magazines. Among the 648 titles of the Periodicals 
Recruitment for Program Use, readers were mostly attracted by Reader’s Digest, Time, 
Newsweek, Foreign Affairs, Atlantic Monthly, American Heritage, U.S. News & World 
Report, Current History, Fortune, Esquire, Architectural Forum, Art in America, NEA 
Journal, Today’s Health, American Literature, Theatre Arts, Opera News, American 
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Political Science Review, Publishers Weekly, Trans-Action (from November 1963), and 
Public Interest (from Fall 1965).381 
The American newspapers (international daily and Sunday editions) played a 
crucial role in attracting daily audiences; like the New York Times, Washington Post, 
Times Herald, New York Herald Tribune (became International Herald Tribune 1967), 
Christian Science Monitor, Washington Star, Wall Street Journal; the U.S. domestic 
magazines such as Saturday Review, Publishers Weekly, National Safety News, 
Broadcasting, Telecasting, Reporter, Business Week, and many more.382 
 Among the U.S. government publications, American Education, Foreign 
Agriculture, Monthly Labor Review, Problems of Communism, Public Health Report, 
and Survey of Current Business seemed very popular. However, readers were most 
pleased by all those colorfully illustrated, simply written and widely popular magazines, 
which were not on the ICS core list: Life, National Geographic, Sports Illustrated, 
Saturday Evening Post, Look, Scientific America, Holiday, Popular Mechanics, Popular 
Science Monthly, Better Homes and Gardens, Ebony, U.N. Monthly Chronicle, and New 
Yorker.383 Because of the USIS donations and the IMG Program, American periodicals 
were available in other cities besides Belgrade, Zagreb and Novi Sad: in 1968, for 
example, the Scientific Library of Dubrovnik held Life, Time, International Herald 
Tribune, National Geographic, Atlantic, Reader’s Digest, Read’s Marina Equipment 
News, and Pregled.384 
When, at the end of 1960, the USIA surveyed the most appreciated pamphlets 
abroad, USIS Belgrade chose, in order of relevance, Facts about the USA, Handbook on 
U.S. Economy, and Elections USA. Other titles enlisted revealed a high interest of 
Yugoslav readers in material covering general issues of the American life: USA – Its 
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Geography and Growth, City Pamphlets, Window to America, America’s Parks, Outline 
of History of the USA, and Man and Outer Space.385 
The first attempt at a fashionable, in loco, USIS magazine was Pregled’s 
predecessor, SAD, a Serbo-Croatian liberally illustrated publication in color and black-
white. Designed to be the Yugoslav counterpart of the Russian language magazine 
Amerika386, it started in December 1951 with 25,000 copies (the second issue increasing 
to 30,000) and consisted of 16 articles over 56 pages, a map of the United States and an 
introductory note of Ambassador Allen. 387  When in 1953 USIS sent 5,097 
questionnaires to SAD readers, the return level, around 42 percent, surprised the officers 
in the field.388 Individuals and Yugoslav official organizations, like the town libraries, 
voiced enthusiasm, requested more copies and added emotional comments of 
approval.389 The magazine appealed to both urban (Zagreb, Belgrade, Ljubljana, Rijeka, 
Osijek, Skopje, and Novi Sad) and rural population, which equally asked (99 percent of 
all) to receive more publications about the United States.390 
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Although dropped in 1954, probably because of financial troubles, the SAD project 
was not abandoned. In 1957, the American cultural officers in Belgrade started the most 
popular, fashionable and widespread USIS publication in Yugoslavia, the monthly 
periodical Pregled (Horizons). Published in Serbo-Croatian, but in the Serbian 
“ekavica” variant which brought complaints from Croatian readers, Pregled lasted from 
July 1957 to 1994.391 In the beginning, the magazine had a monthly circulation of 
12,000 copies and was distributed to persons all over Yugoslavia who, in the past, had 
showed some interest in USIS activities. 392  Only four years later, Pregled reached 
25,000 copies and was published 11 times per year in 66-colorful pages.393 
By avoiding any criticism of the Yugoslav communist society, it presented the 
American way of life, its social and political assets, as highly appealing, attractive and 
dynamic. A USIA survey conducted between December 1965 and June 1966 catches the 
periodical’s extraordinary popularity. The questionnaires, written in Serbo-Croatian, 
were sent in pre-stamped envelopes to 31,839 Yugoslav readers. Of 10,853 returns (34 
percent of the total, according to USIS a high response rate for a dictatorial regime), 
there were 4,546 replies giving their opinion of the magazine of which 99 percent were 
favorable or mostly favorable feedback (many of the returns added a separate letter 
where they expressed gratitude and appreciation of Pregled).394 
3.1.3 Battles for Hearts and Minds in Books, Pamphlets and Monthly 
Themes 
 
The Center’s focal point is the library, for books are purveyors of ideas, and 
the right book in the right hands at the right moment can be a powerful 
persuader.395 
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The following pages will not explore the USIA overall effort of telling America’s 
story abroad, neither present a comprehensive view of its priority themes in the 1950s 
and 1960s. 396  The intention is to underscore the specificity of USIA messages to 
Yugoslav audiences, while emphasizing common points of the American cultural 
propaganda in the European area. Laura Belmonte argues that “America’s ideological 
offensive was not a ham-handed, one-size-fits-all model, but a sophisticated endeavor 
utilizing the most advanced communications methodologies of the era.” The images of 
America as offered by USIA policymakers suggest how the United States constructed 
its national identity as defining and protecting national security, and how carefully 
constructed narratives of progress, freedom and happiness fused the material and 
immaterial into a discourse justifying American predominance in international affairs.397 
Such a process goes, notwithstanding, beyond the Cold War era. John Fousek 
asserts that the American nationalist globalism (“a tradition of thinking about American 
national mission and destiny”), while becoming predominant in 1950s public discourse, 
developed its key elements during WWII.398 Wendy Wall challenges this traditional 
interpretation by situating the creation of an “American character” and consensus 
earlier, during the Great Depression crises and the rising of Marxism and fascism. In a 
splintering society torn by economic hardship, suggests Wall, Americans of all political 
persuasions, economic backgrounds, religions, and ethnic and racial origins, latched 
onto a single unifying American Way in order to rescue the American experiment. In 
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focused on presidential propaganda rhetoric in Truman’s and Eisenhower’s era. An Italian perspective on 
USIA policies can be found in Simona Tobia, Advertising America. The United States Information 
Service in Italy (1945-1956) (Milano: LED, 2009) e Ascoltatori Italiani buonasera!: Voice of America e 
l’Italia 1942-1957 (Milano: Libraccio editore, 2014). For variable outlooks on USIA rhetoric and policy 
operations, look into Yale Richmond, Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2008); Donna Vincent Roa, Propaganda, Public Diplomacy & Idea Invasion: The Story 
of USIA’s Worldnet (Vincent Roa Group, LLC, 2016); Greg Barnhisel and Catherine Turner, eds., 
Pressing the Fight: Print, Propaganda, and the Cold War (University of Massachusetts Press, 2012). 
397 Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 28–29. 
398 John Fousek, To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 187. 
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such circumstances, democracy, free enterprise, Judeo-Christian tradition, and 
patriotism gained new meanings of ideals worth fighting for.399 
The USIA policy papers for Yugoslavia, its VOA broadcasts and Pregled 
magazine, targeted American values of democracy, capitalism, and freedom, frequently 
interweaving with one another, as priority messages. The USIA Recommendations for 
Scopes and Types of Programming in EUR Area Beginning FY 1957 or Earlier included 
the “American economic system,” “America as an adult in the world family of nations,” 
“America as a great hope for prosperity for all mankind,” “America as a «human 
institution» based on freedom and dignity of every individual”; and “the resourcefulness 
of America in terms of technology, business practices, looking ahead” as the chief 
propaganda themes.400 
The USIS ground rhetoric and program content relied on different, transversal 
initiatives. Worldwide programs like Truman’s “Full and Fair Picture” (1946), 
Eisenhower’s “Campaign of Truth” (1950) and “People’s Capitalism” (1955), and 
Johnson’s “Great Society” (1965) were presidential initiatives, limited in time, and 
usually focused on special exhibit events. 401  Political crises that suggested the 
superiority of American democratic capitalism (i.e. the Soviet suppression of the 1956 
Hungarian revolution, the 1961 Berlin Wall or the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) inspired 
the “advocacy” mission of the USIA and presented occasions for “talks” on the U.S. 
democratic traditions. Furthermore, the celebration of American historical anniversaries, 
remembrances of the Founding Fathers and significant personalities that “made 
America” inspired the field officers to present narratives on American exceptionalism. 
Finally, Pregled pages, USIS exhibit windows and VOA radio waves delivered monthly 
themes on the American life, domestic policies and foreign relations developments. 
There is a continuity of themes, from the late 1940s to the 1960s, in the U.S. 
cultural offensive abroad. The United States were such a great and wealthy superpower 
because they relied on a democratic system of individual freedom, while their high 
                                                 
399 Wendy L. Wall, Inventing the “American Way”: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal to the 
Civil Rights Movement, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
400 Recommendations for Scopes and Types of Programming in EUR Area Beginning FY 1957 or Earlier 
enclosed in Robert C. Hickok, IOP/E, to IOP and IOA Officers, Aug. 15, 1955, Box 16, USIA Subject 
Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
401 Study of USIS Libraries, Aug. 1967, File E-4-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-1978, USIA 
Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 1). 
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standard of living was a result of flexible social mobility, production innovations and 
competitive education.402 As a very early USIS pamphlet put it (The Gift of Freedom, 
1949), America’s unique “combination of circumstances – free labor, free unions, social 
consciousness […], sacred regard for individual human dignity, and economic capacity” 
was the highway to American workers’ wealth and high living standards.403 
According to Meet some Americans… at work (1951), released as part of the 
Truman’s “Full and Fair” campaign, American workers had ordinary, but nevertheless, 
cheerful and almost idyllic life conditions. As a color-sensitive publication, it presented 
African Americans integrated within U.S. working society. It displayed workers as free 
to pursue higher education by a system of scholarships and credits, and the American 
farmers as living “the freest life on Earth.” While building skyscrapers and metropolitan 
tunnels, semiskilled New York workers fought for just management in factory unions. 
Finally, everyone was smiling, the secretary and the storekeeper, the schoolteacher, the 
police officer, the tax collector, the journalist, the mail carrier, the lawyer, the 
housewife, and the artist.404 
In order to counter Marxist propaganda on capitalist workers’ exploitation, 
Yugoslav USIS centers distributed general pamphlets on American democratic unions 
(The American Labor Movement), comparative pamphlets on workers in free and 
totalitarian countries (Free or Slave Labor), and stories of miserable farmers in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Red China (The Farmer and His Land: Promises and 
                                                 
402  Making America’s free enterprise system known abroad is what Dawn Spring called a “nation 
branding strategy.” (Dawn Spring, Advertising in the Age of Persuasion: Building Brand America, 1941-
1961 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)). The role of the Advertising Council in branding “America” in the war 
and post-war era is explored in Inger L. Stole, Advertising at War: Business, Consumers, and 
Government in the 1940s (University of Illinois Press, 2012), 121–175. 
403 The Gift of Freedom, Jan. 1949, Box 10, Master Files Copies of Pamphlets and Leaflets 1953-1983, 
USIA IPS/Publication Division, RG 306, NACP. Another pamphlet created on the Whitman’s poems was 
the 1959 I Can Hear America Singing. Throughout the verses of Whitman’s homonym lyric, this 
pamphlet narrated, in naïve tones, the expansion of the American land from the Great Plains, through the 
Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Coast. In a triumphant tone, it proclaimed America’s land fertility, 
religious richness, and technological leadership (i.e. the Manhattan skyscrapers). America was a land 
where “the worker works eight-hours a day, [and] receives an equitable wage” (I Hear America Singing, 
1959, Box 1, Publications 1950-2000, USIA Information Programs, RG 306, NACP). 
404 Meet some Americans…at work, 1951, Box 1, Publications 1950-2000, USIA Information Programs, 
RG 306, NACP. 
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Facts).405 By mid-1952, centers in Belgrade and Zagreb distributed over 28,000 copies 
of Consumer Capitalism, renamed in Yugoslavia as The American System Works.406 
The most famous narrative about America’s free enterprise system was certainly 
the 1955 “People’s Capitalism” campaign created by long-serving president of the 
Advertising Council, Theodore S. Repplier, and Eisenhower’s close advisor. Under the 
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship, Repplier spent six months traveling to Burma, 
Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Laos, Singapore, Philippines, Pakistan, India, then 
Egypt, Greece, Italy, England, hence becoming “the first non-government American to 
study our information activities abroad.” Upon his return, he found “capitalism 
synonymous with either colonial exploitation or restrictive practices,” and felt the 
United States needed an “inspirational concept” to counteract this “serious propaganda 
handicap.” He recommended the name and helped the USIA create an exhibit 
representing “America’s system of free enterprise capitalism.” 407  The campaign 
envisioned glorifying the achievements of the American middle class, such as the 
growth of its income, the abundance of opportunities, and the ownership of capital of a 
large number of Americans.408 Devised for wide-reaching trade fairs around the world, 
the main aim of the exhibit was to persuade people that American capitalism was not 
Marx’s Capitalism.409 On February 14 and 15, 1956, almost 25,000 people, including 
100 invited foreign journalists, filed through the main hall of Washington’s Union 
Station to preview “People’s Capitalism” where two homes were displayed: a common 
dwelling in 1776 and a modern, 1956 prefabricated steel house stocked with new 
furniture and labor-saving appliances.410 Along with the exhibit, PAOs abroad received 
feature packets of press releases, speeches, magazine reprints, glossy photographs 
                                                 
405 Airgram 682 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
Oct. 7, 1950, 511.00/10-750, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
406 Semiannual Evaluation Report – Yugoslavia enclosed in despatch from Belgrade to the Department of 
State, Dec. 17, 1952, 511.68/12-1752, Box 2247, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
407 Spring, Advertising in the Age of Persuasion, 144–145.  
408 Excerpt from Speech by the Honorable Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, over the Mutual 
Broadcasting System, Dec. 1, 1955, Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; Hixson, 
Parting the Curtain, 133. 
409 Information Campaign on the American Economy by Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the USIA, 
Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP.  
410 The People’s Capitalism Exhibit: a Study of Reactions of Foreign Visitors to the Washington Preview, 
March 1956, IRI.G.7., Box 38, Research Memoranda 1963-1999, USIA Office of Research and Media 
Reaction, RG 306, NACP. 
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which focused on the U.S. economic system, cultural events, Hollywood, women’s 
education, labor, sports and other subjects. Obviously, neither the pamphlets nor the 
exhibits were concerned with domestic criticism of the American economic system or 
aggravated forms of urban poverty. Hence “convinced that they could not answer such 
criticism directly without undermining «People’s Capitalism», U.S. information 
officials tried to divert attention to the positive features of democratic capitalism,” states 
Laura Belmonte.411 
Other two very rhetorically innovative pamphlets were The People’s Capitalism 
(1956) and Primer of the American Economy (1957). The first was a report 
summarizing a roundtable held at Yale University in November 1956. By gathering the 
best American economists, professors and intellectuals, business and labor 
representatives, the pamphlet stressed the changing nature of American capitalism, in 
order to dismantle the propagandist caricature of capitalism as the bloated selfish 
exploiter of the masses. Indeed, the publication sent two basic messages: first, that 
capitalism in the United States was a subject of vivid discussion, not an imposed status 
quo (as in the Soviet Union); secondly, that the “new American capitalism” was 
creating a new type of owners, shareholders, small and medium enterprise business 
persons, and farm owners. 412  The second pamphlet, whereas addressing the same 
argument, used quite a different strategy. In Primer of the American Economy an 
English student at the Tuck School of Business Administration, was the narrator’s voice 
making a general eulogy to the American economic system.413 
USIS celebrated America’s democracy through U.S. historical anniversaries, as was 
that of President Abraham Lincoln’s 150th birthday in February 1959. Pregled devoted 
its entire issue to this “typical representative of remarkable American qualities.”414 The 
                                                 
411 Belmonte, Selling the American Way, 224–225. For further details and impact analysis, see pages 220–
226 and Hixson, Parting the Curtain, 133–141. 
412  The roundtable collected leading personalities from Yale University, the Advertising Council, 
Washington Post and Time Herald, Ford Glass Company, Transportation Displays, Holiday Magazine, 
and C.J. La Roche & Company (People’s Capitalism by David M. Potter, Yale University and The 
Advertising Council, Part I, Nov. 16-17, 1956, Box 19, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; 
Spring, Advertising in the Age of Persuasion, 145). 
413 A Primer on the American Economy by Christopher Buxton, 1957 enclosed in John M. Begg, IOC, to 
E. J. Heffron, IOC, May 31, 1957, Box 19, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
414 David M. Potter, “Lincoln i značaj Američke unije,” Pregled, February 1959, 2. 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
106  Carla Konta - April 2016 
American post in Belgrade received 10,000 copies of the Lincoln pamphlet.415 The 
movie Face of Lincoln (26’ in black-and-white); collected works, selected speeches and 
his writings, Lincoln’s biography by Paul McClelland Angle, William Herdon, Jesse 
Weik, and Carl Sandburg; and special historical studies, drama and literature pieces, 
books for children and youth, appeared in the library. 
The Pregled’s narratives focused on the image of President Lincoln as the 
incarnation of U.S. democracy, an inspiration for worldwide freedom struggles, an 
American of universal character but humble working-class provenience, a symbol of 
patriotism and unity, the savior of the Union and democracy for the entire humanity.416 
Yugoslav USIS libraries were regularly furnished with the American Democratic 
Concepts, a special reference list on the U.S. political system, the Constitution, the 
Presidency, the Congress, the Courts, the elections and the two-party system.417 Yet 
Yugoslav audiences were eagerly fascinated by technical information about the United 
States and the American everyday life. “Fed up to the teeth with propaganda in its 
natural state,” Yugoslavs preferred “American Factories,” “Small Town America” or 
“New York and Its People,” to conventional titles such as The Democratic Way of Life 
(and indeed, USIS officers in Yugoslavia were advised to avoid any films, publications 
and exhibit material beset with straightforward propaganda).418 
The variety of USIS publications produced in loco expresses this attentiveness to 
technological and cultural knowledge. Indeed, some of the most noticeable were Vesti 
ove nedjelje (News of the Week) and Građa za urednike (Materials for Editors), both 
weeklies printed in 600 and 400 copies; then Šta ima novog u SAD (What is New in the 
U.S.), Ljudi i događaji (People and events) and Medicinski Bilten (Medical Bulletin), 
                                                 
415 Message 1503 from USIA CA to USIA circular, Nov. 28, 1958, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 
1953-1964, RG 306, NACP. 
416 Pregled, February 1959, 2–20.  
417 Message 143 from USIA CA to all principal USIS posts and Barcelona, Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, 
Istanbul, Ankara, Lahore, Madras, and Zagreb, July 17, 1957, Box 7, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-
1964, RG 306, NACP; List of Reference Materials enclosed in Airgram 81 from the Department of State 
to All American Diplomatic and Consular Posts, July 13, 1962, 511.00/7-1362, Box 1046, CDF 1960-
1963, RG 59, NACP. 
418 USIE Country Paper – Yugoslavia enclosed in circular 2 from Belgrade to the Department of State, 
July 3, 1950, 511.68/7-350, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
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three monthly publications printed in 400 and 500 copies. 419  Other attractive 
publications were Poljoprivredni Bilten (Agricultural Bulletin) in 4,000 copies, 
Ekonomski bilten (Economic Bulletin) in 3,000 copies, and Prosvetni Bilten 
(Educational Bulletin) and Vojni Bilten (Military Bulletin) both in 400 copies.420 
Not surprising then that Pregled, which elaborated the pamphlet subjects in more 
sophisticated terms, had such a widespread demand and enthusiastic reception. Yet 
beside economic and political issues, Pregled addressed themes of special social 
interest, such as the American women, the gender roles and family images. Crucially, 
family and gender narratives would gain a central point in the cultural Cold War 
struggle with the Soviet Union. Elaine T. May unveiled how many Americans embraced 
domesticity and traditional gender roles as an antidote to anxieties unleashed by atomic 
weapons and political instability. Particularly, Cold War public ideology was crucial in 
shaping post-war American family roles, the images of the bread-winning man and the 
children-dedicated housewife in white suburban neighborhoods. Yet these roles 
changed in the 1960s, when the baby boom generation aged and women sought to crush 
their domesticity boundaries on the wave of the second American feminism inspired by 
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963).421 
It is very illuminating to follow Pregled articles as gender roles began to change 
from the early to the late 1960s, particularly reflecting on women’s choices of maternity 
or career (or sometimes both). In November 1961, an article stated that even if women 
were satisfied with occupying leading management positions, “for many young women 
the happiest day is the one when she leaves service to get married.” And continued, 
                                                 
419 Pravo na propagandu – Pravni savet DSIPa, March 2, 1956, Pov. br. 91022/1, Box 55, Materijali 
komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
420 UDBA Report, May 20, 1953, XI-109-VI-36, Box 6, Komisija za međunarodne odnose i veze 1945-
1990, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ. 
421 At the time it was published, The Feminine Mystique became an instant best-seller and inspiration for 
millions of American women in which Friedan elevated nondomestic achievement, demoted full-time 
domesticity toa lower status and legitimated open protest against what she called the “housewife trap” 
(Joanne Meyerowitz, “Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946-
1958,” The Journal of American History 79, no. 4 (March 1, 1993): 1481–82). Nevertheless, as the main 
critics awakened, although Friedan was writing during the civil rights era, she barely mentioned African-
American women, she ignored the status of the working-class women, and she never discussed American 
laws limiting women’s autonomy in credit, property or earning issues (Gail Collins, “Introduction,” in 
Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique, ed. Gail Collins and Anna Quindlen, 50th Anniversary Edition 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), xi–xix). For more, see Elaine T. May, Homeward Bound: 
American Families in the Cold War Era, Revisited and updated edition (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
2008). 
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The daughters and grandchildren of feminists who fought for the right to vote and 
women’s equality with men serve their husbands and homes without words. They aspire 
to get married and raise children by marrying at an average age of 20 with young men 
of 23. Even if today the majority of young girls attend college, still there is a smaller 
number of those who wish to devote their lives to poetry, painting and public life than 
was the case twenty years ago. As students, many of them are already married.422 
 
But circumstances for American women changed and by 1965, in an issue 
dedicated exclusively to women, an article commenced in a slightly different tone: 
Both those who admire her and those who criticize her, agree that the American 
woman can be always recognized because she possesses a number of characteristics: she 
is beautiful and youthful, vigorous and capable, independent, restless, confused and 
disappointed, but more than anything, happy. Whether this picture is the truth or not, the 
American woman is more suited to these descriptions, mainly because she has always 
led movements that changed the way we understand the world and our institutions, 
profound changes that shook up and confused men and women all around the world.423 
 
Pregled photographs depicted fashion women of all colors, often cheerful, or 
immersed in working and intellectual activities. In April 1964, Pregled’s back cover 
portrayed a stereotyped lady, relaxed and smiling, satisfied and wealthy with her nails 
red and fancy white clothing.424 Articles emphasized women’s new job opportunities; 
they were doctors, industrial workers, laboratory researchers, and academic professors. 
The examples were almost infinite; the notable stage and television actress Julie 
Harris,425 the gospel singers and activist Mahalia Jackson, the chess champion Lisa 
Line,426 the vanguard painters Jane Wilson, Joan Mitchell, Grace Hartigan and Lee 
Bontecou,427 the CEO and owner of the King Bee Manufacturing Company, Zella Ritz-
Voller,428 and Ella Fitzgerald, the first Lady of Jazz429. Yet images of young American 
mothers walking with their babies along the New York’s Fifth Avenue, proved that, 
despite her infinite working opportunities, the American woman was still interested in 
motherhood.430 
                                                 
422 “Američke žene,” Pregled, November 1961, 61. 
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Nowadays, reported Pregled, women in America have greater access to qualified 
jobs, 431  “the family is democratizing,” and “the participation of women […] is 
extending to financial issues.”432 The issue of November 1967 reported further curious 
stories: 
Last year André Robertson from Hicksville on Long Island in the New York State, who 
is happily married and has four children, made a very important decision: she decided to 
work as an assistant teacher in a summer school for culturally undeveloped children. 
Afterwards, André Robertson will make another important decision: to enroll or not in a 
two-year study course for a teacher’s degree […].433 
 
Many American housewives had a dream, a job outside their homes, and the 
American dream made their aspirations come true.434 Stories on “average American 
families” living in private suburban homes, with five rooms, a television, a radio, a 
fridge and an automatic laundry machine,435 reinforced the gender and family narratives 
on affluence, prosperity and free choice. It is hard to deduce which of these stories had a 
stronger emotional impact on the Yugoslav women in the 1960s. However, we can 
presume, as Radina Vučetić suggests, that the abundance of the American ordinary life, 
the items at the supermarkets and their price, as well as the household appliances that 
helped housewives’ daily work, certainly made the foremost effect in a socialist country 
where shortages of consumer goods could not satisfy the needs.436 It was Pregled’s 
strategy to solicit a comparison of the American and Yugoslav systems, and 
subsequently to deduce that the American one was highly superior from every point of 
view.437 
                                                 
431 “Žene radnice,” Pregled, January 1965, 12–24. 
432 “Promene u američkoj porodici,” Pregled, January 1965, 25–26. 
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434 Ibid, 50–54. 
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3.2 USIS Movies within Yugoslav Territory: From Centers to 
Peripheries 
 
We often tolerate artistic productions from the West, because ours are not 
attractive enough. In this way, we justify the lower number of viewings of our 
films.438 
 
Movies embody one of the most powerful communication and entertainment 
medium of today and this was true especially in the wave of the cultural Cold War. 
Recent comparative and transnational scholarly studies revealed how the Cold War 
forged the longest and most sophisticated cinematic conflict in history between the 
American and Soviet film industries that lasted more than four decades. 439  In 
Hollywood’s Cold War, Tony Shaw evidenced how the American film industry entered 
the conflict for profit and propaganda reasons. Moreover, Hollywood-State relationships 
were far more consensual than that between filmmakers and government in the 
communist regimes, simply because their owners and employees shared Washington’s 
ideological worldview. In fact, while in some instances the Washington propaganda 
agencies merely assisted in making or trimmed movies, on other occasions, agencies 
such as the FBI, CIA and USIA financed, produced and marketed films. 440 
Nevertheless, those who refused adaptation to these “Cold War” criteria, were 
blacklisted or marginalized.441 
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From the 1930s on, Hollywood movies dominated the film public sphere in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Apart from the inter-period 1944 to 1949/1950 (from the 
liberation of Belgrade to the unreserved rupture with Stalinism), when Soviet movies 
overshadowed Yugoslav cinemas, the next decades saw American movies almost 
continuously exceeding the Soviet ones (and West and Eastern European) in number, 
projections, and audience affection.442 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the movies were the most popular entertainment in 
Yugoslavia. In 1958, for a population of some 19 million inhabitants, mostly of rural 
and semi-urban areas, there were approximately 120 million paid admissions to the 
movies.443 Tito himself was a “movie addicted” personality: his private cine-operator 
recounts that there were years when the Yugoslav dictator watched one film per day, 
mostly Westerns, as his favorite pastime.444 The westerns had such a profound impact 
on Yugoslav movie makers that they invented the genre of “partisan western,” which 
narrated the National liberation struggle of World War II (Narodno-oslobodilačka borba 
or NOB) between partisans and fascist-Nazis forces as action battles between cowboys 
and Indians in John Wayne western style.445 
In Tito’s Yugoslavia, American movies arrived through two main channels. 
Yugoslavia imported Hollywood movies through the IMG program, which meant that 
the films were imported at very low prices because they were paid in dinars, owned by 
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partizanskoj uniformi: američki vesterni i partizanski vesterni u Jugoslaviji šezdesetih godina 20. veka,” 
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the Veljko Bulajić’s Vlak bez voznog reda (Train without schedule, 1959). While Vučetić emphasizes the 
American influence on Yugoslav directors, Ivo Škrabalo and Nikica Gilić avow that these trends actually 
derive from highbrow cultural traditions linked to the West and antecedent to the film era (Škrabalo, 
Hrvatska filmska povijest ukratko, and Nikica Gilić, Uvod u povijest hrvatskog igranog filma (Zagreb: 
Leykam International, 2011), 84–85. 
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the U.S. government at the Yugoslav National Bank, at an advantageous exchange rate. 
Hollywood made its way thanks to visits of Eric Johnston, president of the Motion 
Picture Association of America, in 1948 and 1957.446 The second channel brought the 
USIA movies that were “extremely short, of news-reel length” documentaries or 
educational movies.447 In Yugoslavia, USIS movie documentaries spanned from science 
(chemistry, geology, physics, and geography) to literature, art and foreign relations. The 
USIS Film Program, conducted by USIA’s International Motion Pictures Service, fall 
into three categories: the invitational showings on USIS premises; the film loans to 
Yugoslav organizations; and the commercial film distribution of USIS movies. We will 
concentrate on the first two categories because, as Joseph Kolarek pointed out in 1959, 
the commercial distribution of USIS movies proved to be completely unsuccessful.448 
The USIS mobile motion-picture units penetrated “the back country to the end of the 
road,” and a bit beyond, “bringing an American message on the silver screen to 
thousands of rural dwellers at a single showing, many of whom have never visited their 
own country’s capital city,” observed Robert E. Elder.449 Indeed, the American missions 
in Belgrade and Zagreb created an unprecedented network of movie circulations, the 
potential impact of which has not, to date, been explored. 
3.2.1 Showing, Lending, and Educating 
From 1953 onwards, foreign movies could enter Yugoslavia by the Jugoslavija film 
enterprise and the foreign cultural missions. Following approval by Jugoslavija film, the 
film was delivered to the Federal Commission for Film Review (Savezna komisija za 
pregled filmova) then passed to the Republic commissions. As for the USIS movie 
section, it was subject to the Federal Commission who were permitted to rent movies to 
                                                 
446 Radina Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslavenske popularne kulture šezdesetih 
godina XX veka (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012), 84–110. Johnston personally met President Tito in 
April 1957 (Eric Johnston, predsednik Motion Picture Association of America, April 1957, I-3-a/107-57, 
Box 57, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, Kabinet Predsednika Republike (hereafter KPR), RG 837, 
Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (hereafter AJBT)). 
447  Alessandro Brogi, Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the 
Communists in France and Italy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 174, 175–177; 
Charles A. Hobbie, The Time of the Monkey, Rooster, and Dog: A Peace Corps Volunteer’s Years in 
Korea (Bloomington: iUniverse, 2011), 146, 228. 
448 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 26. 
449 Robert R. Elder, The Information Machine. The United States Information Agency and American 
Foreign Policy (Syracuse University Press, 1968), xi. 
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Yugoslav organizations only if free of charge.450 The Regulation of Film Reviews for 
Public Showing of May 4, 1953 (Uredba o pregledu filmova za javno prikazivanje) and 
the Film Law of April, 18, 1956, prohibited the American posts to provide public movie 
showings.451 Each spectator had to be personally invited. Although for some time USIS 
tried to get around this device and posted a notice advising those interested to pick up 
the invitation at the door, the Yugoslav authorities protested that “it was not in the spirit 
of the law.” The practice was dropped, and the American missions set up to develop a 
special audience: they selected some 70 films and obtained the names of clubs, 
associations, and individuals possibly interested in their projection. Through phone calls 
and personal visits they established a list of contacts, members, and began to send 
personal invitations to “science enthusiasts, engineers, workers, painters, musicians, 
architects, doctors, photographic groups, [and] mountaineers.”452 
By the mid-1950s, the regulations on movie showings (both mobile and in posts) 
and film lending activities varied from republic to republic.453 The film showings at the 
Belgrade auditorium had to be approved by the city’s Film Censorship Committee, but 
mobile projections in the surrounding places were permitted.454  In Croatia, the major 
downfall of film showings and mobile trip operations to Croatian, Slovenian and 
Bosnian schools dropped considerably when, in 1954, the Republic’s Secretariat of 
Education, Science and Culture “circularized teachers, instructing them that all foreign 
documentaries had to be borrowed through the Zagreb Office of the Secretariat.”455 
Henceforward, USIS Zagreb only continued to distribute catalogs and maintain direct 
contact with the final users. 
                                                 
450 Pitanje propagandnih stranih misija u FNRJ, June 3, 1953, Pov. br. 92562, Box 44, Materijali komisije 
za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 15-17. 
451 Pravni položaj stranih kulturnih institucija – Pravni savet DSIPa, 1956, 1651/1, Box 55, Materijali 
komisije za međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 22. 
452 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 24. 
453 In 1954, the American posts in Yugoslavia owned two mobile units and 27 film projectors for showing 
in suburban and rural areas (IMS Budget FY 1954, July 7, 1953, Box 8, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-
1964, RG 306, NACP). 
454 USIE Report 610 for April and May 1950, June 20, 1950, 511.68/6-2050, Box 2472, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP. 
455 Despatch 156 from USIS Zagreb to USIA Washington, June 26, 1956, Box 4, Europe and Canada, 
USIA Foreign Service Dispatches, RG 306, NACP. The same telegram reported that the director of the 
Lower State Gymnasium of Bosanska Kupa (Bosnia-Herzegovina) commented of the film lending 
program: “all the movies you loaned us […] contributed to widening the cultural horizon of the students 
[…] we often could not borrow because of the insufficient number of copies. We would like to see more 
movies about the U.S. in the Second World War, and more travelogues about America.” 
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Since the early 1950s, the USIS post in Belgrade had at their disposition more than 
400 movies, two vehicles with integrated movie projectors, an automatic translation 
machine, a machine for automatic photo slides, and gave weekly projections of 
American movies in Zemun, Pančevo, Šumadija, Vojvodina and Novi SAD. 456 
Preoccupied by such a propaganda machine and decisive at preventing the foreign 
cultural missions from “publicizing materials at their convenience,” 457  in 1957 the 
Yugoslav authorities decided to set up several film distribution centers in each of the six 
republics. Two years later, further restricted laws prohibited USIS to directly distribute 
the movie catalogs. Then, the lending activities declined a further 30 percent,458 while 
the foreign missions were obliged to “distribute only films of non-propagandist 
character.”459 
Henceforth, the Yugoslav government instituted new distribution centers that 
would be responsible for foreign movie lending, sending foreign catalogs, 
communicating with foreign cultural missions, and regulating their members’ 
registration. Among these, the Cultural Center Belgrade (Kulturni centar Beograd) 
operated for Serbia, the Center for Cultural, Educational and Teaching Film (Centar za 
kulturno-prosvjetni film i nastavni film) and the Film Library Nikola Tesla (Filmoteka 
N. Tesla) for Croatia Zagreb. 460  In Rijeka, there was the Distribution Center 
(Distribucioni Centar); in Sarajevo, the Teaching Film (Prosvjeta film); in Osijek, the 
Center for Film of the University for Adults (Sveučiliste za odrasle – Centar za film) 
                                                 
456 Propaganda kapitalističkih zemalja u Jugoslaviji, 1953, 724/1953, Box 44, Materijali komisije za 
međunarodne veze 1950-1959, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 18–20. 
457 Republički sekretarijat za informacije, July 10, 1964, 8/54-1964, Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, 
Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA. 
458  Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 26. Still, in 1959, the mobile units of the 
American posts projected 715 movies in 4,724 showings, attended on average by 810,000 citizens of the 
most remote villages of Yugoslavia (Prevođenje i štampanje knjiga američkih pisaca po BTP, Nov. 25, 
1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i 
kulturu, RG 318, AJ). 
459 Republički sekretarijat za informacije, July 10, 1964, 8/54-1964, Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, 
Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA. 
460 The Zagreb distribution center belonged to the Republican Secretariat of Culture and, besides the 
American posts, it provided service to the British Council, the French Institute and the House of Soviet 
Culture. From 1965, in the wave of the decentralization processes that affected the cultural institutions 
after the 1963 Constitution, the responsibility of movie lending activities transferred to Filmoteka 16, at 
that time the major film library in Zagreb (Republički sekretarijat za informacije, July 10, 1964, 8/54-
1964 and Posudba filmova inozemnih ustanova, May 17, 1964, 2/38-1965 in Box 42, Kinematografija 
1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA).  
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and the Center for the Advancement of Technical Education (Centar za unaprijeđenje 
tehničkog obrazovanje); and in Skopje, the Department of Cultural, Educational and 
Teaching Movies (Zavod za kulturno prosveten i nastaven film).461  
In order to match the new Yugoslav film regulations, in 1962 all the foreign 
cultural missions sent to the Belgrade Cultural Center the majority or part of their film 
holdings: 244 from the American post; 285 from the British Council; 173 from the 
French Institute; and 25 and 24 from the Indian and Czech posts. The Russian Home of 
Culture discharged its entire collection. 462  Though resistance remained alive, the 
American cultural mission continued to directly contact the movie users, and many 
Yugoslav institutions resisted mediation as well (for this reason the American center, 
with the Soviet Home, was defined as a propagandistic-political institution).463 
USIS movie section furnished an extensive network of Yugoslav educational 
institutes, foremost schools, colleges and universities. An ample 1964 dossier of the 
Croatian Republican Secretariat of Culture, found in the Croatian State Archives, offers 
a minutely detailed description of the lending processes, the mechanisms of contacts, 
their geographical impact and covers the lending activities of the Croatian Center for 
Cultural, Educational and Teaching Film from January to June and from October to 
December 1964.464 This extensive list of the institutes that asked for USIS movies 
comprehended every region and the main city of the Republic of Croatia. It includes 
Croatian primary schools from Zagreb, Varaždin, Podravska Slatina, Niš, Slunj, 
Daruvar, Mošćenička Draga and Konjščina; high schools from Zagreb, Makarska, Sinj, 
Vukovar, Slavonska Požega;465 the state colleges from Zagreb, Rijeka, Varaždin, Krk, 
                                                 
461 This information has been collected from several documents with identification numbers 8/6-1964, 
8/24-1964, 8/11-1964, 8/14-1964 located in Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat 
za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA. 
462 Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane 
propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
463  Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, Feb. 2, 1962, 232, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju 
inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 19–20. 
464 According to the statistics of the Republican Secretariat, in 1964 297 USIS movies were rented, 1,067 
projections given to 95,819 spectators (Dostavljanje godišnjeg izvještaja o korištenju filmskog fonda, 
Dec. 19, 1964, 8/142-1964, Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 
1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA). 
465 The mentioned Zagreb schools were: the 1st and 3rd Gymnasiums, the High School for Physical 
Culture, the School Center for Education of Staff in Commerce, the Technical School Klaićeva and P. 
Pilota, the School for Tourism, the High Neuropsychological School, and the Railway Traffic School. 
Surprisingly, among the 14 Zagreb schools mentioned, four were catholic: the Religious High School, the 
 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
116  Carla Konta - April 2016 
Otočac, Ploče, Metković, Koprivnica, Bosanski Novi, Senj, Ivanić Grad, and Samobor; 
university faculties and research institutes from Zagreb, Gospić, Split, Belgrade, Skopje, 
Đakovo, and Rijeka; 466  hospitals and care facilities, 467  cultural and professional 
associations, reading rooms, and industry councils.468 
The USIA movies ranged from popular science (A is for Atom, Nuclear Ship 
Savannah, The Story about Fuel, Satellite Research, Atomic power and the USA), 
geography (All about New York, San Francisco, The Mountain), to popular medicine 
(The Story of Doctor Jucawi); from history and art (The Face of President Lincoln, The 
Life of Indians, Museum of Art, Pan-American Festival, The Boston Symphony 
Orchestra, The Art of Maya, Abstract Art), to agriculture (Preservation of Fruit and 
Vegetables by Freezing, Farmer at his Job, Harvest Carried Out by One Man), to 
international and domestic U.S. events (Tito in the United States, Inauguration of 
President Kennedy, Kennedy’s Journey to Europe, The Story about John Glenn).469 
                                                                                                                                               
Inter-diocesan School, the Franciscan High School and the High School for Priests Kaptol. Other high 
schools that appeared in the list were the Textile School Vukovar, the School for Medical Nurses Šibenik, 
the School for Students in Enterprise Slavonska Požega, the Garden School “Arboretum opeka” Vinica 
and the Franciscan High School Sinj. 
466 The Medical, Theological, Social Sciences, Veterinarian, Economic, Agricultural and Technological 
faculties of the Zagreb University, the Pedagogical Academy Gospić, the Medical Faculty Skopje, the 
Electro Technical Faculty Split, the Economic Faculty Rijeka, the Institute of Pathophysiology of the 
Medical Faculty Belgrade, the Institute of Oncology of the Clinical Hospital Ljubljana, and the 
Histological-Embryological Institute of the Medical Faculty in Ljubljana. Among the catholic theological 
institutes appeared the Diocesan Seminary of Split, the High Seminarian School in Đakovo, the 
Franciscan High Seminary in Makarska, and lastly from Zagreb the Theological Institute, the Seminary of 
Conventual Franciscans, the Seminary of the Holy Spirit and the Theological Institute of Jordanovac. 
467 The School of Public Health A. Štampar, the Health Station in the company “Kombinat – Borovo,” the 
Public Health Home “Peščenica” and “Trešnjevka” in Zagreb, “M. Pijade” in Petrinja, the Zagreb 
hospitals “Zelengaj” and “Rockfellerova.” 
468 The majority of them were from Zagreb: the Photochemistry Industry, the Centre for Education Rade 
Končar, the Radio Television and School Radio Television Zagreb, the Military Posts, the Pioneer City, 
the Aero Club, the Technical Museum, the Tuškanac Kindergarten, and the Student Homes of the 
Seminary and Technical School. The others were: the Alliance for Physical Education – Students 
Croatian Club Zadar, the Library and Reading Room Mursko Središće, the People’s Reading Room 
Omišalj, the Company Engineers and Technicians of Cotton Industry Klanjec, the Aeronautics Section of 
the Flying Club “Wings of Kvarner” Rijeka, the 3. Maj Shipyard Rijeka, the Electro Technical Society 
SR Croatia, the Center for the Workers Education Bedekovčina, the Iron Foundry and Machine Factory 
Slavonska Požega, the Horse Association of Serbia, the Yugoslav Red Cross, the Club of Geography 
Students, the Service for the Narrow Movie Zadar and Virovitica, the Municipal Assembly Remetinac, 
the Center for Adult Education Karlovac, and the Societies of Automotive, of the National Technique 
Nikola Tesla, of the Hungarian Cultural Association, of Engineers and Technicians Sisak, and of the 
Mountaineering Club Sljeme. All the above lists have been collected from Box 42, Kinematografija 1964-
1965, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA. 
469 Centar za kulturno-prosvjetni film i nastavni film, April 2, 1964, I9/64, Box 42, Republički sekretarijat 
za kulturu SRH, 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA; Centar za kulturno-prosvjetni film i nastavni film, April 10, 
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The content of the movies followed the theme-patterns of a post’s library, its 
pamphlets and its Pregled periodical. Many portrayed ideal and ideological projections 
of American Life as inspiring, competitive and personally fulfilling. There’s Music in 
the Town (USIA, 1954), by depicting the New England High School Musical ensemble, 
its students practicing, after-school activities, earning money for instruments, typified 
“the genuine interest [of American] students in developing their musical skills,” their 
“satisfaction of self-expression,” and the “deeper appreciation of the world around 
them.” 470  Others as Man’s Machines (USIA, 1957) – suggested for government 
officials, management groups, schools, and universities – emphasized that automatic 
machines were the major factor in raising the American standard of living and liberating 
“the wage earner from unpleasant toil.”471 Finally, politically hot movies, as Tito in the 
U.S. (News of the Day, 1964), while presenting Tito’s 1963 visit to Kennedy and 
evincing Tito as “a leader who has traveled widely and whose country has played a 
significant role in world affairs,” delivered a highly symbolical account of the American 
Revolution and historical liberties.472 
In Williamsburg, Virginia, Marshall Tito saw an America conscious of its revolutionary past, 
[that] remind[ed] every visitor of the way Americans of 200 years ago lived and worked, 
dreamed of liberty and, when the time came, fought for it. […] The revolution set in motion the 
creative forces that were to shape the dynamic society of 20th century America, [where] the 
press was the people’s voice of protest and rebellion. […] On his visit to New York, President 
Tito saw this vitality in a city as diverse as America itself.473 
Yugoslav organizations handled these and analogous USIA movies through the 
Republican secretariats of culture, in charge of censoring these materials by controlling 
their territorial dissemination. In the same way as for other U.S. public diplomacy 
activities, the Yugoslav authorities played between toleration, restraint and institutional, 
                                                                                                                                               
1964, 8/3-1964, Box 42, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH, 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA; Filmovi iz 
područja nuklearne energije, April 30, 1964, T-MM/VM-931, Box 42, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu 
SRH, 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA. 
470 Telegram 624 from USIA CA to USIS posts, March 31, 1954, Box 8, USIA Master Budget Files 
1953-1964, RG 306, NACP. 
471 Outgoing message 830 from USIA CA to USIA circular, Oct. 2, 1957, Box 7, U.S. Information 
Agency: Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 306, National Archives. 
472 Transcript of the motion picture “President Tito in the U.S.”, News of the Day, 1964, enclosed in 
Office Memorandum from E.C. Conte to IMS New York Staff, March 18, 1964, Box 34, Movie Scripts 
1942-1965, USIA, RG 306, NACP. 
473 Transcript of “President Tito in the U.S.” (1964) enclosed in E.C. Conte to IMS/NY, March 18, 1964, 
Box 34, USIA Movie Scripts 1942-1965, RG 306, NACP. 
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often invisible, forms of control. As we shall observe in the final paragraph, varied 
institutional ties constrained American propaganda in a boundary between censorship 
and liberty that moved along political, often arbitrary, lines. 
 
3.3 A Cold War ‘Case’: The Civil Rights Struggle in the 
American Cultural Mission in Yugoslavia 
 
We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by 
the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. 
Martin Luther King, Jr.474 
 
Among all the USIS themes delivered to Yugoslav audiences, the African 
American civil rights struggle best illustrates how the U.S. public diplomacy became a 
weapon of foreign policy, and represents a special case.475 As scholarly research shows, 
from the early 1950s on, the U.S. State Department became increasingly concerned that 
domestic racial relations could have a negative impact “on the dozens of countries on 
the verge of independence from Western colonial powers;” the new nations’ view of 
racism in the United States would be a strong reason for them to ally themselves with 
the Soviet Union rather than with America.476 As Brenda Plummer demonstrated, the 
                                                 
474 Letter from Birmingham jail, April 16, 1963 quoted in Jonathan Rieder, Gospel of Freedom: Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s Letter from Birmingham Jail and the Struggle That Changed a Nation (Bloomsbury 
Publishing USA, 2013), 59. 
475 For more details, see Carla Konta, “Languages of Freedom in a Coca-Cola Communist Country,” in 
Discourses of Emancipation and the Boundaries of Freedom. Selected Papers from the 22nd AISNA 
Biennial International Conference, ed. Leonardo Buonomo and Elisabetta Vezzosi (EUT Edizioni 
Università di Trieste, 2015), 243–51. 
476 Ingrid T. Monson, Freedom Sounds: Civil Rights Call Out to Jazz and Africa (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 107-108. From the mid-1990s on, scholars began to study how the civil 
rights struggle was shaped by the Cold War, the emergence of the “global South,” and the anti-
colonialization movement. Among many scholarly works, are recommended Michael Krenn, Black 
Diplomacy: African Americans and the State Department, 1945-1969 (Armonk, N.Y.: Routledge, 1999); 
Brenda G. Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960, (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color 
Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University 
Press, 2001). Other important studies include Brenda G. Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil 
Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Richard 
Lentz and Karla K. Gower, The Opinions of Mankind : Racial Issues, Press, and Propaganda in the Cold 
War (Columbia: University of Missouri, 2010); Robert C. Lieberman, Shaping Race Policy: The United 
States in Comparative Perspective (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011); Daniel S. 
Lucks, Selma to Saigon: The Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War (Lexington, Kentucky: 
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worldwide demands for decolonization put new pressures for change in race relations in 
America and African-American involvement in international affairs, 477  while the 
NAACP and its leaders exerted their power in order to take their human rights agenda 
before the United Nations.478 Undoing the negative impact of domestic racial relations 
became part of Washington’s foreign policy agenda; by sending ambassadors for jazz 
and African-American sportsmen abroad, American policymakers intended to overcome 
hostile international responses to the violent repression of the national civil rights 
struggle.479 
Since the early 1950s, the USIA proposed the supposed domestic advancement of 
African-Americans as a top priority issue of U.S. public diplomacy abroad, “as an 
effective means of combatting communist propaganda” and demonstrating the progress 
of African-Americans in the U.S.. 480  In Yugoslavia, the USIA bulletins planned to 
deconstruct the anti-American stories that had become popular in its mainstream press 
in the late 1940s by taking their cue from Soviet anti-Americanism;481 nonetheless, 
because of the Yugo-American partnership in the early 1950s these anti-American 
narrations partly vanished from Yugoslavia’s public discourse. When, in the wake of 
the Brown vs. Board of Education verdict, the African-American desegregation 
movement exploded, it spilled over, almost immediately, from U.S. national 
boundaries:482  the Yugoslav press expressed sympathy and Borba defined it as an 
“anachronistic and painful phenomenon.”483 
                                                                                                                                               
University Press of Kentucky, 2014); Manisha Sinha and Penny Von Eschen, Contested Democracy: 
Freedom, Race, and Power in American History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and 
Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, Revised edition 
(Princeton; N.J.; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
477 Brenda G. Plummer, In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956-1974 
(Cambridge, England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5–20. 
478 Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human 
Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
479 Linda Heywood et al., African Americans in U.S. Foreign Policy: From the Era of Frederick Douglass 
to the Age of Obama, (Urbana; Chicago; Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2015), Kindle edition, 
Chapter 7; Thomas L. Damion, Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics (Urbana; 
Chicago; Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2012). 
480 Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State, to Hugh J. Addonizio, House of Representatives, 
March 2, 1954, 511.00/2-2354, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
481 “Dobici,” Vjesnik, Oct. 17, 1948, 4; Velizar Savić, “Njujork – «grad» čuda i njegova stvarnost,” 
Borba, Jan. 30, 1947, 4. 
482 The U.S. Supreme Court decision ended the system of segregation in schools in 1954. While American 
legal history often discussed Brown as unrelated to the Cold War, Mary Dudziak discovered how the 
Justice Department’s instructions in the Brown Case argued that school segregation undermined U.S. 
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Pregled articles and the Voice’s broadcastings in Yugoslavia evidence such a USIA 
agenda. Certainly, these two communication channels were the most suitable for their 
audience pool and impact. Indeed, according to a 1961 VOA survey, 69 percent of all 
Yugoslav listeners turned to the Voice at least once a week; whilst between 1965 and 
1966 Pregled had a monthly distribution of 32,000 copies.484 Even though the Yugoslav 
regime never took advantage officially of the problem of U.S. racial relations (at least 
not after 1950), USIS in Yugoslavia saw it as a major blot on U.S. society and a litmus 
test for America’s sincerity. The USIA “civil rights” campaign started much earlier than 
the first civil rights protest ever took place; indeed, it was in 1952 when the American 
post distributed 35,000 copies of the Negroes in America (Crnci u Americi) pamphlet in 
order to dismantle the “prevalent misconceptions” on “persecution of the colored people 
of the South.” Soon, USIS called June Davis, an African-American Fulbright scholar in 
Slavic languages, from London to Zagreb University for a two-months summer session 
and used the Voice “to carry special commentaries on the colored problem.”485 
3.3.1 The Voice of America Reports… 
Much before the Brown Case escalation, VOA paid high attention to African-
American history and to their contribution to U.S. society and to American education, 
science, sports, music and social welfare. In May 1950, the broadcast “Outstanding 
Negroes of the United States” outlined: 
Of the hundreds of national and racial groups that compose the people of the United States, few 
have contributed more to the enrichment of the country than the Negro. Almost every field of 
                                                                                                                                               
prestige, hence harming U.S. foreign relations. By grappling with Cold War concerns, the Supreme Court 
pushed for formal legal change to aid the U.S. image abroad (Mary L. Dudziak, “Brown as a Cold War 
Case,” The Journal of American History 91, no. 1 (June 2004): 32–42). 
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endeavor is represented among the Negro men and women of achievement and their names […] 
have become household words throughout the land.486 
Personalities such as Booker T. Washington, Mary McLeod Bethune, scientist 
George Washington Carver, New York State Representative Clayton Powell Jr., 
Langston Hughes and Richard Wright in literature, then jazz and blues artists, were 
named as worthy symbols of the American nation.487 The VOA broadcasts gave voice 
to the Negro Theater in Harlem and Brooklyn,488 while Jazz Notes regularly figured as 
one of the features of the VOA broadcast “Arts in the USA.”489 Each month, “Negroes 
in the News” reported on African-American achievements in U.S. society. It provided 
information such as “William Gordon wins Nieman Fellowship for study at Harvard 
University,” or “Negroes in training awarded over $330,000 by National Medical 
Fellowship,”490 or “Blind honors student wins Root-Tilden scholarship for law study at 
New York University.” 491  On a regular basis, it reported the success of African-
American artists in the motion picture industry, such as “Dorothy Dandridge – popular 
night club singer selected for starring role in […] See How They Run.”492 Such articles 
provided proof to the Yugoslav public of the advancing integration of African-
Americans in U.S. society and in its fields of education, banking, the business sector, as 
well as in public and civil services, and the arts. 
When in January 1953, the VOA endorsed the “Negro History Week” initiative – 
held throughout the United States from February 8 to 15 (sponsored by churches, 
schools, colleges, community agencies and study groups), it was to reveal not only the 
progress of civil rights in the United States, but also to reflect “the spirit of American 
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democratic ideals in action.”493 So the VOA provided stories about courageous African-
American men and women, and initiatives such as “the National Council of Negro 
Women,” which, according to its director Dorothy Ferebee, “is proud to add its 
influence and resources to [....] that struggle for equality of status, which will permit 
women […] their true influence in the quest for universal peace.”494 The broadcasts on 
“Negro” culture not only fought the traditional communist propaganda on Americans as 
“cultural barbarians,” but helped the United States government in its global propaganda 
campaign against the Soviet Union and its communist allies. The latter widely reported 
and successfully exploited the racial tension and violence that accompanied the rise of 
the Civil Rights movement in the United States – especially after Brown vs. Board of 
Education and the 1958 Little Rock events – as a blatant example of hypocrisy on the 
part of a nation that claimed to be a leader in the free world.495 
3.3.2 Pregled Reports…: Lessons on Democracy, Freedom, and 
Emancipation 
As Mary Dudziak revealed, “from 1946 throughout the mid-1960s, the federal 
government engaged in a sustained effort to tell a particular story about race and 
American democracy: a story of the triumph of good over evil, a story of U.S. moral 
superiority.” 496  Pregled’s role in forming Yugoslav public opinion on the African-
American struggle was invaluable. It attested that democracy in America was leading to 
social justice even though the struggle was hard, and confirmed that democratic change, 
however, slow and painful, was superior to the Soviet’s dictatorial approach. The key 
figure of such historical narrative was Abraham Lincoln, the “Emancipator,” an 
illustrious, courageous man who kept alive the American Revolution and liberated the 
slaves.497 Speeches on the African-American struggle were often introduced by citing 
Lincoln’s famous Gettysburg speech of 1863: “our fathers brought forth on this 
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continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all 
men are created equal.” 498  In Pregled’s articles, the African-Americans’ battle for 
liberty and equality, was actually the endless American Revolution. As in the words of 
President Johnson: 
We are the children of the Revolution. […] The history of America is a history of a 
revolution still going on today. This revolution has conquered this continent and 
expanded democracy. […] Our achievements have raised hopes and aspirations of 
people all over the world for a better life. Our political ideas have helped ‘freedom’ to 
become a shared symbol of people gathering in every part of the world.499 
 
Historical accounts on the African-American struggle against slavery and inequality 
usually started by narrating the arrival of the first Dutch ship in Jamestown (Virginia) in 
1619 and continued by the “happy ending” of the Proclamation of Emancipation in 
1863.500 The 14th and 15th amendments were portrayed as the continuation of this 
story. Then things got worse when in the late 19th century the Supreme Court reversed 
the Proclamation with Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896) by establishing the “separate but 
equal” rule. Nonetheless, the Pregled articles related a better turn of events in the 20th 
century with the foundation of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League Supreme Court victories, 
with the New Deal and Roosevelt’s Black Cabinet, during the Second World War, and, 
finally, with the Supreme Court Brown vs. Board of Education verdict in 1954.501 From 
time to time, Pregled evidenced the advancement of African-Americans in U.S. society, 
their entrance in government, and the desegregation of airports, schools, public 
restrooms, restaurants, hotels, and public fountains. There were quotations by Roy 
Wilkins, the secretary of NAACP, affirming that “in the field of civil rights, the black 
position is evolving so completely, that it can only make progress toward full 
equality.”502 The segregationist community of the United States was – according to 
Pregled – made up of a small and gradually declining minority. The integrationists 
included the younger generation and educated people, even in the Deep South. In the 
civil rights struggle, good news were from the United States: the protests, the sit-ins, 
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and the occupations of public segregated places, the court victories of the NAACP, were 
widespread and overwhelming.503 
Crucially, two other figures played a key role in affirming the truth and faithfulness 
of the American fight for democracy and equality: Martin Luther King Jr. and John F. 
Kennedy.504 Both of them were seen as symbols of the fight for freedom, and strong and 
determined enemies of racial inequality. Pregled covered the events of the 1963 “March 
on Washington for Jobs and Freedom”, which culminated in Martin Luther King’s 
famous “I have a dream” speech. Stories about the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC) and the National Women’s Committee on Civil Rights (NWCCR) 
were eagerly followed to show that racial equality would soon be achieved.505 Certainly, 
it is very difficult to assess to what extent the USIA/USIS presentations of the African-
American desegregation struggle was successful in convincing its public, due to the 
absence of any U.S. or Yugoslav contemporary surveys on the issue. However, one 
survey report might be helpful in decoding the impact of these messages: in 1961, thirty 
Yugoslav refugees in Germany were asked to name the negative aspects of American 
life; the most common answers were “gangsters” and “absence of social welfare 
provisions,” but with no mention of the racial question.506 
3.4 A New Plan for the 1960s: The Yugoslav Press Law and the 
USIA Leaders ‘Shift’ 
In his inauguration address on January 20 1961, John F. Kennedy argued that “the 
same revolutionary beliefs for which our forbearers fought are still at issue around the 
globe,” and stressed that “the energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring […] will 
enkindle our country and all who serve it – and the glow from that fire can truly light 
the world.”507 Such a doctrine, (adopted by both his predecessor Eisenhower and his 
successor Johnson), relied on the presumption that the American-style institutions and 
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values and the free market, would enable other nations to become more prosperous, 
modern, stable, and friendly.508 
Both Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, looked at the Cold War as a long-term 
struggle and a paradigm for international relations. But, in the same way, Eisenhower, 
Kennedy and Johnson embraced a stronger “exuberant activism”.509 Kennedy’s close 
advisers believed that Eisenhower’s foreign policy establishment was slow moving, 
bloated and unwieldy. The new President resolved to “cut back the National Security 
Council staff” as the main national security decision making body, and to rely on more 
direct contacts with individual departments and task forces.510 Furthermore, he thought 
that Eisenhower and Secretaries Dulles and Herter had all but ceded the newly emerging 
states in Latin America, Asia, and Africa to the communists. However, Kennedy’s 
strategy of “flexible response,” was a reaction to Eisenhower’s deterrent strategy which, 
in Kennedy’s opinion, relied too heavily on the threatened use of nuclear power to 
achieve its goals. Flexibility was necessary to “extend the means available to deter 
undesirable shifts in the balance of power.”511 By initiating the creation of the volunteer 
Peace Corps, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the inter-American 
Alliance for Progress, Kennedy proved his flexible strategy to be efficacious, especially 
when in 1963 he signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, accepted by both the 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, his presidency was hardly 
stroke by the intelligence fiasco of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, a U.S. supported 
military action carried out by anti-Castro Cuban exiles; his Vienna Summit talks with 
Khrushchev which henceforth saw the escalation of the bipolar struggle in the aftermath 
of Berlin’s Wall erection; and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.512  
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The bipolar struggle reflected on Yugoslav-U.S. foreign relations which had to 
balance between the two superpowers. In early September 1961, Tito gathered in 
Belgrade India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru; Indonesia’s first president, 
Sukarno; Egypt’s second president, Gamal Abdel Nasser; Ghana’s first president 
Kwame Nkrumah and twenty other state delegations. Opened just two weeks after the 
Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet Yuri Gagarin’s space success, the First Non-Aligned 
Conference in Belgrade only impacted Washington’s anti-communist moods.513 Tito’s 
anti-Western and anti-American conference speech left Ambassador Kennan 
constrained: “Tito’s statements on Berlin and on Soviet resumption of tests came as a 
deep disappointment […]. Passage on Berlin contains no word that could not have been 
written by Khrushchev; and that on [Soviet resumption of nuclear testing], is weaker 
and more pro-Soviet than even those of Nasser and Nkrumah.”514 Kennan suggested 
Washington should carefully reflect “on its implications for our treatment of conference 
and, in more long-term, our attitude towards role of Yugoslavs.”515 But then, Secretary 
Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Kohler, especially after 
Kohler’s reassuring meeting with Ambassador Marko Nikezić on October 19, calmed 
the waters, so that the pragmatic line seemed to win.516 
Nonetheless, voices contrary to U.S. softness towards Yugoslavia urged the 
stopping of economic aid, and anti-communist hard-liners in Congress and Senate 
prevailed. On June 6, 1962, during the Aid Act voting, the U.S. Senate adopted the 
Frank Lausche (D-Ohio) amendment which restricted U.S. economic aid to all 
communist dominated countries, including Poland and Yugoslavia. On June 12, the 
House’s Ways and Means Committee, while considering the Kennedy administration’s 
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request for widened authority to negotiate trade agreements, reported legislation (H.R. 
1818) that included a provision withdrawing the most-favored-nation (MFN) status 
from Poland and Yugoslavia. The bill passed the House on June 28 by a vote of 298 to 
125.517 Foreign Secretary Popović and Ambassador Nikezić rushed to meet Rusk, who 
was also unpleasantly surprised, since the MFN retreat “was contrary to the wishes of 
the Administration.”518 Between 1961 and 1963, the Cold War “breeze” imposed on 
relations between Belgrade and Washington; Veljko Mićunović, appointed as 
Ambassador in Washington in October 1962, in his meeting with Rusk underlined 
“Yugoslavia’s sense of bewilderment and consternation,” since “great political damage 
had been done to Yugoslavia’s international reputation and prestige.” 519  The State 
Department interpreted Brezhnev’s most cordial visit to Tito in October 1962, and 
Tito’s visit to Moscow in December, to be a result of U.S.-Yugoslav distancing.520 It 
was Tito’s first official visit to the United States on October 17, 1963 (Kennedy’s last 
meeting with a foreign statesman, a month before his assassination), and the Senator’s 
Fulbright visit to Yugoslavia only two days after the Johnson election in November 
1964, that rebalanced reciprocal relations and reaffirmed a pragmatic standpoint.521 
3.4.1 Applying and Resisting the Yugoslav Press Law 
 
There are members of the League of Communists that do not take enough care 
and fall into this error and are not able to take a proper attitude toward 
foreign propaganda and foreigners [...] first of all the communists have to 
clean up their positions.522 
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After the publication of the Law, there were attempts to resist it because they 
could not comprehend that they no longer had the liberties they enjoyed 
before. […] Foreign reading rooms cannot give courses of foreign languages 
anymore because, for this purpose, we have specific institutions in town. […] 
Because of a certain liberalism and lack of understanding for the seriousness 
of the problem, a number of communists did not realize what they actually 
needed to do, how to behave, what to take into account and how to prevent 
certain phenomena. Towards members of the SK who continued to visit the 
reading rooms, receive foreign propaganda publications and participated in 
various competitions of foreign radio stations, strong partisan measures were 
taken. Such measures continue to be taken....523 
 
The 1961-1963 “freezing” biennium hardly hit the USIA-USIS mission. But a 
negative reversal of the U.S. cultural missions in Yugoslavia likewise resulted from a 
bolder Yugoslav non-aligned positioning, since Tito’s anti-colonialist speech at the UN 
15th General Assembly in New York in September 1960.524 In the 1960s, Yugoslav 
foreign relations policymakers would persist in strengthening the non-aligned 
positioning as a new “nation-building” identity course.525 
Both the American and Yugoslav archival sources demonstrate that the 1960 
Yugoslav Press Law represents a point of caesura for the development of American 
propaganda on Yugoslav territory. The Second Plenum of the Party’s Central 
Committee, 526  held in November 1959, accused foreign “enemy propaganda” of 
operating in Yugoslavia through visits of foreigners to industrial and production plants, 
through Yugoslav citizens who undertook exchanges abroad and the activities of foreign 
cultural missions. The Yugoslav Press Law, affirmed a 1961 analysis, embodied the 
“measures for paralyzing and limiting these influences,” and prevented the “weaknesses 
of Yugoslav institutions” and “the lack of communist consciousness.”527 Therefore in 
1962, the Ideological Commission, responsible for administrating the propaganda 
activities for the Central Committee, brought up the issue of foreign propaganda at the 
highest level. In its final report, the Commission stressed the dual view of the party 
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leaders on foreign propaganda: some of them considered foreign influences as a 
weakening feature of Yugoslav political conjecture, while others regarded it as an 
internal problem, but not as its source. In the opinion of the Commission, Yugoslav 
political and social developments were both the cause and consequence of the foreign 
propaganda operations. Because of its non-alignment, Yugoslavia was an open 
community, therefore under attack by the “psychological warfare” of “block politics,” 
and by “moral pressure” that was exploiting its weaknesses in order to popularize and 
impose foreign values and lifestyles. 528  The 1966 SSRNJ Ideological Commission 
meeting, chaired by pro-Western diplomat Leo Mates, similarly expressed: “Our 
country has gradually liberalized its contacts with foreign countries and according to our 
Constitution precept Yugoslavia is a community open” to foreign influence.529 
In order to combat foreign propaganda, the Ideological Commission appointed a 
permanent working group to the Commission for Political and Ideological-Educational 
Work of the Federal Board of the SSRNJ (Savezni odbor SSRNJ or SO SSRNJ).530 
Reflecting the grueling bilateral relations between the United States and Yugoslavia in 
the 1961-1962 biennium, many local Ideological Commissions of the League of 
Communists of Serbia (Savez Komunista Srbije, SKS) of Belgrade’s surrounding 
municipalities, vividly discussed the impact of counterpropaganda measures and the 
outcome of the Press Law. Savski Venac, Zvezdara, Palilula, Zemun, Stari Grad, 
Vračar, Novi Beograd, Voždovac, took almost universal positions and agreed to 
develop systematical activities to counter react. They criticized the “film and 
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entertainment press for spreading a foreign way of life, mentality and traditions,”531 and 
the lack of critical appraisal of young people towards foreign artists and cultural 
workers. They urged the representatives of Avala-film, Kolo, Interfarm, Metropola, 
Jugoinvest, Automobil-Beograd and all the other Belgrade enterprises, to establish a 
more severe regulative stance to foreign visitors.532 Finally, they insisted that all the 
bulletins, publications and press sent by foreign Embassies or cultural posts be returned 
to senders or destroyed. 533  The University Committee expressed an equally critical 
attitude and, in order to prevent these “dangerous activities,” purchased TVs and 
technical books, they “instructed students to avoid the foreign reading rooms,”534 and 
obliged foreign professors and students on exchanges, wishing to lecture at the 
University, to ask the Rectorate and Secretariat for approval.535 
Among all the cultural missions, Yugoslav authorities recorded the American one 
to be the most resistant in accepting the new regulations. In the following months, the 
USIS officers insisted in contacting the movie users directly,536 and were very tenacious 
in sending propaganda materials to Yugoslav industrial plants, even after several had 
been returned. 537  Furthermore, when the Yugoslav authorities denied certain 
amendments for the application of the law, and to prevent the financial supervision by 
the Secretariat of Information, the USIS transferred its financial sector to the Embassy. 
Henceforth, after USIS and Yugoslavia signed a new agreement on June 14, 1961, the 
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Opštinski komitet SKS Zvezdara, July 14, 1961; Informacija o merama OK Vračar, July 14, 1961; 
Informacija o preduzetim merama protiv strane i neprijateljske propagande OK Zemun, July 15, 1961; 
Informacija o merama OK Novi Beograd, July 15, 1961, locate in Box 512, Materijali o delovanju 
inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
534 O uticaju strane propagande (Informacija UK SKS), July 17, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju 
inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
535  Informacija Univerzitetskog komiteta SKS o rešavanju pitanja uticaja strane propagande na 
univerzitetu, Jan. 18, 1962, 02-167, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, 
Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
536  Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, Feb. 2, 1962, 232, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju 
inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 19–20. 
537 Informacija o nekim pitanjima u vezi strane propagande, Jan. 20, 1962, 02-19, Box 512, Materijali o 
delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
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number of registered USIS officers dropped from 108 to 22.538 Besides demanding 
separation from the diplomatic mission, the Press Law removed the posts from 
diplomatic immunity and extraterritoriality. Public Officer, Walter Roberts, who arrived 
in Belgrade in the spring of 1960, recalled in this way the negotiations in the aftermath 
of the law’s approbation: 
If you read that press law from A to Z, it meant the end of USIS, [but not] of the British 
Council, because as you know the British Council [was] a non-governmental organization. They 
had to register and were as a Yugoslav incorporated organization. USIS could never have done 
that. I personally was convinced that my days were numbered, […] because the press law 
denied diplomatic status to any information, or cultural program. In other words, it denied 
diplomatic status to the relationship with the Yugoslav people. And of course, we bitterly 
protested, but in vain. […] We then started negotiations about how to make our program livable. 
And in the course of it, we used certain gimmicks, like putting an American resident in 
Belgrade in charge of our library. And as weeks and the months went by, the Yugoslavs became 
less interested in enforcing it. So within a year or so, we were back to where we were before.539 
At that juncture, USIS resisted and, both in Zagreb and Belgrade, remained united 
to the Embassy and Consulate until 1998540 also thanks to ambassador Kennan who 
“talked to Tito about [the Press Law and] wanted that law to become a non-law.”541 As 
a result of political lobbying and eager audience interests, USIS activities in the 1960s 
continued on an uprising current. Compared to other foreign centers, USIS distributed a 
                                                 
538  Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, 
Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
539 Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- ‘We Had 
Quite a Program There,’” accessed February 22, 2016, http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-
roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html. Walter Roberts (1916-2014) is one of the most prominent figures of 
the U.S. public diplomacy history. He was U.S. diplomat and scholar, involved early on in VOA radio 
broadcasts to Nazi Germany during World War II. He held, afterwards, important positions within the 
U.S. government as the Deputy Area Director for Europe in the newly created USIA (1953); member of 
the U.S. Delegation to the Austrian Treaty Talks (1955); long-term supporter, Senior Fellow and board 
member of the Salzburg Seminar for American Studies (nowadays Salzburg Global Seminar); Counselor 
for Public Affairs (PAO) at the American Embassy in Yugoslavia (1960-1966) and U.S. Mission to the 
UN in Geneva, Switzerland (1967-1969); Deputy Associate Director of USIA (1969); and executive 
director of the Board for International Broadcasting which oversaw Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty 
(1975-1985). Both George H.W. Bush (1991) and William J. Clinton (1994), appointed Roberts as a 
member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. In 2001, Roberts co-founded the 
Institute for Public Diplomacy and Global Communication and the Public Diplomacy Council. He wrote 
Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies 1941-1945 (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 1973), the first 
historical “best-seller” on the Tito-Mihailović talks of March 1943, banned in Yugoslavia for several 
decades. 
540 Status američke čitaonice, Nov. 25, 1962, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, 
Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ; IRC Belgrade, E-mail message to the author, 
June 16, 2015. 
541 Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: George Kennan and Public Diplomacy -- ‘Basically, 
George Kennan Was an Old-Line Diplomat,’” accessed February 22, 2016, 
http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-george-kennan-and-public.html. 
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record number of printed materials (2,680,000 of 3,727,160 foreign distributions in 
1965); it frequently conducted mail public opinion surveys (seen as extremely irritating 
for Yugoslav’s ideological commissions), and Pregled had the highest circulation 
among all foreign publications in Yugoslavia.542 
But besides the Press Law, from the early 1960s Yugoslav authorities engaged in 
other forms of coercive policies towards the USIS posts and their users. The situation 
escalated in early 1961. On May 19, a part-time USIS employee of Novi Sad was called 
in by local Interior authorities and warned that some of his duties (like carrying the 
Daily Bulletin from Novi Sad station to the reading room) constituted “a criminal act.” 
Ambassador Kennan, waiting for the settlement of the Press Law question, advised 
them to discontinue temporarily the Bulletin for Novi Sad and instructed the post not to 
lend films or projectors. Meanwhile, the Interior authorities questioned the Yugoslav 
Assistant of the Cultural Attaché Office in a two-hour interview. On June 6, “a local 
employee at the reading room in Belgrade observed individuals […] identified as «plain 
clothes men» from the Interior who have appeared from time to time in the past, when 
there had been reason to give extra protection.”543 On June 8, Kennan decided to close 
temporarily the posts because of the absence “of firm assurance from Yugoslav 
authorities that continued operation of American reading rooms […] would be regarded 
by them […] as not contravening Yugoslav law.”544 This highly embarrassing situation 
stopped when both parts signed the new agreement between USIS and the Yugoslav 
government on June 14 1961.545 
Tensions resurged again in 1962, when the Municipal Committee of Palilula 
strongly criticized a Belgrade professor and Party member, whose wife was employed at 
the American Embassy, for receiving the American publications by mail.546 In January 
1962, a telegraphist of Belgrade’s train station was stopped and severely criticized 
                                                 
542 Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, 
Box 256,  Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
543 Telegram 1004 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, June 6, 1961, 511.682/6-661, Box 1074, CDF 
1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
544 Telegram 1008 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, June 7, 1961, 511.682/6-761, Box 1074, CDF 
1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
545  Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, 
Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
546  Informacija o merama preuzete na teritoriju OK Palilule, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju 
inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
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“because he participated in a prize contest of the American reading room.” The same 
report described how two Party members, employees of the Belgrade Graphic Institute, 
have declared themselves to be frequent visitors of the American Library just “to see 
what is written in their press.” But since they were “non-politically influential,” the 
Municipal Committee of Savski Venac decided not to punish them.547  
Another “informal” restriction arose two months later, when Danilo Pejović, a 
philosophy professor at Zagreb University, 548  a Party member and Djilas political 
sympathizer, was warned by UDBA to stop contacting the USIS Zagreb officers549 and 
prohibited to have luncheons with Ambassador Kennan if not via visits of protocol.550 
In June another incident occurred, this time when Tomislav Kuzmanović, an art student 
at the Sarajevo University and frequent visitor of the Consulate’s magazine facilities, 
was called to a four-hour session with faculty members of the SKJ. He was strictly 
warned against further use of American magazines among other students, because the 
exhibition of House and Garden, Holiday, Look, and Arts would “make [students] prone 
to make comparisons between life in Yugoslavia and life in the United States,” hence 
making them more dissatisfied.551  
Censorship practices based on the Press Law applied to American publications as 
well. On January 29 1963, Branko Karadjole, the Assistant Director of DSUP for the 
                                                 
547  Informacija o aktivnosti OK SKS Savski Venac po pitanjima kontaktiranja naših institucija i 
građanima sa strancima i delovanju inostranih propagandnih ustanova, Jan. 22, 1962, 59, Box 512, 
Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 6–7. 
548 Danilo Pejović spent nine months on a Ford grant at the New York University with his wife in 
1960/1961 and, according to his testimony to the USIS officers in Zagreb, “since their return, [they] have 
been more unhappy then before (Airgram 30 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of 
State, April 17, 1962, 868.43/4-1762, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP). 
549  Airgram 30 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, April 17, 1962, 
868.43/4-1762, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
550 In his last conversation with General Consul Joseph Godson, Pejović underlined how the Consulate 
“office telephones [were] tapped and all […] mail inside [the] country […] opened.” While Godson 
concluded: “It was a sad meeting and an even sadder parting, a sharp reminder of unrelenting totalitarian 
police control of its citizens” (Airgram 47 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of 
State, June 12, 1962, 868.43/6-1262, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP). 
551 According to what Kuzmanović reported to the Consular officer, students at Sarajevo University were 
divided between the “Russians” and “Americans.” Yet, while shaken by the interview, Kuzmanović 
“retained sufficient courage to borrow two more Art magazines” (Despatch 122 from American Consulate 
Sarajevo to the Department of State, June 6, 1962, 511.682/6-662, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, 
NACP). 
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Western Hemisphere, 552  called the Embassy political section warning them against 
some Bilten articles on Cuba published days before (and particularly Secretary Rusk’s 
speech at Punta del Este from January 26), because it presented “controversial, slanted, 
and one-sided cold war material for broad public dissemination.” The issue wasn’t 
banned because it was the first violation of the law, but Karadjole requested more 
circumspection for the future.553 Nevertheless, the sharpest restrictions applied to the 
Party members, since the “communists that participate[d] in the contests of foreign 
radio stations, or who receive[d] different gifts from foreigners or visit[ed] the foreign 
reading rooms,” were expelled from the party lines. 554  Still, there were, in Walter 
Roberts memories, interesting moments of tangling with Yugoslav authorities, when 
they had a softer approach to the USIS, and even apologized: 
We had a mailing list of our magazine called Pregled. One day, at some occasion, one of the 
Yugoslavs approached me and said: “Have you discontinued Pregled?” And I said, no, not at 
all. “Well, I didn’t get my copy this month.” Well, I said, give me your name and I’ll see that a 
copy be sent to you. In the next two or three or four days, other people of the staff, both local 
employees and Americans, said they heard that Pregled was not distributed. So finally I came to 
the conclusion that Pregled was not sent out by the post office. So, I took my jacket and went to 
the Foreign Office. […] And Mr. Milan Bulajić, who was the American desk officer said: “Out 
of question.” I said, “No […] it’s a fact but let’s find out what happened.” One Sunday, a week 
later, […] Milan came over to my house and he said: “I’m red-faced. I apologize. Pregled was 
thrown by the Ministry of the Interior into the Danube River. Lock, stock and barrel.” We found 
out. But that was the only time.555 
3.4.2 A New USIA Plan for Yugoslavia: Crafting the New Yugoslav 
Leadership 
Wilson Dizard has well described the USIA’s perennial failure to get full support 
and acceptance within the U.S. executive branch, Congress and Senate. The USIA’s 
operations were surmounted by much favored psychological and secret operations, 
                                                 
552 DSUP, or otherwise Državni Sekretarijat za Unutrašnje Poslove, was the State Secretariat for Internal 
Affairs. 
553 Despatch 449 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, January 31, 1962, 
511.682/1-3162, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
554 Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane 
propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
555 Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: USIS Magazines and Exhibits in Yugoslavia - ‘I’m 
Red-Faced. I Apologize,’” accessed February 22, 2016, http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-
roberts-usis-magazines-and.html. 
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which excluded the information agency from policymaking.556 George Allen’s (1957-
1960) and Edward Murrow’s (1961-1964) USIA directorships shortly overturned these 
trends. By the time Allen left, the USIA had 202 posts in 85 countries; it employed 
3,771 Americans and a further 6,881 foreign nationals while the VOA daily audience 
was around fifty million. The USIA director sat on the NSC, attended cabinet meetings, 
and by 1960 was meeting the President at the White House every three weeks. Allen’s 
leadership gave a positive shift to the Agency by maintaining excellent relations with 
Congress, initiating jazz ambassadors to go abroad, and pushing for broader English 
teaching activities.557 In January 1961, John F. Kennedy nominated journalist Edward 
R. Murrow to lead the USIA. Both of them were particularly concerned to renew the 
American image abroad using the power of new media communication channels such as 
the television.558 In Murrow’s years, the USIA played a role in major foreign policy 
stories such as Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam. The agency’s research department careered under 
Leo Crespi, its polls found wide circulation and, every day, President Kennedy read the 
USIA’s digest of world editorials. Nonetheless, Murrow’s era demonstrated a growing 
incompatibility between the USIA and VOA, since Murrow expected the broadcasts to 
be able to manipulate its content as policy dictated. Executives left USIA “out of the 
loop” in one of the hardest covert actions of the U.S. government, the landings at the 
Bay of Pigs. According to Cull, “Murrow spent much of the next three years recovering 
                                                 
556 Wilson P. Dizard Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 63–103. 
557 Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and 
Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989, (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 149–
168; 186–188. 
558 Murrow was familiar with the power that television had in shaping public opinion and influencing 
policies: in the wake of the McCarthy purges in early 1954, as the anchorman of the CBS, he initiated the 
See it Now series (remembered for their “Good luck, and good night” closing) by which he contributed to 
discredit McCarthy’s tactics in rooting out communist elements within the government. Some excellent 
depictions of the relationship between Cold War ideology and political culture, television documentary, 
and McCarthy’s purges can be found in: Thomas Rosteck, See It Now Confronts McCarthyism: 
Television Documentary and the Politics of Representation (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University Alabama 
Press, 2005); Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American 
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Robert L. Ivie, “Diffusing Cold War 
Demagoguery: Murrow versus McCarthy on ‘See It Now,’” in Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, 
and Ideology, by Martin J. Medhurst et al., (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997), 81–
101; and Brian Thornton, “Published Reaction When Murrow Battled McCarthy,” Journalism History 29, 
no. 3 (2003): 133–146. For a remarkable film interpretation of Murrow, see George Clooney, Good Night, 
and Good Luck, Drama, (2005). 
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from the implications of that single decision.”559 Murrow believed the agency should 
not just inform but persuade, and personally oversaw propaganda operations during the 
most tense Cold War moments: Operation Mongoose (a covert program of sabotage of 
the Castro regime in Cuba), the disastrous Bay of Pigs incident, and the Cuban missile 
crisis in 1962 (when the Soviet Union endeavored to build missile sites towards the 
United States on the Cuban island).560 
Under Murrow’s directorship, the USIA produced the most ambitious Country Plan 
for Yugoslavia that predicted a radically different, leaders-oriented, cultural agenda. 
Approved in 1962 and released in 1963, the new USIA plan, crafted on the State 
Department’s Guidelines of U.S. Policy and Operations for Yugoslavia, emphasized the 
crucial role of the USIS posts in Yugoslavia in linking the country to the West. USIS 
objectives were to “influence the evolution of Yugoslavia’s political, economic, and 
social institutions along more democratic and humanistic lines and with increasing 
association with the West” (Objective B); and “to maintain and expand the channels of 
communication with the Yugoslav people and to use these channels to help them 
understand United States policies” (Objective D).561 
Even though USIS activities were controlled by the Yugoslav 1960 Press Law, 
dissimilarly to other Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia presented a unique case 
since it permitted the USIS a relatively wide range of freedom. In addition, individual 
deregulations, temporary permits, and ad hoc negotiations, made the USIA’s job much 
easier. Since American representatives were strictly forbidden to disseminate 
information that reflected adversely on other countries, with the exception of “the 
diplomatic corps or circle of specified state leaders, organs and establishments,” the 
                                                 
559 17th Review of Operations, USIA, July 1 - December 31, 1961, Box 1046, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, 
NACP; Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 189–191. 
560 Wilson P. Dizard Jr., Inventing Public Diplomacy, 123–128. On Murrow’s use of covert propaganda 
programs within the USIA, see Gregory M. Tomlin, Murrow’s Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the 
Kennedy Administration, (Potomac Books - University of Nebraska Press, 2016). 
561 The other two objectives were also related to USIS activities in Yugoslavia, but had minor impact on 
policy execution. They were: “To assist Yugoslavia to build a firm, secure base of national independence 
and development, and to support the determination that Yugoslavia has shown to preserve and strengthen 
its national independence” (Objective A) and “To adopt courses of action bringing the United States 
maximum benefits from (a) the divisive effects of Yugoslavia’s independent status upon the international 
communist movement, and (b) the stimulus provided Soviet-dominated Eastern European governments 
by Yugoslavia’s example to seek greater freedom of action from Moscow in shaping their own policies 
and institutions” (Objective C) in Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA 
Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 1. 
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USIA new Country Plan took a sharp leader’s directed path. 562  The new Plan 
established that: 
a) Yugoslav leaders and opinion molders were to be persuaded to 
promote objective information on the United States; 
b) USIS would enlarge its policy of cultural contacts with Yugoslav 
policymakers, mass media editors, and spokespersons; 
c) the government and intellectual leaders would became the U.S. 
priority target groups in Yugoslavia, and the goal of USIS to influence the 
Yugoslav leadership and, ultimately, adapt Tito’s regime to Western values 
and standards.563 
The Country Plan enlisted 2,000 Yugoslav leaders to whom the USIS would send 
unrestricted, “un-sanitized,” U.S. bulletins. This group included parliamentarians and 
assemblymen (members of the Federal People’s Assembly, of the Republican 
Assemblies and of the Assemblies of the Autonomous Regions); Executive Council 
leaders (members and secretaries of the Federal Executive Council and members of 
Republican Executive Councils); ministries, agencies, and commission leaders (officials 
of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, State Secretaries and Under-Secretaries, 
Republican Secretaries and Under-Secretaries, and Presidents and Secretaries of 
Commission and Committees at the Federal and Republican level); and press and 
information leaders (editorial boards of newspapers, radio, and television, both at 
federal and republican level).564  
The new USIA Country Plan for Yugoslavia urged the enlargement and the 
realization of what would be major and subversive platforms of influence on the 
Yugoslav leaders, intellectuals, academics and opinion molders: the U.S. Leader’s 
Exchange Program (from 1958) and the Fulbright agreement (signed in November 
                                                 
562 Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963 (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963), January 30, 1963, Box 45, 
USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 1. 
563 As the Country Plan underlined, the Yugoslav leaders were “most likely to be influenced towards a 
true understanding of American systems and policies, and who, upon their return, are in a position to 
influence others” (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963: 5). 
564 As in the 1950s, the general audience targets remained the youth, the managerial class, the press corps, 
the working class, the intellectual community and the professionals (scientists, doctors, lawyers, judges, 
and translators) (Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-
1967, RG 306, NACP: 3, 6). 
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1964).565 Indeed, while the Yugoslav Press Law intended to reduce USIS margins of 
freedom, it inspired a new shift towards a leader-oriented policy, with unpredictable and 
controversial outcomes in the decades to come.  
3.4.3 The Yugoslav 1960s: Public Opinion, Leadership and the 
Experiment 
 
We will never be able to solve propaganda. It is an octopus with thousands of 
tentacles that adapts to certain circumstances. But we can do a lot if we lead 
our propaganda in the direction that will, in a certain way, paralyze what we 
don’t want to […] exist.566 
 
American propaganda continued to preoccupy Yugoslav policymakers even after 
the approval of the Press Law. They were aware that the Federation’s gigantic 
bureaucracy and system of institutions, associations, organs, agencies, leagues, 
syndicates, councils, and committees, was impossible to entirely coordinate with the 
propaganda agenda.567 Whilst they felt that much had been done on the juridical ground, 
they considered the trends to be intensifying, not diminishing. Very rightly, they 
suspected that sophisticated and long-term “permanent ideological influence” of 
American social norms, ideals, and moral concepts would orient young people and 
university students. They were irritated by the U.S.’s “considerable cultural 
arrangements with organizations and individuals,” and by American cultural infiltration 
on TV, in the musical and entertainment press, film enterprises, and children’s 
literature. 568  Against these penetrations, the Central Committee urged a stronger 
ideological battle.569  It was necessary to “bring more order and intensify control,” 
                                                 
565  Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963: 4–7. As for the youth exchanges, the associations like the 
Experiment in International Living, the American Friend Service Committee, and The Four-H Club were 
particularly involved in such cultural programs. 
566 Magnetofonske beleške o propagandi, Oct. 28, 1968, Box 257, O inostranoj propagandi i idejno-
političkom radu 1968-1970, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 16, 19. 
567 Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali 
ideološke komisije 1965-1967, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
568 Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali 
ideološke komisije 1965-1967, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 2-5. 
569 Uloga i zadaci sredstava informacija u ostvarivanju aktualnih političkih zadataka - Aktualni politički 
pregled, 1968, n. 24, D-2950, Idejno-politička pitanja i ideološki rad, CK SKH, RG 1220, HDA: 7–13. 
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asserted the Executive Committee in 1967.570 Nonetheless, under the veil of severe 
directives it seemed evident that the “opening of our country towards the foreign world, 
this circulation of people [made] our measures to be of limited impact.”571 
The Yugoslav Press Law was modified several times during the 1960s: in 1966572 
and 1968, but no radical alteration was made to the articles regarding foreign 
propaganda. The 1968 amendments provided individual Yugoslav citizens the right to 
initialize a press publication, but expanded the motives for prohibition including the 
“attack on the social realities established by the Constitution, the social self-
management, […] and the violation of the honor and reputation of the nationalities of 
Yugoslavia.”573 Such elusive definitions left the doors open for political manipulations 
and invisible boundaries of censorship. 
The Yugoslav authorities were correct when fearing the influences of “American” 
ideas on Yugoslav young generations. An interview conducted on 30 Yugoslav refugees 
by the Italian Research Institute in 1960 and 1961, shows that these young male 
workers, mostly from the Yugoslav middle-income group, saw “freedom” in 
predominantly economic terms and the U.S. as an “example of a democratic country.” 
Their image of America was shaped by the American movies and the VOA broadcasts. 
They were indignant about the “absence of political rights and freedom [and] party 
control over life, and favoritism for party members” in Yugoslavia. But most of all, they 
                                                 
570 O nekim vidovima delovanja neprijateljskih elemenata i odnosu komunista prema tim pojavama – 
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SKH, RG 1220, HDA. 
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exclusively in the post spaces). Before film catalogs could be distributed to Yugoslav institutions, the 
posts had to request permission of the DSIP, while for outside exhibitions they needed the approval of the 
Secretariat of Information (Objašnjenja za primenu propisa u oblasti inostrane propagande, Sept. 1968, 
36/1, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, 
IAB). 
572 Savezni sekretarijat za informacije sekretaru drugu dr. Milivoju Rukavina, April 22, 1966, 05-1015/1, 
Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
573  Informacija o dosadašnjem radu na pripremanju novog Zakona o štampi i drugim vidovima 
propagande, Jan. 24, 1968, 01/172, Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
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depicted the American life with “Almost everyone has his home and television set,” 
“You live like a human being,” and “Freedom.”574 
In 1964, the Institute of Social Science of Belgrade conducted a public opinion 
survey on the subject “Who is Yugoslavia’s best-friend country?” While the United 
States figured third after the Soviet Union and the UAR and India (a very high score 
given the political cautions that surrounded these surveys), the results displayed that the 
“younger the respondents, the more they favored the United States and other capitalist 
countries.” What is even more interesting, the majority of them responded that they 
were not politically active nor did they want to become members of the SKJ. 575 
Between March 1968 and January 1969 a group of American and Yugoslav social 
scientists (the first from the Bureau of Applied Social Science, Columbia University and 
the second from the Institute of Social Science, Belgrade) joined in a collective research 
on the Yugoslav opinion leaders. 576  The findings were quite remarkable, as they 
demonstrated that the members of the federal governmental institutions had more 
“conformist” attitudes on economic development, less propensity for freedom of 
criticism and were less aware of public social criticism, while on the other hand, those 
who participated on the regional and local level of power were more likely to support 
freedom of criticism and more aware of the public moods. Perhaps the most remarkable 
finding of the study, however, was that in a socialist society operating under a one-party 
government, there was a wide range of opinions among influential people and that they 
enjoyed a high level of mass media output and involvement in policy advising.577 Just a 
                                                 
574 Yugoslav Refugee Attitudes, April 2, 1962, RN-10-62, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-1962, USIA 
Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
575 Jugoslavensko javno mnijenje o tome koja nam je zemlja najveći prijatelj, Nov. 4, 1964, Box 38, 
Series II-4-a (Političko stanje u zemlji), KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
576 The interviewers included federal legislators, administrators, mass organization leaders from the SKJ, 
SSRNJ, SSJ, and SKOJ; directors of enterprises, economic planners and advisors in government; 
directors and chief editors of newspapers of the largest national circulation, of television networks, of 
radio stations, and publishing houses, leading journalists and commentators; and intellectuals such as 
university professors, editors, leading literary writers, theatrical and film directors and writers artists, for a 
total of 517 individuals occupying 569 of these positions. The top 20 positions, the President and the 
cabinet members, were excluded. An innovative and exhaustive critical examination of the intellectual 
origins of communications research in 20th-century America, with particular attention to the developing 
links between university campuses, the military, and the media industry perspective, can be found in 
Timothy Glander, Origins of Mass Communications Research during the American Cold War: 
Educational Effects and Contemporary Implications (Taylor & Francis, 2000). 
577 Yugoslav Opinion Leader Study, 1968-1969, YO6801, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-
Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. The difference in political attitudes 
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brief outlook on the public opinion studies regarding the Yugoslav leaders and youth 
indicates how Yugoslav society was profoundly changing in the 1960s. Without 
anticipating any correlation, it is noteworthy to underline that the USIS priority target 
for the 1960s was exactly the same groups of leaders included in the 1968-1969 
research. 
From early 1960s on, the Yugoslav press started improving in more objective news 
reporting, separated news from editorials, and were open to foreign press agencies like 
AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, and USIS. 578  The pro-Western tendencies of Yugoslav 
journalists (mainly the younger generations), were recognized very early by the 
Ideological Commission of the Central Committee that criticized the acceptance by 
Yugoslav journalism of the market consumer mentality, the bourgeois aristocratism and 
the prevalence of interests in Western over Eastern countries. 579  Despite negative 
cyclical political actions against the American cultural missions, the perception of the 
USIS representatives when approaching lower ranked politicians and party 
administrators was constructive. In 1966, the USIS librarians undertook a large tour of 
the Yugoslav cities and national libraries in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. Compared to receptions in the 1950s, USIS representatives felt 
“that an old and enduring ice was broken.” When they came to visit the National 
Library of Cetinje in Montenegro, Niko Martinović, the Library’s director and president 
of the Yugoslav Association of Librarians, made a public toast to USIS thanking them 
“for your help to all Yugoslav libraries over these years, [so] I thank you in my name, 
and in the name of my colleagues and in the name of all the Montenegrin people.”580 
Compared to the severe and stern rhetoric of many Yugoslav ideological commissions 
                                                                                                                                               
between higher and lower Yugoslav hierarchy has been acknowledged by a USIS officer in 1962: “we 
had been able to convince at least lower echelons in the hierarchy of the necessity of continued close 
cultural relations with the West. Indeed, we have evidence that leaders at the lower level exercised quite 
some influence on the higher echelon for he [Tito] later disavowed any anti-Western intentions” (Country 
Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP). 
578 Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 
306, NACP. 
579 O nekim vidovima stranog uticaja u našoj zemlji, June 20, 1962, II/2-b-(162-169) K-10, Box 10, 
Ideološka komisija VIII, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ. 
580 Message 44 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Nov. 9, 1966, CUL 9, Box 56, USIA Subject 
Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
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(from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy), lower ranked politicians such as Niko 
Martinović, expressed a diametric standpoint.  
These two perspectives, while deriving from different political backgrounds, 
represent in fact the experimentation of the Yugoslav way to socialism.581 On the one 
hand, the highest-ranked politicians tried to rationalize the propaganda problems as a 
side-effect of the Yugoslav non-Aligned international policy; on the other, they 
identified a possible risk of the Western “infiltration” in Yugoslav society. While 
defining these practices as “antisocialist,” 582  they deemed that it was impossible to 
restrict the dissemination of “foreign propaganda” without Yugoslavia losing 
international prestige as an “open community.” 583 Nonetheless, the middle echelons 
perceived and looked for cooperation with the West from a mainly pragmatic, and less 
ideological, point of view. We will observe these phenomena in more details when 
examining the cultural exchanges with the United States. From the point of view of the 
Yugoslav policymakers, the American propaganda in Yugoslavia was particularly 
inclined to interpret the liberalization of the Yugoslav regime and the supposed 
abandonment of Marxist ideology as a consequence of American aid and of its 
rapprochement with the West. What is more, they admitted that many other Yugoslav 
citizens shared this particular view.584 
This strategy might be recognized in the Pregled’s accounts on American 
democracy and freedom. Articles like “The Spiritual Heritage of America,”585 “Freedom 
in America,” 586  “Faith in Freedom and Democracy,” 587  “Artistic Freedom for 
                                                 
581 Dennison I. Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978). 
582 Stenografske beleške Komisije za ideološko-vaspitni rad SSRNJ, May 5-6, 1966, 16/6680, Box 256, 
Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 10/2. 
583 Informacija: Donošenje posebnog zakona o inostranoj propagandi, Aug. 21, 1969, 034-1564/1-69, Box 
565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
584  Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, 
Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. As the 
members of the Savski Venac Municipal Committee concluded “[those who visit the American library] 
interpret the evolution of democratic management in our enterprises and communes as inevitable steps 
that they expect to happen when reading about social life in the West” (Informacija o aktivnosti OK SKS 
Savski Venac po pitanjima kontaktiranja naših institucija i građanima sa strancima i delovanju inostranih 
propagandnih ustanova, Jan. 22, 1962, 59, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-
1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 6–7). 
585 Dorothy Lafferty, “Duhovno nasledje Amerike,” Pregled, January 1966, 2. 
586 Walter F. Murphy, “Sloboda u Americi,” Pregled, July 1966, 2. 
587 “Vera u slobodu i demokratiju,” Pregled, January 1966, 8. 
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Everyone,”588 “The Role of Religion in a Free Society,”589 or “Protests in front of the 
White House,” 590  depicted U.S. society as one where dissent was possible, plural 
opinions were allowed, and where even demonstrations and oppositions were 
interpreted as signs of a healthy democracy. The main objective was, obviously, to 
“prick the imagination” of Yugoslav readers, and their “appetites” for the American way 
of democracy. 
The 1960s were a decade of profound change for the Yugoslav Titoist regime. The 
new 1963 Constitution represents only one – even if paradigmatic – example of how 
decentralization and liberalization was implemented in executive policies, while the 
expulsion of Aleksandar Ranković from the party lines in 1966 indicates the 
abandonment of centralization policies and the victory of Kardelj’s federalist stance.591 
When student protests erupted at the Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana Universities in 
June 1968, another image of Yugoslavia appeared. As Hrvoje Klasić pointed out, the 
repression – which meant mainly expulsion from the Universities and the Party of 
students and professors, and imprisonment for some of them – started imminently after 
Tito’s public appeasement with the students.592 Analogous forms of reaction followed 
the uprising of the Croatian nationalist movement (the Croatian Spring) in 1971, the 
affirmation of the Serbian “liberals” in the Central Committee of the SKJ in Serbia in 
1972, and their subsequent breakdown. 593  Those events once more suggest that 
liberalization had a different meaning in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
                                                 
588 “Sloboda stvaranja za sve,” Pregled, July 1967, 14. 
589 Charles P. Taft, “Uloga religije u slobodnom društvu,” Pregled, March 1966, 13. 
590 “Zaštita demokratije pred Belom Kućom,” Pregled, January 1966, 56. 
591 Ranković (1909-1983) was a top Yugoslav communist leader, one of the founders of the Yugoslav 
state, creator and head of the Yugoslav secret services (first OZNA than UDBA). As a highly regarded 
personality in the party ranks, he was dreaded both by his colleagues and by his enemies. He was also the 
main ideologist and leader of the centralizing fraction of the KPJ/SKJ. On the Forth Plenum, look into: 
Ivan Dragović, Brionski Plenum (Beograd: GMT Servis, 2002); Vojin Lukić, Sećanja i saznanja: 
Aleksandar Ranković i Brionski plenum (Titograd: Novica Jovović, 1989); Latinka Perović, Zatvaranje 
kruga: ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 1971./1972. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991), 41–52. 
592 Therefore, Klasić claims that, even if student demonstrations in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana had 
not an antisocialist character, they were brutally blocked because any accusation of the deficiency of the 
Yugoslav economic and political system was interpreted as a threat to the monopoly of the communist 
elites in power (Hrvoje Klasić, Jugoslavija i svijet 1968. (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2012), 222–274, 448–450.  
593  Posthumous narrations of these events recounted by their protagonists can be found in Savka 
Dabčević-Kučar, ’71. - hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol. 1, 2 (Zagreb: Interepublic, 1997) and Perović, 
Zatvaranje kruga. 
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and that economic reform and political federalization did not intend to become a liberal 
democracy or multi-party system. 
The American cultural mission in Yugoslavia was pursuing the objective of 
changing the regime from outside while, in the meantime, internal, often opposite, 
movements pushed for reforms. Among them, the Croatian literates and linguists in 
1967, the Yugoslav students in 1968, the Marxist intellectuals of the Praxis School 
(1963-1974), the Croatian “springers” in 1971, the Serbian liberals in 1972. 
Nevertheless, censorship and coercion fallouts never really abandoned the official 
Belgrade policies. Hence, to what extent did the American cultural mission in 
Yugoslavia enhanced the liberalization trends by making available Western ideas, 
projections, images, messages, and, most of all, policy practices? Were the Yugoslav 
attitudes towards foreign propaganda at the highest level indeed, part of an ideological 
dispute or, conversely, expressed the awareness of the peril of U.S./Western 
“infiltrations”? 
In the first part of this study we analyzed processes, mechanisms, channels, 
messages and personalities that shaped the USIA-USIS mission in Yugoslavia during 
the 1950s and 1960s, scrutinized the impact of the American policies in the field, and 
reconstructed their interconnections with foreign and internal policy developments. The 
next chapters will be dedicated to following the visible and invisible networks and 
programs that the USIA-USIS missions built during these two decades, through the 
American exhibitions at the Belgrade and Zagreb International Trade Fairs, the Voice of 
America broadcasts, and the State Department-sponsored tours of American musicians, 
artists, and actors in the so-called Cultural Presentation Program. 
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4 EXHIBITED! AMERICAN 
MODERNITY, ABUNDANCE 
AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
VANGUARD AT THE 
YUGOSLAV TRADE FAIRS 
Consumption goods, doubling as phantom images of themselves, are 
living contradictions. They are meant to be consumed, yet at the same time 
they have reached consummation, a higher level of sense and meaning, of 
dreams and desire. […] The automobile as an object of consumption has a 
finite life; its only future is the scrap heap. Nevertheless, as a dream object it 
keeps riding on.594 
 
In the May 5 1947 issue, Life magazine presented a photo-essay entitled “Family 
Status Must Improve: It Should Buy More for Itself.” In this short report, the reader 
could observe the imaginary post-war adjustment of Ted and Jeanne Hemeke and their 
three children from their life in an unpleasant, rude cottage – where Ted arrived home in 
                                                 
594  Rob Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture 
(University of Illinois Press, 1996), 94. 
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working man’s clothes and Jeanne struggled with a dirty coal furnace in the kitchen595 – 
“to their symbolic entry into the new post war order when […] Ted wore the middle-
class badge of a suit, the children were fashionably dressed, and Jeanne approvingly 
surveyed a kitchen stocked with shiny new appliances.”596 According to the Twentieth 
Century Fund economists, by 1960 the U.S. family would “acquire, in addition to a 
pleasant roof over its head, a vacuum cleaner, washing machine, stove, electric iron, 
refrigerator, electric toaster and […] matching dishes, silverware, cooking utensils, tools, 
cleaning materials, stationery and postage stamps.”597 In fact, the majority of American 
post-war economic theorists and actors, from the anti-New Deal big businessmen to 
moderate liberal capitalists, to labor and its allies on the left, endorsed (even if for 
different reasons) the importance of mass consumption as a highway to prosperity and 
middle-class wealth.598 
In the post-war world, mass-consumption society and culture became the synonym 
for the United States, the euphemism of a conventional view of the American way of life 
and a paradigm of affluence, material wealth and freedom of choice. Meaning more 
than just availability of products and services, the advent of the mass-consumption era 
rescinded the separation between object and image, commerce and art, making the 
advertisement industry an instrument of accommodating dreams and fantasies.599 “The 
experience, or at least the promise, of freedom that U.S. citizens in their role of 
consumer could share in, became the central ingredient of America’s modernity. 
Shopping became a reassertion of one’s identity,” claims Dutch historian Rob Kroes.600 
We shall keep in mind this essential ingredient when examining the American 
exhibitions at the Yugoslav trade fairs. 
Much of the consumption of American mass culture took place in private endeavors 
where people watched television in their living rooms, Hollywood movies in the quasi-
private places of the darkened movie theaters, American music via radio or on records 
in homes or dance clubs. There was an area outside the private homes that served 
                                                 
595 Life, May 5, 1947, 32–33. This analysis has been inspired by Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: 
The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2003), 112–116. 
596 Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic, 112–113. 
597 Life, May 5, 1947, 33. 
598 Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic, 114–120. 
599 Kroes, If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall, 94–95. 
600 Ibid, 95. 
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effectively and successfully “as a site of exposure of American mass culture” and which 
traveled worldwide via the entertainment industry and under commercial auspices 
“creating the demand, if not the desire, for its consumption.”601 Thus, in the cultural 
Cold War, there was another medium by which American mass culture interacted with 
and was assimilated by audiences abroad: the international trade fairs and exhibitions. 
The U.S. national pavilions epitomize privileged case studies of the cultural Cold 
War by bringing up multifaceted dimensions of politics and culture. According to 
Haddow, these promotional events became favored government vehicles for 
administrators and business supporters to counter communism through the promotion 
and transplantation of democratic capitalism overseas. As in the case of the Chicago 
International Trade Fair of 1950, the American Pavilion at the 1958 Brussels World’s 
Fair and the American 1959 Sokolniki Fair in Moscow, the U.S. policymakers 
significantly advanced the deployment of culture as a Cold War weapon, along with 
economic aid and military power. Through the creative process of conceptualizing trade 
displays and exhibitions, special interconnections and relationships were established 
among government agencies, corporate associations, advertising firms, industrial 
designers, and the art world.602 
Moreover, the exhibitions as case studies illuminate foreign policy relations and 
diplomatic moods. Additionally, they consider the public opinion impact by involving 
public-opinion molders. Lastly, in the Cold War struggle for hearts and minds they 
stress the relevance of private artistic actors, designers and architects, engaged by state 
agencies to achieve national success.603 
                                                 
601 For Kroes, the advertisements created economic demand while conveying imaginary Americas at the 
same time. In such a way, “they have contributed to a European repertoire […] a realm of reverie, filled 
with iconic heroes, setting standards of physical beauty, of taste, of proper behavior. […] Europe’s 
significant Other has become America, as commercially constructed through advertising” (Rob Kroes, 
“Imaginary Americas in Europe’s Public Place,” in The Americanization of Europe: Culture, Diplomacy, 
and Anti-Americanism After 1945, ed. A. Stephan (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), 347). See 
also, Beatriz Colomina, Ann Marie Brennan, and Jeannie Kim, eds., Cold War Hothouses: Inventing 
Postwar Culture, from Cockpit to Playboy (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2004). 
602  Robert H. Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s 
(Washington: Smithsonian, 1997); Andrew James Wulf, U.S. International Exhibitions during the Cold 
War: Winning Hearts and Minds through Cultural Diplomacy (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2015). 
603 One of the first comprehensive studies on how American policymakers, business executives, industrial 
designers and artists were involved in the creation and promotion of U.S. trade fairs in the 1950s is 
Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s by Robert Haddow, while for a 
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As we shall observe in Chapter 4 and 5, Washington’s public diplomacy utilized 
soft power instruments of visual and emotional (sound) persuasion that covered all 
bodily senses and were, in that sense, totalizing. In this chapter, focused on the 
American pavilions at the Yugoslav trade fairs, we shall investigate the U.S. 
participation as part of a general public diplomacy effort to “sell America’s story abroad” 
by presenting the visual allure of commodity products, the charm of aesthetically 
appealing and technologically advanced kitchen appliances and the attraction of 
technological aids. Our focus will, therefore, be on those means with high appealing 
visibility, codifying messages, whetting appetites: the stories of American success 
bolstered to promote the culture of abundance and the Yugoslav participation in it.604 
In public spaces of mass culture consummation, the American exhibitions at Zagreb 
and Belgrade Trade Fairs exemplified an all-round effort of “selling” representations of 
American modernity, technological advancement, and consumerist abundance in order 
to generate imaginary spaces for a Yugoslav average public. Moreover, as Jakovina 
pointed out, every spring and autumn when International Trade Fairs were running, 
Zagreb became “a promotional battlefield of two ideologically, economically, 
religiously and politically opposite blocs,” the United States and the Soviet Union.605 
The Yugoslavia belonging to the “socialist forces of the world,” its non-Aligned 
policies and political linkages with Third World countries, its unique, often debated, 
                                                                                                                                               
deeper insight into the role of designers and architects for U.S. exhibitions abroad, look into Jack Masey 
and Conway L. Morgan, Cold War Confrontations: US Exhibitions and Their Role in the Cultural Cold 
War (Baden, Switzerland: Lars Müller Publishers, 2008). A fascinating two-sided account on this topic 
can be found in Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010) where the author explores tactics used by the 
American government to seduce citizens of the Soviet bloc with state-of-the-art consumer goods, and the 
reactions of the Communist Party staged socialist home expositions intended to evoke the domestic ideal 
of a cultured proletariat. 
604 Partial scholarly studies have addressed the issue of U.S. participation at the Yugoslav trade fairs, in 
particularly on Supermarket USA the case study of 1957. On his part, Tvrtko Jakovina has recreated the 
political echoes of the U.S. participation among the Yugoslav party elites, while Shane Hamilton has 
analyzed how technology served as soft power instrument in the “Yugoslav kitchen debate” during the 
U.S. exhibition (Tvrtko Jakovina, “Narodni kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija. Američki super-
market na Zagrebačkom velesajmu 1957. godine,” in Zbornik Mire Kolar Dimitrijević (Zagreb: FF Press, 
2003), 469–79 and Shane Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the 
Technopolitics of Industrial Food Distribution into Cold War,” in Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, 
Technology, and European Users, ed. Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2011), 137–59). 
605 Jakovina, “Narodni kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija,” 478. 
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American partnership, made the Zagreb Trade Fair, and to lesser degree the Belgrade 
one, an exemplary battlefield of cultural Cold War practices.606 
4.1 Washington’s Exhibition Program 
 
American industrial strength supports your freedom.607 
 
An important part of USIA’s job was to give foreign audiences a picture of 
American life evoked with “familiarity and friendliness.”608 Part of this mission were 
the USIA exhibits abroad usually classified into two groups, namely the exhibits 
prepared by the agency for the post’s specific uses and the special international 
exhibitions prepared specifically for trade fairs and circulating exhibitions in Eastern 
Europe. After the creation of the USIA, the supervision of these two sections passed 
from the State Department to the International Press Service Displays and Photographic 
Division, and then transferred to the ICS where, in 1956, they became part of the 
Branch of the Exhibits, English Teaching and Special Program Division. In 1965, the 
Smithsonian Institute was assigned the organization of fine art exhibitions abroad, while 
the ICS continued responsibility for the showings overseas. With the fiscal year 1966, 
the USIA acquired the entire responsibility for the International Trade Fair program 
from the Department of Commerce, until then operationally in charge of it since its 
inceptions in 1954. Finally, in 1968, an Agency directive limited the participation in 
international trade fairs principally to Eastern European countries.609 
                                                 
606 Both the United States and the Soviet Union, together with the Communist ruled countries of Eastern 
Europe “laid claim to the same cultural heritage, the same Enlightenment tradition, and the same concepts 
of human worth and social progress.” Following this argumentation, the question of heritage became a 
Cold War engagement at the international fairs worldwide. (Jack Masey and Conway L. Morgan, Cold 
War Confrontations, 15). 
607 Robert C. Hickok to Mr. Dennis, Feb. 3, 1956, Box 38, USIA Master Budget Files 1953-1964, RG 
306, NACP. 
608 A Study of USIA Operating Assumptions, Volume 3, Dec. 1954, S-27-54, Box 6, Special Reports 
1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP. 
609 Functions and Responsibilities and Recommended Organization for the ICS: Report of a Study Group, 
Aug. 1, 1973, Box 4, Records Relating to Culture Centers 1946-1988, USIA Library Program Division, 
RG 306, NACP: 32-34. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (but not Yugoslavia), these exhibitions 
operated under the Cultural Exchange Agreements or similar arrangements, while the Trade Missions or 
Labor Missions were allocated to the Department of Commerce and Labor under Executive Order 11034 
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From very early on, the IIA commenced discussions over the possible usage of 
exhibitions and commercial enterprises at world fairs in channeling propaganda and 
attracting large audiences: “We know of no more important instrument of psychological 
warfare than the actual display of America’s industrial, economic and labor 
resources.” 610  Starting in 1954 and grounded on a close cooperation between 
government agencies and American individuals and business enterprises “that have 
patriotically contributed […] to exhibit American industrial quality, progress and 
power,” 611  the Trade Fair program aimed to incorporate “our [American] spiritual 
values […] and reflect purposes beyond mere commercial expediency.”612 Its objectives 
were officially proclaimed by the President’s Congressional Message of January 10, 
1955: 
To impress upon the peoples of the world that the United States’ great productive capacity is 
dedicated to the preservation of peace and […] to the improvement of mankind’s standard of 
living; [to prove that] American owners, managers and workers, living under a free political 
system and enjoying free enterprise, are cooperating in the production of all kinds of goods and 
services not only for the benefit of our own people but for all with whom we trade; to counteract 
and overshadow the efforts of the Soviet bloc countries in their intensive program to use 
international trade fairs as instruments to stimulate good will; [and] to supply tangible evidence 
that the United States is capable of and willing to expand mutually beneficial two-way trade 
pursuant to these objectives.613 
                                                                                                                                               
of June 25, 1962 (Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 
1969, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 3–4). 
610 G. J. Hummel, IPS, to Charles P. Arnot, IPS, Feb. 29, 1952, 511.00/2-2952, Box 2244, CDF 1950-
1954, RG 59, NACP. 
611  Roderick L. O’Connor, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, to Frank Thompson Jr., House of 
Representatives, March 2, 1956, 511.00/8-1855, Box 2071, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP: 3–4. 
612 E. O. Titus, IOP/E, to some IOP officers, Sept. 20, 1954, 511.00/9-2054, Box 2250, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP. 
613 The Impact of the U.S. Trade Fair Program. The Analysis of Visitor Reaction in the Far East, South 
Asia, Europe and Latin America, April 25, 1956, PMS-3, Box 13, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 
306, NACP. As Haddow notes, the artists and designers who created trade fairs and exhibitions for 
government offices, such as the Department of Commerce, the USIA, and the Eisenhower White House 
Project, developed strong working relationships with business groups including the Committee on 
Economic Development (CED) and the Advertising Council. Because of these interactions, a new 
generation of artists, architects, and designers like  R. Buckminster Fuller, Charles and Ray Eames, 
George Nelson, Peter Blake, Ivan Chermayeff and Thomas Geismar who were trained to conceptualize 
and incorporate displays celebrating American capitalism and material abundance into public exhibitions 
and their art (Robert H. Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty). 
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Between 1954 and 1969 alone, the USIA was involved in 343 separate showings, 
visited by millions of people at Expos and World Fairs, whose influence, for scale 
reasons, is incalculable, but their impact cannot be denied.614 
Official Yugoslavia looked upon trade fairs, commercial exhibits, biennales, 
triennials, and cultural presentations as necessary concomitants to economic progress 
and cultural enlightenment. 615  From the U.S. point of view, the Zagreb Autumn 
International Trade Fair and the Belgrade Technological Trade Fair were the two major 
Yugoslav fairs considered worthy of participation. Along with Izmir, Damascus and 
Plovdiv, Zagreb’s fair was considered by “the U.S. officials […] as the best American 
exhibitions there to date”616 and a “strategic show window” counteracting the Soviet 
Bloc propaganda in Yugoslavia. In the context of Yugoslav trade history, the Zagreb 
Fair had an old, pre-war, prestigious tradition and a prominent place among the 
southeastern European fairs. The American pavilion in Zagreb was the largest 
permanent U.S. pavilion in the world. As a split-level of excellent design, it was built in 
1957 and included 2,780 square meters of covered space, 2,400 square meters of 
outdoor area, plus some additional storage space.617 USIS officials participated in the 
pavilion’s arrangement by designing the fair’s 30-meters long exhibit window in charge 
of daily changes of photographic fair materials. In addition, the post officers prepared 
press releases and provided photographs, while, just before the opening, USIS Zagreb 
arranged the press kits, diagrams, displays, and descriptions (on the occasion of the 
                                                 
614 Masey and Morgan, Cold War Confrontations, 11. 
615 Similarly, the Yugoslav participation at International Trade Fairs, as in the case of the Brussels EXPO 
’58 with an inspiring piece of modern architecture, the pavilion designed by Croatian architect Vjenceslav 
Richter, was as “an attempt to internationally showcase the specific brand of socialism […] since its break 
from the Soviet bloc.” In the Brussels case, however, the Yugoslav pavilion failed in its objective because 
it subsisted between a politically engaged avant-garde striving for the transformation of Yugoslav society 
and an apolitical ‘autonomous’ modernism merely interested in exploring its own aesthetic potential 
(Vladimir Kulić, “An Avant-Garde Architecture for an Avant-Garde Socialism: Yugoslavia at EXPO 
’58,” Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 1 (January 2012): 161, 182). 
616  Robert Hickok, ICS, to Harris, ICS, and Wilson, I, Oct. 1, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to 
International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP. 
617 The rental space and other fair expenses were covered by Embassy dinars either held by the Treasury 
Department or generated by P.L. 480 and various ICA aid agreements. The American pavilion was 
renewed in 1967 when Ambassador Elbrick and the Fair’s general director Ivan Baćun signed an 
agreement that prolonged the exhibit rights for the next ten years (Telegram 49 from the American 
Consul Zagreb to the Secretary of State, March 3, 1967, CUL 4 US-YUGO, Box 335, Central Foreign 
Policy Files 1967-1969, RG 59, NACP). 
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1959 fair, which attracted some 1.3 million Yugoslavs – a number “which could never 
be reached anywhere” – USIS distributed over 300,000 pamphlets).618 
Held for the first time in 1957, the International Technical Fair in Belgrade on 
industrial equipment and other engineering products was Zagreb’s strong rival and the 
second Yugoslav fair by status, with a high commercial significance, since Yugoslavia’s 
foreign trade was oriented towards the capital city. The event was in high consideration 
of the U.S. representatives in Belgrade because it drew mass audiences from the central 
and southern parts of the country. “Workers and children, particularly those from rural 
areas,” usually very difficult to reach with more restricted and conventional media,  and 
“key governmental officials, industrial bureaucrats and the military,” all flooded the 
Belgrade fair, giving the Embassy officers a unique opportunity of expanding and 
developing contacts.619 
4.2 Pleasing the “Whetted Appetites” at the Yugoslav Trade Fairs 
(1955-1964) 
In May 1950, the director of the Zagreb Trade Fair sent a first-time invitation to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce pleading for the American participation at that year’s 
exhibition, held from September 23 to October 9 1950.620 Due to a lack of successful 
involvement of American firms by the Yugoslav Commercial Attaches of the Embassy 
in Washington, the 1950 Zagreb fair was characterized by a very limited American 
participation. The exhibit displayed some mining equipment by Ingersoll-Rand, General 
Motors products and CARE packages and none of the American companies made any 
sales at the fair. The third post-war Zagreb Trade Fair, more aimed at stressing the 
                                                 
618 Despatch 93 from the USIS Belgrade to the USIA Washington, July 1, 1960, 868.191-ZA/7-160, Box 
2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
619 Ibid. Other relevant fairs were occurring in Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s, but witnessed a minor 
American participation. Among them the Zagreb Spring International Fair; the Novi Sad Agricultural 
Fair; the Ljubljana’s International Timber Processing and Forestry Fair, International Motor and Motor 
Vehicle Show, International Fair and Packing Materials Show, International Electronics Fair, 
International Wine Fair, International Building and Construction Fair, and the Modern Electronics Fair; 
Zadar’s International Shipping, Fishery and Tourist Fair; and Skopje’s International Tobacco Fair 
(Despatch 80 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Feb. 2, 1960, 868.191/2-260, Box 2705, CDF 
1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 26 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Feb. 15, 1961, 
868.191/2-1561, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP). 
620 Despatch 566 from Belgrade to the Department of State, May 29, 1950, 868.191-ZA/5-2950, Box 
5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
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benefits of the Five Year Plan rather than showing goods available for present 
consumption, achieved a high attendance of 561,907 visitors, a number maximized by 
extensive official efforts to bring various groups from all over the country through 
reduced transportation fares and other price concessions.621 
In the following year, the fair’s directorship guided by Ivan Šnidaršić and assisted 
by Sokolić, chief of the Fair Committee’s Propaganda Section, extended the formal 
permissions to Yugoslav firms for trade with foreign producers and made available 
major amounts of foreign currencies for Yugoslav firms. Šnidaršić repeatedly renewed 
the invitation to U.S. greater participation for the 1951-1954 years: “we all know how 
important it is that every possible effort be made to bring America and Yugoslavia 
closer together,” he claimed.622 Despite these invitations, for several years USIS Zagreb 
was not allowed to participate near the American expositors,623 even if sometimes they 
obtained an initial permission,624 this was often suddenly retracted just before the fairs 
opening (as in August 1951)625 because of the high “apprehension [of] the influence of 
the American information in such large and sudden doses.”626 
Between 1952 and 1954, the Zagreb Trade Fair evolved from an exhibit of 
“propaganda purpose” to a more “regular international commercial show,” increasing its 
foreign participation from 52 foreign exhibitors in 1947, 234 in 1949, 247 in 1951 and 
680 in 1952.627 From 1953 onwards, Yugoslavia began liberalizing its trade policies by 
expanding the exhibitions in other including Osijek, Novi Sad, Ljubljana, and Skopje, 
                                                 
621 Despatch 172 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 9, 1950, 868.191-ZA/9-950, Box 5340, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 353 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 17, 1950, 
868.191-ZA/11-1750, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
622 Despatch 145 from Zagreb to the Department of State, April 12, 1951, 868.191-ZA/4-1251, Box 5340, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
623  Airgram 366 from the Department of State to the American Embassy Belgrade, June 13, 1951, 
868.191-ZA/4-1251, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
624 Telegram 88 from Allen to the Secretary of State, July 19, 1951, 868.191-ZA/7-1951, Box 5340, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; and then accepted in Telegram 3084 from Acheson to Allen, Aug. 8, 1951, 
868.191-ZA/8-851, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
625 Ivan Šnidaršić to the USIS/Embassy Belgrade, Aug. 6, 1951, enclosed in despatch 147 from Belgrade 
to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1951, 868.191-ZA/8-1651, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, 
NACP. 
626 Despatch 147 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1951, 868.191-ZA/8-1651, Box 
5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 316 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 25, 
1951, 868.191-ZA/9-2551, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. Fair representatives would not 
allow the participation of an USIS desk at the American pavilion until 1955. 
627 Despatch 257 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 10, 1952, 868.191-ZA/10-1052, Box 
5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
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whilst Yugoslav enterprises engaged in international expos in Milan, Brussels, Paris and 
Casablanca. 628  Although the Yugoslav commercial ties with Western European 
countries were vastly augmented, the Yugoslav fairs lacked a major and stable 
American participation until 1955 (as until then local or European agents represented 
the U.S. firms). 629  In addition, only after 1953, the year of Stalin’s death and 
meliorating Yugo-Soviet bilateral relations, the Yugoslavs permitted the Soviet bloc to 
participate at the fairs.630 
Instead, as far as the Belgrade Fair was concerned, in its first 1957 edition it already 
witnessed an intense Soviet bloc countries participation (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, East Germany, Poland and Soviet Union, but only through Yugoslav 
agencies). Impressive from an architectural point of view, the first Belgrade 
International Fair accommodated 650 Yugoslav and 850 foreign firms with the 
contribution of Italy, England, Belgium, Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland, 
Sweden, France, Austria, Greece, in addition to the Soviet Bloc and 11 Near-East and 
Asian countries. Even if the Fair had a remarkable business turnover (the total value of 
the 1957 contracts was 134 billion dinars or 12 percent of all Yugoslav foreign trade) 
and an outstanding attendance (almost 1.2 million of first edition visitors), it lacked 
American participation until 1960.631 
4.2.1 The “Atoms-For-Peace” Debut at the 1955 Zagreb Trade Fair 
 
The United States pledges before you – and therefore before the world – 
its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma, to devote its entire 
heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man 
should not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life. 
                                                 
628 Despatch 746 from Belgrade to the Department of State, March 18, 1953, 868.191/3-1853, Box 5340, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
629 Despatch 147 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 13, 1954, 
868.191-ZA/9-1354, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
630 Despatch 49 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, Aug. 14, 1953, 868.191 
ZA/8-1453, Box 5340, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
631 Despatch 245 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 26, 1957, 
868.191-BE/11-2657, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; Despatch 450 from Belgrade to the 
Department of State, Feb. 29, 1960, 868.191-BE/2-2960, Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
From 1957 to 1959, U.S. firms participated at the Belgrade’s Fair only through representatives, although 
with the Trade Information Exhibit desk that furnished a commercial library, pamphlet materials and 
officers available for consultations to businessmen. 
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Inscription of President Eisenhower UN speech at the Atoms-for-Peace 
exhibit632 
 
We are convinced that the only real way, which ensures the progress of 
humanity is the use of nuclear energy in peaceful industrial purposes toward 
the end of raising the standard of living and eliminating want and 
backwardness, which, to a great extent, are a cause of war. 
Inscription of President’s Tito speech at the Atoms-for-Peace exhibit 633 
 
Long live America. 
Vojislav Kazić, Guest book of the Atoms-for-Peace exhibit634 
 
The Cold War confrontations transformed the atomic question into more than a 
mere issue over nuclear forces or weaknesses. It developed into cultural war waging to 
persuade worldwide audiences and leadership about the purpose, each of its own – 
Soviet or American – nuclear program. In the line with President Eisenhower’s 
celebrated address to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, in which he 
heralded a new Atoms-for-Peace campaign designed to “hasten the day when fear of the 
atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people” and redirect nuclear research 
toward “peaceful […] efficient and economic usage [of] [and towards] an international 
atomic energy agency […] set up under the aegis of the United Nations,”635 the USIA 
conceived and designed the Atoms-for-Peace exhibition. 636  On its side, the State 
Department engaged from the early 1950s in the so-called “Release of Non-Classified 
Atomic Information” program maintained abroad by the Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC),637 which was exploiting the USIA channels in order to disseminate the newest 
acknowledgements on American peaceful nuclear science.638 
                                                 
632 The inscription letters were 10 centimeters high topped by the exhibit title, flanked by a two meters 
portrait of President Eisenhower and an American shield of similar size (Report on the Atoms-for-Peace 
Exhibit enclosed in despatch 006542 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, Dec. 15, 1955, Box 21, 
Country Project Correspondence 1952-1963, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP). 
633 The Tito speech was delivered to the Federal Assembly on March 8, 1955. Here quoted in Report on 
the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955. 
634 Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 5. 
635 NCS 5507/2, March 12, 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Vol. XX, doc. 14. 
636 Atomic Energy Developments in Europe enclosed in Instruction 4103 from the Department of State, 
Nov. 25, 1955, 511.00/11-2555, Box 2071, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
637 The United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was an agency established after World War II 
by Congress to foster and control the peacetime development of atomic science and technology. President 
Harry S. Truman signed the McMahon/Atomic Energy Act on August 1, 1946 (in effect as PL 585, 79th 
Congress, from January 1947) transferring the control of atomic energy from military to civilian hands. 
Such a shift gave the first AEC members a complete control of the plants, laboratories, equipment, and 
personnel assembled during the war to produce the atomic bomb (Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. 
 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
156  Carla Konta - April 2016 
Very indicatively, the United States debuted at the Zagreb Trade Fair with the 
USIA Atoms-for-Peace exhibition (Atomi za mir). In the view of Tito’s “widespread 
misunderstanding of U.S. atomic position [versus] neutralist countries,” this exhibit was 
considered politically mandatory and crucial to “stress identity of interests” of both 
sides, the “opportunity for Yugoslavs to bring [the] peaceful uses message,” the support 
of Yugoslav development of peaceful atomic energy and its participation to AEC’s 
international isotopes distribution program.639 
The Atoms pavilion, exhibited in September 1955, had a more glorious affect than 
in any other Communist country. Its fabulous success was testified by a 20-page USIS 
report from Zagreb. Recalling the fact that only two years before, in October 1953, the 
Trieste question smashed USIS windows and menaced the security of the personnel, 
Yugoslav PAO Joseph Kolarek proudly reported how Yugoslavia’s highest officers 
toured the Atoms exhibit “along with more than a quarter of a million other 
Yugoslavs.”640 The 12-day exhibit reached more than 150,000 visitors with a daily 
average of 12,000 and some 108,000 at the Belgrade Kinoteka Film Museum, to where 
the exhibit was transferred after Zagreb. Visited by the vice-president Edvard Kardelj, 
the Croatian Assembly president Vladimir Bakarić, the then chief of the Yugoslav 
Mission for American Military Aid, General Franc Poglajn, Branko Drašković from 
DSIP, and prominent Communist leaders such as Aleksandar Ranković and Svetozar 
Tempo-Vukmanović, the American pavilion gained high publicity.641 
Never had an American publication issued by USIS had such a wide spread 
distribution as the “Atom – Nada Sveta” (Atom – Hope of the World), a handsomely 
colorful and illustrated pamphlet, printed in 150,000 copies, then distributed to 88,000 
visitors from Zagreb and 62,000 Belgrade visitors, adults and students, with additional 
copies being sent via mail. Posters were put up in all major Serbian cities, American 
                                                                                                                                               
Anderson, The New World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume I 1939-
1946 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 
638 Airgram 1434 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
May 12, 1953, 511.00/3-1253, Box 2248, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
639 Message 122 from USIA-State to Belgrade, March 31, 1955, 868.191/3-3155, Box 4841, CDF 1955-
1959, RG 59, NACP. 
640 Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 1. 
641  According to a USIS report, President Tito, together with Moša Pijade, president of the Federal 
Assembly, visited the U.S. pavilion out of official working hours. 
Chapter 4: Exhibited! American Modernity, Abundance and Technological Vanguard at the Yugoslav Trade 
Fairs 
Carla Konta - April 2016   157 
cultural centers, insertions were paid for in radio broadcasts and daily newspapers, and 
invitations were sent to schools, agricultural and technical organizations. 
In spite of this positive feedback and cooperation, police and fair authorities in 
Zagreb prohibited the Atoms-for-Peace films Introducing the Atom, Atoms in Medicine, 
Atoms in Agriculture and Industry and Power, scheduled at the pavilion’s film 
projection panel. To counteract this, the USIS installed a rear-view projector in one of 
its windows so that movies could be seen from outdoors. Two movies – Atomic power 
for Peace and A is for Atom – were scheduled continuously for 4 hours nightly 
beginning at 7 PM. During the first two nights, about 800 spectators saw the film before 
the police ordered them to stop because “spectators interfered with traffic by crowding 
the sidewalk and overflowing into the street.”642 
Certainly, the negative official reactions in connection with the staging of the 
exhibit reflected to a large extent the conditions under which USIS operated in 
Yugoslavia. While in Belgrade the efforts made to find an adequate indoor space for 
exhibition were many times denied, the Zagreb Fair management imposed Tito’s speech 
as an inscription next to Eisenhower’s less than a week before opening, because 
apparently the American exhibition failed to obtain the Federal Executive Council 
permission.643  Moreover, Zagreb authorities denied the USIS officers a refreshment 
reception for journalists and guests, the fair authorities denied a telephone line for the 
pavilion, whilst the official opening procession intentionally avoided the visit to the 
American pavilion while visiting all the other foreign pavilions.644 
Nevertheless, the American pavilion, together with the cultural mission, received – 
as never before – an abundant and decidedly favorable press attention in newspapers, 
magazines, children’s weekly, and economic periodicals: “the first and only one of this 
kind in Yugoslavia;”645 “it was the greatest attraction at the International Fair;” “shows 
the enormous power of atomic energy used for peaceful purposes,” 646 and “people were 
                                                 
642 Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 9. 
643 Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955, 15–16. 
644 Report on the Atoms-for-Peace Exhibit, Dec. 15, 1955. 
645 “Atomi za mir. Nastup Sjedinjenih Američkih Država na Velesajmu,” Privredni Vjesnik, Sept. 2, 1955, 
3. 
646 “Atomi u službi čovječanstva,” Glas Istre, Oct. 14, 1955, 3–4. 
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very thankful to the organizers.”647 The aftermath of the fair proved a successful soft 
power instrument. Inspired by the contacts made out of the Atoms exhibit, the Yugoslav 
Nuclear Energy Commission sent twelve of their most prominent scientists and nuclear 
researchers to the United States in 1956,648 while, in the spirit of that collaboration, the 
Yugoslav Commission for Atomic Energy received the Atoms-for-Peace library 
collection as a gift from the U.S. government during a high-level ceremony attended by 
Ranković, Vladimir Velebit, and other distinguished members of the government.649 
Apart from the 1955 Atoms Exhibit, the U.S. participated in several other “nuclear” 
fairs in Yugoslavia, but none proved to be such a successful propaganda story.650 
The first years of American informal and formal participation at the Yugoslav fairs 
illustrate several key points of USIA strategy related to these exhibitions. Certainly, it 
proves the preference of USIA and USIS policymakers for exalted style-appealing 
propaganda that was very well recognized in public discourse. Secondly, it undoubtedly 
points to, and even more so with the 1957 “Supermarket USA” exhibition, its 
preference for propaganda benefit rather than a commercial one. Apart from the exciting 
newspaper reports, we do not possess any other evidence of the Atoms exhibition 
impact. Nevertheless, the choice for the appealing “nuclear” theme was surely an 
affirmation of the USA super-power, whose corrosiveness and anti-Soviet orientation 
could not go unnoticed to the Yugoslav officers and party leaders in that late September 
1955. 
                                                 
647 Naš Vjesnik, Oct. 28, 1955. 
648 Despatch 453 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, March 6, 1956, 
868.1901/3-656, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
649  Despatch 654 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, June 4, 1957, 
868.1901/6-457, Box 4841, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
650 For example, the U.S. companies presented their nuclear research equipment at the Belgrade Technical 
Fair (August 23 – September 2) in 1960 where USIS made up an American Information Commercial 
Booth (Despatch 312 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 23, 1960, 868.191-BE/11-2360, 
Box 2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP). A relatively notable collaboration was the exhibit “Atoms in 
Effect” (Atomi u dejstvu) organized collectively by AEC and the Yugoslav Commission for Nuclear 
Energy, with permission from the highest party members and expenses totally relegated to the American 
government, presented at the 1963 Belgrade Trade Fair (Beleška o saglasnosti za organizovanje izložbe 
“Atomi u dejstvu,” May 11, 1963, 75, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ; Koča Popović, Secretary of 
State, to SIV, 91429, April 30, 1963, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ). This illustrative and 
educational exhibit established cooperation between American and Yugoslav scientists and was 
specifically designed for specialists and advanced students thanks to the Student Teacher Demonstration 
Program prepared by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies (Airgram 60 from the American 
Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 26, 1962, 868.191/9-2662, Box 2705, CDF 1960-
1963, RG 59, NACP). 
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4.2.2 The “American Supermarket” and the Yugoslav “Kitchen 
Debate” 
 
Officials are inclined to view trade fairs from the point of view of what 
they contribute to the Yugoslav economy at a particular phase of its 
development and officially at least are not pleased with large displays of 
consumer goods, produced by more developed economies, which they see as 
whetting popular appetites that cannot be satisfied. The general public, on the 
other hand, comes to fairs to see a show and be amused. They want to see 
customer goods, cars, and recreational items. Industrial equipment and 
tractors interest them less. […] U.S. exhibits […] realizing the value of 
whetted appetites in a country with a Communist regime, quite properly err on 
the side of pleasing the general public.651 
 
Therefore, the Americans brought the supermarket to Yugoslavia. 
Nobody knew what a supermarket was. And it was sensational! 
Nada Apsen-Pintarić, former director of USIS library Zagreb652 
 
The report quoted above, written by an unknown USIS officer in Belgrade, 
illustrates and confirms the uniformity of American policies in the Eastern European 
countries when it comes to the basic principles that motivated the U.S. participation at 
the Eastern European trade fairs. Taken as the topmost example, the Moscow Sokolniki 
exhibit of summer 1959 ended as “an epic propaganda battle” in which the “Americans 
mounted a massive exhibition of consumer capitalism,” while the “Soviet mobilized a 
counterattack against the Western culture invasion.”653 However, the Soviets failed, 
while, as Greg Castillo emphasized, the American pavilion “bombarded Soviet visitors 
with multimedia images of American daily life and then deposited them in a multistory 
warehouse overflowing with retail goods.”654 
                                                 
651 Despatch 93 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, July 1, 1960, 868.191-ZA/7-160, Box 2705, 
CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
652 Interview with Nada Apsen-Pintarić, May 31, 2014, Zagreb. 
653  Hixon, Parting the Curtain, 185. The American success at the Moscow exhibit represents the 
paradigm of the state-private network. As never before, the response of the American business 
community to Eisenhower’s appeal was unprecedented: the Radio Corporation of America provided a 
complete color television studio, American Express endorsed a travel exhibit, food companies such as 
General Mills, General Foods, Grand Union and others provided food displays and demonstrations, Pepsi-
Cola offered free soft drinks, IBM donated its RAMAC electronic “brain” while companies such as Sears, 
Kaiser, Whirlpool, Macy’s, Singer, Kodak, and DuPont contributed with thousands of dollars (Ibid, 168–
169). 
654 Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front, xxii. During the six-week exhibit, the U.S. pavilion was visited 
by 2.7 million visitors, even if tens of thousands of gatecrashers made the actual number much higher. A 
24-meter high and 60-meters long, gold-anodized geodesic dome that served as the information center of 
the exhibit dominated the American pavilion. Inside, giant slides displayed colored pictures of American 
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At the opening of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, Vice President 
Richard Nixon engaged in what would become one of the most notable verbal Cold War 
sparring matches with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the “kitchen debate.” 655 
Staying in front of an American model kitchen and a sunshine yellow GE washer-dryer, 
Nixon and Khrushchev engaged in a heated and lengthy dispute, not over presumably 
missiles, bombs and diplomatic issues, but, surprisingly, over the relative merits of 
American washing machines, televisions and electric ranges. For Nixon, the American 
superiority rested on the ideal of the suburban home complete with modern appliances 
and distinct gender roles of the male breadwinner and the full-time housewife. The 
availability of labor-saving devices were proving in fact the essence of American 
freedom and superiority of the free enterprise over communism.656 Apart from pointing 
to the American post-war dream of successful breadwinners supporting attractive 
housewives in affluent suburban homes, the kitchen debate illuminated ideological 
conveyances, as Castillo accentuated, “over citizen enfranchisement, housework and 
gender equity, and the economics of mass consumption and planned obsolescence.”657 
In September 1957, the United States Department of Commerce, along with the 
USIA and the American businessmen, launched the “Supermarket USA” exhibition at 
the Zagreb Trade Fair. Most of the one million socialist citizens, who visited the 
exhibition, had never seen an American-style supermarket, owned a mechanical 
refrigerator, or purchased a prepackaged convenience food. It was a transnational effort 
to revolutionize the production and distribution of food in Yugoslavia. The American 
planners expected that a radical transformation of Yugoslav consumer culture would 
                                                                                                                                               
life accompanied by a musical score and a voiceover commentary in Russian (Hixon, Parting the Curtain, 
174). 
655 The “Kitchen Debate” was partly recorded on the Ampex color videotape, a new technology pioneered 
in the United States by the Ampex Company. It is nowadays available on Ampex Data Systems, The 
Kitchen Debate (Nixon and Khrushchev, 1959) Part I, accessed November 10, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D7HqOrAakco and Ampex Data Systems, The Kitchen Debate 
(Nixon and Khrushchev, 1959) Part II, accessed November 10, 2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6RLCw1OZFw. 
656 Elaine T. May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era, Revisited and updated ed. 
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 2008), 10–14. A challenging transatlantic revision of the Kitchen Debate, 
and its newly discovered social and political implications in cultural Cold War can be found in Ruth 
Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, eds., Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European 
Users (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011) and Shane Hamilton and Sarah Phillips, The Kitchen 
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2014). 
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follow in the wake of that exhibition.658 John A. Logan of the National Association of 
Food Chains drew up the plans for an American-style supermarket-stocking 4,000 items 
in a space of 1,000 square-meters. It was the first USA Supermarket in a communist 
country.659 The American goods on display were fresh and included yellow bananas, 
juicy grapes, and prepackaged meats. The Yugoslav women expressed adoration at the 
exhibit products with such exclamations as “Look at the meat, it’s all packed and 
assorted, the price is marked on [it] and you just know it’s clean.” “Why would it be so 
difficult for us to package meat this way? A little paper, that’s all there is to it. […] 
Hygienic, it’s wonderful” commented a housewife.660 
At the pavilions entrance, Eisenhower’s huge poster and message was stating “All 
countries today stand on the threshold of more widely shared prosperity, if they utilize 
wisely the knowledge of science and technology available to this age. International fairs 
help to spread this knowledge […] in the creation of a better life for all.” Besides the 
supermarket, the fair visitors admired one of the latest models of U.S. air conditioned, 
fully power-equipped car, the Zagreb youngsters admired a full line of automatic 
dispensers of candies, soft drinks, and pastries, whilst elsewhere in the pavilion there 
were displays of agricultural equipment and home appliances, a laundry-mat and a 
furnished American style five-room apartment.661 
As Hamilton underlined, the revolutionary potential of American supermarketing in 
a communist country seemed apparent to many visitors of the American pavilion. 
Certainly, for the Yugoslav consumers accustomed to rationing, the abundance 
displayed at the exhibition was overwhelming.662According to the New York Times the 
                                                 
658  Shane Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Technopolitics of 
Industrial Food Distribution into Cold War,” in Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and 
European Users, ed. Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011), 
137–59. Nonetheless, Supermarket USA was not the first attempt by American policymakers and 
businessmen to transform European food retailing. Beginning with 1953, a traveling Modern Food 
Commerce exhibit, funded by the Marshall Plan, introduced the basics of supermarkets to businessmen 
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659 “U.S. Supermarket In Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, Sept. 22, 1957; see also Vjesnik, issues 6, 8, 
19 September, 1957. 
660 “Typical American Supermarket Is the Hit of Fair in Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, Sept. 8, 1957. 
661 “U.S. Supermarket in Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, Sept. 22, 1957; Tvrtko Jakovina, “Narodni 
kapitalizam protiv narodnih demokracija. Američki super-market na Zagrebačkom velesajmu 1957. 
godine,” in Zbornik Mire Kolar Dimitrijević (Zagreb: FF Press, 2003), 472–73. 
662 Hamilton, “Supermarket USA Confronts State Socialism: Airlifting the Techno-politics of Industrial 
Food Distribution into the Cold War Yugoslavia,” 143. 
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party officials who visited the exhibition together with the Soviet government 
representatives, were reportedly “visibly embarrassed.” 663  Every hundredth visitor 
received a bag, which he was free to fill with food. Female students, hired from the 
Zagreb University, acted as American shoppers and cashiers. The young students 
pushed carts around the model store, often borrowing a baby from a mother in the 
crowd and surrounding the child with packages of processed foods. It was the 
representation of an unknown self-service system.664 
For a regime that struggled with cyclical famines and domestic shortages, the 
Supermarket USA introduced an industrial model of food production and distribution 
that was challenging for the Yugoslav system. It was, for Hamilton, “a demonstration of 
the systemic nature of American supermarketing and an exercise in techno-politics” that 
used “technology as an instrument of power.” 665  Finally, relying on Cold War 
geopolitics to justify the penetration of a socialist economy, the executives working on 
the exhibit expected that Supermarket USA would lead to an expansion of American 
economic hegemony in Eastern Europe generally, and Yugoslavia in particular. 
Steplock, the economic consultant of the fair in this sense affirmed: “The changes in the 
Yugoslav economy over the last few years have been very substantial. The desire of the 
Yugoslavs to learn and improve their economy holds forth the promise of increased 
mutually advantageous trade.” 666  In fact, American food-processing corporations – 
including Armour, Campbell Soup, Kraft, Minute Maid, Pillsbury, Sunkist, and Wesson 
Oil – donated the equipment and supplies for the Zagreb exhibit hoping to establish 
prosperous economic relations. At first, the Supermarket USA enjoyed great success in 
the aftermath of the fair: together with the refrigerated cabinets, the United States sold a 
host of technologies required in the supermarket retailing-food-processing machinery: 
industrial freezers, meat-wrapping machines, can and jar-making machinery, and other 
packaging machines.667 
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The American intentions partly failed. In one sense, the USIA achieved its goal 
very soon: the first American-style supermarket opened in Belgrade in April 1958, the 
same American model from the fair bought by the “Vračar” enterprise,668  and the 
number and popularity of these supermarkets continued to increase rapidly. Although, 
from a propaganda point of view, the Yugoslav consumers adopted the American style 
of consuming and partly enjoyed the feeling of free (even if limited) commodity choice, 
these supermarkets were American only in the sense that they sold branded goods at a 
central location. Indeed, as Patrick H. Patterson suggests, the Yugoslav supermarkets in 
both the 1960s and 1970s tended to be quite small and sold only a limited range of 
groceries generally manufactured in Eastern Europe, and combined American self-
service shopping with more personalized forms of retailing such as the open-air markets 
(the pijacas).669 Nevertheless, according to the Trade fair surveys conducted jointly by 
Yugoslav and American poll agencies, the Supermarket USA was a successful 
propaganda story,670 impressing the visitors, whetting images, with new gender and 
leisure spaces that partly revolutionized the idea of consuming and the consumer in 
Yugoslavia during the next decades. 
4.2.3 Selling the American Market Economy 
In the years to follow, USIS continued exploring themes which could have an 
increasing “psychological impact on the audience;”671 at the following Zagreb fairs 
USIS presented “Marketing and Services in an Industrial Economy” (1960), 
“Productivity – The Key to Abundance” (1961), “The Constructive Use of Leisure 
Time” (1962), “Transportation USA” (at the Belgrade Fair, 1962), and “Intensive 
Farming” (1964). 
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The first of these high appealing exhibits, “Marketing and Services in Industrial 
Economies,” was attended by 1.2 million Yugoslavs of a total attendance of 1.4 million, 
with a participation of 124 U.S. firms and 84 exhibitors in a pavilion of 8483 square 
meters. As was traditional, the fair was opened by Marshall Tito accompanied, for the 
occasion, by other high Yugoslav officials (Edvard Kardelj, Vladimir Bakarić, Ivan 
Gošnjak, Milentije Popović, and Zagreb’s mayor Većeslav Holjevac), foreign diplomats 
and, exclusively, George Allen, USIA director and former ambassador to Yugoslavia. 
The exhibit consisted, after the entrance gate dedicated to the Presidential message and 
poster, of a small area devoted to photomurals of drug stores in America. The Compact 
Cars section displayed the Corvair, the Falcon, the Lark and the Valiant, whilst the 
Shopping Centers USA portrayed the type and size of a community-shopping complex 
in America. Besides the Drug Fair, Space Exploration (where two satellite models, 
Pioneer V and Tyros I, portrayed the “man in space”), the Fashion and the Ampex 
Video Tape sections, the “Kitchen” section shone as the star of the exhibit. That part 
was particularly catching because the visitor to the fair could observe three kitchens, 
one of the 1920s, one of the 1960s and one of the future, all designed to show how 
research and design have simplified the housewife’s chores. As the Moscow exhibit in 
Sokolniki, “the kitchen of the future proved to be about the biggest attraction at the U.S. 
exhibit.”672 
In 1961, when the U.S. pavilion presented “Productivity – The Key to Abundance,” 
an entire exhibition woven by the story line of productivity and the worker, dramatizing 
on how technology could enhance the value of an individual worker, put a premium 
upon his safety, training, skills, education, and new job opportunities, enabling him to 
acquire and enjoy a more abundant standard of living.673 Though it lacked the major 
crowding of the Supermarket USA or the RCA color television of 1958, its Aeromobile 
200-2,674 a ground effect vehicle travelling on a cushion of air a few inches above the 
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ground, developed by an Illinois country doctor, managed to attract the highest number 
of visitors for the American pavilion generally.675 
More importantly, it sent a well-defined message of the benefits of market 
capitalism: “As the individual worker produces more – through better machinery, higher 
safety standards and better training for his job – his added contribution is reflected in 
greater material rewards and opportunities to cultivate a more meaningful life. Thus, the 
country as a whole grows and prospers” quoted President Kennedy in his poster 
message.676 In more simplistic terms, “Productivity – The Key to Abundance” wanted 
to prove that the growing U.S. productivity had meant jobs for more people, higher 
living standards, increased investments in industry and agriculture, and more social 
welfare policies. 
Transportation USA was a USIA exhibit that came from the Soviet Union and 
constituted the U.S. pavilion of the Belgrade Technical Fair in spring 1962 and the 
Ninth Ljubljana International Electronics Fair in October 1962. Designed by George 
Nelson, Transportation USA was the second exhibition to travel to the Soviet Union. It 
featured a Cessna Skyhawk airplane, a Ford Thunderbird hardtop car, a 4-meter model 
of a Boeing 707 passenger aircraft, a scale model of a concept car on a circular track 
and additional information on public transport systems. The emphasis was again, as for 
many other exhibitions, “on the range of choice available to the American traveler.”677 
USIS Belgrade ordered other new items for the Yugoslav shows such as a Mack 25 ton 
Dumper, a caterpillar Traxcavator, a Desert Rat remote area vehicle, a Dodge pickup 
with a camper body and an Internattona1 Harvester Scout, all displayed on 600 square 
meters of outdoor space. The 1,200 square meters of interior space was occupied by 
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photographic panels, models, and mock-ups, a Ford station wagon, a Lincoln 
Continental, a Plymouth Coronado, an air-stream trailer, a U.S. rubber storage tank, a 
model of the Pan American terminal building in New York and Tele-register, a model 
of automatic equipment for making airline reservations. The most visited was the John 
Glenn capsule, whilst USIS showed three films about the Glenn flight, rocket belt and 
general American transportation and distributed over 200,000 Transportation USA 
pamphlets.678 Walter Roberts, Belgrade’s Public Officer, recalled,  
We had beautiful exhibits coming from the United States, and they were always part of the 
Belgrade fair. As a matter of course, and policy, Tito came to these fairs. [He] was very 
interested. I remember the capsule in which Glenn, later Senator Glenn, circled the Earth; we 
got that capsule to show it. I remember I showed it to Tito [who] said “Well, I’d have to lose a 
lot of weight to get into it.679 
 
Figure 4-1: John Glenn Capsule arrives at Belgrade Airport (Courtesy of Mark Taplin). Source: 
Taplin, Mark. “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: USIS Magazines and Exhibits in Yugoslavia - 
                                                 
678 Airgram 270 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 19, 1962, 868.191-BE/9-1962, Box 
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Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP). 
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‘I’m Red-Faced. I Apologize.’” Accessed February 22, 2016. Http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/ 
2015/02/walter-roberts-usis-magazines-and. html. 
 
In the same year, USIS participated at the Zagreb Autumn Fair with “Constructive 
Use of Leisure Time, ”a theme of “mass appeal,” “first class in every way,” enhancing 
“the prestige of the United States,” not too narrow nor too specialized but 
“representative of some important aspects of the American way of life.”680 The U.S. 
exhibition included the “Creative Home” section on American recreation rooms, 
workshops, photo equipment, paint spray cans, slides and film projectors. It integrated 
also an “Outdoor Living and Recreation” unit with an A-frame ski lodge, summer 
cottage, plastic swimming pool, squab diving equipment, archery equipment, and 
American made camp trailer. The Mercury capsule, even if not related to the exhibition, 
proved very popular among the Yugoslav public, as was the space race generally.681 The 
section of Plastics USA, originally the first touring exhibition in the Soviet Union in 
1961, was focused on the products in industry rather than industry itself, putting the 
emphasis on “the variety and adaptability of plastics for use in automotive design, 
medicine, clothing, home furnishings and houseware.” 682  Among other noteworthy 
sections, the “Constructive Use of Leisure Time by Women,” which included clothes 
making and home beauty aids, was the most gender oriented.683 In “Constructive Use of 
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Leisure Time,” USIS wanted to communicate that Americans work hard (with the “Do-
It-Yourself” unit for example) but still put a lot effort into organizing their leisure time. 
On the contrary, and that was the main Consulate’s criticism, the final message 
perceived was that “Americans are very rich people with a great deal of spare time that 
they use for sports, arts and crafts and so forth.” Consequently, USIS urged and strongly 
recommended that, since the Yugoslav public was getting accustomed to more 
sophisticated messages (“they are no longer impressed by displays of consumer goods 
and luxury items”), “our message should be more for the «eye» than for the «ear»” and 
that greater emphasis should be placed upon more sophisticated technologies such as 
the U.S. automatic computer systems.684 
The codification of messages commenced with the Supermarket USA, determined 
to prove and persuade Yugoslav citizens of the superiority of the U.S. free market 
system over state-centered communist economies (and by far supporting pro-market 
reforms of the Yugoslav self-management socialism), ended – almost symbolically – 
with the “Intensive Farming: A Story of American Food from Field to Table” at the 
Zagreb 1964 fair. Managed by Fritz Berliner and designed by Peter Muller from Munk 
Associates of New York, the Intensive Farming exhibition presented a technologically 
advanced story of the history of American agricultural triumph over nature. The 
exhibition units included the graphic history of American intensive farming and 
addressed several interrelated issues on the county agents, irrigation, pesticides, egg 
production, automatic milking, hot feeding, grain, seeds and feed equipment, rural 
electrification, film packaging, milk processing, apple cutting, pickle injection, potato 
chips production, hot meat merchandising, outdoor barbecue, and the vacation home. 
The exhibition incorporated an emotionally sound message of President Johnson, just 
running for his second mandate and first elections in November 1964: 
The Toil of Man to feed his kind is the struggle that unites all people. I know the sacrifices 
involved. I grew up on a farm. I return there whenever time permits, to the land, where human 
solidarity is a necessity and where progress through work of mind and body is hard to win. 
Eighty years ago 80 percent of American labor farmed the fields to feed our forbearers. Today 
in America less than eight percent suffice to feed all of us and more. If we, together, are to win 
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our war on poverty, to win a world free of hunger, we must share our “know how.” That is what 
our exhibition, rendering a glimpse of American farming methods, attempts to do.685 
In other words, intensive farming meant “a nearly constant amount of cropland [per 
hectare and per hour of work] to provide more than enough food for an expanding 
population […] by means of capital input in the form of such things as fertilizers, 
improved seeds, pesticides, irrigation, better tillage practices and mechanization.” 686 
When on September 11, the American Day at the fair, Edvard Kardelj and his spouse 
accompanied by Pero Pirker, Zagreb’s Mayor, and Miko Tripalo, president of the City 
Committee of SKH, visited the U.S. pavilion, Kardelj found himself “very impressed 
with slides explaining the voluntary relationship between government and 
individuals.”687 
The key point was that “U.S. agriculture [was] productive because of free 
enterprise orientation and [the] government as [a] service not as a director.”688 The 
USIS officers were particularly insistent on this because the “private peasants in 
Yugoslavia [were] subject to harassment and discrimination in favor of the Socialist 
sector of agriculture.”689 They suggested American technological superiority was an 
end-product of its free institutions that provided the necessary incentives while 
nourishing “the vitality and ingenuity of [the] individual”690.Still, the State Department 
and USIA policymakers were not always univocal in defining the goals and methods of 
these exhibitions. In the case of the Intensive Farming exhibition, Nick Andrews from 
the Yugoslav Desk thought that an overwhelming propagandistic effort would harm the 
expanding trade relations with Yugoslavia while Edwin Pancoast, from the USIA 
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European area (IAE) was rather skeptic on the simplistic correlation of the exhibition 
message with American-style farming.691 
 
 
Figure 4-2: A farm airplane designed for crop spraying by Piper Aircraft Corporation (Courtesy of 
the National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Photographs of American Pavilion at Zagreb 
Trade Fair 1964, Box 20, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA 
ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP. 
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Figure 4-3: Farmhand Feedmaster by Daffin Corporation allows a farmer to grind and mix 
livestock feed to suit individual needs (Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD). 
Source: Photographs of American Pavilion at Zagreb Trade Fair 1964, Box 20, Records Relating to 
International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP. 
 
Figure 4-4: Machine for film packaging of food products by W. R. Grace & Co. (Courtesy of the 
National Archives, College Park, MD). Source: Photographs of American Pavilion at Zagreb Trade 
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Fair 1964, Box 20, Records Relating to International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits 
Division, RG 306, NACP. 
4.3 Displays Get Sophisticated (1967-1970) 
According to Washington’s policymakers, the end of the 1960s reserved four very 
popular U.S. exhibitions with high-pitched impact. In 1967, the USIA inaugurated a 
series of four exhibits designed to show leadership groups and the public of Yugoslavia 
how a free-enterprise economy met the consumer needs. The first was “Modern 
Management and Marketing” (1967), the second “Packaging-USA” (1968), followed by 
“Research and Development USA” (1969) and completed with “Industrial Design 
USA” (1970). 
The second of these series, Packaging USA, was held in Zagreb between 
September 12 and 22, 1968, then moved to Budapest in May 1969, to Poznan (Poland) 
in June, and was ultimately modified and updated for the Berlin Industries Fair in 
September 1969. Focused on packaging design, materials, and production, as well as 
illustrations of various functions of packaging in distributions, merchandising, and 
advertising, marketing and customer service, Packaging USA projected an image of 
American experts and leadership in serving the final consumer. 692 
Visitors entered the exhibit over a plate-glass floor through a passageway 
surrounded by mirrors in which myriads of packages were projected into infinity. Next, 
48 showcases displayed the variety of American packaging in terms of their salient 
functions or characteristics: product protection and preservation, consumer convenience, 
innovation, and design. The pavilion facilities also included a small lounge and library 
with USIS periodicals and reference materials. Bruce Wills, formerly manager of the 
Packing Division of the American Management Association, New York, conducted the 
exhibit seminar. These seminars relied on their ability to reach Yugoslav leadership 
groups in depth, where executives from American industry and specialists representing 
labor and government established fruitful and rare personal contacts.693 
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That this, for the USIA Yugoslavia, was a special cultural Cold War battlefield and 
strategical political arena, is proven by the fact that Packaging USA was the second 
Zagreb fair to be visited by USIA director, Leonard H. Marks (1965-1968), who 
accompanied Ambassador Elbrick and President Tito on the opening day roundtrip.694 
The fact that on September 12, the fair’s “America Day,” the pavilion held a reception 
for 450 Yugoslav officials, dignitaries and commercial leaders, is very indicative of 
how things had changed from the incidents and frustrations of the Atoms-for-Peace 
exhibit in 1955, when the refreshment reception was denied to the organizers.695 
The third of these sophisticated displays was the “Research and Development USA,” 
presented firstly at Zagreb International Fall Fair in September 1969 and then re-used in 
the Budapest, Poznan and Bucharest International Fairs the following spring and in 
October 1970. It featured a wide range of products manufactured by leading American 
firms, background graphics, photos and texts illustrating the vital role of research and 
development in responding to consumer needs and preferences. The subject was 
dramatized by the display of an Apollo Command Module, famous for having 
completed a manned flight to the moon, lent to the USIA by the Smithsonian Institute. 
President Tito and his official party leaders were among the more than 800,000 visitors 
attracted by the Apollo 8 that made the pavilion an “unprecedented success” of the fair, 
while 125 leaders from all Yugoslav republics attended the pavilion’s seminars and 
symposia. 
Lastly, the much-travelled “Industrial Design USA” exhibit, reshaped from the 
Brno International Fair in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Industrial Fair, was initially 
exhibited in the Soviet Union, then in Zagreb and in an updated version in Bucharest 
and two other major Romanian cities, Iasi and Brasov. The exhibit included a wide-
ranging array of products from American industry, contrasting some older items with 
contemporary versions, demonstrating effects of miniaturization, new forms and 
materials, and mass production.696Eugene Smith, the famous American designer of 
                                                 
694 The first one was “Marketing and Services in Industrial Economies” (1960) granted by the presence of 
George Allen (USIA director from 1957 to 1960). 
695 Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 1969, Box 13, 
USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 7.  
696 Special International Exhibition – Seventh Annual Report, July 1, 1968 – June 30, 1969: 15.Exhibitors 
included Abbott Labs, American Instrument Co., Bell Telephone Laboratories, Beckman Instruments, 
 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
174  Carla Konta - April 2016 
“Why Ugliness-Why Not?” curated the exhibition697 after Frank Shakespeare, the USIA 
director who followed Leonard Marks, personally besought him at the Bucharest 
Industrial Design exhibit. 698  Moreover, the Industrial Design seminars included 
prominent American leading designers as guests, such as Clare MacKichan from the 
General Motors Design Studios, Yay Doblin from Unimark International, and William 
Katavolos from the Parsons School of Design.699Another extraordinary success of the 
fair was the Moon Rock Exhibit that arrived in Zagreb after the Belgrade Technical Fair 
in February 1970 and that gained fabulous TV nationwide coverage.700 
That Industrial USA was a political event of highest revenue is proven by the fact 
that President Nixon nominated Robert Murphy, at the time head of the board of 
directors of Corning Glass International and his personal adviser, to be his 
representative at the openings on September 10 1970.701 Indeed, Robert Murphy was a 
unique diplomat for the history of Yugoslav-American foreign relations for the 
prestigious role he played in the Allies’ negotiations with Tito and his partisans in the 
last years of World War II. Apart from being a special representative of President 
Roosevelt in North Africa, he appeared at the Marshall Tito-General Wilson meeting 
and at the Tito-Churchill encounters in Naples and on the island of Vis. In 1954, he 
helped defuse tensions between Yugoslavia and Italy and until 1959 he served as Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, when he finally retired.702 
Examined from the point of view of Washington’s policymakers, the American 
exhibitions at the Yugoslav fairs point to a crucial argument. Whilst in general the 
                                                                                                                                               
California Computer, Corning Glass, Cyanamid International, Eaton Yale & Towne, General Dynamics, 
General Electric, Parke-Davis Sunen, Uni-Royal, Vendo, and Xerox (“How to build a corporate image 
and sell in an East European market,” Business Abroad, Dec. 1969, enclosed in Henry A. Dunlap to Frank 
Shakespeare, March 17, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP: 18–
20). 
697 Henry A. Dunlap to Frank Shakespeare, Nov. 3, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-
1972, RG 306, NACP. 
698 Frank Shakespeare, USIA Director, to Henry Dunlop, ICS, July 23, 1969, Box 13, USIA Director’s 
Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP. 
699 Frank Shakespeare to Clare Mac Kichan, General Motors, Oct. 14, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s 
Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP. 
700 Kempton B. Jenkins to Frank Shakespeare, Jan. 26, 1970, Box 13, USIA Director’s Subject Files 
1968-1972, RG 306, NACP. 
701 Informacije o dolasku Roberta Marfija na otvaranje Zagrebačkog Velesajma, Sept. 2, 1970, 09 542, 
Box 44, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA. 
702  “Robert D. Murphy,” U.S. Department of State Archives, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/stamps/67016.htm. 
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USIA handled Yugoslavia as a case apart from the rest of Eastern Europe, in the 
specific case of the trade fairs, this “Coca-Cola communist country” was treated as part 
of the USIA’s East European tours. Was the USIA proving in this way that 
Yugoslavia’s economic paradigm needed as much “westernization” as its Eastern 
neighbors? There is no univocal response. It is unquestionable that, as much as in 
Eastern Europe, the American pavilions in Yugoslavia were consumer-care oriented. 
They insisted on instructing the public on tangible free enterprise benefits for an 
average customer. They explored new commercial routes for American corporations. 
Finally, did their role include only soft power commodification or do they suggest a 
larger Cold War battlefield inside a supposed neutral territory? We will discuss this in 
the final section of this chapter. 
4.4 Soft Power Commodities and Cold War Battlefields 
“Among the strongest individual memories of life under state socialism – explains 
Slovenian scholar Breda Luthar – is the lack of desired goods, the «culture of 
shortages» and the «dictatorship over needs».” 703  Indeed, commodity culture had a 
central place, not only in everyday life, but also in the public and political discourse in 
Yugoslavia. At the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists in 1958, the SKJ 
program declared that in the worldwide arena “socialism in the economic battle with 
capitalism, had to win.” To achieve the socialist goal, namely “the individual happiness 
of every man,” socialism had to pursue the “maximum satisfaction of the individual and 
collective needs of its citizens,” accept “private ownership […] over different 
commodities,” increased life standards, private ownership and personal consumption, 
and, finally, the productivity of work. The Yugoslav communists considered that 
consumption had to be increased and aligned with the pace of economic development 
by increasing the social control over trade and enlarging the network of supermarkets 
and the demand for commodity goods. 
                                                 
703  Breda Luthar, “Shame, Desire and Longing for the West. A Case Study of Consumption,” in 
Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday Life in Socialist Yugoslavia, ed. Breda Luthar and Maruša 
Pušnik (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2010), 341. 
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As Igor Duda proposed, we could choose the year 1958 and the SKJ Program of the 
Seventh Congress to indicate the birth of the consumer society in Yugoslavia.704 In the 
light of the Supermarket USA exhibition of 1957 and the first Belgrade American-style 
supermarket opened in April 1958, this coincidence seems rather suggestive. Moreover, 
the concepts of “individual needs,” “private ownership,” and “personal consumption” 
used in the 1958 SKJ Program imply that there was in play some ideological 
hybridization of Marxism with liberal capitalist concepts. 
The organs of the League of Communists discussed the positive and negative sides 
of the consumer society, addressed negatively the bourgeois and snob mentalities, 
tendencies and acts, and considered positively those incomes produced by major 
personal engagement in superior work productivity (like extra hours).705 The question 
about the morally acceptable consumer practices and the immoral embourgeoisement of 
the working class remained a debated ideological category for the communist organs.706 
Certainly, the Yugoslav government utilized the rising standard of living and 
commodification of culture as a weapon of consent.707 The trade fairs in Zagreb and 
Belgrade were a trial field that exposed positive internal economic advancement and, 
consequently, higher standards of living and greater availability of consumer goods. 
Concerning the USIA strategies at the Yugoslav fairs, their objective was two-fold: 
popularize American-style consumerism and way of life and affirm export trade 
relations with Eastern European countries for American businessmen and corporations. 
Exceptionally, the Yugoslav restrictive commercial legislation prevented larger foreign 
                                                 
704 Igor Duda, “Konzumerizmom do konzumizma? Potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj od 1950-tih do 1980-
tih,” in Potrošačka kultura i konzumerizam, ed. Snježana Čolić (Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo 
Pilar, 2013), 85–86. 
705 Igor Duda, Pronađeno blagostanje: svakodnevni život i potrošačka kultura u Hrvatskoj 1970 - ih i 
1980 - ih, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: Srednja Europa, 2014), 93–109. 
706 For example, Patterson has argued that the Yugoslav compromise around consumer practices and 
Marxist mentality ended up in, what he defines as, the “Yugoslav dream,” “modern but modest, 
rewarding but reasonable.” The Yugoslav variant of consumerism did not promote social differentiation 
through consumption, or at least did not explicitly, as in the case of free-wheeling practices in the West. 
“This was mass consumption, not massive consumption,” asserts Patterson (Patrick H. Patterson, Bought 
and Sold, 194, 148–196). 
707 Patterson claims that, while inside and outside the circles of official power a heated debate arose over 
the contradiction between Marxist ideology and massive embracement of consumption, consumerism was 
one of the critical factors that held the Yugoslav multiethnic society together during the “gold” 1960s and 
1970s. Relying on extensive investigation, he argues that the economic downturn of the 1980s stripped 
the model of Yugoslav legitimacy and materialized publicly nationalist resentment and, ultimately, ethnic 
conflicts and war (Patterson, Bought and Sold). 
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trade relations (the lack of foreign currencies, state permissions for enterprises and so 
forth) which ultimately disappointed American business makers and executives. For the 
USIA, the first objective had the highest priority.708 The U.S. pavilions became public 
spaces of mass culture consumption that trained appetites and imaginary desires. They 
were the embodiment of freedom of choice and freedom to choose, that, for the field 
officers, would entice pro-American stances and frames of mind. For both sides, the 
exhibitions represented soft power commodities with the intention of persuading the 
Yugoslav public.709 
The USIS field officers in Zagreb mostly cared about the first impact. Since the fair 
audience tended to “see everything in one day,” they had to create “something truly 
dazzling or exciting.” To achieve it, the USIS management relied on the good 
demonstration techniques of their employees. So, for example, Warren Peace who 
demonstrated the apple peeling and coring machine at the Intensive Farming exhibit in 
1964, proved to be “a showman with a captivating type of humor [who added a] chuckle 
[…] to an otherwise serious demonstration” and provided “the illusive bridge that binds 
the human race together and thus creates an additional and more lasting impact.”710 The 
field officers concurred that an overtly propagandistic show would probably be less 
effective than one with an artful blend of commercial and educational elements. 
“Having had long experience with propaganda, most Yugoslavs tend[ed] to be 
somewhat skeptical of obvious attempts to indoctrinate, and skeptical of slogans, charts 
and statistics. This should be kept in mind and our approach to them should be subtle 
and indirect” was the leading thought of the exhibition management.711 
                                                 
708 Despatch 411 from Zagreb to the Department of State, Dec. 27, 1960, 868.191-ZA/12-2760, Box 
2705, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
709 Many scholars extensively analyzed the power of the consumer and commodity culture during the 
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Americanization (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 1993), while Elaine T. 
May explored how consumerism shaped cultural values, success, social mobility, life-styles, gender roles 
and domestic containment (Homeward Bound, 143–162. 
710  Robert Hickok, ICS, to Harris, ICS, and Wilson, I, Oct. 1, 1964, Box 21, Records Relating to 
International Trade Fairs 1951-1966, USIA ICS/Exhibits Division, RG 306, NACP. 
711 Airgram 251 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 29, 1961, 868.191-ZA/12-2961, Box 
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The collaboration with Yugoslav authorities of consular representatives, USIA 
officers, American architects, designers and managers, was generally stable with some 
negative outcomes along the way. Apart from periodical accusations of being overtly 
“propagandistic,”712 the U.S. pavilions encountered some political complaints from the 
authorities. For instance, during the 1960 fair the director Ivan Baćun, while visiting the 
U.S. exhibitions with Bogdan Crnobrnja, Deputy Secretary of State, claimed that he was 
treated impolitely by three female students from the University of Zagreb working at the 
pavilion as demonstrators. The incident escalated in a political clash because Baćun 
requested Edward Montgomery, the Consulate General, to dismiss the employees, 
whilst, in the meantime, the other employed students threatened to abandon their jobs 
out of a sense of solidarity. Montgomery insisted for reallocation and threatened to 
interrupt America’s participation the following year, whilst Baćun threatened with 
UDBA to obtain the students’ names. Surprisingly, the episode ended with no particular 
consequences and the students remained in their jobs.713 
Another political incident occurred during the Ninth Ljubljana International 
Electronics Fair in October 1962, where USIS participated with Transportation USA. 
During the exhibit, Dejan Kostić of the American Information Desk distributed some 
questionnaires asking visitors for information on relatives in the United States, travel 
habits and contacts in foreign countries, membership of U.S. associations, clubs and 
political parties, including the Communist Party. Marko Nikezić, the Undersecretary of 
DSIP, treated the issue personally and with the highest regard, demanding the urgent 
removal of the questionnaires, because they were “transgressing all proper limits and 
[…] would not be permitted in the future.”714 
In the light of the evidence, facts and events analyzed above, what conclusion could 
be drawn of the effective impact of the American fairs at the Yugoslav, mainly Zagreb, 
trade fairs? Repeatedly, the reports from the Zagreb Consulate emphasize the fact that 
the U.S. pavilions were, year by year, the most visited at the Fair. The Yugoslav 
                                                 
712 See for example “Slabost najjačih,” Ekonomska politika, Sept. 17, 1960, 867. 
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newspaper gave a contradictory statement and description, as happened in the case of 
the Supermarket USA reports in Vjesnik. 
To measure the medium and long-term effect and co-optation power of the fair 
exhibitions requires different sources and social science instruments. The American 
participation at the Sokolniki fair is in this case illustrative. While the general public 
opinion, newspapers and many scholars have highly validated the American exhibition 
in Moscow to have been psychologically and propagandistically effective,715 Ralph K. 
White, the USIA officer charged with an initial effectiveness evaluation, noted the 
unrealistic Soviet expectations of what they were going to see, their disappointment 
over the scarcity of American technology at the exhibition, and the general lack of 
signage and visual information to guide the visitors. According to Masey and Morgan, 
the problem of analyzing the success of the Moscow Exhibition is that the U.S. pavilion 
had no competition at the Moscow fair other than Soviet preconceptions about the 
United States. From the USIA perspective, what can be learned from the American 
National Exhibition is that it confirmed the success of a method of presentation by 
combining impressive architecture, commodity goods and, above all, human contact.716 
Could this interpretation be applied to the American participation at the Yugoslav fairs? 
It certainly fits in with the positive outcomes of some notable U.S. pavilions: the 
Atoms-for-Peace, the Supermarket USA, the 1960-1964 consumer and commodity 
oriented themes and the sophisticated displays of the late 1960s. 
Among the American pavilions, Supermarket USA represents certainly a more 
easily measurable final point. In May 1958, Poljoprivredne Vesti (Agricultural News) 
published a special issue on the first self-service store in Belgrade and Yugoslavia. 
According to the Embassy records, it offered the “most varied foodstuffs and kitchen 
supplies, including frozen meat, fruit and vegetables” and was equipped with 
refrigerators, cash registers, display stands, and purchase trolleys, already used for the 
Zagreb exhibition. The store attracted a huge number of visitors on the opening day, 
“deeply impressed by the huge quantities of packaged foodstuffs […] in such cute and 
hygienic wrappings.” Among the first visitors, there were Karl Rankin, the U.S. 
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Ambassador and Lloyd Larson, director of the ICA Mission. Larson stated that the new 
self-service store represented “an extraordinary progress” in comparison with the 
traditional Yugoslav method of food distribution, while Milorad Jovanović, director of 
the Vračar enterprise, expressed his gratitude for the help of two American experts, 
Rolin Moon and John Gallop, whose two months stay in Yugoslavia was covered by the 
Department of Agriculture and the Colonial Stores Company.717 
The themes addressed at these pavilions perfectly illustrates what another 
exhibition, this time a contemporary one, has underscored over the relations of 
socialism and modernism. In late 2011 and the first months of 2012, the Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Zagreb organized an exhibition entitled “Socialism and modernity: 
Art, Culture and Politics (1950-1974).” Although it was a joint project by authors of 
different perspectives of the Croatian socialist past, it nevertheless underlined how the 
Yugoslav society and culture, created in the context of a cultural struggle for hearts and 
minds, produced its own version of modernity. Nonetheless, the distinctiveness of 
“western” modernity framed and conceptualized the Yugoslav modernity in spheres of 
architecture, urbanism and home furniture.718 It would not be too impertinent to affirm 
that the U.S. pavilions at the Yugoslav fair publicized a kind of modernity and 
commodity culture that would develop in public places of both highbrow and mass-
consumption culture in Yugoslavia. 
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5 BETWEEN ART AND SOUND 
DIPLOMACY: THE 
CULTURAL PRESENTATION 
PROGRAM AND THE 
YUGOSLAV VOICE OF 
AMERICA 
During the Yugoslav tour, the Nikolais group performed before enthusiastic 
capacity audiences […].The acclaim the group received in Skopje, Sarajevo, 
and Ljubljana was almost as great as in Belgrade. Certainly not all people 
could appreciate what to many was rather new, revolutionary theatre, but this 
did not affect the enthusiasm they displayed in receiving it. Yugoslav audiences 
are grateful for the opportunity to see what is new, experimental or avant-
garde and there is no question that they look primarily to the U.S. for this. 
American Embassy Belgrade on the Alvin Nikolais Dance Company tour 
in 1968719 
 
                                                 
719 Ralph T. Backlund, CU/CP, to Edward D. Re, Dec. 19, 1968, Folder 8, Box 21, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, Manuscript Collection 468 (hereafter MC 468), Special Collection, University of 
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Microhistory tries not to sacrifice knowledge of individual elements to wider 
generalization, and in fact it accentuates individual lives and events. But, at 
the same time, it tries not to reject all forms of abstraction since minimal facts 
and individual cases can serve to reveal more general phenomena. 
Giovanni Levi720 
 
The performances of American artists sent on worldwide tours by the State 
Department agencies microhistories reveal the inner workings of the cultural Cold War. 
During several decades, the U.S. policy makers related to artists and musicians in order 
to exploit their prestige in Europe and worldwide, whilst the latter took advantage of the 
cultural diplomacy agenda either for personal success or for prioritizing their race or 
gender equality agenda. 
It was on July 27 1954, that President Eisenhower requested from Congress five 
million dollars of additional funds at his discretion “to assist and encourage private 
musical, dramatic and other cultural groups”721 in tours abroad. The President’s Special 
International Program for Cultural Presentation, or more simply the President’s Fund, 
was the forerunner of the Cultural Presentation Program officially enacted in August 
1956 with the passage of Public Law 860, the International Cultural Exchange and 
Trade Fair Participation Act, administered by the State Department through its Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU).722 Publicly, the purpose of the program was 
to “strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the cultural 
interests, developments and achievements of the people of the United States […] and 
thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations [with] 
other countries.” 723  However, in private correspondence, President Eisenhower 
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721 Joseph N. Acinapura, “The Cultural Presentations Program of the United States” (MA thesis, Rutgers 
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expressed additional strategic goals, “depicting music as a psychological tool that could 
counteract the stereotypical perception of Americans as «bombastic, jingoistic, and 
totally devoted to the theories of force and power»” while the “National Security 
Council executive ofﬁcer Elmer Staats described it as «a secret weapon».”724 
Musical performances, as well as drama pieces or sport events, are commonly 
perceived as possessing “mass appeal in their ability to transport an audience into a 
variety of emotional states.”725 But beyond inspiring emotions, artistic performances 
create communication spaces between the performers and the gathered public. In the 
case of the U.S. performers sent abroad, the channels enacted were more than one. By 
investigating the tours of the New York City Ballet to the Soviet Union, the Martha 
Graham Dance Company to Asia, and the Alwin Ailey Dance Theater to Africa, Clare 
Croft discovered how these performances appeared ‘in frames’ crafted by the State 
Department and its various public and private partners. “But these frames do not contain 
the full picture,” she argues; since these dynamic events were cultural diplomacy 
embodied “to be simultaneously propaganda and something more than propaganda.”726 
The U.S. Cultural Presentation Program (CPP) in Yugoslavia engaged both private 
artists and CU actors, as well as Embassy representatives, Yugoslav art directors, music 
commentators and journalists in order to create linkages and communicate messages. 
The impact relied mostly on the cultural environment in Belgrade, Zagreb, Skopje, 
Ljubljana, Dubrovnik, and other Yugoslav cities. The medium and long-term political 
intentions encompassed a whole span of psychological effects, mostly focused on 
enhancing the idea of freedom through classical elitist and unconventional artistic 
expression. 
This chapter will not be an account of the influence of American popular music, 
mainly jazz and rock’n’roll, on the Yugoslav musical arena and youth. Many scholarly 
studies have already produced appreciated accounts on these issues. The last two 
decades have witnessed a higher interest in the follow-up of the hybridization that 
occurred in Yugoslav popular music, both jazz, rock’n’roll and pop, a musical 
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hybridization between mainly American, British and Italian traditions and local musical 
folklore.727 When it came to jazz, and afterwards rock, the Yugoslav authorities, Tito 
and Kardelj personally, vividly discussed this genre. Since Tito was sensitive to “rock’s 
potential for rebelliousness,” he hoped that by applying a policy of toleration, he would 
win the rock scene over “to a supportive stance.” Ramet put it in this way: “His gamble 
paid off, and the 1960s in particular saw a rush of panegyric rock ballads praising him 
and his program of self-management.”728 
In this chapter, discussion will be centered on the role of the State Department and 
its CPP in popularizing and supporting American classical soloists, choirs and 
orchestras, jazz and rock artists on tour in Yugoslavia, together with drama theatre and 
ballet groups, as well as experimental performers. Such cultural engagement was 
intended to affirm U.S. leadership in classical music and vanguard artistic 
experimentation, and to consequently dismantle prejudices over the United States’ 
supposed cultural backwardness. Finally, its goal was to inspire freedom of artistic 
expression in a communist regime and disseminate heterodox ideas of art 
unconventionality by linking the Yugoslav cultural scene to Western cultural elites. In 
this public diplomacy arena, the Voice of America – examined in the last section – 
appeared to be the right channel for publicizing the CPP, even though its end goals were 
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see Reinhard Köchl, Richard Wiedamann, and Peter Tippelt, Duško Gojković: Jazz ist Freiheit 
(Regensburg: ConBrio, 1995). For notable insights on how Yugoslav rock’n’roll has transformed from an 
ideological enemy to its ally and promotor look into Aleksandar Raković, Rokenrol u Jugoslaviji 1956-
1968. Izazov socijalističkom društvu (Belgrade: Arhipelag, 2011), Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam, 163–
223; and for a more personal account Siniša Škarica, Kad je rock bio mlad. Priča sa istočne strane (1956-
1970) (Zagreb: VBZ, 2005). Finally, a recent study about the Italian influences on Yugoslav pop culture 
and the transpositions of identities and cross-cultural exchange is those of Francesca Rolandi, Con 
ventiquattromila baci. L’influenza della cultura di massa italiana in Jugoslavia (1955-1965).(Bologna: 
Bononia University Press, 2015). 
728  Sabrina P. Ramet, “Shake, Rattle, and Self-Management: Making the Scene in Yugoslavia,” in 
Kazaaam! Splat! Ploof!: The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945, ed. Sabrina P. 
Ramet and Gordana Crnković (Lanham; Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 181. 
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of a political nature, both for the transmitter, the USIA, as for the receiver, the Yugoslav 
average listener.729 
None of the relationships explored were unilateral or framed by superiority, neither 
political nor psychological. The CU accomplished the promotion of a large number of 
U.S. artists at the major Yugoslav festivals and cultural events, whilst, on the other 
hand, Yugoslav cultural leaders succeeded in making the U.S. appearances a matter of 
their own prestige and internationalist significance. Interpersonal and intercultural 
relations had extraordinary results: for example in 1963 Josip Depolo, director of the 
annual Dubrovnik Summer Festival, spent three months in the United States under the 
Foreign Specialist Grant and managed to link eminent cultural personalities of the U.S. 
art world to the Dubrovnik Festival. 730  This is demonstrated by the long list of 
American cultural elites who visited the Festival between 1966 and 1969, among them 
Curtis Davis (cultural director, National Educational Television), Mark Schubart (vice-
president, Lincoln Center New York), actress Fay Marbe, Samuel Rubin (president, 
Rubin Foundation), music critic Paul Affelder, and several renowned professors from 
Stanford, Chicago and Harvard Universities (among them Wayne Vucinich, Erich 
Hamp, and David Bynum).731 
5.1 Classic Style, Classy Performances 
With the Executive Order 10716 issued on June 17 1957, the President passed the 
functions of his former Fund to the Department of State. The Mutual Educational and 
Cultural Exchange Act (with the Executive Order 10912) then amended the latter in 
January 1961.732 The program’s purpose was two fold: to “provide tours in countries 
abroad by creative and performing artists and athletes from the United States, 
individually and in groups, representing any field of the arts, sports, or any other form 
                                                 
729 As an additional source of information for this Chapter, I consulted the “Jugosvirke Online Collection” 
(https://jugosvirke.wordpress.com/), an informal, open access, and web archive/blog 
containing digitized newspaper excerpts, photographs and posters on American artists who played in 
Yugoslavia in the Cold War era. 
730 Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, 
Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13. 
731 Ugledne ličnosti i gosti iz inozemstva koji su pratili izvedbe Dubrovačkih ljetnih igara od 1966 do 
1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
732 Special International Program – Tenth Semiannual Report, Jan. 1-June 30, 1961, S-50-61, Box 17, 
Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP: 29. 
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of cultural attainment”; and to provide “United States representation in international 
artistic, dramatic, musical, sports […] and other cultural festivals, competitions, 
meetings, and like exhibitions and assemblies.” 733  The operational authority of the 
Program was vested in the Secretary of State, while the action responsibility rested with 
the CU. 734  The USIA worked with the Department of State in recommending the 
Advisory Committee on the Arts, handled overseas performances and covered their 
promotional activities.735 
Eisenhower charged the American National Theatre and Academy (ANTA) with 
organizing the CPP. Congress established this New York-based institution in 1935 to 
serve as the United States’ national theater company. While the State Department 
arranged the finance and travel logistic, ANTA provided the program’s advisory 
committees in music, dance, and theater. According to Ansari, the Music Advisory 
Panel “was responsible for around 65 percent of the tours ANTA organized and a 
sizeable proportion of its $2.5 million budget.”736 
Despite what was a major historiographical interest by today’s standards, the 
majority of the U.S. sponsored performers were not jazz nor rock musicians.737 Emily 
Ansari’s analysis of the Music Advisory Panel’s approvals and rejections operating 
under the ANTA demonstrates that the vast majority of all were classical musicians, a 
total of 83 percent over the period spanning from 1954 to 1963. Among these 341 
soloists or groups, the most favored were orchestras (among them New York 
Philharmonic), choirs such as the Robert Shaw Chorale, and chamber music groups, 
including the Juilliard String Quartet. On the other hand, jazz ensembles never made up 
                                                 
733 Cultural Presentation Program of the U.S. Department of State – A Report to the Congress and the 
Public by the Advisory Committee on the Arts, July 1, 1963-June 30, 1964, Folder 1, Box 49, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
734 The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), formerly the Division of Cultural Relations, was 
organized in 1961 within the Department of State with the responsibility for administering the principal 
provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act. It functioned as a part of the State Department until 1978 when it 
merged with the USIA. 
735 Ibid. 
736 Abrams Ansari, “The Sound of Musical Diplomacy,” 41–42. 
737 The topic of jazz men abroad have been a focus of Penny Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: 
Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006) and “Duke 
Ellington Plays Baghdad : Rethinking Hard and Soft Power from the Outside In,” in Contested 
Democracy : Freedom, Race, and Power in American History (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), 279–99, and Lisa E. Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era (Univ. 
Press of Mississippi, 2010). 
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more than a third of the groups approved, even if jazz was the second most funded 
category (apart from classical and jazz music, all other categories, such as folk groups, 
represented less than 3 percent of funds).738 
The Music Advisory Panel comprehended well-known experts from the music 
world, including critics such as Jay Harrison (New York Herald Tribune) and Olin 
Downes (New York Times), and musicologist and journalist Paul Henry Lang. In 
addition, three eminent American composers, Howard Hanson, Virgil Thomson, and 
William Schuman, inspired the panel’s most signiﬁcant policies during its ANTA years 
(1954-1963). 739  All three of them built successful careers writing tonal music for 
traditional ensembles such as orchestras and choirs. Consequently, they discouraged 
jazz and folk music because “there are no standards by which to judge ‘light music’ 
except ‘charm,’ and charm is hard to judge, and it is not international in its acceptance,” 
and the panelists agreed during a 1955 meeting.740 
Not only the ANTA panel members despised jazz and other forms of “popular” 
music. Many high positioned cabinet members thought similarly. In his letter to 
Secretary Dulles dated on July 23 1954, Henry Cabot Lodge (at the time U.S. 
representative at the UN) proposed that the cultural presentation program should include 
“quality music, such as Boston Symphony, New York Philharmonic, and American 
opera singers, pianists, violinists, ballet dancers,” all adjusted to the taste of the country 
in which they are shown, but required that “there must be no vulgarity – no matter how 
funny or clever or interesting,” and ended “I would even avoid jazz music, acrobats, and 
the Fred Waring type of thing.”741 
Classical music was infused with social prestige and European elite culture that was 
more widely recognized than the number of listeners would suggest. What mattered was 
not only the music in itself, but the knowledge of its significance, argues Fosler-Lussier: 
                                                 
738  Emily Abrams Ansari, “Shaping the Policies of Cold War Musical Diplomacy: An Epistemic 
Community of American Composers,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (2012): 44. 
739 Ibid, 42. Among the three of them, Hanson was director of the Eastman School of Music and William 
Schuman of the prestigious Juilliard School of New York. 
740 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 23. 
741 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative at UN, to John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, July 23, 
1954, 511.00/7-2354, Box 2249, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. Fred Waring was an American popular 
musician, bandleader and radio-television personality, as well as financial backer and eponym of the 
Waring Blender, the first modern electric blender on the market. 
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“Classical music and its avant-garde offshoot were part of a symbolic system in which 
the association with European elite culture was important to the value of music.”742 
 
5.1.1 The Dubrovnik Summer Festival and the Zagreb Musical 
Biennale 
 
La Biennale de Musique veut être – dirons-nous – une espèce de 
«Documentum Temporis» présentant tous les caractères d’un bouillonnement 
agité et émouvant tumultueux mais chargé d’une considérable richesse 
artistique. 
Inscription on the Musical Biennale Leaflet for 1965743 
 
It was at the beginning of the 1950s, when theatrical and musical events were 
springing up all over Europe (such as in Edinburgh, Avignon, Aix-en-Provance, and 
Santander), that the Dubrovnik Summer Festival was founded. As early as 1952, 
Croatian director and writer Marko Fotez, the prime mover behind the group of 
enthusiasts who started up the Festival in 1950, put on Hamlet at the Lovrjenac Fort. 
Soon, the performances of Goldoni’s Fishermen’s Quarrels in the old city harbor, 
renaissance comedies and mystery plays began taking place in the city squares, Rectors 
Palace, Sponza Palace and Gruž summer residence. The Dubrovnik Summer Festival, 
today one the most exclusive theatrical and musical events in Europe, started its Festival 
music program in the early 1950s, initially conceptualizing it as the presentation of the 
best composers, soloists and orchestras of the country. Then, by the end of the 1950s, it 
grew into a real review of top solo artists and ensembles from all around the world.744 
                                                 
742 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 25. The classical choice was subject to 
critics as well and essentially because its musical tradition was more associated with Europe than the 
United States, and was not universally familiar to broad audiences. Furthermore, many famous American 
composers, such as Rudolf Serkin, Isaac Stern, and Eugene Ormandy, were European born, whilst others 
such as Kurt Weil and Aaron Copland were trained in Europe or by European teachers (Ibid, 24–25). 
743 Muzički Biennale Zagreb, 1965, 7, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 
1410, HDA. Translated from French: “The Musical Biennale wants to be - shall we say - a sort of 
“Documentum Temporis” with all the characteristics of a tumultuous, agitated and moving ferment but 
full of a considerable artistic richness.” 
744 Hrvoje Ivanković, “Dubrovačke ljetne igre,” Leksikon Marina Držića (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod 
Miroslav Krleža i Dom Marina Držića, 2016), http://leksikon.muzej-marindrzic.eu/dubrovacke-ljetne-
igre/. 
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With the Dubrovnik Festival, the Split Summer Festival (founded in 1954) and the 
Music Biennale Zagreb (founded in 1961) became the major channels for promotional 
U.S. classical presentation program.745 The program depended upon the USIS posts for 
organizational, logistics, press and financial support; the USIS Country Plan urgently 
stressed that top American performers were to be brought to the Music Biennale Zagreb 
in May and the Dubrovnik Festival in July-August.746 
The CPP program, both musical and theatrical, started in Yugoslavia very 
intensively even from its very beginning. Between May and June 1955, Eleanor Steber, 
Metropolitan opera soprano and one of the major U.S. opera stars, performed in Zagreb, 
Belgrade and Osijek (near the Hungarian border) where she performed an 
“extraordinary effective work.” 747  It was one of the first high-class performances 
financed by the President’s Fund.748 New York Times reports, “she let her temperament 
show a bit” when she refused to sing “Madame Butterfly” at Belgrade’s Theatre 
because “they didn’t have an obi [a Japanese sash]” and substituted for Tosca, but 
nevertheless received “critical acclaim,” 749  “made friends there” and returned to 
Yugoslavia already in August to sing Mozart’s Idomeneo at the Dubrovnik Summer 
Festival.750 
Ruggiero Ricci, prominent American violinist of Italian descent, prolonged his 
private European tour to perform in Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade in 
February 1956 under the auspices of the President’s Fund.751 Besides Ruggiero Ricci, 
other eminent U.S. soloists and conductors paid a visit to Yugoslavia during the 1950s 
and 1960s. A 1971 report of the Croatian National Theatre included among the 
conductors Leopold Stokowsky, Igor Stravinsky, Robert Kraft, Zubin Mehta, Dean 
                                                 
745 For an extensive contemporary report by the Cultural-Educational Council of Yugoslavia [Kulturno-
prosvetno veće Jugoslavije] on Yugoslav major festivals, look into Festivali u Jugoslaviji, Beograd 1963, 
02-2808/1, Box 128, Komisija za idejno-vaspitni rad 1963, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ. 
746 Country Plan for Yugoslavia 1963, January 30, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 
306, NACP: 6-7. 
747 “Metropolitan Soprano to Make Four-Month World Trip,” New York Times, Feb. 9, 1956. 
748 Instruction 161 from Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, May 4, 1955, 511.683/5-
455, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
749 “Clothes Makes an Opera as Temperament Shows,” New York Times, June 4, 1955. 
750 “The World of Music: Council Seeks Charter,” New York Times, July 10, 1955; Američki ansambli, 
dirigenti i solisti na Dubrovačkih ljetnim igrama, 1971, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
751  Instruction 4063 from Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, Nov. 25, 1955, 
511.683/11-2555, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
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Dixon, William Steiberg, Lukas Foss, Georg Byrd, and Stanislaw Skrowaczewsky. 
Amongst the soloists, appeared the pianists Alexandar Brailowsky, Alexandar Uninsky, 
Shura Cherkasky, Byron Janis, Rudolf Firkusny, Jakob Lateiner, and the African-
American André Watts who has won over the world with his rhapsodic skills; the 
violinists Nathan Millstein, Jehudi Menuhin, Michael Rabin, and the legendary violin 
prodigy Roman Totenberg; sopranos such as Rhea Jackson, Leonore Lafayette, and the 
African-American opera star Martina Arroyo who also played at the Dubrovnik 
Summer Festival in 1961, 1962, 1964, and 1969; then alto Louise Parker, mezzo-
soprano Lucretia West, base Norman Foster and baritone Georg Bailley.752 
Besides Arroyo, Cherkasky, Janis and Watts, and the world famous Mehta (who 
came to conduct the Los Angeles Philharmonic) also performed at the Dubrovnik 
Festival. However, this July-August event accommodated many U.S. art elites. By 
1971,the Festival involved the elegant performances of John Browning, “a great talent 
among young American pianists;” 753  then Van Cliburn who achieved worldwide 
recognition in 1958, at the age of 23, when he won the first quadrennial International 
Tchaikovsky Piano Competition in Moscow at the height of the Cold War; pianists 
Alexis Weissenberg, Alexandar Zakin and Lorin Hollander; coloratura sopranos Gianna 
D’Angelo, and Mattiwilda Dobbs, sopranos Lucilla Udovich and Felicia Weathers; the 
Metropolitan diva Blanche Thebom; and the master violinist Isaac Stern. On the 
Dubrovnik renaissance stages conductors included Harold Aks, Eliot Forbes, Bruce 
McInnes, Max Rudolf (German naturalized American), and Thomas Scherman.754 The 
“Libertas” Festival – another synonym for the Dubrovnik Summer event – gained 
prestige and frequently attracted renewed U.S. musical critics and editorialist: Paul B. 
Affelder who served for Musical America, Opera News, Metropolitan Opera, and the 
                                                 
752 Suradnja Zagrebačke filharmonije sa umjetnicima i ansamblima SAD, September 30, 1971, File SAD, 
Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Poznatiji vokalni i instrumentalni 
solisti koji su do danas učestvovali na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne 
veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; XX Dubrovačke ljetne igre - Festival Dubrovnik, 1969, 
File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
753 Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 
1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
754 Američki ansambli, dirigenti i solisti na Dubrovačkih ljetnim igrama, 1971, File SAD, Komisija za 
kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Poznatiji vokalni i instrumentalni solisti koji su 
do danas učestvovali na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
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National Observer; Mort Gerberg and Mary Leatherbee from Life; Stabley Karnow 
from The Washington Post; Christopher Bird from the Times; Claire Sterling from 
Harper’s Magazine; Jan Maguire from the New York Herald Tribune, and many 
more.755 
Apart from the large group of soloists and conductors, choirs, symphony orchestras, 
glee clubs, drama companies and ballet groups also played in Yugoslavia, both at the 
Dubrovnik stage and the Music Biennale in Zagreb, as well as in Belgrade and 
Ljubljana. In 1954, the Smith College Chamber Singers debuted in Dubrovnik and 
returned in 1958; in the same year, it was the turn of the Hora Smith College Chorus.756 
The Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra played at the National Theatre in Zagreb in 
1957,757 the same year as the Westminster Choir came to sing.758 
The early 1960s were characterized by many well-known names. The Robert Shaw 
Chorale, for instance, sang in Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo and Skopje between October 7 
and 12, 1962, under the President’s Fund sponsorship,759 showing, according to USIS 
PAO, Walter Roberts, “a degree of precision and technical competence in the choral 
field […] unmatched by any other chorus; the artistry of Shaw himself as conductor was 
also given equally high praise.” 760  The state-private network functioned for the 
presentation program as it did for the broader cultural exchanges: acclaimed U.S. 
musicians, touring Europe privately were solicited by the State Department to prolong 
their stay and give performances in non-profitable countries. So that the Yale Glee 
Club, while on a private tour in Western Europe in 1963, was invited to Yugoslavia 
where the Embassy’s Press and Cultural Service covered their expenses, and where on 
                                                 
755 Strani kritičari, publicisti i novinari koji su pratili Dubrovačke ljetne igre od 1966 do 1969, n.d., File 1, 
Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
756  Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Pregled, Feb. 1959, 30. 
757 IES Monthly Progress Report, Aug. 1957, Folder 2, Box 25, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Suradnja Zagrebačke filharmonije sa umjetnicima i 
ansamblima SAD, Sept. 30, 1971, Fascikl SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, 
RG 1410, HDA. 
758 Status of Current Cultural and Sports Projects, IES Monthly Progress Report, Jan. 1957, Folder 2, Box 
25, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
759  “Najvažniji događaji 1962 – Kulturna razmena,” Pregled, Dec. 1962, 38; Airgram 218 from the 
American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject 
Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13. 
760 Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 
1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
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June 29 they provided “one of the most heart-warming performances we have ever 
witnessed in Belgrade.”761 
Similarly, between September and October 1964, the USIS in Belgrade arranged 
the American Festival of Music (American Festival Week), not completely planned in 
advance, but that saw Arthur Rubinstein performing on September 23 at the Belgrade 
Trade Union hall. The next day was the turn of Ruggiero Ricci who gave a private 
performance (organized by Yugokoncert) in an “all-Chopin” program; whilst from 
September 27 to 30 there was the New York Pro Musica choral performance in 
Belgrade and Zagreb;762 and the Pittsburgh Symphony Orchestra in Belgrade in early 
October. For PAO Roberts, it was the victory of USIS efficiency and capacity in the 
field (Roberts arranged the arrival of Rubinstein from Bucharest by the U.S. Air 
Forces). Rubinstein’s unexpected concert was quickly sold out and the involvement of 
Yugoslav TV, radio and advertising turned out to be above expectation. “He performed 
magnificently and evoked great enthusiasm from the audience,” commented Belgrade’s 
Politika.763 
Outstanding U.S. orchestras and choruses filled the Dubrovnik stages in the second 
half of the 1960s. In 1966, it was the turn of the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, the 
Beaux Arts Trio, and the Sarah Lawrence Chorus (they returned in 1968), followed by 
the Harvard Glee Club – Radcliffe Choral Society in 1967, the Bach Aria Group in 
1968, and the Amherst College Glee Club in 1969.764 The 1970s commenced with an 
elite participation: the New York Chamber Soloists and the world renewed Juilliard 
Quartet, with an exclusive participation of Ruggiero Ricci and the Duke Ellington 
Orchestra.765 The CU co-financed the U.S. presence at the Dubrovnik events, which the 
USIS post carefully organized, and the Consul discussed at the meetings with 
                                                 
761 Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, 
Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13. 
762 This vocal and instrumental ensemble that specialized in medieval and Renaissance music had already 
performed at the Dubrovnik Festival in 1963 (Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., 
File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA). 
763 Message 44 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, January 8, 1965, EDU 14-2 YUGO (BE), Box 
382, Central Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. 
764  Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
765  XXI Dubrovačke ljetne igre - Festival Dubrovnik, 1970, File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
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Dubrovnik authorities.766 The CU sponsorship emerged from the Croatian and Serbian 
archives, as well as from the Bureau’s reports. In the fall of 1967, the CU sponsored the 
Los Angeles Symphony to visit Eastern Europe: they turned to Yugoslavia, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, India, accompanied by Andre Watts 
and Zubin Mehta.767 In 1971, the Bureau furnished $5,000 (of the total cost of $20,000) 
for the University of California Chamber Singers, “a very effective” student-singers 
group, to sing in Budapest, Belgrade, and Dubrovnik, as an addition to their already 
existing tour to other European countries.768 
Amid the most prominent guests of the Yugoslav festivals figured the LaSalle 
String Quartet, the American Brass Quintet and the Juilliard Quartet. The LaSalle 
Quartet, best known for its espousal of the Second Viennese 
School of Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, and other European modernists, performed for 
the first time in Yugoslavia at the Dubrovnik Festival in August 1962 under the 
auspices of Yugokoncert and the Embassy. Afterwards, they returned to Belgrade, 
Zagreb and Ljubljana in January 1963, under USIS sponsorship,769 where during five 
days of crowded scheduled concerts, TV appearances and workshops, “they found the 
Yugoslav musicians eager to learn the [modern] techniques,” reported first violinist 
Walter Levin. 770  They “broadened the awareness of the excellence of American 
ensembles in the field of chamber music,” simply stated PAO Roberts.771 Finally, they 
performed at the Music Biennale of Zagreb in 1965, even with a small contribution 
from the Yugoslav government (160,000 dinars).772 
                                                 
766 Bilješka Dubrovačkih ljetnih Igara o posjeti američkog konzula C. Johnsona, June 1, 1968, 02-103/19-
68, Box 43, Republički protokol, IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
767 Charles Frankel to Katzenbach, Feb. 24, 1967, TH29-SA-8, Folder 2, Box 25, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
768 John Richardson Jr. to Martin J. Billenbrand, April 23, 1970, Folder 1, Box 26, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
769 Airgram 218 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, 
Box 45, USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13. 
770 Memorandum of Conversation between Walter Levin, LaSalle Quartet, and Ralph Jones and James A. 
Durand, Jr., EUR/SES, April 8, 1963, EDX 32, Box 3255, Central Foreign Policy File 1963, RG 59, 
NACP. 
771 Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 
1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
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The Juilliard String Quartet, a classical string quartet founded in 1946 at the 
prestigious Juilliard School in New York, included violinists Robert Mann and Robert 
Koff, violist Raphael Hillyer, and cellist Arthur Winograd. These elitist performers 
fascinated the Dubrovnik public in both 1964 and 1970.773As for the American Brass 
Quintet, their artistic innovation consisted in being the first quintet playing music 
originally written for brass, but substituted a bass trombone for the conventional tuba 
part. Being a rather innovative quintet, they were invited by the Music Biennale Zagreb 
to perform in 1966 and 1967 (in 1966 the Yugoslav government partially covered their 
salaries and travel expenses).774 
Of all the festivals, the Zagreb Biennale was certainly the most vanguard and 
groundbreaking Yugoslav festival of contemporary classical music. Initiated back in 
1961, this international festival was conceived by its founders, Milko Kelemen (the 
MBZ initiator and president), Ivo Vuljević (head of MBZ promotion) and Josip 
Stojanović (the director of MBZ), an “extraordinary project in need of special efforts 
[for] the democratization of music and culture in Yugoslavia.”775 The Commission for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, together with foreign governments, provided 
financial coverage for the international guests. In 1963, the Embassy contributed 
562,000 dinars, 776  while Gunther Schuller’s participation (a distinctive American 
composer, conductor and jazz musicians) was gained through the American specialist 
grant.777 
                                                 
773  Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
774 Koncertna direkcija Zagreb, Oct. 25, 1966, JS 24, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, 
kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA; Muzički Biennale Zagreb, 1967, File 2, Komisija za 
kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
775 The MBZ was established in the period when New Music flourished within electronic and electro-
acoustic music, as well as on the music scene and instrumental or music theatre. “In those days the Music 
Biennale Zagreb was a platform of contemporary music detached from any form of convention, thus not 
having turned into a classic festival, but rather prompted a possibility and necessity to confront, re-
examine and disclose the reasons, style or experience of a new and distinct view of life. Of course, this 
view was not the only one, nor was it unambiguous, but its idiom could be easily identified” (“Music 
Biennale Zagreb’s History,” MBZ, access Jan. 19, 2016, 
http://www.mbz.hr/index.php?opt=news&act=mlist&id=2372&lang=en). 
776 Sekretarijat za kulturu NR Hrvatske, Feb. 26, 1964, 584, Box 41, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu 
SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA. 
777 Airgram 218 from American Embassy Belgrade to Department of State (CU), Sept. 13, 1963, Box 45, 
USIA Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP: 13. 
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The MBZ gained major leadership in experimental musical arts during its 1969 
edition imbued with electronic music, accompanied by the “Computers and Visual 
Researches” exhibition. For the occasion, the Sonic Arts Group,778 founded by Robert 
Ashley from Michigan and inspired by the musical innovations of John Cage and David 
Tudor, presented electronic music as “not having been made up in a laboratory but 
develop[ed] on the stage,” accompanied by electronic equipment and creations of 
sound.779 Vjesnik expressed scandal and disbelief: “Like witchdoctors of a strange, new, 
technical religion, these engineers-musicians from Ann Arbor [were] casting spells and 
mixing with their electronic cans,” a scene that “astonished, staggered and scared”; 
“was this music anyway?” asked Vjesnik journalist and defined the performance as a 
“stupidity” and its music as “ugly.”780 
In the context of the new wave of experimental music, a Yugoslav group led by 
Devčić, Frajt, Matičić, expressed themselves in playing electronic sounds.781 Contrary 
to what was expected, journalists and music critics spoke negatively about the MBZ 
1969 program,782 which convinced the organizers to insist on major foreign and U.S. 
participation (even if, according to their bulletin, the MBZ accommodated Igor 
Stravinsky, Lukas Foss, John Cage and David Tudor during the 1960s).783 
5.1.2 The Negro Theatre and the Vanguard Ballet 
 
All of Yugoslavia is singing today. The workers and the peasants are singing. 
The Communist officials, the man in the street, the students, all are singing the 
                                                 
778 Known afterwards as the Sonic Arts Union, this first musical body to gain an international reputation 
by performing and creating live electronic music, interpreted their performance as “permanent creativity, 
a way of perceiving the world” and specialized in electronic-theatre music with cyber sonic devices 
(Michael Nyman, Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 22, 101–
105). 
779 Muzički biennale Zagreb, 1969, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, 
HDA. 
780 Bilten br. 13 - Muzički biennale Zagreb, June 13, 1969, 28-29, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
781 Muzički biennale Zagreb, 1969, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, 
HDA. 
782 Bilten br. 13 - Muzički biennale Zagreb, June 13, 1969, 28-29, File 2, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Bilten br. 14 - Muzički biennale Zagreb, Dec. 15, 1969, File 2, 
Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
783 Muzički Biennale Zagreb, n.d., File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 
1410, HDA. 
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songs of George Gershwin and the praises of the cast of the folk opera, 
“Porgy and Bess,” which left this truly heartbroken country this morning.784 
 
In 1951 I was in Italy when a delegation of ten Soviet performers, dancers, 
singers and instrumentalists arrived unexpectedly for an appearance at the 
Florence Festival. Italians observed cynically that the visit coincided with an 
election campaign in which Florence's Communist Mayor needed help. But the 
fact was that the Russians, who included such distinguished performers as 
Galina Ulanova, the famous ballerina and Emil Gilels, the illustrious pianist, 
cut a wide swath. They performed brilliantly; they stimulated interest in the 
festival: they drew the attention not only of Italy but of all Western Europe to 
their gifts as artists. The Italians, like other Western Europeans, might have 
reservations about Soviet benevolence but they were beguiled by the artistic 
visitors. 
Howard Taubman, New York Times, April 13, 1958785 
 
Dance, ballet and drama speak universal languages. In engaging drama forms and 
ballet movements, ANTA realized that messages could reach and move hearts. In 
December 1954, Gershwin’s opera Porgy and Bess was performed at the Zagreb 
National Theatre786 and then Belgrade. The first ANTA proposed tour literally “welled 
up in joyous affection,” “more than twenty curtain calls,” “expressions of gratitude” 
(that were even extended for the military and economic aid that was sent), “hundreds of 
letters […] expressed in crude English and Serbian” and “regret that this talented group 
of artists will not stay longer in our country” (according to Borba).787 In Belgrade, 
members of the company “surprised the citizens […] by engaging in a game of 
‘football’ with a bunch of local youngsters in the street in front of their hotel.”788 
Authored by Du Bose Heyward, George Gershwin and Ira Gershwin and debuted in 
1935, Porgy and Bess told the story of a crippled beggar, his drug-addict girlfriend, her 
violent ex-boyfriend, and their long-suffering and hard-praying neighbors. With their 
white authors and all African American characters, Porgy and Bess became, in fact, a 
                                                 
784 “Yugoslavs Sing Praise of ‘Porgy’; U. S. Troupe Earns Gratitude and Affection of Nation in One-
Week Stand,” The New York Times, December 22, 1954, sec. Amusements. 
785 Howard Taubman, “Cold War On the Cultural Front; At Brussels the U. S. and Russia Will Compete 
or the Minds of Men with Their Arts. Cultural Cold War,” The New York Times, April 13, 1958, sec. 
Magazine. 
786 Opera HNK Zagreb, Sept. 30, 1971, 3539/1, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-
a SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
787 “Yugoslavs Sing Praise of ‘Porgy.’”; Joseph N. Acinapura, “The Cultural Presentations Program of the 
United States” (MA thesis, Rutgers University, 1970), enclosed in D.W. Galvin, Federat ion of Rocky 
Mountain States, Inc., to Dayton Coe, Cultural Presentation Branch, Dec. 2, 1970, Box 1, Records 
Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP: 29-30. 
788 Taubman, “Cold War On the Cultural Front.” 
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case study of the way white Americans “craved stories about African Americans 
featuring earthy authenticity and frictionless progress towards racial equality,” and the 
way African Americans “had to maneuver within the cultural marketplace created by 
such white desires.” In other words, it was a history of collisions between white fantasy 
and black pragmatism before, during and after the Civil Rights era.789 
Porgy and Bess was not completely new to the Yugoslav audience when it came in 
1954. Actually, it was in 1951 that Belgrade’s Opera demanded USIS assistance in 
providing piano and libretto copies.790 The Opera director, reported Ambassador Allen, 
felt “anxious to receive all possible information about presentation, costuming, scenery 
as well as piano scores.”791 However, when it came to Yugoslavia, Porgy and Bess 
meant sending a missive that, “with grace and charm,” would open up “new 
perspectives here for a communist-led people sensitive to reports on American racial 
prejudice and exploitation.” In order to achieve such an impact, artists entertained 
“personal offstage contacts” on the street, in places of entertainment, hotels and in 
private homes, they were invited to the Serbian Orthodox saint’s-day (“Slava” 
celebration) and sang Christmas carols and Negro spirituals at the Ambassador’s 
reception.792 About the Zagreb performances, where the company received fourteen 
curtain calls and a half-hour ovation, a leading Yugoslav critic wrote: “They have not 
only shown us a new kind of art, but a new world… a world which was unknown to us 
and more or less distorted through literature, I may say falsified… I think we should be 
thankful that they have come and have made it possible for us to feel friendship and 
closeness to a world so far away from us.”793 Crucially, while communist propaganda 
sedulously fostered “the notion that United States culture consists of comic books and 
gangster motion pictures,” and that American Negroes lived under conditions of “Uncle 
                                                 
789 According to African American writer James Baldwin, “What has always been missing from George 
Gershwin’s opera is what the situation of Porgy and Bess says about the white world. It is because of this 
omission that Americans are so proud of the opera. It assuages their guilt about Negro and it attacks none 
of their fantasies” (Ellen Noonan, The Strange Career of Porgy and Bess: Race, Culture, and America’s 
Most Famous Opera (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1. 
790 Telegram 1570 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1951, 511.68/4-2551, Box 2472, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
791 Telegram 1683 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1951, 511.68/5-1251, Box 2472, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
792 “Yugoslavs Sing Praise of ‘Porgy.’” 
793 American Cultural and Sports Groups Abroad under the President’s Fund, Jan. 1956, IES Digest, 
Folder 11, Box 24, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
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Tom’s Cabin,” “Porgy and Bess” opposed “hard at these stereotypes.” 794  Or as 
President Eisenhower put it in 1954, Porgy and Bess was receiving “fabulous success 
[…], playing to capacity houses” in a contribution that could “scarcely be 
exaggerated.795 Similarly, Jack Raymond proclaimed them “America’s top Ambassador 
at large”; or as “one communist said here, «This is more than money and easier to take 
than political tracts».”796 Certainly, Porgy and Bess represented a special case of Cold 
War propaganda centered on dismantling the racial-problematic United States, 
undermining the Soviet’s accusations of a lack of cultural enlightenment and proposing 
a racial narrative inclusive of the African American culture as a national one. 
“I [see] the dance as a vision of ineffable power. A man could, with dignity and 
towering majesty, dance…dance as Michelangelo’s visions dance and as the music of 
Bach dances,” declared José Limón, the establisher of the American Modern Dance.797 
Decisively, the most eminent U.S. ballet groups and dance performers displayed this 
kind of soft power on Yugoslav stages. The American Ballet Theatre (1958), Jerome 
Robbin’s Ballet (1959), New York City Ballet (1965), Alwin Ailey Dance Theatre 
(1968), American National Theatre of the Deaf (1969), Glen Tetley Dance Company 
(1969) performed at the Dubrovnik Summer Festival.798The American Ballet Theatre 
participated with Billy the Kid and Rodeo of Aaron Copland; Jerome Robbin’s Ballet 
presented a Concert of Frederick Chopin; while the New York City Ballet – 
choreographed by George Balanchine, the founder of American ballet, – performed 
Tchaikovsky’s Serenade, Raymonda of Aleksandar Glazunov; Felix Mendelssohn’s 
Scottish Symphony; Paul Hindemith’s Four Temperaments and George Bizet’s 
Symphony in C.799 
                                                 
794 “Porgy Makes a Hit,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 1954. 
795 Dwight D. Eisenhower to the President of the Senate, July 27, 1954, 511.00/7-2354, Box 2249, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
796 Jack Raymond, “Porgy Delights Belgrade Crowds,” The New York Times, December 17, 1954. 
797 “Dance Troup Preserves Heritage of Jose Limon,” Sun Sentinel, July 27, 1986. 
798  Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
799  Ansambli na Dubrovačkim ljetnim igrama 1950-1969, n.d., File 1, Komisija za kulturne veze s 
inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA; Muzičko-scenska djela na repertoaru Dubrovačkih ljetnih igara 
1950-1969, n.d., Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
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The grandiose José Limon Company performed at the National Theatre in Zagreb 
in 1957.800 USIS reported of exultant audiences after Jerome Robbin’s 1959 play: “It’s 
you who are the revolutionaries! The Russian Ballet is static – you are the country of 
the future!”801 Analogous admirations were aroused by the Martha Graham Company 
dance in November 1962 at Zagreb’s Opera: “[they] opened up new concepts of dance 
not before seen here, plus a general admiration for the tremendous accomplishment in 
training and disciplining the dancers to such a high perfection in this style.”802 
In September 1968, one of the most renewed and groundbreaking U.S. 
choreographers, Alwin Nikolais, visited Yugoslavia and performed in Belgrade, Skopje, 
Sarajevo and Ljubljana (he then returned to the MBZ in 1969 and the Dubrovnik 
festival in 1971).803 Nikolais employed lights, slides, electronic music, and stage props 
to create environments through which dancers moved and blended. He made use of 
props, masks and mobiles with esthetic as well as functional purposes, and popularized 
modern multimedia theater.804 The Embassy report testified of “enthusiastic capacity 
audiences” and “standing ovation.” However, the Nikolais dancers did not only attract 
youngsters in excitement: the performance was attended by, as well as the U.S. 
diplomatic corps and Ambassador Elbrick, Živan Berisavljević, Republican Secretary 
for Education and Culture, Milan Vukos, Vice-mayor of Belgrade, government 
officials, dancers and theatre leaders. The event seemed to go beyond mere artistic 
performances, since “a person of such profound and various talents coupled with a 
modest, warm, genuine personality leaves a tremendous impression on all who meet 
him.”805 
                                                 
800 Cultural Presentation Staff, Activity Report of IES, Aug. 13 – 24, 1956, Box 25, Folder 1, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Opera HNK Zagreb, Sept. 30, 1971, 
3539/1, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
801 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 
1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 16. 
802 Message 74 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, March 25, 1963, Box 45, USIA Subject Files 
1953-1967, RG 306, NACP; Opera HNK Zagreb, Sept. 30, 1971, 3539/1, File SAD, Komisija za kulturne 
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Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA. 
804 Claudia Gitelman and Randy Martin, eds., The Returns of Alwin Nikolais: Bodies, Boundaries and the 
Dance Canon (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan, 2007). 
805 Memorandum from Ralph T. Backlund (CU/CP) to Edward D. Re, Dec. 19, 1968, Folder 8, Box 21, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, University of Arkansas Libraries. 
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Above all, the Nikolais case explores the cross-cultural interactions that public and 
cultural diplomacy was actually meant to do. In fact, during the group’s stay in 
Belgrade, the Yugoslav theatre leaders, with Embassy support, organized several 
roundtables and meetings with members of the Opera, the BITEF806 and the Atelje 212 
theatres, at the time controversial because they were following global theatre trends 
with avant-garde explorations. During such meetings, Nikolais spoke with Mira 
Trajlović, BITEF and Atelje 212 director Mladen Sabljić, Belgrade’s Opera director, 
actress Mladja Veselinović, Dušan Trninić, leading ballet dancer Katarina Obradović, 
Belgrade’s Opera ballet dancer, and many others.807 
Finally, in May 1969, the Glen Tetley Ballet Group, whose founder Glen Tetley is 
best known for having mixed ballet and modern dance, displayed “fervid intensity, 
sinuous nonstop propulsion, and voluptuous physicality” 808  when they played in 
Yugoslavia. Both Jerome Robbins, Jose Limon, Martha Graham, Glen Tetley, and 
Alwin Nikolais, were leaders in contemporary dance, innovative in techniques and 
controversial in styles and vanguard explorations. 
The preference for classic performances, whether in music, theatre or dance, 
reinforced U.S. prestige abroad and pledged the embodiment of excellence. In the same 
way as Porgy and Bess and the ballet groups, these plays were dismantling racial and 
cultural prejudices and inspiring theatrical vanguard and artistic unconventionality. 
However, what measurable effects and goals have they accomplished, apart from 
making available otherwise expensive tours, and psychologically strengthening 
American prestige in highbrow culture? Were they increasing the appeal of the 
American dream instead? How could the State Department capitalize on these artistic 
performances and to what extent did they gain obedience or political acquiescence to 
U.S. foreign policies? 
Recent historiographical works have pointed to several new perceptions of the U.S. 
Cultural Presentation Program in the Cold War: the preference of classical music over 
jazz and other styles and the relevance of the selection process; the overcoming of 
                                                 
806 Abbreviation of Belgrade International Theatre Festival. 
807  Photographs of Alwin Nikolais Dance Group in Yugoslavia, Folder 34, Box 346, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
808 Allen Robertson, “Glen Tetley,” ed. Selma J. Cohen, International Encyclopedia of Dance (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Chapter 5: Between Art and Sound Diplomacy: the Cultural Presentation Program and the Yugoslav Voice 
of America 
Carla Konta - April 2016   201 
musical diplomacy as a weapon of cultural imperialism and of musicians as its passive 
actors; the consideration of the spectators responses; and the interest in how these 
musical actors were in fact “performing the nation.”809 Gienow-Hecht argued that the 
real importance of these orchestras and soloists performing abroad lies in the fact that 
they legitimize “the nation’s political inﬂuence and boost its self-conﬁdence to exert 
leadership abroad.” 
 
Figure 5-1: Alwin Nikolais Dance Company in Belgrade Yugoslavia, September 1968; Nikolais 
discussion at BITEF attended by leading theater, ballet as well as by dancers and other theater 
personalities (Courtesy of the University of Arkansas Libraries). Source: Photographs of the Alwin 
Nikolais Ballet Group in Yugoslavia, Folder 34, Box 346, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
 
In her view, the performances abroad were an act “similar to a speech at the United 
Nations, a banquet at an embassy, or a handshake on the White House lawn.” She 
demonstrated the shift from pre-World War I symphony orchestras as “places of 
                                                 
809 For a notable debate, see whole issue of Diplomatic History, 36, no. 1 (2012). 
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international encounter,” culturally opened, to a post–World War II focus on musical 
performances as “stages of national self-representation” enacted to demonstrate world 
leadership capability. CIA’s cultural officer Thomas Braden claimed that the Boston 
Symphony Orchestra in 1952 “won more acclaim for the U.S. in Paris than John Foster 
Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches.” When 
Leonard Bernstein reported how “Russian audiences screamed and stamped and all but 
tore the seats out of the ﬂoor,” he was actually “displaying hierarchy and leadership.”810 
Whether hailing from New York, Moscow, or Teheran, the orchestras enacted the desire 
to perform the country they represented in front of silent audiences by displaying 
hierarchy and leadership. Finally,  
The political function of symphony orchestras on tour abroad is not just that they play beautiful 
music trying to establish dialogue but that they seek to display leadership and symbolize the 
authority behind the orchestra in a foreign environment, while audiences remain quiet and 
attentive. A state-sponsored guest concert is a way of saying adsum – I am present.811 
5.2 Jazz Diplomacy or Simply “Jazz”? 
 
As long as I’ve been playing, they never say I done anything. They always say 
that some white guy did it. 
Miles Davis812 
 
Put it this way: Jazz is a good barometer of freedom. When pure jazz is not 
accepted and pseudo jazz with political and dogmatic coatings takes over, you 
can look for freedom of expression to step out of the picture. In its beginnings, 
the United States of America spawned certain ideals of freedom and 
independence through which, eventually, jazz was evolved, and the music is so 
free that many people say it is the only unhampered, unhindered expression of 
complete freedom yet produced in this country. But if I were told to play my 
music in only the keys of F-sharp the monotony and frustration of it would 
force me right out of jazz. Yet there are some people who in effect are 
permitted to express themselves freely in only one key. 
Duke Ellington813 
 
I think rock’n’roll in communist countries has much more importance than 
rock’n’roll in the West. We can't have any alternative parties or any 
                                                 
810 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “The World Is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global 
Performance of America,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (2012): 18–19, 22, 24–25. Nevertheless, artists 
performing abroad, including Bernstein rarely behaved as planned: by talking to audiences, pitching 
music and emotions against wars and weapons, they questioned the entire Cold War scenario and “raised 
eyebrows across Washington” (25). 
811 Ibid, 26. 
812 Paul Tingen, “Miles Davis. The Making of Bitches Brews,” JazzTimes, May 2001, 54. 
813 Mark Tucker and Duke Ellington, The Duke Ellington Reader (Oxford University Press, 1995), 295. 
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alternative organized politics, so there are not too many places where you can 
gather large groups of people and communicate ideas which are not official. 
Rock’n’roll is one of the most important vehicles for helping people in 
communist countries to think in a different way.” 
Goran Bregović, front men of Bijelo Dugme [White Buttons] rock 
group814 
 
Jazz and rock’n’roll might be distant as musical styles, but they have much in 
common by being a social catalyzer of Yugoslav youth. Both jazz and rock’n’roll were 
identified with youth rebellion and unconventional life styles. As Vučetić proved, the 
post-war Yugoslav communist leadership identified jazz with Western decadence and 
reminded of Djilas’ 1947 assertion “America is our sworn enemy, and jazz, as its 
product, as well.”815 Nevertheless, the abandonment of Stalinism after 1950 meant for 
Yugoslav jazz men more freedom in forming jazz orchestras and arranging concerts. 
Despite Tito’s softened, but still critical, opinion about jazz (“Jazz for me is not music, 
it is a racket,” he stated in 1962),816 in the 1960s the Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) 
Jazz Band played in honor of Tito’s birthday – May 25 – the Day of Youth. During the 
1960s, Yugoslav cultural authorities provided institutionalizing patterns for jazz, so in 
1960 they established the Yugoslav Bled Jazz Festival, while almost every larger town 
had its jazz orchestra. Vučetić recognized in the institutionalization of jazz two major 
influences: the repositioning of Yugoslav authorities that in the late 1950s stopped 
considering this musical style politically dangerous; and the breakthrough of jazz 
concerts sponsored either by the American Embassy or by the State Department and the 
contribution of the Voice of America for the penetration of jazz in Yugoslavia.817 
                                                 
814  Sabrina P. Ramet, “Shake, Rattle, and Self-Management: Making the Scene in Yugoslavia,” in 
Rocking The State: Rock Music And Politics In Eastern Europe And Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), 135. 
815  Duško Gojković, the Serbian world known jazz musician explained the role of jazz in post-war 
Yugoslavia in this way: “For us to play jazz was a kind of freedom. The [Party] Commissioner could not 
tell me how to improvise on the trumpet. This was the only thing where I could choose what to play, and 
this was freedom for us” (Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam, 174, 173). On these issues, see also Radina 
Vučetić, “Trubom kroz Gvozdenu zavesu: prodor đeza u socijalističku Jugoslaviju,” Muzikologija, no. 13 
(2012): 53–77, doi:10.2298/MUZ120229012V. 
816 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita, vol. 3, 3 vols. Sabrana dela Vladimira 
Dedijera (Beograd: Rad, 1984), 609. 
817  Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam, 178, 179-182. The VOA contribution in spreading jazz into 
Yugoslavia will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
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Penny Von Eschen was among the first scholars to address the issue of jazz 
diplomacy in the cultural Cold War. She explored how the U.S. officials, despite their 
misgivings about jazz, sent leading African-American jazz players to tours abroad – 
among them Dizzy Gillespie, Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, and Randy Weston, – 
believing that they could save the tarnished American “race problem.” By sending 
African Americans abroad, Washington’s bureaucracy suggested that talent and hard 
work, rather than skin color, determined individual success in the United States, while 
the jazz ensembles, which encouraged individual expression within the established 
parameters, rendered the music an apt metaphor for liberal democracy. But jazz 
musicians and U.S. policy makers often spoke different languages. For them, the tours 
meant a “long-overdue recognition from a society that had previously failed to 
acknowledge its greatest music,” even if such recognition was not without an edge. In 
fact, jazz arranger Quincy Jones who led the Dizzy Gillespie rehearsals before the tour, 
reported that ANTA briefed the crew to “indulge in your various idiosyncrasies 
discreetly,” to which Jones recalled, “we couldn’t believe it. If the New York 
Philharmonic were about to tour Europe for the State Department, would he feel obliged 
to say the same thing?”818 
Von Eschen proved how musicians championed jazz as a model of racial equity 
that they aspired to achieve, not as a faithful reflection of the freedom and equality 
offered by U.S. society.819 Therefore, while the government officials insisted on the 
music’s universalism and its broadly American roots, African American artists pledged 
that the particularity of the black experience had created jazz. Although the State 
Department sought to engender pro-American sympathies among the ruling elites 
abroad, musicians frequently democratized the tours, playing impromptu gigs for 
                                                 
818 Penny Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 35–36. Apart from professional recognition, jazz ambassadors 
enthusiastically accepted to tour because of their widely shared patriotism commitment, the pride of 
representing the nation and helping their country, for “the edgy, competitive masculinity of Cold War 
America” not foreign to jazz culture, for the intrigue of adventure and “the inherently secretive nature of 
covert action” (29–30). 
819 “The Gillespie tour began as the five-month-old Montgomery bus boycott brought unprecedented 
national and international attention to American racism and the Southern civil rights struggle. 
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ordinary citizens and jamming with local musicians.820 Likewise, tour participants often 
articulated ideas more attuned to pan-African and broadly Third World concerns than to 
those of U.S. leaders. This inability to maintain a tight focus on national identities and 
priorities points to one of the reasons for the termination of the program in 1978.821 
The CU sponsored jazz tours following the line of the Cold War hot spots. By 
looking at the itinerary of the 1956 Dizzy Gillespie tour (beginning in Iran, the tour 
culminated in Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece, with stops in Syria and the U.S. military 
allies Pakistan and Lebanon), “one can trace America’s increasing assumption of the 
former role of the British in assuring Western access to the region’s oil,” a commitment 
of the 1947 Truman Doctrine to take over British funding of anti-communist forces in 
Greece and Turkey. The Gillespie, as well as Dave Brubeck trip in 1958, moved 
through the Eisenhower conception of a “perimeter defense” against the Soviet Union 
along the Northern Tier extending from Turkey to Pakistan.822 
Another revenue of the jazz tours transpired in the meaning that foreign audiences 
attached to them. Discussing jazz tours to Soviet Union, Lisa Davenport argued, “While 
American jazz musicians who traveled on cultural tours sought to dismantle the 
structures of American racism, Russian youth, jazz lovers, and fans sought to surmount 
the political structures of Soviet Communism.”823 What were the consequences of the 
Yugoslav jazz case, what was the role of this highly tempered jazz diplomacy? 
5.2.1 Big Masters, Private Arrangements 
From the early 1950s onwards, and during the following two decades, jazz 
conquered Yugoslav radio, TV, the record industry and Yugoslav institutions and 
media. Moreover, Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana, came to be special destinations of 
                                                 
820 In Karachi, Pakistan, for example in 1956 Gillespie refused to play until the gates were opened to the 
ragamuffin children, while in Ankara, Turkey, he likewise opened the gates declaring he had come to play 
for all the people (Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World, 35). 
821 Albeit in a substantially reduced form, the Jazz Ambassadors Program survived in post-Cold War 
Washington’s public diplomacy as the ECA’s American Music Program Abroad, including blues, 
bluegrass, gospel, country, and hip hop styles (Harm Langenkamp, “Global Harmony in Silk Road 
Diplomacy,” in Music and Diplomacy from the Early Modern Era to the Present, ed. Rebekah Ahrendt, 
Mark Ferraguto, and Damien Mahiet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 94. 
822 Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World, 31–32. 
823  Lisa E. Davenport, Jazz Diplomacy: Promoting America in the Cold War Era (Univ. Press of 
Mississippi, 2010), 85. 
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Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Albanian jazz fans because they accommodated 
hundreds of American jazz concerts. 
Dizzy Gillespie with his Orchestra played in Belgrade in 1956, whilst his Quartet 
performed in late May 1961, and then in 1971(and 1981 and 1990). The Glenn Miller 
Orchestra appeared at the Belgrade Kolarac Hall in April 1957, whereas the Great 
Satchmo performed in 1959. Ella Fitzgerald sang in 1961 for the first time and then 
returned in 1971. Duke Ellington played at the Trade Union Hall (Dom sindikata) in 
1970.824 Lionel Hampton came twice, in 1971 and 1979, while Casey Anderson was in 
Yugoslavia in November 1970. The Modern Jazz Quartet played in the Trade Union 
Hall both in 1960 and in 1989. The Oscar Peterson Trio with Ray Brown and Ed 
Thipgen played in Belgrade in 1961 and 1973, and Ljubljana in 1964. The great Miles 
Davis participated at the Newport Belgrade Jazz Festival in 1971 and 1973, and then in 
1986; and many more. Nevertheless, according to the CU, USIA and State Department 
archival records, the majority of these jazz players came to Yugoslavia through private 
arrangements, mostly with the Jugoslovenska koncertna Agencija (Yugoslav Concert 
Agency).825 
From 1954 to 1971 the CU sponsored only four jazz performances in Yugoslavia, 
one rock concert (Blood, Sweat and Tears in 1971), and the folk blues guitarist Casey 
Anderson in November 1970.826 The first two sponsored jazz bands were the Dizzy 
                                                 
824 Duke Ellington was scheduled to perform under CU sponsorship in 1963, but Kennedy’s sudden tragic 
death cancelled the already arranged concerts (Airgram 307 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the 
Department of State (CU), July 24, 1970, Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-
1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP). 
825 A highly interesting and useful blog on Yugoslav concerts from the early 1950s to late 1990s is 
“Yugoslav Concerts” posted by a group of music fans, ranging from classical, to jazz, rock, punk, metal. 
It collects and posts online newspaper extracts, photographs, reproduction of cover records, concert 
tickets, and more (https://jugosvirke.wordpress.com/). 
826 In the CU objectives, Blood, Sweat and Tears, a nine-man rock-jazz band, would identify the U.S. 
administration with youth, “here and abroad”; “They bridge the generation gap [and] have just won three 
Grammy Awards,” conveyed the Bureau. Except Yugoslavia, Blood, Sweat and Tears performed in 
Romania and Poland. An independent film crew accompanied the group and produced a TV 
documentary, and a prestige picture book was planned to come out about the tour. According to the New 
York Times, the rock group brought “more than 5000 Yugoslav music fans at a downtown stadium to their 
feet in roaring approval.” (“Blood, Sweat &Tears Wins Ovation in Yugoslav Concert,” The New York 
Times, June 19, 1970; John Richardson Jr. to Martin J. Billenbrand, April 23, 1970, Folder 1, Box 26, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). For Casey Anderson 
sponsorship, see Mark B. Lewis to John Richardson Jr. (CU), Feb. 17, 1971, Folder 12, Box 21, Bureau 
of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
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Gillespie Orchestra and the Glenn Miller Orchestra in 1956 and 1957.827 The third was 
the Woody Herman’s concert in Belgrade in 1966.828 Whilst, at the end of the 1960s, 
the CU sent the University of Illinois Jazz Band, a 25-man band, including vocalist Don 
Smith and led by John Garvey, to an eight-week tour in Eastern and Western Europe. 
The band passed through Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš and Skopje 
between October 17 and 30. The American Embassy was satisfied, “the Band’s 
presence provided […] a unique opportunity for direct cooperation with the League of 
Belgrade University Students,” they emphasized “the vitality, the imagination and talent 
of young American musicians” and advanced “the program objectives of the Embassy’s 
cultural program.” The newspapers testified, “they proved [to] deserve their reputation 
as the best university band in the U.S.” and “the entire Zagreb-Radio Television 
Orchestra should have gone to hear the nineteen-year old trumpeter.”829 As far as the 
Duke Ellington concerts in Belgrade are concerned, the CU, the Embassy, the Belgrade 
Bank of Commerce and the Radio-TV Belgrade jointly sponsored them.830 
In 1959, USIS field officers stated that USIS was not supporting individual 
American musicians to come to Yugoslavia, rather their assistance consisted in helping 
Jugokoncert to bring U.S. musicians, as they affirm to have done in the case of the 1959 
Louis Armstrong concert.831 Indeed, in its December 1962 issue, Pregled reported that 
the Americans Jimmy Prat Trio, Herb Geller Quartet, and John Lewis had participated 
in the Yugoslav Jazz Bled Festival, but without any reference to U.S. official 
sponsorship.832 
                                                 
827 Cultural Presentation Program – Area and Country Breakdown, July 1954-Sept. 1966, Folder 11, Box 
49, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Telegram 694 from 
Department of State to Belgrade, Feb. 25, 1957, 511.683/2-1857, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, 
NACP. 
828  Educational and Cultural Profile of Yugoslavia, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
829 Ralph T. Backlund, CU/CP, to dr. Edward D. Re, Sept. 26, 1968, Folder 8, Box 21, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; Thomas D. Huff, CU/CP, to Jacob 
Canter, Feb. 27, 1969, Folder 9, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special 
Collection, UAL. 
830 Airgram 307 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), July 24, 1970, 
Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, 
NACP. 
831 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 
1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 30. 
832 “Kulturna razmena,” Pregled, Dec. 1962, 38. 
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Some years later, an exception occurred and in 1966 USIS Yugoslavia financed the 
American participation at the Seventh Jazz Bled Festival (June 2 to 5), by providing a 
modest dollar honorarium and a round trip to jazz trumpeter Art Farmer, as well as 
facilitative services to VOA’s conductor Willis Conover. The latter proved to be, 
according to Acting PAO Hugh B. Sutherland, a great success at the Festival. “Willis 
Conover added his knowledge of jazz to the unofficial program […] he spent night and 
day interviewing, being interviewed, listening and talking with Yugoslav and foreign 
jazz fans.” Additionally, he discussed arrangements for stronger and facilitated 
cooperation and performances of American jazzmen in Yugoslavia.833 
Nevertheless, in the general context of the Bureau’s Presentation Program, it 
appears that USIS played a minor part and the greatest American jazz masters continued 
coming mostly through private arrangements. Moreover, some officially sponsored jazz 
concerts – Duke’s for instance – resulted from a joint effort between formal and 
informal state actors. It is highly probable that the extraordinary jazz popularity made 
needless and redundant any official sponsorship. The data above shows that American 
jazz was a cultural Cold War weapon in the broad sense, having the connotation of 
improvisation and freedom, but the State Department mostly prioritized classical 
arrangements. This latter policy was due to two key factors: the ANTA propensity 
towards classical music and art; and the high-level free circulation of jazz groups, LP, 
radio stations, orchestras, in Yugoslavia as a consequence of the general cultural 
liberalization tendency from the 1950s on. 
The jazz performances made thousands of young people in Belgrade, Zagreb, 
Dubrovnik and Ljubljana delirious. Ella Fitzgerald “filled Belgrade’s largest music hall 
[…] with a delirium of enthusiasm [and] […] there were prolonged, angry shouts when 
the announcer said the concert was finished”834. Whilst for Vjesnik, Ellington’s concert 
at the Dubrovnik festival “was a sensation,” with “excellent trumpeters, splendid 
soloists […] who played with their whole body […] showing at the same time a great 
concentration and deep emotional involvement.”835 
                                                 
833 Message 86 from USIS Belgrade to USIA Washington, June 27, 1966, CUL 16 US, Box 351, Central 
Foreign Policy Files 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. 
834 “Ella Fitzgerald and Peterson Trio Receive Ovation,” New York Times, Feb. 21, 1961. 
835 A. Tomašek, “Od baroka do džeza,” Vjesnik, July 17, 1970, 6. 
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A letter of Paul B. Lichtman, a young law graduate from Columbia University, 
written on October 28 1963, to President Kennedy, after his extensive trip through 
Yugoslavia, is a witness to the popularity of jazz:  
My contact was limited to persons in their twenties, my age and I stand as a witness to only 
their hearts. Their love for Americans is most enthusiastic. […] numerous persons rushed over 
to me and questioned me about America and about the President. Some of their questions led 
me to believe that it was thought that I was a weekly household guest at the White House. […] 
Our music is on the lips of every young Yugoslavian […]. The most asked question is when is 
Louis Armstrong, or Ella, or Benny Goodman coming. How often I was asked if I had ever seen 
Ray Charles and all wanted to know about him. I was astonished to find out music so 
widespread.836 
But while the jazz concerts were a result of mainly unofficial cultural arrangements, 
there was undeniably a special Cold War weapon that made jazz a widespread loved 
musical style: the Yugoslav broadcasts of the Voice of America, to which will be 
dedicated the last section of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
836 Paul B. Lichtman to John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Oct. 28, 1963, Box 45, USIA 
Subject Files 1953-1967, RG 306, NACP. 
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5.2.2 Some Final Points 
Figure 5-2: Belgrade, July 14, 1970. Duke Ellington giving his autograph to Ivanka Pavlović, singer, after the 
concert at the Trade Union Hall (Dom sindikata). Behind him standing from the left: Miroslava Janković, 
Cultural Advisor USIS Belgrade, Vojislav Simić, conductor of Belgrade RTV Jazz Orchestra, and Petar 
Vujić, Secretary of the Assoiation of Jazz Musicians of Serbia (Courtesy of National Archives).  
Figure 5-3: Belgrade, July 14, 1970. Duke Ellington giving his autograph to Ivanka Pavlović, singer, after the 
concert at the Trade Union Hall (Dom sindikata). Behind him standing from the left: Miroslava Janković, 
Cultural Advisor USIS Belgrade, Vojislav Simić, conductor of Belgrade RTV Jazz Orchestra, and Petar 
Vujić, Secretary of the Association of Jazz Musicians of Serbia (Courtesy of the National Archives, College 
Park, MD). Source: Photograph of Duke Ellington Concert in Yugoslavia, July 14, 1970, Box 6, Records 
Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, NACP. 
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By covering transportation expenses and production, the State Department typically 
sustained only those tours incapable of being supported by private arrangements and the 
financial assistance was, as a rule, designed to underwrite deficits, “not to subsidize 
tours completely.” By deficits, the CU officers considered those box-office receipts 
inadequate to meet the costs.837 Additionally, low priced or free tickets were seen as a 
handicap, because “they would disable the public” to buy tickets for private 
arrangements and appreciate them so well. Subsequently, each diplomatic post 
established the tickets “on the going rate” because “events requiring a token payment, 
however modest, gain prestige and are attributed greater merit, artistically and 
otherwise, than are completely free performances.”838 
Despite the fact that Yugoslav authorities despised the USIS person-to-person 
direct activities in the field, their attitude towards the presentation program seems 
motivated by opposite assumptions. In 1951, USIS received several requests from the 
Yugoslav Council for Science and Culture, soliciting to promote, in conjunction with 
the field post, “visits to Yugoslavia by American conductors and/or musicians.” “The 
British Council has been fairly active here in this field,” the USIS report continued, 
“and it would be considered most desirable if a first-class American conductor or 
musician could visit this area.” Moreover, the Yugoslav Council proposed to guarantee 
the artist’s fee. To which Margaret Glassford, USIS information officer, added that, 
since previous concerts fell through because of the Council’s inability to finance them, 
“some sort of subsidy [from the State Department] would have to be provided […] 
inasmuch as the Yugoslav government cannot guarantee in dollars the fees usually 
sought by top-ranking artists.” Glassford took as an example the British Council praxis 
that paid both the travel and stay expenses, whilst the Yugoslav Council guaranteed the 
artist’s fee in dinars (previously converted into sterling by the British authorities in the 
field). “This arrangement has apparently proved most satisfactory […] and has as well 
served to acquaint the Yugoslavs with British cultural activities in a manner which 
                                                 
837 Joseph N. Acinapura, “The Cultural Presentations Program of the United States,” 22–23. 
838 Ibid, 24. 
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USIC has not to date been able to match.”839A similar request was again forwarded by 
the director of Jugokoncert, Veljko Bijedić, who sent an informal request to the 
Embassy on March 31, 1952 pleading for assistance to obtain top rank American artists 
for performances because of “enormous public demand.”840 
At this point, it is impossible to sustain that Yugoslav cultural authorities permitted 
U.S. concerts, whether of classical music, jazz or rock, with the intention to show how 
liberal their regime was, as Vučetić suggested841. These interests seem authentic and we 
found them reproduced many times throughout the 1950s. In 1952, the Federal Council 
for Science and Education (Savet za nauku i kulturu FNRJ) contacted Albert L. 
Donnelly, the director of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, at the time sponsoring the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra in Western Europe, to provide a concert in Yugoslavia. 
Donnelly promised to include Yugoslavia in the 1953 Boston Symphony tour in the 
Middle-East, and additionally proposed a closer cooperation of Yugoslavia with ANTA, 
which was enthusiastically accepted.842 Moreover, in 1953 the same Council eagerly 
accepted the proposal of pianist Gary Graffman to visit Yugoslavia during his European 
tour, for which he received the promise to be paid for the travel expenses from Paris.843 
During his appointment as Yugoslav ambassador in the United States (1962-1967), 
Veljko Mićunović strongly advised Janez Vipotnik, president of the Federal 
Commission of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, to invite a higher number of 
U.S. prestigious cultural managers – like Sol Hurock, musical impresario, and Kurt 
Weinhold, president of Columbia Artists Management, – to Yugoslav festivals in 
Dubrovnik, Split, Opatija, Ohrid, Zagreb, and Ljubljana, so they could arrange the 
performances of Yugoslav artists in the United States.844 Indeed, such reciprocity of the 
                                                 
839 Despatch 521 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Jan. 13, 1951, 511.68/1-1351, Box 2472, 
CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. USIC was another, more rare, designation for USIS, abbreviating the 
United States Information Center. 
840 Despatch 936 from Belgrade to the Department of State, April 2, 1952, 511.68/4-252, Box 2472, CDF 
1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
841 Radina Vučetić, “Trubom kroz Gvozdenu zavesu: prodor đeza u socijalističku Jugoslaviju.” 
842 Razgovor sa predstavnikom Bostonskog simfonija, May 9, 1952, 237, Box 7, Poverljive veze sa SAD i 
Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ. There is no archival and newspaper 
evidence that Yugoslavia was included in the 1953 Middle-East tour of the Boston orchestra. 
843 Lujo Goranin, Yugoslav Books NY, to Yugoslav Concert Agency, Belgrade, April 24, 1952, 204, Box 
7, Poverljive veze sa SAD i Kanadom, Savet za nauku i kulturu Vlade FNRJ, RG 317, AJ. 
844 Neke primedbe druga Mićunovića o radu KKV, gostovanju umetnika i ansambala u SAD i programu 
razmene, enclosed in Zabeleške o razgovoru između Budisavljević Bogdanke, v.d. samostalnog savetnika 
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presentational programs sometimes functioned, but never on an equal basis. In 1969, the 
Zagreb Philharmonic played at the Music Festival in Philadelphia during a 45-day tour 
managed by Herbert Barret from the Herbert Barret Management, who arranged the 
1970 tour on the West Coast, then cancelled because of the lack of financial support 
from the Commission for the Advancement of Cultural Activities (Komisija za 
unaprijeđenje kulturnih djelatnosti SRH).845 
But, if the classic and jazz concerts, ballet and theatre groups, were not regarded as 
a potential political risks by the Yugoslav cultural leaders, thus interested in reciprocal 
cooperation, the same could not be said for the Yugoslav broadcasts of the VOA, which 
raised political anxieties and uproar similar to those of the USIS direct activities in the 
field.846 
5.3 The Voice of America Speaks… 
 
To hear news from America makes me feel somehow warm. 
Anonymous respondent of VOA survey in 1952847 
 
The Voice of America is a symbol of freedom that can give people hope, and 
we who enjoy freedom must not let them down. 
USIA Report of 1972848 
 
I believe that the Voice of America – and Radio Liberty and Radio Free 
Europe – made an enormous difference. […] The libraries in Yugoslavia 
helped the cause but very frankly, to the people who went to the library were 
people who already were in the American corner. They were able to 
                                                                                                                                               
u Komisiji i Raymonda Bensona, atašea za informacije Američke ambasade, May 19, 1964, 213/64, Box 
237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
845 Suradnja Zagrebačke filharmonije sa umjetnicima i ansamblima SAD, September 30, 1971, File SAD, 
Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA. Another example of famous 
Yugoslav presentation in the United States was LADO, the National Folk Dance Ensemble of Croatia on 
several tours in the 1970s. 
846  Although not discussed in this chapter, the CPP in Yugoslavia included the Sports Presentation 
Program which sent to Yugoslavia the African American athlete Malvin Whitfield (1954), the Olympic 
hammer-throw champion Harold Connolly (1957), the coach of the Boston Celtics Arnold “Red” 
Auerbach (1959), the Harlem Globetrotters (1963), and in 1966 the NBA Pro Basketball Team, the AAU 
All-Star Swimming Team, and the Vesper Boat Club Rowing Team. In 1968 the U.S. National Basketball 
Team ended its European tour in Yugoslavia. For a lucid scholarly insight on these issues, look into 
Thomas L. Damion, Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics (Urbana; Chicago; 
Springfield: University of Illinois Press, 2012). 
847 Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 
1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP: 70. 
848 Washington Report – The Voice of America, May 5, 1972, enclosed in J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to James N. 
Sites, May 24, 1972, Box 27, USIA Director's Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP. 
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strengthen their beliefs, strengthen their arguments in conversations by what 
they read and what they saw in the libraries. But the Voice of America and the 
other broadcasting organizations – they had a mass appeal. 
Walter Roberts, Public Affairs Officers in Belgrade849 
 
During a two-hour press interview with Duke Ellington, held in Dubrovnik on July 
15, 1970, Nikita Petrak from Radio-TV Zagreb asked the jazz master whether he knew 
Willis Conover. When Ellington responded that he knew him personally, Petrak 
commented: “Willis Conover is fondly considered to be the principal tutor and friend of 
a whole generation of Yugoslav jazz buffs.” In his perfect American English imbued 
with Conover’s deep-toned accent, he kept saying that “thousands of Yugoslav youths 
learned and kept abreast of the best in popular music,” as Conover was their “inspiration 
and teacher of English.”850 Indeed, the Voice and its Music USA program raised an 
entire generation of jazz musicians whose production resulted in one of the most 
vanguard and innovative in whole Europe. 
Together with Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL),851 the Voice of 
America spoke up for the U.S. government during the Cold War years, engaged in the 
battle for hearts and minds. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty broadcasted 
uncensored news and commentaries to people living in the communist nations, utilized 
“World War refugees from the USSR and Eastern Europe to communicate 
anticommunist messages to their homelands,” 852  and were involved in CIA’s 
psychological warfare covert activities against the Soviet Union and its satellites. These 
Munich-based stations drew a large audience despite the Soviet efforts to jam the 
broadcasts and ban citizens from listening to them. The first was founded in 1949 and 
the second in 1951, and both received funds from the CIA until 1972 and were 
                                                 
849 Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: The Impact of U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy - 
‘The Most Effective Way of Influencing...Was the Voice of America,’” accessed February 22, 2016, 
http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-roberts-impact-of-us-cold-war.html. 
850 Airgram 307 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State (CU), July 24, 1970, 
Box 6, Records Relating to Selected USIA Programs 1953-1999, USIA Bureau of Programs, RG 306, 
NACP. 
851 RFE and RL were fused in 1975 and renamed Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 
852 A. Johnson, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond (Washington, DC: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 7. 
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subjected to CIA-State Department’s policy directives (then, as the system evolved, 
broadcast policy was determined by negotiation).853 
As far as RFE and RL relations with VOA are concerned, “I always had the feeling 
that the Voice of America was not happy with them, that they felt that they were 
encroaching on their territory and that they were saying things that might even be at 
cross purposes from what the VOA said,” testifies Walter Roberts, USIA veteran. And 
he continues, “[I would describe] relations between the Voice of America and RFE/RL, 
[…] as cool, and maybe even cold.”854 
Radio Free Europe was never broadcast in Yugoslavia.855 Moreover, contrariwise 
to what happened in the Soviet Union and its satellites, VOA jamming was forbidden in 
Yugoslavia, which made this radio the greatest mass communication channel of the U.S. 
foreign policy worldviews and cultural mediations. Commonly, Yugoslavs avoided 
committing themselves publicly and admitting VOA listening, but did it in private 
conversations; as an unnamed Party Secretary from Montenegro confessed to USIS 
PAO Joseph Kolarek in 1959, “of course [he] listened to the Voice of America.”856 
Radio Industry Nikola Tesla produced the first radio set in Yugoslavia in 1947. In 
1955, one radio set cost the equivalent of 1,000 cinema tickets and a radio gramophone 
1,300 tickets. They were luxury items. Some of the radio sets were imported, since from 
                                                 
853 For an overview of the RFE and RL role in the Crusade for Freedom with the support of private allies 
as the American Heritage Foundation, see Richard H. Cummings, Radio Free Europe’s “Crusade for 
Freedom”: Rallying Americans Behind Cold War Broadcasting, 1950-1960 (North Carolina: McFarland, 
2010), 5–28. For an overview of the perils the RFE and RL staff faced, the infiltrations of KGB agents, 
look into Richard H. Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous History of American Broadcasting in 
Europe, 1950-1989 (North Carolina: McFarland, 2009). Bright insights from both radio veterans and 
scholars are collected in A. Ross Johnson and R. Eugene Prata, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe : A Collection of Studies and Documents (Central European University 
Press, 2010), while an insider perspective can be found in George R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the 
Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
854  Taplin, Mark. “Walter Roberts: Relations With State, CIA - ‘Most of the People in the 
Department...Were Happy to Get Rid of the Information Program.’” Global Publicks, February 1, 2015. 
http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/ 2015/02/walter-roberts-relations-with-state-cia.html. 
855  After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and USSR, RFE/RL gradually dropped its 
broadcasts in these areas (beginning in 1993 in Hungary, and ending in Romania in 2008). Nonetheless, 
with the eruption of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, RFE/RL began broadcasting in Serbian, Croatian and 
Bosnian to the Yugoslav successor states in early 1994, in Albanian to Kosovo in 1999 and in 
Macedonian and Albanian to Macedonia in 2001 (RFE/RL History - Archives, “Then And Now: Free 
Media In Unfree Societies,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, accessed January 31, 2016, 
http://www.rferl.org/info/history/133.html). 
856 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 
1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 19. 
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1951 to 1959 Yugoslav electrical industries produced 1,075,105 radios on 1.3 million 
registered sets. An often-encountered obstruction for a major spread of the Yugoslav 
radio network was the poor electricity network, the bad technical quality of national 
sets, and the lack of highly skilled workers and spare parts.857 High radio taxes (the so-
called radio license or registration) increased the list of obstacles that handicapped VOA 
listening.858 
From the end of World War II, the number of receivers increased dramatically: in 
1951, there were 310,148 registered radios in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.859 Relying 
on the USIA Office Research data, in March 1957 Yugoslavia had 711,000 licensed 
radio sets to a population of 17,799,000 (or some 4 percent).860 According to Komunist 
(October 6, 1960) in 1959 this figure reached 1.3 million radio licenses, which 
corresponded to one radio set every third family.861 A BBC-VOA joint survey of 1966 
(assigned to Fedor Rocco of the Institute of Market Research, Zavod za tržišna 
istraživanja Jugoslavije, in Zagreb) revealed that in 1966 87 percent of Yugoslavs had at 
least one radio or transistor, whilst in larger cities that number increased to 91 percent. 
Nonetheless, differences among republics persisted and Serbia with 89 percent, Croatia 
91, and Slovenia 96, were above the national average. The other less developed 
                                                 
857 Janjetović, Od “Internacionale” do komercijale, 74–77. 
858 The rise of radio tax fees of November 1, 1951, applying only to sets capable of picking up foreign 
broadcasts, entailed up to $60. Because of high electricity expenses and power limitation (in Vojvodina 
and Dalmatia), listeners reported to have abandoned VOA listening or to have passed to battery set radios. 
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Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP); The Yugoslav Transistor Contest Draw Large Response, March 
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860 Worldwide Distribution of Radio Receivers Sets, Dec. 31, 1957, P-105-57, Box 4, Research Reports 
1956-1959, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
861 This opinion poll was jointly conducted by the Yugoslav Council of Culture and Education, the 
Central Council of Yugoslav Trade Unions (Centralno Veće sindikata Jugoslavije), and Belgrade RTV 
(Radio Listening – a Popular Pastime in Yugoslavia, Nov. 9, 1960, RN-43-60, Box 4, Research Notes 
1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP). 
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republics remained on lower percentages: Bosnia and Herzegovina on 79, Vojvodina on 
83, and Macedonia on 84 percent.862 
Along with cinema-going, radio listening was the most favored pastime in 
Yugoslavia, revealed a 1960 Yugoslav opinion poll. Light music, such as romantic 
Italian and French songs, South American folk and mostly jazz were more popular than 
serious and classical music. In addition, radio seemed more popular within rural 
populations, since “in towns, where a great variety of entertainment media is available, 
radio listening is probably second or even third on the list.”863 
The first broadcast of the Voice of America was transmitted in the middle of World 
War II, in February 1942, followed in July by President F.D. Roosevelt’s executive 
order that provided $5.4 million for the construction of transmitters. “While the desire 
to advance the Allied cause united all propagandists,864 ideological disputes emerged 
between New Deal liberals and their opponents,” argues Walter Hixon.865 Indeed, critics 
of it being a propaganda forum for the liberal domestic agenda and the President’s 
personal ambitions, continued to allege the VOA transmissions in the decades to follow. 
Another VOA permanent weak point concerned its employee’s competence. “Forced to 
compete with a thriving domestic radio industry, VOA employed writers, technicians, 
and broadcasters who were often inferior to those working at a higher salary for 
commercial stations.”866 After the first hard-hitting anti-communist trends in broadcasts, 
followed by Senator McCarthy’s investigations in February 1953 (whose hearings 
produced no evidence of communist subversion of the VOA), the official policy altered. 
Aware of its precious role in the Cold War, the Jackson Committee recommended that 
the network should place its emphasis on “objective, factual news” and political 
“commentary explanations,” and reinforce its popularity with “satire and humor […] 
                                                 
862 VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967, E-7-67, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe 
and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
863 Radio Listening – a Popular Pastime in Yugoslavia, Nov. 9, 1960, RN-43-60, Box 4, Research Notes 
1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
864 In the original context not used with pejorative connotation, propaganda and propagandists indicated 
those who, involved in spreading ‘information’ in the psychological warfare arena, served the country for 
the right cause. 
865 Hixon, Parting the Curtain, 29–30. 
866 Ibid, 31. 
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music and entertainment”867 by which the VOA succeeded in becoming an effective 
source of cultural infiltration. 
Operationally, the International Broadcasting Division (IBS) was responsible for 
the over-all plans and operations of the VOA radio program. In 1950, some 32 percent 
of all radio outputs were dedicated to the news, 57 percent to news analysis, 
commentaries, features, documentaries, forums and discussion; while the music 
programs featuring orchestras, performers, and artists retained 11 percent of all the 
programs. Additionally, the IBS provided thousands of radio transcripts sent abroad to 
USIS officers, meant to be used for the national radio stations.868 In 1950, the Voice 
operated “on a 24-hours schedule with a total of 70 daily programs in 25 languages” and 
had a “potential listening audience of 295 million people.”869 A 1972 report underlined 
how the Voice broadcasted 780 hours per week in 35 languages, whilst by way of 
contrast, the Soviet Union broadcasted more than 1,900 hours per week in 84 languages, 
and communist China and the United Arab Republic both transmitted more than 1,300 
hours in 38 languages.870 
VOA’s estimated audience in 1966, based on sample surveys and transistor radio 
contests, suggested that there were some 42 million adults weekly following the Voice, 
roughly distributed in communist Europe (17 million), in Latin America (7 million), in 
the Far East (6 million), in Near East and South Asia (5.5 million), and in Africa (2.2 
million). Such an audience distribution proves its anti-communist Cold War assignment. 
Another advantage of the VOA was its audience feature: most of its listeners were 
predominantly males, aged 20 to 35 years, employed in higher tenures, while 25 to 35 
percent were represented by students.871 
Formally, the VOA broadcasts were 
                                                 
867 Report to the President by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, June 30, 
1953,FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 368, 1847; Memorandum for the National Security Council 
by the Executive Secretary (Lay), Oct. 1, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. II, part 2, doc. 372, 1890. 
868 Department of State Publication 3927, Aug. 1950, File 511.00/9-2250, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, 
RG 59, NACP. 
869 Jack K. McFall to Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Aug. 22, 1950, 511.00/8-950, Box 2238, CDF 1950-
1954, RG 59, NACP. 
870 Washington Report – The Voice of America, May 5, 1972, enclosed in J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to James N. 
Sites, May 24, 1972, Box 27, USIA Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP. 
871 Voice of America Audience Estimate, Dec. 1966, E-1-66, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-
1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP. 
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dedicated to presenting a fair picture of life in the United States and the Western world. They 
provide the listeners with a better basis for judging and interpreting the national and 
international events going on around them. Thus, the Voice of America might be described as 
being an expression of our belief that the United States has the right and the duty to speak out to 
the world, and to speak the truth as we see it so that all may hear. Unlike the Voice of America, 
these broadcasts [from communist China, Soviet Union and UAR] are loaded with distortions 
and propaganda. It would be a crime of omission to let them go unanswered. One of the oldest 
lessons of history is that a government which rules by repression or terror may rule the land, but 
it does not rule the minds of the people.872 
By the end of March 1943, the Voice started its transmissions on Yugoslav territory 
and became a precious source of information for Nazi-fascist occupied territories, along 
with the BBC.873 In the years to come, and much less secretly, Yugoslavs continued 
listening to the VOA in their homes or at the homes of friends and relatives, but not at 
work, school or in public places (such behavior, as we shall observe, was politically 
undesirable). 
5.3.1 Listening in the 1950s 
Similar to the RFE and the RL in their destination countries, the Voice gained 
enormous popularity among Yugoslavs of all strata and ages, an impact which the USIA 
Research Offices accurately surveyed and analyzed since the early 1950s.874 How many 
listeners were there? Who were they and why did they listen? How did they listen and 
what did the broadcasts mean to them? Did they make a difference? 
In the early 1950s, the evaluation of listeners’ reactions was retrieved both through 
regular panels in Belgrade or through reader surveys distributed with the SAD 
periodical.875 At the end of the decade, relations between USIS Belgrade and the VOA 
became close, with the post usually sending weekly guidance telegrams to the 
IBS/Yugoslav desk, to inform them about the subjects of greatest interest in the 
                                                 
872 Washington Report – The Voice of America, May 5, 1972, enclosed J. Glenn Beall, Jr. to James N. 
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Yugoslav press, and a monthly monitoring report from Belgrade. In this way, the Voice 
became more responsive, gave valuable publicity to the cultural presentation program 
and to the U.S. participation at the Yugoslav fairs, advertised Pregled issues, and so 
forth.876 
Until the middle 1960s, Yugoslav high-ranking communists opposed to the opinion 
polls stating that, since “the Party was close to the masses,” it inevitably knew what 
people’s opinion was. In 1966 these trends changed along with general liberalization in 
society that flared after the approval of the pro-market Economic Reform (July 24, 
1965) and, especially, after the Forth Plenum of the CK SKJ when Aleksandar 
Ranković was expelled and the secret services reorganized (of the post-Ranković 
period, Savka Dabčević-Kučar wrote in her memoires, “As if one could breathe more 
freely”). 877  Indeed, in 1966, for the first time, the Yugoslav Institute for Market 
Research and Councils of Education and Culture got involved in audience surveys 
commissioned by the U.S. agencies.878 
USIS Belgrade conducted the first-known USIA/VOA survey in Yugoslavia in 
February 1952 by sending mail questionnaires to some thousands of VOA listeners. The 
names and addresses of the potential respondents were taken from lists of VOA 
program schedules recipients, at the time printed in five major Yugoslav languages. All 
six republics were represented, with emphasis on representatives from small towns and 
villages. Five-hundred samples were accompanied by prepaid postage envelopes of 
which 496 were returned.879The questionnaires were sent to individual listeners, but the 
respondents collected answers from friends or their fellow citizens. 
The final 60-page long report, authored by the Bureau of Applied Social Research 
of the Columbia University, New York, showed that 57 percent of all the listeners came 
from urban areas, while, on the gender divide, it included predominantly males from the 
middle urban class (mainly bank managers, government officials, students, writers, 
                                                 
876 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 
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teachers, engineers, and judges). Finally, the VOA listeners in Yugoslavia proved to 
include a high proportion of young people: 29 percent was under 20, 18 percent 
comprehended those between 20 and 30 years old, whilst the over 30s represented only 
10 percent of the sample. Moreover, every interviewed person under 20 was a student, 
which suggested that there was “some association between being in school and listening 
to the VOA.” Such a young age of the listeners, proves Voice’s crucial impact in 
shaping Yugoslav political opinions towards pro-Western preferences. 
The most astonishing data related to the frequency of listening: 66 percent of all 
listeners reported listening every day, while business, white collars and government 
officials listened more than any other category. Women claimed to listen more than 
men, which was related to their being at home more afternoons. The VOA schedule for 
Yugoslavia in the early 1950s comprehended News, Sports, Language Lessons, 
Science, Life in the USA, Press Reviews, Commentaries, Agricultural News, Sport, 
Classical Music, Popular Music and Youth Programs. Apart from their interests in 
popular music and youth programs, young Yugoslav were ardent listeners of News, 
Sports, Language Lessons, and Science. 880 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
programs were expanded and came to offer, for the Serbo-Croatian desk, around 13 
different shows emitted from 8.30 to 10.00 pm (compared to a 1966 survey, VOA 
evening broadcasts were moved to later, as evidence of the change in working and 
living habits of the Yugoslav population). They included: News, Commentaries, 
Reports, Sport, People, Culture, Panorama, Events, America, the Press, Youth, Science, 
Economy, the Sunday Review, Religion, and Women’s World. The Slovenian 
broadcasts were emitted from 5.00 to 7.00 am every day and offered News, 
Commentaries and Life in the United States and, on Sunday, Religious Music.881 
The main revelation of the 1952 VOA survey were the political commentaries the 
listeners freely left on the questionnaires. The final report listed six anti-Tito and anti-
communist commentaries and 20-odd favorable political references to the United States, 
in addition to anti-Soviet remarks. These commentaries certainly evince the level of 
                                                 
880 Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 
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political coercion in vogue. They represent a vent of tragic personal accounts, as well as 
a sign of protest and courage since the respondents were probably aware of postal 
control from communist authorities. “I listen to VOA programs every day; I don’t listen 
to enemies,” was a commentary; whilst a farmer underlined “I do not work anywhere 
now. I am not a Communist so they will not let me work in my job as a grain merchant. 
Long live mother America who is delivering and freeing the whole world from 
communist Russia. Long live Truman and American democracy.” A former high school 
teacher narrated, “Since May 1945 I was a professor of the First High School in 
Belgrade. I was dismissed for being an ‘Anglophile’ – at that time it was a big sin. For 
six years I have lived here in my village with my father and have a rather hard primitive 
life.” Another letter accused Tito and Moša Pijade of being “liars, swindlers… a robber 
band” accusing them of tortures by UDBA.882 
Commentaries of young listeners had a more entertaining reasoning, “VOA is my 
great recreation for through its emissions I get to know the whole world and the life of 
different people,” while a mother stated “I wish to listen to medical advice because we 
have ten children, we are poor and this advice would be very useful to us.” 
Conclusively, the survey draws attention to the fact that Yugoslav listeners wanted more 
news on Yugoslavia and its culture, as well as to hear the U.S. opinion on it, in a way 
which would close the “circuit of communication between themselves and ‘The 
Voice.’”883 
5.3.2 Listening in the 1960s Between Political Disapproval and 
American Jazz 
Surveys conducted in the 1960s present analogous audience attitudes, thus more 
complex in their outcomes. A report based on an interview of 146 Yugoslav refugees 
collected in West Germany between May 1960 and January 1961, demonstrates the 
diverse listening habits of Western broadcasts: 70 percent of the interviewers declared 
that they listen to foreign Western radio stations and 69 percent declared to be regular 
VOA listeners. Sergije Visich of the Yugoslav desk stated that 64 percent of the 
listeners in Serbo-Croatian and in Slovenian tuned in to the Voice (the corresponding 
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figure for Czechoslovakia was 59 percent and 62 for Poland). Conrad Mejac, VOA staff 
from the same desk, reported having interviewed 100 Slovenians in 1960, of whom 71 
listened to the Voice regularly. The comparative figure for the BBC was 14 percent of 
weekly listeners. What mostly surprised the USIA Office was the definition by 
Yugoslav interviewers of VOA’s approach to Communism, defined by 33 percent of 
them to be “too soft.” The corresponding figure for Poland and Czechoslovakia was 27 
and 16, from which the report, quite rightly, concluded that the “greater impatience 
towards moderation in Yugoslavia and Poland […] may also reflect the greater measure 
of freedom Yugoslavs and Poles have become accustomed to.”884 
Nevertheless, it was the Transistor Contest that best framed the Yugoslav listening 
habits and audience composition. The contest consisted in announcing that everyone 
could win a transistor radio by sending to VOA a card or letter giving their name, 
address, and certain personal information such as age, sex, occupation, in order to 
deliberately obtain an indication of the geographical distribution and composition of the 
audience. The Transistor Contest in September 1961 yielded 18,767 entries, an 
“unexpectedly heavy response” that “exceeded the total of any previous transistor 
contests.”885 Of the total entries, three quarters came from Croatia (which represents 
only 25 percent of the Yugoslav population, while only 15 percent came from Serbia 
that represents 41 percent of the population). This discrepancy might be due to two 
main reasons: greater availability of radio sets and electricity power network in Croatia 
and traditional Croatian pro-Western attitudes and cultural linkages. Compared to the 
1952 USIA survey, this time the sample comprised a higher percentage of females (46) 
and a higher percentage of workers, which in fact testifies to the increase in women’s 
participation in society and superior purchasing power for the working class.886 That the 
participation to the contest was surrounded by political intimidations, is suggested by 
the fact that on November 15 1962, Radio Belgrade described contest participants as 
                                                 
884 Yugoslav Reactions to Western Broadcasting, July 5, 1961, RN-15-61, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-
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“impulsive,” “ignorant” and “traders in their pride,” with particular harsh words for 
“those who – at least because of their formal qualifications – should in practice be 
strongly opposed.” This last was a thinly disguised allusion to party members and 
government officials, as we shall witness later on. The broadcast ended with a veiled 
threat against “the individuals concerned” and resulted in withdrawal of entries from 
VOA headquarters requested “directly or through American relatives.”887 
The VOA’s major strength in acting as a cultural soft power persuader reposed on a 
very high adult weekly audience (2.2 million listeners on 2.8 million radio sets in 
1966) 888  and its appeal to an urban population which represented the base for all 
Yugoslav pro-reform movements. According to another 1966 audience poll by the 
Zagreb’s Institute of Market Research, 22 percent of Yugoslav urban population 
listened to VOA, half of them on a regular basis. Moreover, VOA urban audiences 
corresponded to USIA target groups in Yugoslavia. The survey gave additional 
information on Yugoslav VOA broadcasts: the broadcasts in Serbo-Croatian lasted one 
hour each evening and in Slovenian one half hour each morning for a total of 10.5 hours 
weekly.889 As a politically important revenue, the survey emphasized how the Yugoslav 
“listeners turned to stations such as the VOA mainly to supplement and check on the 
news supplied by their own media, whose credibility they often suspected.” Crucially, 
they made a relevant point about Slovenian broadcasts that, while being more costly 
than the Serbo-Croatian ones, were successful above the average. Slovenians constituted 
8.5 percent of the entire Yugoslav population, but they made up 5 percent of the VOA 
audience, which was essential since “the leadership of Slovenia, in the current economic 
and political direction of the nation, is important to U.S. interest.”890 
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The USIA surveys on the Yugoslav Voice marked the undeniable contribution that 
Music USA had in popularizing American jazz in Yugoslavia. This legendary world-
known show, half dance and half jazz, conducted by Willis Conover, producer and 
broadcaster, started on January 6, 1955, and lasted for 40 years. With his recognizable 
deep-toned voice, Conover was a jazz promoter and a jazz star for audiences in Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union and worldwide. When George Wein traveled the states of the 
Warsaw Pact, as the producer of the Newport Jazz Festival, he reported that he was 
astonished that “Eastern Europe’s entire concept of jazz comes from Willis Conover,” 
while visitors traveling to Poland in the 1960s remained surprised that “Conover’s 
likeness was displayed as often and with as much affection as pictures of John F. 
Kennedy.”891 
In 1966, the USIA initiated a worldwide survey on the VOA by questionnaires 
distributed through local USIS posts, except for Yugoslavia where they were sent 
directly from Washington, probably for reasons of security. While the percentage of 
returns in the Yugoslav case remained very low, this worldwide poll indicated that 
Yugoslav respondents were the youngest among all the others (with an average age of 
25). The Yugoslav students’ response proved particularly high and constituted 60 
percent of all respondents. The outcomes showed that the largest proportion of 
respondents in all areas listened to Music USA 4 to 6 times a week and were generally 
interested in the whole program. However, the jazz portion remained the first preference 
in Yugoslavia and Europe. In the Yugoslav case, Music USA proved a universal hit: 
young audiences, mostly students, dedicated many (above average) listening hours to 
jazz music. Indeed, 13 percent of them followed Music USA 7days per week, 52 
percent from 4 to 6 days per week, 33 percent from 1 to 2 days a week, but for a total of 
one or one and a half hours.892 In other words, the Yugoslav youth deliberately chose to 
be subjected to U.S. more than to Yugoslav propaganda, and did it for entertainment 
purposes, thus enjoying music and feeling unconventional. However, was this behavior 
politically detrimental in the long run for a dictatorial communist regime?  
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5.3.3 Communist Political Anxieties 
In 1950, the Central Committee’s Commission for Foreign Relations (Komisija za 
međunarodne odnose i veze) recognized that anti-Yugoslav tones were disappearing 
from VOA’s broadcasts, while continuously reporting on “anti-clerical abuse of priests 
in Czechoslovakia, abuse of youth and scientists in the USSR,” and so forth. The 
Commission admitted that there was no anti-Yugoslav propaganda, except for some 
articles as the one containing AFL’s condemnation of “Tito’s despotic regime which 
destroyed the rights of democratic forces and workers.”893 
The Yugoslav authority’s inquiries of 1966 revealed that socialist countries 
broadcast more on standard issues of life: lower prices, higher purchasing power, 
workers social rights and welfare state, whilst the “capitalist radio stations” prioritized 
“themes of social superstructure,” namely the advantage of the multi-party system and 
political liberties such as freedom of thought and speech.894 
Both the Voice and other foreign radio stations, mainly the BBC and the RAI, but 
also Radio Moscow, used contests to gain audience information on program 
preferences, broadcast ratings and effectiveness feedback. While they were not jammed, 
as in the Soviet Union, UDBA despised and scrutinized the mails that listeners sent in 
response to contests. Foreign broadcasts were considered dangerous but were not 
officially prohibited.895 
When in 1961, the Municipal Committee of Belgrade wrote to the SKJ to underline 
that foreign radio stations were spreading enemy propaganda and had to be immediately 
eradicated, they were referring to necessary counterpropaganda actions.896 What mostly 
preoccupied Yugoslav communist leaders at the local level was the participation of the 
SKJ members in the VOA Transistor Contests which, indeed, was punished by 
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expulsion or verbal admonishment.897 In 1961 200 citizens of the Krnjača municipality 
(today part of Belgrade city) applied to the VOA contest, among them four 
“communists,”898 three blue collar workers and one policeman. Called by the report 
“holders [and] participants of foreign propaganda,” the four SKJ members where 
excommunicated and expelled from the Party.899 The Party’s Ideological Committee 
from Belgrade’s city region put it in this way,  
Towards the SKJ members who participated [in the contests] strict measures have been 
taken, they were criticized, some of them were punished, and a smaller number were 
excommunicated. These measures are totally justified, because communists must bear 
in mind that these countries [...] will access materials which they will extensively use in 
their political and propaganda activities.900 
 
The VOA represented “highly problematic and dangerous propaganda,”901 but in 
internal discussions its impact was sometimes underestimated maybe even intentionally, 
since “only old pre-war politicians and few former royal traders listen today to the Voice 
of America.” 902  While listening to the VOA was not prohibited, it was politically 
undesirable and dangerous (the same went for the BBC, Radio Paris, and the RAI). The 
fact that SKJ members were punished or expelled from the Party lines because of 
participating in the contests, usually meant to lose one’s job, social privileges such as 
the state-provided flats or apartments (which were given to the majority of employees, 
regardless of Party membership, by a “waiting list” criteria), leisure time benefits, 
subsidized vacations, possibility of employment for family members, and so forth. The 
VOA example proves, once again, how Yugoslav authorities practiced invisible 
boundaries of coercion that had repercussions when they were trespassed. 
A refugees’ opinion survey of 1962 enhances these views, since, for these 
Yugoslav emigrants to listen to the Voice and to other Western broadcasts, signified 
                                                 
897 Informacija o preduzetim merama u vezi neprijateljske propagande na teritoriju opštine Zvezdara, Jan. 
15, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS 
Beograd, IAB. 
898 “Communist” means members of the SKJ. 
899 Informacija OK Krnjača, June, 1961, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-
1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
900 Informacija o delatnosti strane propagande, May 3, 1962, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane 
propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
901 Opštinski komitet SKS Zemun Gradskom komitetu SKS, Jan. 22, 1962, 01-115/i, Box 512, Materijali 
o delovanju inostrane propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
902  Opštinski komitet SKS Sopot, Feb. 12, 1962, 232, Box 512, Materijali o delovanju inostrane 
propagande 1958-1968, Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB. 
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breaking implicit rules, having access to unofficial news, and expressing informal 
dissent and nonconformity. These emigrants, of predominately Croatian and Slovenian 
nationalities, from urban areas and middle-high and highly educated, preferred to rely 
mostly on the VOA (46 percent), Radio Vatican (14 percent), Radio Paris (13 percent), 
the BBC and the RAI (11 percent).903 
Memories of former VOA listeners collected by Vučetić on several personal 
Serbian and Croatian blogs and newspapers, confirm that listening to the Voice was 
regarded with concern, and as a secret and conspiratorial activity.904 The same pattern of 
behavior is observed in the relations of communist authorities towards USIS posts in 
Belgrade and Zagreb where boundaries of freedom and margins of coercion fluctuated. 
As a result there were no established criteria for what was totally forbidden, tolerated or 
implicitly not recommended. The shades of grey of politically undesirable behavior 
were discussed among Party fractions in the negotiated spaces of the political arena 
where decisions were made. The Praxis question is just one example. 
The analysis of U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia helps to highlight and uncover 
these unstable boundaries that created a discrepancy between the low perception of 
Tito’s dictatorship and the mechanism of political violence and coercion actually 
executed. Certainly, the political anxieties that surrounded the listening to foreign 
broadcasts, and the Voice in particular, frames the complexity of Yugoslav leader’s 
polyarchy, its internal fractures and differentiation of policy priorities (a differentiation 
that almost naturally originates from such a huge bureaucratic state apparatus as was the 
Federation). 
                                                 
903 Radio Listening: Attitudes of Refugees, July-Aug. 1962, Box 121, Country Projects Files 1951-1964, 
USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
904 Popular Croatian talk show conductor, remembers “that my grandpa and father secretly listened to the 
Voice of America and the political news of the famous reporter Grga Zlatoper.” “Many times I could not 
hear the Italian songs till the end because father asked for the Voice of America. He always wanted that 
station, for me boring news. He would find the Voice and you’d hear: ‘Here is Washington, Voice of 
America, Grga Zlatoper speaks [Ovde Washington, Glas Amerike, govori Grga Zlatoper!]” recalled 
Milorad Bibić, journalist of Slobodna Dalmacija. (Orhidea Gaura, “Vojo Šiljak: Prva zvijezda talk-showa 
u Hrvatskoj,” Nacional, September 22, 2009, http://arhiva.nacional.hr/clanak/ print/67442; Vučetić, 
“Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi,” 158–160. 
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5.3.4 And the RAI, BBC, and Radio Moscow? 
Different comparative studies in the early 1950s emphasized Yugoslav preference 
for VOA over the BBC, the RAI (Rome), Radio Paris and Radio Moscow.905One of 
these comparison studies, conducted in 1953 by the Institute of Communication 
Research (University of Illinois) revealed that the “VOA is neither so carefully neutral 
as BBC nor so blatantly propagandistic as Radio Moscow. While its news is more 
general than Moscow, VOA is careful to include news that will interpret U.S. policy, 
which is apparently its main function.” And continued,  
Moscow world is a black and a white one. It seldom says anything good about the U.S. or 
bad about the USSR. VOA, on the other hand, seldom says anything bad about the U.S. or good 
about the USSR, with the possible exception of an occasional wistful hope that the Soviet 
Union’s leadership is not all bad. […] But BBC’s world is grey. [Moscow’s political strategy] is 
to divide the U.S. from its chief allies. To this end, Moscow devotes special treatment to France 
and Britain. It sympathizes with French predicaments in Indochina, opposes EDC and deplores 
American pressures on France. VOA strategy revolves around mutual security as the hope of the 
world. It portrays the U.S. as peaceful, defensively strong, and desirous of protecting human 
rights. [However, it] does not employ the detail and bright colors that Moscow uses in 
describing the chief cold war protagonists. 
The stations differed in their basic approaches; the VOA and the BBC news “tend 
to be direct and simple, […] VOA scripts appear to be on about the level of American 
commercial radio news; Radio Moscow is slightly more difficult level and the BBC […] 
apparently thinks its audience is a highly-educated leader group.”906 
In 1961, a survey by Radio Zagreb’s Audience Department also confirmed the 
VOA’s larger audience as compared to the BBC (the figures presented 33 percent for 
VOA and 9 for the BBC).907 Among 14 foreign broadcasts – the VOA, the BBC, the 
RAI, ORTF (Paris), Deutsche Welle (Cologne), Deutschland funk (Cologne), Radio 
Moscow, Vatican, Madrid, Ankara, Bucharest, Sofia, Tirana and Peking, – revealed a 
1966 survey, the VOA was by far the most widely listened to foreign station, “it 
attracted about three times as many listeners as its nearest competitor Radio Moscow, 
although Moscow beams twice the number of weekly hours – 21 compared to 10.5 
                                                 
905 Voice of America Listening in Yugoslavia, October 1952, YO5201, Box 121, Country Projects Files 
1951-1964, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
906 IRI Intelligence Memorandum, Oct. 25, 1954, IM-1-54, Box 1, Intelligence Bulletins, Memorandums 
and Summaries 1954-1956, USIA Office of Research and Intelligence, RG 306, NACP. 
907 Yugoslav Reactions to Western Broadcasting, July 5, 1961, RN-15-61, Box 4, Research Notes 1958-
1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
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[VOA] hours to Yugoslavia.” Moreover, the BBC broadcast 11 hours per week to 
Yugoslavia but captured only about one-seventh the VOA audience.908 
As for the BBC, the majority of VOA listeners were aged 18 to 24, while, 
proportionally, Radio Moscow was followed by the age group 35 to 54. The surveys 
uncovered the usual daily rhythm of Yugoslav people: they preferred morning radio 
listening between 6 and 6.30, tuned in again for lunch between 12 and 12.30, and finally 
returned after work around 3 pm with the listening peek around 7 to 8 pm. Quite 
predictably, the appearance of the TV from the middle 1960s decreased radio listening, 
but without diminishing its appeal for a large number of listeners.909 
The Voice transmitted by short and medium wave from Thessaloniki, while the 
other foreign broadcasts, the BBC included, ran on short wave. Since most Yugoslavs 
tuned in on medium wave, this partly explains VOA’s dominant overall position among 
the foreign broadcasters.910 
While there is much scholarly literature on the RFE/RL,911 scholarly investigations 
on the VOA impact need to be expanded.912 The micro perspective on the Yugoslav 
Voice of America shows the much needed recognition of this public diplomacy channel 
that, not only transmitted hot political messages, but throughout its audience surveys, 
transistor contests, and mail responses to listeners,913 effectively acted as, what Nicholas 
                                                 
908 VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967, E-7-67, Box 1, Estimates and Evaluations 1966-
1978, USIA Office of Research and Evaluation, RG 306, NACP: 1; Survey of Listening in Yugoslavia, 
Dec. 1966, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and 
Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
909 Survey of Listening in Yugoslavia, Dec. 1966, YO6601, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-
Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. 
910 VOA Listening in Urban Yugoslavia, Nov. 1967. 
911 Apart from the studies already quoted, other important scholars have explored the covert dimensions, 
clandestine offshoots and fifth column’s role of RFE/RL, their reliance on the CIA-CCF network, and 
their advocacy for liberal democracy and free market economy; for this see A. Johnson, Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty: The CIA Years and Beyond (Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, 
2010); Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New 
York, NY: Praeger, 1983); Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio 
Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington, Ky.; London: University Press of Kentucky, 2003); Nicholas 
J. Schlosser, Cold War on the Airwaves: The Radio Propaganda War against East Germany (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2015).  
912  Alan L. Heil Jr., Voice of America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) provides a 
respectable perspective from one of its longest serving employees. An insightful focus on VOA’s 
domestic propaganda problems is to be found in David F. Krugler, The Voice of America and the 
Domestic Propaganda Battles, 1945-1953 (University of Missouri Press, 2000). 
913 The Development of a System for Answering and Analyzing Voice of America Audience Mail, Aug. 
17, 1966, S-8-66, Box 22, Special Reports 1953-1997, USIA Office of Research, RG 306, NACP. 
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Cull defined, the “listening” function of the USIA, thus collecting public opinion data 
and reactions from abroad.914 The Yugoslav political anxieties and cautions regarding 
VOA popularity and reception by the Yugoslav mass public, point to the visible and 
invisible coercion boundaries which characterized the Yugoslav socialist experiment, 
whilst the listening attitudes show a rather successful public diplomacy story, maybe 
less because of the VOA’s extraordinary talents, and more because of a Yugoslav urban, 
young, and basically communist-disaffected population. VOA broadcasts were effective 
in propagating American classical and jazz music, artists, and trends, “breaking-news” 
and educational lectures, but also U.S. foreign policy views, ideas, ideologies, the 
possible external impact of which will be discussed in the last part of this study. 
                                                 
914 Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, xiii–xix. 
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6 THE U.S. CULTURAL 
EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN 
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE 
NEW/OLD LEADERSHIP 
There are few countries in the world with which the U.S. has such close 
cultural relations or where scholars, political and economic leaders through 
the exchange program have been exposed to the United States. Yugoslavia has 
shown great courage and determination in meeting its difficulties and applied 
imagination and adaptability to its problems. United States backing such as 
the exchange program provides is essential to encouraging Yugoslavia to 
move ahead toward the creation of a «compromise between Western 
democratic traditions and proletarian dictatorships which lies at the root of 
Yugoslav Post-War developments. 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Report, April 1967915 
 
Intellectual and cultural cooperation depends, essentially, on the 
establishment and development of ties between American and Yugoslav 
universities, academies and other institutions; if such are to be effective in 
advancing mutual understanding and in benefiting both nations, they must rest 
on the strength and vigor of those institutions in interpreting and helping to 
meet the needs of their own societies. The long-range program, however, 
should be seen primarily as an investment in people. 
Report of the Binational Advisory Commission, December 2, 1966916 
                                                 
915 CU program planning and budgeting system – FY69 Program Recommendations for Yugoslavia and 
Turkey, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special 
Collection, UAL. 
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From 1956 to 1965, Yugoslavia established cultural exchange programs with many 
Eastern and Western European countries such as USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, Rumania, and the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, and Norway. Among these nations, there were also Middle East and African 
countries such as Syria, Lebanon and Kenya.917 The arrangements passed through the 
Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Savezna komisija 
za kulturne veze s inozemstvom), while the Republican sub-commissions (Komisije za 
kulturne veze s inozemstvom) were responsible for the programs for the Republican, 
local, needs. The Federal Commission coordinated the initiatives, published the 
competitions,918 promoted ad hoc commissions for candidates’ screening (or delegated 
it to the republican commissions), and collected local and republican requests with the 
cooperation of the secretariats of culture. Usually, the candidates eligible for the 
exchanges were post-doc students, assistants, lecturers, and researchers with reliable 
“political and moral” qualities. As a notable point, the Commission always promoted 
collective calls for all these countries. Nevertheless, these collective calls, as the one of 
1963 that comprehended 22 countries,919 did not include the United States.920 
The Yugoslav government treated the cultural exchange and cooperation with the 
United States on a privileged and separated platform. Even if Yugoslavia did not have a 
special and unidirectional convention with the United States as with other countries (but 
plenty of official and unofficial programs), this cultural exchange program had the 
                                                                                                                                               
916 Report of the Binational Advisory Commission for Long Term Planning of Educational, Scientific-
Technical, and Cultural Cooperation between the SFRY and the USA, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL: 1, 10. The underlined text 
is original. 
917 See entire Box 64, Razmjena naučnih radnika, Savjet za kulturu i nauku NRH 1956-1961, RG 1599, 
HDA. 
918 The competitions were published in the Yugoslav main newspapers: Borba and Politika for Serbia, 
Vjesnik for Croatia, Delo for Slovenia, Nova Makedonija for Macedonia, and Oslobodjenje for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
919 Among them Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, DDR, France, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, USSR, Switzerland, Sweden and among the Middle East 
and Asian countries,  India, Iraq, Sudan, Tunis, and UAR (Poziv na sastanak, Jan. 15, 1964, 3845/1-1963, 
Box 22, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 1414, HDA). 
920 Ibid. See also: Box 22-23, Vize za inozemstvo, Republički sekretarijat za kulturu SRH 1963-1965, RG 
1414, HDA; Box 227, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, 
HDA. 
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largest extension and a high political priority. 921  In 1967, the first country 
accommodating a major number of Yugoslav students was East Germany with 222 of 
them, followed by the United States with 194 of them.922 The U.S. budgetary allocations 
for educational and cultural exchange in Yugoslavia indicate a galloping increase of the 
U.S. cultural “investments” in Yugoslavia in the period 1949-1975: from $10,260,595 
in 1949, to 29,288,021 in 1959, with a peak of 56,763,844 in 1966, followed by a partial 
decrease in the period 1967-1970,923 and then a return to the rising trends in the early 
1970s.924 
Not only were the CU and the State Department in Washington concerned with 
cultural and educational exchange in Yugoslavia: the USIS publications in Belgrade and 
Zagreb were highly involved in explaining to Yugoslav audiences the core issues of the 
U.S. educational and university system. Special subject lists at the libraries were 
dedicated to American education and universities, 925  while pamphlets like Goals of 
Education described the American higher education system as one permitting a wide 
range of freedom: “a student of liberal arts can choose agriculture, or a liberal art 
student [can practice] industry management.”926 Even the Pregled periodical did not fail 
to underline that the U.S. universities such as Harvard “gave […] not only full freedom 
in our academic life, but also complete liberty in choosing what courses shall be 
attained.”927 
                                                 
921 Materijal i neke sugestije u vezi programiranja saradnje sa SAD u prosvetno-naučnoj i kulturnoj 
oblasti, Nov. 15, 1966, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za 
obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
922 The Educational and Cultural Profile of Yugoslavia, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
923 By the end of the 1960s, there was a serious “reversal of fortune for the Bureau,” when the U.S. 
economy started to face a major trade deficit and spiraling costs of the Vietnam War and the social 
welfare programs. In order to contain costs, Congress approved a 31 percent budget cut for CU, reducing 
it drastically to $31.5 million in the fiscal year 1969 (Giles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US 
State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France and Britain 1950-1970 
(Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A, 2008), 87–88).  
924 Budgetary Allocations for Educational and Cultural Exchange 1939-1975, Folder 1, Box 46, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
925 List of Reference Materials enclosed in Airgram 81 from the Department of State to All American 
Diplomatic and Consular Posts, July 13, 1962, 511.00/7-1362, Box 1046, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, 
NACP. 
926 Airgram 682 from the Department of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 
Oct. 7, 1950, 511.00/10-750, Box 2238, CDF 1950-1954, RG 59, NACP. 
927 Pregled, June 1961, 38. On the innovation and exclusivity of American higher education, see also the 
special issues of November 1961 and June 1967. 
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This chapter, focused on the cultural exchange programs between Yugoslavia and 
the United States, will particularly discuss privileged cooperation paths as they occurred 
through the Leader’s, the Fulbright, and the state-private network exchange programs. 
This kind of cooperation with Yugoslavia spanned from the middle 1950s and onwards, 
but their major expansion was realized in the first five years of the 1960s. These 
programs, as we shall see, were reserved a special treatment by the Yugoslav leaders 
because they were not directly connected with propaganda and had an immediate visible 
benefit for the grantees and institutions involved. In addition, wide attention shall be 
given to the political background of these programs, the level of government 
involvement in channeling soft power networks, and Cold War policies that shaped such 
cultural linkages. The chapter also underpins an inquiry into the personal grantees’ 
experiences and life paths that lay beyond cultural cooperation agreements and policy 
practices. 
6.1 The Leader’s Exchange Program and the Yugoslav Middle 
Ranked Leadership 
As Scott-Smith emphasized, the “United States has a unique ability to project and 
manage empires” and the Leader’s Exchange Program occupies a “special place within 
this imperial endeavor.”928 The U.S. exchange programs represent in fact a category 
apart in the endeavor of U.S. public diplomacy activities. If the USIS soft power in the 
field was focused on a massive distribution of propaganda material and activities, the 
exchange programs were mostly effectively pursuing an individual approach revolving 
“around personal experience and insight.”929 In the words of Joseph E. Slater, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, the educational and cultural activities were set “as a major 
instrument of foreign policy, to be joined with political and economic activities in 
sustaining and directing the position of the United States in world affairs.”930 In the 
Cultural Cold War context, Slater regarded education “in terms of the conflict of ideas” 
and, as far as the communist countries were concerned, “so long as we have faith in the 
                                                 
928 Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire, 21. 
929 Ibid, 26. 
930 Source Material on International Education and Cultural Activities for the 1960s, July 15, 1961, Folder 
2, Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
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power and the viability of our own culture, we must be prepared to encourage cultural 
penetration in both directions.”931 
The State Department Leader’s Exchange Program (LEP) in Yugoslavia can be 
considered as the most subversive action of the U.S. government towards the Yugoslav 
communist regime in the history of U.S.-Yugoslav foreign relations. While all the other 
cultural exchange programs were subject to some form of Yugoslav control, the LEP 
allowed only the U.S. administration to select grantees independently, and was 
specifically established so “that top governmental officials, as well as leaders and 
specialists in all categories, can be selected by the U.S. Government rather than by the 
Yugoslavs.”932 The Yugoslav party ranks considered the LEP as a subversive program 
as well. Their main concern was the personal contact through which the invitation was 
delivered, without asking any permission of competent Yugoslav authorities, and 
sometimes without even informing them. Often, Yugoslav personalities solicited the 
Americans to first confer on them higher party ranks and organizations before inviting 
them to the LEP. When, on February 11, 1964, the U.S. General Consul in Zagreb, 
Samuel H. Lee, visited the Consular Department of the Executive Council of Croatian 
Parliament in order to invite its Secretary, Stjepan Iveković, on a 2-month LEP, he 
received a nervous response from the Parliament President, Ivan Krajačić, that 
invitations were to be made through federal or republican institutions, and never 
personally.933 
6.1.1 The Ideological and Policy Background 
Inspired by Truman’s Campaign of Truth ethos to promote a “full and fair picture” 
of the United States in the world, Washington inaugurated the LEP in 1949-50. The 
program began as a series of trips of three months or more around the U.S., with the aim 
of including destinations chosen by the grantee, and ensuring a multi-varied experience 
                                                 
931 Ibid. 
932 Despatch 73 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 6, 1959, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, Roosevelt Study 
Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands (hereafter RSC). The archival sources contained in Box 2 are 
originally located in the MC 468, Special Collection, University of Arkansas Library, Fayetteville, 
Arkansas.  
933 Bilješka, Feb. 11, 1964, 04-Pov. K. 54/1-1964, Box 29, Republički protokol, IVS SRH 1953-1990, RG 
280, HDA. 
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mixed with professional interests and environmental and social diversity. The 
itineraries, flexible and varied, comprised meetings with “professional counterparts 
interspersed with tourist visits and small-town hospitality.” The LEP relied on the belief 
that “anyone undertaking such a facilitated journey across the country, in constant 
contact with the American people, could only come away favorably influenced.”934 The 
LEP was renamed in 1965 the International Visitor Program, then the International 
Visitor Leadership Program in 2004, but its principles have largely remained the same. 
Until today, it is considered to be 
the U.S. Department of State’s premier professional exchange program. Through short-term 
visits to the United States, current and emerging foreign leaders in a variety of fields experience 
this country firsthand and cultivate lasting relationships with their American counterparts. 
Professional meetings reflect the participants’ professional interests and support the foreign 
policy goals of the United States.935 
 
According to the CU principal action recommendations for the 1960s, the five 
major goals of the U.S. cultural activities abroad were very much leader-oriented. Their 
recommendations included: to expose “present and potential leaders […] to the ideology 
and techniques of free societies,” “to aid free world countries in meeting their needs for 
technically and professionally trained personnel, […] [and] in expanding and improving 
their basic educational systems” and in developing “a high level of cultural and 
scientific achievements within each country and interchange between countries.” 936 
Moreover, the 1961 CU study strongly praised that 
we should give more emphasis than we have in the past to those who are uncommitted or even 
anti-American in their present orientation as compared to those who are already basically well-
disposed towards the United States. […] We should include in this group not only elected 
officials but party officials, local committee chairman, and similar present and potential party 
leaders […] and ensure that the sons of local “elite” leaders are given specific exposure to 
modern concepts of free society. […] We should develop comprehensive projects for exposing 
the owners, editors and staff of all elements of the press, radio and television in other countries 
to free society, concepts and techniques.937 
 
                                                 
934 Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire, 78, 21. 
935  “About IVLP,” Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, 
http://eca.state.gov/ivlp. See also Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, The International Visitor 
Leadership Program 75th Anniversary, accessed September 12, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=SOqGE-Hbf3g. 
936  Summary of Principal Action Recommendations, July 13, 1961, Folder 2, Box 46, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
937 Ibid. 
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The emphasis on uncommitted and anti-American Yugoslav leaders emerges 
similarly in the “Key Elements of Population” report that suggests which leaders should 
be mostly involved in LEP in Yugoslavia. The first group comprised the political and 
governmental officials of each Yugoslav republic. The Yugoslav regime was modeled 
on the federation and each republic had its own Parliament, executive council, 
administrative agencies, and a judiciary. The new constitution of April 1963 provided 
for a president and vice president of the republic and a Federal Assembly. Even if there 
was a single party control in Yugoslavia, the CU policymakers deemed that 
there is considerable parliamentary democracy which we should encourage and stimulate [in] 
the present system of rotating key officials every two years, […] between those of the federal 
and republic levels […] [that] enables us to reach a greater segment of the population […] 
during the period of transition to a more liberal form of government in Yugoslavia.938 
 
Such a position indicates to what extent the CU as an agency of the U.S. 
government considered the Yugoslav regime as going through a transitional period 
towards a more liberal form of government. Besides the influence on political leaders, 
the U.S. agency considered to be highly effective the U.S. exchange programs on the 
Yugoslav academic community. The third priority of the CU were the communication 
and media leaders, evaluated as middle to highly effective: while the “Yugoslav media 
presents a constantly changing picture […] [and] though this area is heavily controlled 
by the Press Law, […] there is evidence of a break-through” estimated the U.S. policy 
creators. 
The Yugoslav professionals, highly qualified, urbane and with ready insight into 
the work of their western colleagues, were considered the best strata of population 
through which “western practice of free communication and association without 
political implications” would be easily introduced. Actually, the Bureau estimated the 
impact on this target group to be the most effective. The so-called group of creative and 
intellectual leaders (artists, poets, dramatist, musicians, and actors, with the exception of 
writers who were under greater political pressure) were regarded as a basic secondary 
                                                 
938 The Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL (hereafter Key Elements of Population, April 27, 
1967). 
Chapter 6: The U.S. Cultural Exchange Programs in Yugoslavia and the New/Old Leadership 
Carla Konta - April 2016   239 
group whose artistic talents could develop without committing themselves to the official 
party line.939 
For the remaining three groups of population, the managers, agricultural workers 
and youth, the U.S. public diplomacy activities were judged to be of less effectiveness. 
Considered as part of the political elite, the first two groups had no special treatment by 
the CU. The U.S. position towards the Yugoslav youth in this 1967 target plan deserves 
some attention. On the one hand, the Yugoslav university youth was included in the 
academic element of the population. The U.S. policymakers considered the Yugoslav 
students to be politically oriented toward the “ideology of Marx and Lenin,” even 
though many “Yugoslav leaders would probably admit they had not fully succeeded in 
their efforts to indoctrinate them.” Even if 85 percent of the students were members of 
the Yugoslav Student Federation (very close to the official party lines), they were still 
“vocal on many subjects […] including the university administration, and had on 
occasion[s] taken a position which runs contrary to the «party line»” reported the 
Bureau.940 
In fact, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Praxis dissident movement and the 
students’ demonstrations in 1968 never took a radical position against the government, 
although they requested challenging reforms for the regime. For these reasons, and 
because of the strong opposition of Yugoslav students to the Vietnam War and their 
consequent anti-Americanism, the CU program estimated a less effective impact on 
students. Nevertheless, much feedback from grantees evidenced that “bringing students 
[…] to the United States has an immediate impact […] on the forming of human 
relations, and clear evidence that certain relaxations have taken place in Yugoslavia to 
permit their students to come to the United States with an open and receptive mind.”941 
6.2 The LEP Inceptions in Yugoslavia: from 1958 to 1965 
In the late 1950s, the majority of leaders under the LEP came from Germany, 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom. The LEP in Yugoslavia started between June and 
                                                 
939 Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967. 
940 Key Elements of Population, April 27, 1967. 
941 Ibid. 
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July 1958, before it officially commenced in the Soviet Union and Poland. 942  The 
exclusivity of Yugoslavia will in fact be proved once more, and in a more evident form, 
during the signing of the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia. The financial coverage of 
the LEP was to the responsibility of the Department of State. Nevertheless, the 
Yugoslav government provided the daily allowances, as their leaders were guests in 
foreign countries,943 and sometimes even covered the travel expenses to the United 
States.944 
The first years of the LEP in Yugoslavia were characterized by different categories 
of leaders involved. In 1958 for instance, the LEP included legislators, government 
officers and media representatives, as well as very high-caliber members of groups and 
delegations. In 1960, the focus moved upon the leaders of Cabinet ranks and heads of 
Secretariats of the Federal Executive Council. The number of grants accepted increased 
from 5 grantees in 1958, to 16 in 1959 and 28 in 1960. 945  After the Yugoslav 
government decided on a policy of decentralization in culture,946 the USIS policymakers 
turned towards republican leaders, mainly those in high positions in the Councils of 
Culture and Education and in the communist hierarchy, “in fact the men who decide 
what USIS shall and shall not be allowed to do in Yugoslavia.” As a 1959 Inspection 
Report underlined, many of those leaders had often a poor knowledge of English, still, 
for reasons of jealousy of inferior more prepared officials, the top ranking officers were 
invited.947 
From 1959 to 1965, more than 100 Yugoslav leaders stayed in the United States 
under the LEP. It is difficult to obtain a comprehensive number since this data has been 
                                                 
942 Study Annual Programs Division, July 1 – June 30, 1958, Folder 14, Box 26, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
943 Koča Popović, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to Federal Executive Council, Jan. 18, 1960, 9327, 
Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
944 Rešenje o putovanju Krste Crvenkovskog u Sjedinjene Američke Države, March 26, 1960, Box 640, 
SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
945 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959, Box 10, Inspection Report and Related Records 
1954-1962, USIA Inspection Staff, RG 306, NACP: 35. These numbers do not coincide with the Tables 2 
and 3 listed below: this is possible because of the lack of documentation, but also because sometimes the 
LEP and the Foreign Specialist Program (part of the State Department scholarships) were united in one 
list. 
946 The policy of cultural decentralization was introduced after the 1963 Constitution. In 1965, many of 
the federal competences in matters of culture and education, as well as financial funds for these sectors, 
were passed to the republican jurisdiction. 
947 Inspection Report USIS Yugoslavia, Nov. 20, 1959: 35. 
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collected from several and dispersed sources, and probably the estimates are lower than 
the actual numbers. 948  According to Latinka Perović, secretary of the League of 
Communists of Serbia (Savez Komunista Srbije or SKS) from 1968 to 1972, a LEP 
grantee in 1969 and victim of the “Downfall of Serbian liberals” in 1972 (to which 
group she belonged), “all the Central Committee secretaries stayed in the U.S. under 
this program.”949 It would not be exaggerating to state that the majority of the Yugoslav 
middle and middle-high to high-level leaders (excluding the top Central Committee 
members) went on the LEP. The next seven tables contain the list of Yugoslav leaders 
granted a LEP experience from 1959 to 1965. 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1959 Vlajko Begović Director, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade 
2 1959 Krsto Crvenkovski 
Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive Council 
(SIV) 
3 1959 Leon Geršković 
Secretary for Legislation and Organization, Federal Executive 
Council (SIV) 
4 1959 Anton Kacijan First Secretary, State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs (DSIP) 
5 1959 Moma Marković Secretary for Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
6 1959 Bogdan Osolnik Secretary for Information, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
7 1959 Spasoje Velimirović Assistant Secretary for Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
8 1959 Vladimir Vujović Secretary, Federal Industrial Chamber 
Table 6-1: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1959 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1960 Drago Baum Head, Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy 
2 1960 Zdenko Dizdar 
Chief of the HOT Laboratory, Institute of Nuclear Sciences “Boris 
Kidrič” 
3 1960 Slavko Komar Federal Secretary for Agriculture and Forestry 
4 1960 Anton Moljk Member, Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy 
5 1960 Slobodan Nakićenović 
Undersecretary of State; Secretary of the Federal Commission for 
Nuclear Energy 
6 1960 Salom Šuica 
State Counsellor and Head of the Federal Commission for Nuclear 
Energy 
7 1960 Stana Tomašević Assistant Secretary for Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
                                                 
948 The data was collected from Box 1074, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; Box 610 and 640, SIV 1953-
1990, RG 130, AJ; Box 142 and Box 320, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special 
Collection, UAL; and the periodical Pregled from 1959-1969. 
949 Interview with Latinka Perović, Belgrade, June 19, 2010 quoted in Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija 
u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih” (PhD. dissertation, University of Belgrade, 2011), 168. 
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Table 6-2: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1960 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1961 Džemal Bijedić Member, Federal Assembly 
2 1961 Sreten Bjeličić 
Assistant Secretary for Social Affairs and Public Utilities, Federal 
Executive Council (SIV) 
3 1961 Zvonko Damjanović 
Head, Department of Biological Sciences, Federal Council for 
Scientific Work 
4 1961 Većeslav Holjevac Mayor of Zagreb 
5 1961 Djurica Jojkić President, Executive Council of Vojvodina 
6 1961 Herbert Kraus Secretary for Health, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
7 1961 Jovan Marinović Director, TANJUG (Yugoslav Press Agency) 
8 1961 Milentije Popović Member, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
9 1961 Vojislav Rakić 
Assistant Secretary for General Economic Affairs, Federal Executive 
Council (SIV) 
10 1961 Franjo Raknić Director, Scientific Work Fund 
11 1961 Branko Raković 
Head, Department of Mathematical and Technical Sciences, Federal 
Council for Scientific Work 
12 1961 Lidija Šentjurc 
Secretary for Social Affairs and Public Utilities, Federal Executive 
Council (SIV) 
13 1961 Mira Trajlović Dramaturg, Theatre Director, Founder of Atelje 212 Theatre 
Table 6-3: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1961 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1962 Gavro Altman Editor, Komunist (SKJ) 
2 1962 Filip Bajković 
President, Executive Council of People's Assembly, NR 
Montenegro 
3 1962 Milutin Baltić Member, Executive Council of Parliament, NR Croatia 
4 1962 Anka Beruš Member, Executive Council of Parliament, NR Croatia 
5 1962 Pero Djetelić 
Assistant Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive 
Council (SIV) 
6 1962 Bogo/Božidar Gorjan Secretary for Information, Executive Council, NR Slovenia 
8 1962 Rodoljub Jeumović 
Assistant Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive 
Council (SIV) 
9 1962 Batrić Jovanović Director, Civil Aviation Authority 
10 1962 Osman Karabegović President, Executive Council of People's Assembly, NR BIH 
11 1962 Boris Kocijančiča President, Association for Health, NR Slovenia 
12 1962 Zdenko Kristl Journal Reporter, Foreign Desk of Vjesnik (Zagreb) 
13 1962 Zvonimir Krst Editor and European Desk Reporter, Vjesnik (Zagreb) 
14 1962 Vlado Majhn 
Secretary for Urbanism, Housing and Communal affairs, 
Executive Council, NR Slovenia 
15 1962 Miodrag Mihajlović 
Third The Secretary of State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs 
(DSIP) 
16 1962 Helij Modić NR Slovenia 
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17 1962 Milijan Neoričić Mayor of Belgrade (1961-1964) 
18 1962 Ante Novak Director, Yugoslav Federal Statistical Institute 
19 1962 Toše Popovski Editor, Nova Makedonija (Skopje) 
20 1962 Nikola Sekulić Vice President, Parliament, NR Croatia 
21 1962 Ivan Šinkovec Editor, Delo (Ljubljana) 
22 1962 Josip Torbarina Dean of English Department, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb 
23 1962 Aleksandar Trumić Dean, University of Sarajevo 
24 1962 Stanka Veselinov President, Council for Culture, NR Serbia 
25 1962 Aleksandar Vuco Yugoslav Surrealistic Writer 
26 1962 Petar Zdravkovski Member, Executive Council, NR Macedonia 
27 1962 Veljko Zeković Secretary, Executive Council, NR Macedonia 
28 1962 Živko Žižić Member, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
Table 6-4: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1962 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1963 Nikola Balog 
Undersecretary of State, Federal Secretariat for Legislation and 
Organization 
2 1963 Rodoljub Jemuović 
Deputy Secretary for Education and Culture, Federal Executive 
Council (SIV) 
3 1963 Boro Miljkovski Secretary for Information SR Macedonia 
4 1963 Aleksandar Nikolić Coach, Yugoslav National Basketball Team 
5 1963 Branko Nilević Secretary for Health, Social Policy and Public Utilities, SR Montenegro 
6 1963 Miha Potočnik Judge, Constitutional Court, SR Slovenia 
7 1963 Mihajlo Švabić Vice President, Executive Council, SR Serbia 
8 1963 Anton Vratuša Undersecretary of State, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
9 1963 Drago Vučinić Secretary, Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries 
Table 6-5: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1963 
 
After the first years, the LEP in Yugoslavia grew immensely in 1961 and 1962, without 
immediately reflecting the galloping political crises that emerged after the First Non-
Aligned Conference and the retreat of the MFN clausal. The crisis of grantee numbers is 
evident in 1963 when from 26 leaders in the previous year, only 9 leaders were sent 
abroad. 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1964 Rista Aćimović General Manager, Yugoslav Bank for Foreign Trade 
2 1964 Predrag Anastazijević Director, Federal Nuclear Energy Commission 
3 1964 Uroš Andrejevski Assistant Secretary of Labor, SR Macedonia 
4 1964 Josip Brnčić President, Supreme Court of Croatia 
5 1964 Krešimir Car Vice President, Committee for Tourism, SR Croatia 
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6 1964 Firdus Djinić Director, Institute of Public Opinion Research, Belgrade 
7 1964 Stana Djurić Klajn Head, Musicological Institute, Serbian Academy of Sciences  
8 1964 Humo Enver Director, Department of Foreign Relations, Belgrade 
9 1964 Neda Erceg 
President, Commission for Cultural and Artistic Programs, Radio 
Yugoslavia 
10 1964 Antonije Isaković General Director, Prosveta, Publishing House, Belgrade 
11 1964 Ljudevit Jonke Dean, Philosophical Faculty, University of Zagreb 
12 1964 Batric Jovanović Director, Yugoslav Directorate of Civil Aeronautics, Belgrade 
13 1964 Ljubica Jurela Director, Gradjevinska knjiga, Publishing House, Belgrade 
14 1964 Verica 
Jurić 
Olenković Undersecretary for Information, SR Croatia 
15 1964 Boris Kocijančić 
President, Committee for General and Administrative Questions, 
Executive Council, SR Slovenia 
16 1964 Erik Kos Writer of the contemporary social science 
17 1964 Marko Kozmar Member, Editorial staff, Komunist (SKJ) 
18 1964 Milka Kufrin President, Federal Committee for Tourism 
19 1964 Marijan Matković President, Association of Yugoslav Play writers, Zagreb 
20 1964 Milorad Miletić 
Department of Foreign Scholarships, Secretariat for Education, 
Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
21 1964 Milorad Mladjenović 
 Research Director, Boris Kidrič Institute of Nuclear Sciences, 
Vinča 
22 1964 Božidar Novak Director, Vjesnik, Zagreb 
23 1964 Boško Novaković Professor, Philosophy Faculty, Novi Sad 
24 1964 Svetozar Pepovski Assistant Secretary of Labor, Federal Executive Council (SIV) 
25 1964 Puniša Perović 
Representative in the Federal Assembly; Director and Chief Editor, 
Naša Stvarnost (SKJ) 
26 1964 Zorka Peršić General Director, Mladinska knjiga, Publishing House, Ljubljana 
27 1964 Miha Potočnik 
Member, Constitutional Court, SR Slovenia, and Secretary 
Slovenian Parliament 
28 1964 Djuža Radović 
Dean, Academy of Theatre Art, Radio, Film and Television, 
Belgrade 
29 1964 Vjenceslav Richter Director, Institute of Industrial Design, Zagreb 
30 1964 Milorad Ristić Director, Boris Kidrič Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Vinča 
31 1964 Matko Rojnić Director, National University Library, Zagreb 
32 1964 Ladislav Rupnik Chief, Division of Financial and Economic Matters, SR Slovenia 
33 1964 Kosta Spaić Rector, Academy of Dramatic Arts, Zagreb 
34 1964 Velizar Škerović Vice President, Executive Council, SR Montenegro 
35 1964 Albert Štruna Rector, University of Ljubljana 
36 1964 Branko Zutić Director, Školska knjiga, Publishing House, Zagreb 
Table 6-6: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1964 
 
N Year Name Surname Position 
1 1965 Nisim Albahari Secretary, Organ of Political Council, Assembly of SR BIH 
2 1965 Dušan Avramov Director, Federal Food Administration 
3 1965 Miroslav Belović Manager and Play Director, Yugoslav Drama Theatre 
4 1965 Jovan Cekić Director, Institute of Health, SR Serbia 
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5 1965 Osman Djikić 
Secretary, Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign 
Countries 
6 1965 Nikola Djuverović Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade 
7 1965 Kiro 
Hadži-
Vasilev Director, College of Political Science, Belgrade 
8 1965 Zdenko Has Federal Labor Inspector 
9 1965 Jože Ingolič Federal Secretary for Agriculture 
10 1965 Mira Janković Head, English Department, Philosophy Faculty, Zadar 
11 1965 Batric Jovanović Director, General Director, Directorate for Civil Aviation 
12 1965 Slavko Macarol Rector, University of Zagreb, 
13 1965 Miloš Macura Director, Federal Bureau of Statistics 
14 1965 Vukašin Mićunović Director, Tanjug, Yugoslavia News Agency 
15 1965 Milan Milosavljević Secretary of TV Program Committee, Radio and TV Belgrade 
16 1965 Dušan Mitević President, Serbian People’s Youth 
17 1965 Lazar Mojsov Director, Borba (Belgrade) 
18 1965 Janez Nedog President, District Chamber of Commerce, Ljubljana 
19 1965 Aleksandar Petković Secretary, Commission for International Relations, SSRNJ 
20 1965 Pero Pirker President of the Zagreb City Assembly 
21 1965 Zoran Polić Federal Secretary, Budget and Administration Organization 
22 1965 Danilo Purić Director, Politika (Belgrade) 
23 1965 Ivko Pustišek Secretary General of RTV Yugoslavia 
24 1965 Enver Redžić 
Director, Institute for the Study of the History of Labor 
Movement, BIH 
25 1965 Laslo Rehak Secretary, Socialist League of Serbia 
26 1965 Sonja Romac Counselor, Educational and Cultural Council, Federal Assembly 
27 1965 Franc Tretjak Director, Chamber of Commerce Rates, SR Slovenia 
28 1965 Milan Uzelac Secretary of Education, SR BIH 
29 1965 
Branka i 
Mladen Veselinov Actor and Actress 
30 1965 Janez Vipotnik Federal Secretary for Education and Culture 
31 1965 Josip Zmajić Director, Institute for International Technical Cooperation 
Table 6-7: Yugoslav LEP Grantees in 1965. Source: The data of Table 6-1 to 6-7 was collected from 
Box 1074, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP; Box 610 and 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ; Box 142 
and Box 320, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; and 
the periodical Pregled from 1959-1969. 
 
The years 1964 and 1965 represent the largest leap in the LEP history from 1958, 
when the average number maintained was 33 grantees per year. What is more 
surprising,  is not only the large number of leaders involved, but their high ranking 
positions in the Federal Executive Council, the DSIP, and media, radio and TV 
broadcasting services. Compared with other cultural exchange programs, particularly 
the Fulbright and the state-private network, the LEP, even if smaller in numbers, 
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seemed highly effective. The returnees, all of them holding very important positions in 
the government, were judged as 
more approachable than heretofore, and have a clearer understanding of and more sympathy for 
the American mentality and U.S. policies. They have become our most important contacts and 
enable us to expand and develop our over-all program more intelligently to the best interests of 
both countries. […] Leaders such as we are sending are in a position to influence the practices 
of institutions both in the economic and political spheres: familiarity with U.S. methods and 
philosophy lead to emulation, as we have witnessed from those who have been in the United 
States. In addition, these grants immensely contribute to their friendliness and approachability 
upon their return.950 
 
After the Yugoslav government prohibited the dissemination of “hard core” 
information through USIS, the LEP assumed the leading assignment of reaching 
Yugoslav representatives beyond official channels. “We believe that our efforts in this 
area [the LEP] have been useful in encouraging Yugoslav officials to adopt more 
positive attitudes towards the program in general and the present negotiations in 
particular.”951 
The LEP in Yugoslavia passed the hardest test in the first years of the 1960s, during 
the downfall of U.S.-Yugoslav foreign relations in the triennium 1961-1963. In the 
aftermath of the Cuban missile crises (October 16 to 28, 1962), that generated a 
worsening of the bi-national relations, the DSIP Office for the USA prohibited the 
travel of Petar Zdravkovski, member of the Executive Council of Macedonia, under the 
LEP. Moreover, the Yugoslav Foreign Office judged that “it would be useful for a while 
that our distinguished political people would desist from making the visits in a situation 
of unresolved issues between the two countries, as well as for the general political 
climate in the US.”952 In these delicate circumstances, the DSIP criticized the lack of 
reciprocity of the LEP and, again, the direct and individual calls to future grantees. They 
insisted, but poorly obtained, that they should go through the DSIP953, who “would 
                                                 
950 Despatch 73 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 6, 1959, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC.  
951Despatch 212 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 17, 1960, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. 
952  Marko Nikezić, Undersecretary of State, to Veljko Zeković, Secretary of the Federal Executive 
Council, Oct. 26, 1962, 435748, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
953 Ibid. 
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determine the political opportunity and realization time of these exchanges.” 954 
Interestingly, for some unknown reason, Petar Zdravkovski, still departed at the end of 
1962. 
6.3 The LEP/IVP after the Fulbright in Yugoslavia 
When, in 1965, the Leader’s Exchange Program was renamed the International 
Visitor Program, it came to combine the earlier Foreign Leader Program and Foreign 
Specialist Program.955 From this very year onwards, the LEP suffered severe budget 
cuts of some 53 percent when, according to the U.S. field officers, the government of 
Yugoslavia was becoming “less suspicious of and with less desire to control the 
program.” The American Embassy in Belgrade regarded the cuts as a “considerable 
blunting of a primary instrument for advancing U.S. policy goals in Yugoslavia [that] 
[…] could also have an adverse effect in other, more subjective, relationships between 
the Embassy and the GOY.”956 According to Embassy sources, it seemed that Yugoslav 
leaders had become more attached to the program as before. A 1967 Embassy memo 
strongly affirmed this point of view: 
While the tensions caused by the Vietnam War cloud the picture and limit to a great extent any 
public espousal of the U.S. by returning grantees, it is apparent that the visits of Yugoslav 
intellectual leaders to the United States are effectual. There is no letup in the number of such 
leaders, who are interested in taking advantage of […] visiting the United States. Good evidence 
of this occurred when a rumor reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the International 
Visitors Program was to be sharply cut back, prompting the then third ranking official of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Srdjan Prica) to personally telephone the Ambassador and express 
the strong concern of the Yugoslav government.957 
 
The U.S. Embassy officials felt very convinced that the LEP had “without a doubt 
affected the course [of] moderate tendencies in political and economic reforms” in 
Yugoslavia. “A second, direct, effect of these visits, continued the memo, is that […] 
                                                 
954 Cabinet of the Secretary of SIV to Edvard Kardelj, Mijalko Todorović, and Žagar Istok, Nov. 22, 
1962, 337, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
955 Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 
17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. Although, the 
U.S. Embassy in Belgrade continued to use both of the designations until the end of the 1960s. 
956 Airgram 252 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Sept. 28, 1965, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. 
957 Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC (hereafter 
Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967). 
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thanks to these individuals the Embassy has been able to arrange various cultural 
programs, often on relatively short notice.” And concluded that the Yugoslav LEP 
would be able to “directly influence Yugoslav policies and, when their number is large 
enough to assure mutual support, the real effects of that exposure to American life and 
ideals, will be more readily seen.”958 
The conviction of the U.S. policymakers in Belgrade corresponds to some extent to 
the data we have shown in this section. In fact, Yugoslav leaders of all strata, many of 
them crucial for the Yugoslav reformation movements in the years to come, went on a 
LEP in the United States. Certainly, the exposure to what they saw in the U.S. and the 
correlation of what they did in Yugoslavia in the aftermath is hard to prove, but 
influence cannot be denied. 959  Nevertheless, the short-term impact was regularly 
reported from Belgrade to Washington. The Yugoslav role as a “decompression 
chamber” for visitors from other East European countries returning from the West 
(quote from a Yugoslav LEP grantee to an Embassy Officer on October 10, 1967) 
seemed to function in the Yugoslav 1960s historical context.960 The LEP in Yugoslavia 
symptomatically points to the U.S. Cold War strategy towards this “Coca-Cola” 
communist regime: changing its internal leadership and exploiting its non-aligned 
example to other Eastern European countries. The LEP was a unilateral program that 
presumed large margins of maneuvers for the U.S. administration. Shorter than most of 
the other exchange programs, it was meant to provide a “hard-core,” dense, and life-
changing experience of the United States, it prioritized middle and middle-high 
Yugoslav leaders and opinion molders, that would, hopefully, change the Yugoslav 
society in the decades to come. 
                                                 
958 Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967. 
959 Giles Scott-Smith put it in this way: “That they have an impact on their participants, be it positive or 
negative, is unquestionable. However, what the impact is in the longer-term remains difficult to pin down, 
since the exchange experience becomes one of many variables that need to be taken into account when 
assessing political trends. As exchanges revolve around personal experience and insight, and therefore 
anecdotal and oral history, they tend to fall outside of orthodox fact-finding analysis and therefore their 
contribution to the practice of international affairs has tended to be overlooked” (Scott-Smith, Networks 
of Empire, 26). 
960 Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967. 
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6.4 The Fulbright Program Comes to Yugoslavia (1964-1970) 
 
In the cultural offensive, the dollar program run by the Embassy is aimed at 
point targets, at the leaders and others in whom an American experience will 
have an immediate and favorable effect on our policies. The Fulbright 
program is aimed at area targets where an American experience will have a 
long term, slowly maturing effect on potentially influential groups: teachers, 
intellectual, students and certain specialists.961 
 
The activity of the Fulbright Commission and the Fulbright program in 
Yugoslavia were indeed, I would say, a Western drilling of holes in a socialist 
“Swiss cheese.” 
Rade Petrović, former Executive Secretary of the Fulbright Commission 
for Yugoslavia962 
 
In December 1958, the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), a presidentially 
appointed 12-member committee to select the Fulbright grantees, “unanimously 
concurred in the initiation [of the] Fulbright Agreement with Yugoslavia.” 963  The 
decision came after almost one year of consultations between the State Department and 
the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade which raised the Department’s major concern about the 
probability of the Yugoslav government wishing “to control the selection of all grantees 
and might attempt cross-the board choices of CP members.”964 At the time when the 
U.S. government began the negotiations with Yugoslavia, the Fulbright program had 
already extended to 38 countries in Western Europe, Middle East, the Near and Far 
East, Australia, and Latin America, although without involving any communist 
country. 965  Since its inception, this exchange program inspired and originated “the 
                                                 
961 Harry B. Wyman, IES, to Scott Lyon, EE/P, Sept. 6, 1957, 511.683/9-657, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, 
RG 59, NACP. Today known as the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, it gathers U.S. specialists, 
mostly academic scholars, writers, lawyers and communication specialists. It works in cooperation with 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, the bi-national Fulbright 
Commissions and Foundations, and the Public Affairs Sections of U.S. embassies abroad, to administer 
the Program. 
962 Telephone Interview with Rade Petrović, Aug. 28, 2014. 
963  Telegram 2647 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, Dec. 5, 1958, 
511.683/11-2058, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
964  Despatch 415 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 24, 1958, 
511.683/2-2458, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
965 By 1958, these countries were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, Brazil, Burma, 
Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Iran, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UAR, and the UK (Fact Sheet on the International 
Educational Exchange Program, April 1966, Folder 11, Box 103, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
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biggest, most significant movement of scholars across the face of the earth since the fall 
of Constantinople in 1453” affirmed Ronald B. McCallum, Senator Fulbright’s Oxford 
tutor, in 1976.966 
James William Fulbright, the father of the homonymous exchange program, was 
born in Missouri in 1905 from where his parents soon moved to Arkansas, to the Ozark 
Mountain town of Fayetteville. He grew up in a prosperous and respected family (his 
father was a successful local businessman), attending the town’s public school and the 
University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. According to Harry P. Jeffrey “he was a solid B 
student, campus leader, and star football halfback,”967 as well as the president of the 
student body and a member of the student senate. Encouraged by a university professor, 
he applied for the Rhodes Scholarship at the age of 20. At that time, the Rhodes 
Scholarship was the first international exchange program founded in 1903. Financed by 
the British colonial statesman and businessmen Cecil John Rhodes, its aim was to foster 
a worldwide commonwealth based on mutual understanding and future leaders’ 
proficiencies, albeit narrowly focused on Anglo-Saxon countries and white male-
oriented. The scholarship provided students from the British Commonwealth, the 
United States and Germany to study at the University of Oxford. William Fulbright’s 
experience at Oxford, lasting from 1925 to 1929, and his holiday and ostensible study 
trips to continental Europe, had a radical impact on his intellectual formation and 
leadership skills. As his biographer Randall Woods pointed out, the spirit of the Rhodes 
scholars at Oxford, their interactions with their British host students and professors, 
served as an indelible and long-lasting model for William Fulbright in his later quest for 
internationalism, mutual understanding, and the fostering of strong bonds across 
cultures and national boundaries through a fellowship based on international learning.968 
                                                 
966  Eric Sevareid, CBS commentary, 18 May 1976 quoted in Haynes B. Johnson and Bernard M. 
Gwertzman, Fulbright: The Dissenter (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968), 108. 
967 Harry P. Jeffrey, “Legislative Origins of the Fulbright Program,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 491, no. The Fulbright Experience and Academic Exchanges (May 1987), 
37. 
968 Randall B. Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 9, 35–36. 
Beside the eminent Woods’s biography, other relevant Fulbright portraits can be found in: Eugene 
Brown, J. William Fulbright: Advice and Dissent (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985); Tristram 
Coffin, Senator Fulbright: A Portrait of a Public Philosopher (Dutton, 1966); Haynes B. Johnson and 
Bernard M. Gwertzman, Fulbright: The Dissenter (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968). For enquiries on 
senator Fulbright and his positioning in the arena of the Cold War international affairs see Lee R. Powell, 
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In September 1945, only one year after he captured his Senate seat, William Fulbright 
introduced an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944 that would proceed from 
the sales of U.S. surplus property overseas to fund an educational exchange program. 
Two months later Fulbright abandoned his first proposal in favor of a second, broader 
bill that made more explicit his ideas of international education. This final bill 
established a non-partisan Board of Foreign Scholarship to administer the project. On 
the first of August 1946, President Truman signed the Fulbright bill into law, officially 
known as the Smith-Mundt Act, and the Fulbright scholarship program came into 
being.969 
The final legislative on the Fulbright academic exchange came with the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, known also as the Fulbright-Hays Act 
(because it was introduced in the House of Representatives by Wayne Hays of Ohio), 
that consolidated the previous laws and broadened the categories of leaders and 
specialists that included “other influential or distinguished persons.” Apart from adding 
new authority to assist foreign groups and individuals to participate in nonprofit 
cultural, artistic and athletic activities in the U.S., the new legislative enlarged the 
support for the American studies abroad and facilitated the establishment of bi-national 
commissions and new agreements.970 President John Kennedy signed the Fulbright-
Hays act on June 25, 1962, with the Executive order 11034.971 
Scholars usually interpreted the Fulbright program background as the corollary of 
William Fulbright’s internationalist Wilsonianism, aimed at fostering the mutual 
understanding of nations, “to help rid the world of the twin evils of parochialism and 
nationalism,” to combat xenophobia that “breeds intolerance and aggression,” and, 
                                                                                                                                               
J. William Fulbright and America’s Lost Crusade: Fulbright, the Cold War and the Vietnam War (Rose 
Publishing Company, 1984) and J. William Fulbright and His Time: A Political Biography (Guild 
Bindery Press, 1996) and Randall B. Woods, J. William Fulbright, Vietnam, and the Search for a Cold 
War Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
969 Randall B. Woods, “Fulbright Internationalism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 491, no. The Fulbright Experience and Academic Exchanges (May 1987): 25–26. 
970  The New Authority provided by the Fulbright-Hays Act enclosed in Instruction 4352 from the 
Department of State to All American Diplomatic Posts, Nov. 21, 1961, 511.003/11-2161, Box 1050, CDF 
1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
971  Airgram 2792 from the Department of State to All American Diplomatic Posts, Sept. 13, 1962, 
511.003/9-1362, Box 1050, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
Waging Public Diplomacy 
252  Carla Konta - April 2016 
finally, to educate future leaders in liberal internationalist Weltanschauungs.972 Recent 
studies have, however, underpinned that the Fulbright program flourished thanks to the 
surplus of the wartime economy (military articles that would otherwise have been lost) 
and was as much as rationalist as ideologist, as Sam Lebovic attested. Indeed, the 
ideology of liberal universalism that resulted from the U.S. global hegemony as well as 
from the defeat of fascism, when put into practice, presumed national asymmetries and 
showed an ideology of nationalist globalism. Unquestionably, the latter was an 
American cultural practice that subsisted prior to the Cold War, but, when put into 
practice with the Fulbright exchange program, it “helped lay the groundwork for Cold 
War cultural propaganda [and] […] make the American Century.”973 
6.4.1 The “Case” of Senator Fulbright in Yugoslavia974 
 
Important as the Yugoslav experiment in itself, the major importance of 
Yugoslavia from the viewpoint of American interest is in its role as a bridge 
between East and West. As a model and a magnet for less audacious 
Communist regimes, Yugoslavia contributed to the advancement of American 
interests by encouraging the trend toward both national independence and 
internal liberalization in Eastern Europe. 
Senator Fulbright, Report to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(date n.a.)975 
 
Why did the U.S. representatives in Belgrade consider the late 1950s as the most 
propitious moment for initiating negotiations over the Fulbright program even if they 
realized that the Yugoslavs were particularly “sensitive to increased Western cultural 
and informational activities?”976 Several indicators seem to be decisive: the positive 
                                                 
972 Woods, “Fulbright Internationalism,” 23. 
973 Sam Lebovic, “From War Junk to Educational Exchange: The World War II Origins of the Fulbright 
Program and the Foundations of American Cultural Globalism, 1945–1950,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 2 
(2013): 280–312. For this revisionist view see also Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public 
Diplomacy and the Transformation of U. S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 
6.   
974 For a short review from the Yugoslav perspective of the Fulbright program, see Radina Vučetić, 
“Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih,” 170–177. 
975 Country Analysis Chart enclosed in CU program planning and budgeting system – FY69 Program 
Recommendations for Yugoslavia and Turkey, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
976 Telegram 532 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 1958, 511.683/11-2058, Box 2205, 
CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
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effect of the 1958 U.S. – Soviet agreement on the exchange program;977 the Yugoslav 
preference for interstate arrangements on cultural exchanges rather than informal 
settlements; and the positive reception of the Ford foundation after five years of fruitless 
negotiations.978 
As a real precedent for a communist country, Congress voted the inclusion of 
Yugoslavia in the Fulbright program in 1959.979 Informal talks commenced when Krsto 
Crvenkovski, the Secretary for Education and Culture of the Federal Executive Council, 
met the State Department officials in Washington D.C. where he stayed under the 
Leader’s Exchange Program in 1959.980 Soon after, the two governments exchanged a 
memorandum giving formal shape to the negotiations.981 The talks brought to the table 
three unsettled difficulties: the impossibility of converting Yugoslav dinars for the 
needs of international travel and stay abroad; an acceptable system of candidates’ 
selection; and the nationality of the Executive Director and Secretary. The first 
impediment was quickly resolved. Both sides agreed that the “excess” currencies owned 
by the U.S. government in Yugoslavia through P.L. 480982 and based on the Agreement 
of the Surplus Agricultural Supplies between the two countries, would be used to cover 
the travel expenses for the Yugoslav grantees (with the rest supplied by the American 
                                                 
977  The accord, signed on January 17, 1958, was entitled “Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical, and 
Educational Fields.” It included exchanges in science and technology, agriculture, medicine and public 
health, radio and television, motion pictures, exhibitions, publications, government, youth, athletics, 
scholarly research, culture, and tourism. As an executive agreement rather than a treaty, it did not require 
ratification by the U.S. Senate, which helped to avoid a prolonged and bitter debate in a forum which had 
only recently witnessed the challenges of McCarthyism (Yale Richmond, U.S.-Soviet Cultural 
Exchanges, 1958-1986: Who Wins? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 133–137 and Cultural Exchange 
and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). 
978 Telegram 532 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, Nov. 6, 1958, 511.683/11-2058, Box 2205, 
CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
979 DSIP to SIV, June 11, 1959, 91842, Box 640, Međunarodni odnosi 1953-1970, SIV 1953-1990, RG 
130, AJ. 
980  Telegram 038335 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, June 7, 1960, 
511.68/6-760, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
981 Pro Memoria sent from U.S. Government to the Government of Yugoslavia, July 7, 1960, 511.683/6-
2660, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; Telegram 038335 from the Department of State to 
American Embassy Belgrade, June 7, 1960, 511.68/6-760, Box 1074, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP; 
DSIP to SIV, Dec. 19, 1963, 91430/3, Box 640, Međunarodni odnosi 1953-1970, SIV 1953-1990, RG 
130, AJ. 
982 The Need for a Policy Decision re the Conversion of “Excess” Currencies, Feb. 27, 1961, Folder 3, 
Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. The P.L. 480 
Sales Agreements with Yugoslavia were signed for the first time in 1955, and then renewed by 
amendments every next year (Agreements Signed from Beginning of Program, March 31, 1961, Folder 3, 
Box 46, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). 
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host institutions and the State Department) and the full grants for the American grantees 
in Yugoslavia. 983  The Agreement of Surplus Agricultural Commodities allowed a 
favorable currency exchange rate at $ 1 for 475 Yugoslav dinars,984 while the official 
currency exchange rate was around 700 dinars per dollar (at least until 1966 when 
devaluation augmented the exchange rate up to 1200 per dollar).985 
The second sore point created more apprehension on both sides. The Yugoslav 
authorities, profoundly concerned with the candidate selection processes, strongly 
lobbied and obtained the possibility of pre-selection. The struggle over procedures 
continued for the whole of 1962 and 1963.986 What actually was accorded is that, after 
the Bi-national Commission finished the first round of interviews, the list was to be 
delivered to the Yugoslav Commission for Cooperation with the American and Other 
Foundations, a 22-member committee appointed by the Federal Secretary of Education 
and Culture whose members were distinguished academics and specialists from all the 
six republics. This so-called Ford Commission or Academic Committee, created in 1958 
in order to guide the selection process for the homonymous foundation, selected the 
Fulbright candidates that most fitted the republican university needs. The final list was, 
therefore, returned to the Bi-national Commission in charge of forwarding it to the BFS 
in Washington.987 On the third sensitive point, the American side ceded unfavorably 
and, in the final negotiations, it was accorded that the chair of the Commission would be 
                                                 
983  Zabeleška o Fulbrajtovom programu, Aug. 21, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa 
inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ. 
984  Savezni sekretarijat za financije, Sept. 27, 1963, 08-2830/1, Box 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska 
Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
985  Godišnji izvještaj Jugoslovensko-americke komisije za Fulbrajtov program od januara 1965. do 
oktobra 1966., May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni 
savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ. 
986 Many reports and memos testimony these lobby negotiations: Airgram 13 from the Department of 
State to American Embassy Belgrade, July 16, 1962, 511.003/7-1662, Box 1050, CDF 1960-1963, RG 
59, NACP; Telegram 09151 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, March 19, 
1963, EDX 4/48-4460, Box 3254, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1963, RG 59, NACP; Godišnji 
izvještaj Jugoslovensko-americke komisije za Fulbrajtov program, May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-
prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, 
AJ: 8; Elaborati o međunarodnim vezama, May 1968, Box 34, Sednice Saveznog saveta 1968, Savezni 
savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ: 72. 
987 Zabeleška o sprovodjenju i produženju ugovora o Fulbrajtovom programu, 1968, Box 61, Kulturno-
prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, 
AJ; Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanje (Fulbrajtov program), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, 
Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, 
RG 319, AJ: 20–21. 
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of American nationality, while the Executive Director and the Executive Secretary 
would be of Yugoslav nationality.988 
The Fulbright Agreement, envisioned “to promote further mutual understanding 
between the peoples of the U.S. of America and the SFR of Yugoslavia by a wider 
exchange of knowledge and professional talents through educational activities,” was 
signed in Belgrade on November 6, 1964. It established a Bi-national Commission 
composed of eight members, four of Yugoslav and four of American nationality.989 The 
celebration of the event and the political treatment of it confirmed how both parties 
considered the cultural reciprocal cooperation a matter of privileged policy. Yugoslavia 
was the first socialist country that signed a Fulbright agreement990 and the only country, 
by 1964, visited by Senator Fulbright for the very purpose of attending the signing and 
the celebration of the event. Moreover, the Senator departed on November 5, only two 
days after the Election Day and on Johnson’s presidential victory.991 Fulbright’s stay in 
Yugoslavia was treated as a political event of the highest level. The Senator met the 
highest ranked party politicians, many of them progressive reformers with pro-Western 
attitudes such as Koča Popović, Marko Nikezić, Edvard Kardelj, and Janez Vipotnik.992 
His meeting with Josip Broz Tito at Brdo Kranj (Slovenia) ended in “good humor” and 
Broz’s appreciation of Fulbright’s pro-Yugoslav campaigns in the U.S. Senate and the 
Foreign Relations Committee.993 
According to the memos of President Tito’s Cabinet, William Fulbright rewarded 
Yugoslavia with a visit when the U.S. administration considered the bilateral foreign 
                                                 
988 Branislav Grbić, chief of the Federal Secretary of Finance, to Paul Wheeler, PAO, 1963, Box 240, 
SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ 
and Janez Vipotnik, Federal Secretary for Education and Culture, to C. Burke Elbrick, American 
Ambassador, Nov. 9, 1964, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ. 
989 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Nov. 9, 1964, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između 
SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ. 
990 In other communist countries, the Fulbright program started much later: in 1973/74 in the Soviet 
Union and in 1977 in Hungary. 
991 Koča Popović, The Secretary of State, to the General Secretary of the President, Oct. 22, 1964, 
441257, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
992 See reports to Josip Broz Tito from Oct. 24 and Nov. 3, 1964, in Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih 
ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
993  Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog 
komiteta Senata SAD, James William Fulbrightom, Nov. 14, 1964, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih 
ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
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relations to be in a “deadlock.” 994  Both sides perceived the negative trends and 
circumstances since early 1960. Tito’s anti-Western statements at the First Non-Aligned 
Conference in Belgrade in September 1961, the Berlin crises after the start of the 
erection of the Wall in 1961 and the Cuban missile crises in 1962, as well as the 
Congress abolition of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) treaty for Yugoslavia in 1962, 
contributed to the inclination towards U.S.-Yugoslav foreign relations.995 The Cabinet 
of the President acknowledged that Senator Fulbright’s lobbying as the President of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee substantially influenced the 1963 restoration of the 
MFN treaty for Yugoslavia. The restoration had several positive revenues for the re-
approval of the Agricultural Surplus Agreement, for the return of American citizens’ 
confiscated property after World War II and for the liberalization of Yugoslav exports 
in the United States.996  
While Yugoslavia opposed the U.S. foreign policy strategies in Latin America, 
Congo, and Cyprus, Yugoslav leaders highly appreciated Senator Fulbright’s efforts to 
canalize the U.S. geopolitical strategies towards détente. Moreover, the Yugoslav 
reports emphasized his flexible position on Cuba, Panama, and China, his fight for 
atomic distension and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and his belief in 
international education exchanges as a contribution to a more peaceful and truly 
internationalist world order.997 As he acknowledged several times in informal talks to 
Koča Popović, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Vladimir Popović, 
president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and International Relations of the 
Federal Executive Council, he truly believed that Yugoslavia and its non-aligned policy 
                                                 
994 Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi 
stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT; Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961. 
– 1971. (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2012), 174–176. 
995 Bogetić, Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961. – 1971., 30–98. 
996 Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi 
stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT; Bogetić, Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961. – 1971., 
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997 Informacija povodom prijema senatora Fulbrighta, Nov. 14, 1964, 611/8, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi 
stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
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was an example of “pragmatic adjustment,” “an experiment of worldwide impact” and a 
“bridge between the capitalist and socialist world.”998 
While he disagreed with Marshall Tito on German rearmament and the “Berlin 
question,” they actually concurred in criticizing the U.S. strategy towards Cuba and the 
necessity of a “peaceful coexistence” rapprochement with the Soviet Union.999 Fulbright 
also ironically remarked how the United States, while pursuing a domestic battle against 
socialism, were in fact implementing many socialist state programs, of which the 
Fulbright scholarships were just an example.1000 Proud of the first agreement signed 
with a communist country, he heavily underscored the fact that the exchanges of 
intellectuals and leaders would end up being more powerful than diplomatic foreign 
policy actions in creating ties and good relationships, which eventually ensued to be 
true for the Yugoslav case. He repeated to Josip Broz Tito what had been the core of his 
philosophy and ideology: that knowledge would tear apart barriers between nations and 
relieve the excesses of nationalism and that “Yugoslavia [was] in a position of 
enlightening other nations to […] overcome the ideologies that divide them.”1001 
Fulbright’s 1964 mission to Yugoslavia was at least two fold. As a U.S. senator, his 
political mission was to repair misunderstandings and low points of the previous U.S.-
Yugoslav bilateral relations. As a politician and intellectual, deeply convinced of his 
liberal internationalist globalism, he came there to affirm his support for the 
independent Yugoslav path as a solution to the world’s ideological and warlike 
contrasts. Additionally, his visit illustrated how foreign policy and public diplomacy 
were serving one another’s purposes and how they were intrinsically reflecting one 
another. 
                                                 
998  Zabilješka o razgovorima dr. Vladimira Popovića, predsjednika Odbora za spoljne poslove i 
međunarodne odnose SIV i James William Fulbrighta, Nov. 7, 1964, 611/5, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi 
stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
999  Zabeleška o izlaganju Predsednika SFRJ Josipa Broza Tita u razgovoru sa predsednikom 
Spoljnopolitičkog komiteta Senata SAD, James William Fulbrightom, Nov. 14, 1964, Box I-3-a/107-132, 
Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT; Zabeleška o razgovoru Predsednika SFRJ 
Josipa Broza Tita sa predsednikom Spoljnopolitičkog komiteta Senata SAD, James William Fulbrightom, 
Nov. 14, 1964, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJBT. 
1000 Zabeleška iz neformalnih razgovora druga V. Popovića i sa Senatorom W.J. Fulbrightom, Nov. 11, 
1964, 611/3, Box I-3-a/107-132, Prijemi stranih ličnosti i delegacija, KPR, RG 837, AJ. 
1001 Izjava senator J.W. Fulbrighta povodom potpisivanja sporazuma o razmeni u oblasti obrazovanje 
između Jugoslavije i SAD, Nov. 9, 1964, Box 1, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i SAD, 
RG 472, AJ. 
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6.4.2 The Fulbright Program Changed My Life…: The First Five 
Years (1965-1970) 
Soon after Senator Fulbright departed, the Yugoslav-American Bi-national 
Commission proceeded by opening the first competitions in December. The first year of 
the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia, 1965/1966,  provided 12 complete grants for 
Yugoslav and American post-graduate students, researchers, teaching assistants, 
lecturers and professors, 12 additional travel grants for scholarships to U.S. universities 
and 5 grants for American post-doctorate researchers provided by the Yugoslav Federal 
Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.1002 In the following years, 
the interest of applicants and the number of grants increased rapidly: from 88 
applications in 1964 to 215 in 1970.1003 The number of grantees confirms these trends: 
in 1967, the Commission provided 38 Yugoslav and 16 American grants,1004 while in 
1970 the numbers rose to 55 Yugoslavs and 17 Americans. Finally, the first five years 
of the Fulbright program resulted in 254 grants to Yugoslav and 112 to American 
professors, scholars, and researchers. 1005  As John Lampe pointed out, the Fulbright 
program in Yugoslavia was the second largest program in Europe, after West 
Germany.1006 
During the first five years, the majority of the Yugoslav grantees (77 percent of 
them) came from the major and prestigious Yugoslav universities: Belgrade, Zagreb and 
Ljubljana. 1007  Speaking in geographical and strategical terms, these three cities 
represented the core points of the U.S. public diplomacy activities in Yugoslavia, 
equally if referring to the USIS libraries, the Cultural Presentation Program or the Trade 
                                                 
1002 Informacija o Fulbrightovom programu, June 16, 1965, 1203, Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
1003 Yugoslav-American Commission Meeting, Jan. 21, 1965, Box 2, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu 
između SFRJ i SAD, RG 472, AJ and 42nd Meeting, June 11, 1970, Box 2, Komisija za prosvetnu 
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1004  Godišnji izvještaj Jugoslovensko-američke komisije za Fulbrajtov program od januara 1965. do 
oktobra 1966., May 12, 1967, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni 
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RG 319, AJ. 
1006 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 292–293. 
1007  Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanje (Fulbrajtov program), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, 
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Fairs exhibition program. Concerning gender divisions, the 1965-1970 years indicate an 
unexpected female presence of 22.5 percent in a period when the Yugoslav academia 
was male-oriented at around 90 percent. Moreover, the data shows an unexpected high 
degree of senior scholars, mostly researchers, academicians, lecturers at around 53 
percent of the total.1008 These last figures reveal the Yugoslav predominance in the Bi-
national Commission and the lobby effect of the Academic Committee. Indeed, while 
the Fulbright program was essentially inclined towards young post-graduate students, as 
those most predisposed to impact and influence, the Yugoslav part of the Commission 
pressed and obtained favorite senior scholars for local university needs. 
The annual plans of the Fulbright Commission for Yugoslavia comprehended 
several major projects: the Yugoslav studies in the Yugoslavia States; the American 
studies in Yugoslavia; the natural, technical and technological sciences; the social 
sciences and education; financial aid to seminars in Yugoslavia; and the art and human 
sciences.1009 The Commission also served other exchange programs either by selecting, 
by interviewing their candidates, or by financially supporting them. Some of these 
exchange programs included the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
program with the Yugoslav universities, the Portland State University program with the 
University of Zagreb, the Skopje University and Chicago State College program and the 
Split Seminar of the local Law Faculty, covered financially by the USIA.1010 
The major battle internal to the commission was the decision as to which projects 
would be privileged. The Yugoslav authorities strongly lobbied and ensured the 
prevalence of the natural, technical and technological sciences grants for their university 
needs, against the U.S. pressures and requests for more human and social sciences 
projects and grantees.1011 The Yugoslav position was justified by the fact that, as the 
                                                 
1008 These data was obtained by intersecting archival sources from Box 2, 124, 145, RG 472, AJ; Box 
240, RG 318, AJ and Box 61, RG 319, AJ. 
1009  Saradnja SFRJ-SAD u oblasti obrazovanje (Fulbrajtov program), Nov. 1970, 021/1, Box 61, 
Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, 
RG 319, AJ: 15. 
1010 43rd Commission Meeting, Sept. 14, 1970, Box 2, Komisija za prosvetnu razmenu između SFRJ i 
SAD, RG 472, AJ. 
1011 Prilog 1: Informacija o sprovođenju zadataka iz programa razmene u oblasti prosvete između SFR 
Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, June 2, 1969 enclosed in Predlog za učešće u finansiranju 
programa razmene u oblasti prosvete između SFRJ i SAD (Fulbright programa), June 11, 1969, 01.1092, 
Box 640, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. 
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deputy director of the Bi-national Commission Petar Bošković stated in 1967, the Ford 
Foundation scholarships were already covering the human and social sciences 
studies.1012 For the Yugoslav academic community, the United States became the Mecca 
for ambitious Yugoslavs, especially in the social, theoretical and applied sciences. The 
Yugoslav scientists who were trained in the United States brought back home not only a 
stimulating research experience, but also remarkable academic contacts. Their 
experience in the United States meant a very rapid and undisturbed professional 
progression.1013 
Ranko Bugarski, a professor of English and General Linguistics at the University of 
Belgrade, retired in 2000, described in this manner his Fulbright experience: “I 
remember this as one of the greatest and most cherished experiences of my academic 
and private life. It opened up new and lifelong vistas, although I was not a beginner 
then.1014 I have many happy memories. I think the Fulbright program was a precious 
endowment to mankind.” 1015  Taib Šarić, another Fulbright grantee, nowadays an 
academician and agronomy professor at the University of Sarajevo, recalls that, even if 
he felt American people had poor interest in other countries, their political systems and 
way of life, “I thank the Americans for this kind of intellectual help.”1016 The expression 
of gratefulness for the Fulbright experience is recurrent in many alumni testimonies. 
Petar Grgić, a grantee from the University of Zagreb in 1965/1966, sent a letter to the 
Bi-national Commission in 1967 stressing how the program was worthy not only from 
the professional but also “from international and human relationship viewpoint.” “All 
Americans that I met – he continued – were very pleasant and fine people, all of them 
[trying] to help, and if one needs anything, they will happily help you. They will never 
                                                 
1012 Izvještaj o boravku u SAD druga Petra Boškovića enclosed in Ante Rukavina to Vukašin Mićunović, 
Jan. 10, 1968, Box 61, Kulturno-prosvetne veze sa inostranstvom 1967-1971, Savezni savet za 
obrazovanje i kulturu 1960-1971, RG 319, AJ. 
1013 Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4. This was 
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Telephone Interview on Aug. 25, 2015. 
1014 He was already abroad in 1962/1963 at the University College London and in 1966/1967 at the 
Columbia University, as a Ford Foundation Visiting Scholar. 
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let one feel left alone in a foreign country, and therefore one should know how to 
appreciate this.”1017 
Many other personal stories, like the one of Marijan Bošković, a 1966/1967 
Fulbright grantee from the Zagreb Institute of Food Research and Technologies (Institut 
za istraživanje i tehnologiju hrane) who obtained his MSc. in Food Science and 
Technology at the MIT in 1968,1018 became international adventures as well as resulting 
in high-ranked careers. The story of Marijan Bošković is symptomatic: he married an 
American woman working for the Boston University Medical School and then returned 
to Zagreb where he enrolled for a PhD. in Biotechnologies. He also served in the Zagreb 
City Assembly from 1969 to 1972 as a Councilor of Cultural and Educational Affairs. 
Out of curiosity, he translated into Croatian the Apollo 13 space-ground 
communications during three live broadcasts by Zagreb RTV in 1970 and interviewed 
the astronauts when they visited Yugoslavia. Hired by Coca Cola’s European 
headquarters in Rome in 1972, he stayed in Italy until 1974 when he moved to the 
United States, which turned out to be his final destination in life. It was there that 
Marijan had an extraordinary career at General Foods (today Kraft Foods), progressing 
from Research Scientist to Research Specialist to Research Principal and exploring new 
scientific discoveries over antioxidants. His international career reflected on his family 
too, so that his two children actually spoke Croatian, Italian, and English. 1019  His 
example, as that of many others, symbolizes effectively what was the consequence of 
the Fulbright program in many micro-histories: internationalized families, careers and 
worldviews. By the end of the 1960s, the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia was still 
facing some recurrent problems: the low convertibility of the dinars for purchasing 
                                                 
1017 Airgram 359 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Nov. 24, 1967, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. This kind of 
appreciation can be found in many studies collecting Fulbright Alumni feedback, as for example: Richard 
T. Arndt and David Lee Rubin, eds., The Fulbright Difference: 1948-1992, Studies on Cultural 
Diplomacy and the Fulbright Experience (New Brunswick ; London: Transaction Publishers, 1993) and 
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Transformations. (New Brunswick, N.J. (U.S.A.): Transaction Publishers, 1987). 
1018  Twenty Years of the Commission for Educational Exchange between the USA and Yugoslavia, 
Belgrade 1984, Box 10, Series III, J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board Records, MC 1279, 
UAL: 58. 
1019 Paula Gordon, “Dr. Marijan Ante Bošković - In Memoriam,” Translation Journal 12, no. 4 (October 
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international tickets and undersized amount of the grants.1020 Beside financial problems, 
the lack of housing facilities in Yugoslavia and lower standards of living, of which the 
American wives complained frequently to the Embassy, introduced the unwritten rule of 
favoring American grantees without young families or small children.1021 
6.4.3 Yugoslav versus U.S. Soft Power 
The 1969 saw the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Fulbright scholarships 
program in Yugoslavia. With an exchange of letters on December 19, 1968, the U.S. 
Ambassador Charles B. Elbrick and the President of the Federal Council on Education 
and Culture, Vukašin Mićunović, extended the program for another four years. 1022 
Under the pressure of John Richardson Jr., the Assistant The Secretary of State for 
Educational and Cultural Affairs (the head of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs), the Yugoslav government agreed to participate in cost sharing the program in 
the months that followed. The official announcement was made in September during 
Richardson’s visit to Belgrade. The Yugoslav side – it was accorded – would contribute 
with 20 percent of the annual budget, and in fact in 1970 the Yugoslav government (and 
after 1971 the Yugoslav republics) participated with 375,000 new dinars and 525,000 
the year after.1023 “This decision – stated the Department’s memo – [is] the first of its 
kind with a communist country.”1024 
Nevertheless, did the Yugoslav side consent to cost sharing the program only 
because it had a high consideration of its benefits? It might be possible; however, it is 
highly plausible that the Yugoslav acquiescence was partly due to a limited political 
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crisis generated by the fire in the Fulbright offices in Belgrade of some months earlier 
before the accord was deliberated. Indeed, in the night between July 21 and 22 1969, a 
group of unknown persons broke into the head office of the Bi-national Commission, 
set fire to, and vandalized the office. The incident caused damage to the facility and a 
partial loss of the files. The Yugoslav government expressed embarrassment and treated 
the case with high concern. They engaged the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Koča 
Popović, the Director of Division for the USA and Canada, Cvijeto Job, then Krsto 
Crvenkovski as the Secretary for Education and Culture of the SIV to assure the 
maximum effort in their investigations. 
The Yugoslav members of the Commission appeared to agree that the arson was 
politically motivated. In the Embassy’s perspective the accident was procured by the 
anti-American Stalinist hard-liners who could not accept the American “success of 
Apollo 11,” the “obvious sympathy of the Yugoslav population for the United States,” 
“the well growing ties between the two countries”1025 and Vice President Humphrey’s 
visit to Yugoslavia occurring in those days.1026 In fact, an Embassy counselor reported 
that on July 21 there were some verbal incidents made by some young people at the 
USIS library in Belgrade during the television broadcasting of the Moon landing of 
Apollo 11.1027 
The Yugoslav authorities were concerned about the possible political repercussions 
of the 1969 fire incident because they saw the Fulbright program from a pragmatic and 
utilitarian perspective, as a need for their scientific and technological advancement. On 
the one hand, they considered the State Department’s annual appropriations to the Bi-
national Commission a “weapon of political pressure.” 1028  On the other, even if 
conscious that the “Americans have some good reasons for pursuing the program,” they 
stated that “with better organization and coordination […], the advantage of the other 
                                                 
1025 Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4. 
1026 Federal Council on Education and Culture to Gagović, secretary of SIV, July 22, 1969, 34/69, Box 
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side [could] be easily minimized.”1029 Certainly, their position strongly contradicted 
with their attitude towards the U.S. cultural mission in Yugoslavia of which the 
Fulbright program was an implementation. The Ideological commissions of the CC, the 
Socialist League of the Working People of Yugoslavia (SSRNJ) and the City 
committees never stopped considering the U.S. cultural penetration in Yugoslavia with 
great concern: as highly dangerous, these activities had to be limited, since they could 
not be stopped.1030 The Yugoslav contradictory practices of a “hard line” towards the 
USIS activities in the field and a “soft line” towards the cultural exchange program 
reveal more than a differentiation of interests among the Yugoslav party ranks. The 
positive views on the cultural cooperation and exchange programs expressed by many 
middle ranked Yugoslav leaders indicate to what extent the Yugoslav Communist 
League was a fractioned party leadership that diverged on economic reform and national 
priorities as well as on their position towards the West and the United States.1031 
The Yugoslav government and its agencies strongly favored the Fulbright program 
as a resource of internationalizing high academic education, developing long-term 
research projects, contributing to American, science, social, Slavic and human studies, 
and assisting technological advancement, such as rationalization in industrial 
production. 1032  They were also extremely satisfied with the candidates’ screening 
procedures that, in their opinion, left them space for maneuvering for their own 
interests.1033 
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For the U.S. policymakers, the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia was, with no 
doubt, a plain success: the Yugoslav Fulbright alumni and the U.S. Fulbright specialists 
were “now to be found in all of the Yugoslav Republics, in every Yugoslav city, in 
every Yugoslav university and at most of the university faculties.” In their view, by 
participating in the program, the Yugoslav leadership showed themselves to be 
“prepared to gamble that the desired technical advances can be made without a total 
dislocation of socialist ideology.”1034 In the opinion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, 
there were three major positive collateral effects of the cultural exchange programs with 
Yugoslavia. The first immediate benefit was the increase of personal contacts and 
mutual trust; the other two effects, the moderate policy reforms and liberalization 
practices introduced in Yugoslavia in the 1960s and the benefits for the foreign policy 
bilateral relations, were contemplated as long-term consequences. The grants for visits 
and study in the United States were “avidly sought by Yugoslavs” and their immediate 
effect was that leaders and academics became “more cooperative [because of] the 
courtesy and honor extended to them.” In this direction, it became noticeable that 
exchange travel to the United States “has not only lost the stigma of «courting 
capitalism» which tended to discourage some Yugoslavs from seeking and accepting 
invitations in past years,” but conversely, such invitations became a respected status 
symbol among the Yugoslav elites.1035 
Regarding the second collateral effect, the U.S. diplomatic representatives were 
profoundly convinced that the Yugoslav moderate tendencies in political and economic 
reforms were in fact a reflection to “some extent of this [Western] influence.” Although 
the political character of the environment to which these Yugoslavs returned created 
impediments for the free discussion of certain ideas or inclinations, in private talks with 
the Embassy officers (and “presumably with trusted friends”), there was no question but 
that these visits served in a major way to advance the U.S. interests in Yugoslavia. As 
the U.S. alumni “advance[d] in positions in the Party, executive government or 
academia,” specified a 1967 Embassy memo, “the influence of American thought and 
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ideals has penetrated Yugoslavia, moderated traditional communist-socialist values and, 
in forms acceptable to that dogma, penetrated other countries with governments of 
similar persuasions.” 1036  The U.S. representatives deemed that many Yugoslav 
innovations among economists, cultural leaders and opinion molders stemmed from the 
personal experiences of Yugoslav grantees in United States and from the exposure of 
Yugoslavs to American grantees who visited Yugoslavia. Lastly, the cultural exchange 
programs had a positive general effect on the treatment of the negative inclinations in 
mutual foreign relations: the effect was particularly visible during the Vietnam 
conflict, 1037  which underpinned a series of antiwar sentiment in Yugoslav political 
speeches, popular culture and street demonstrations.1038 
The analysis of the Fulbright program in Yugoslavia brings to our attention several 
innovative conclusions. Both sides considered the program a tremendous success and 
both agreed that it had created not just another new exchange program, but instead a 
mechanism of exchanges on a new organizational basis (the Bi-national 
Commission).1039 After the program became operational, the Yugoslav government and 
party members almost totally abandoned a negative anti-American rhetoric on the 
cultural exchanges and took a pragmatic position.1040 Such a policy demonstrates that 
the Yugoslav experiment was possible and shows by which modalities it was realized. 
The Yugoslav “oxymoron” became the Yugoslav experiment in itself, a product of the 
Cold War binaries that originated the Yugoslav “third-way,” its non-aligned position. 
The contradictory position on U.S. propaganda was only a collateral effect of such 
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policies. Searching for this new identity characterized the history of Yugoslavia and 
became its “nation branding” transnational practice.1041 
For the Washington Democratic administration generally, and Senator Fulbright 
particularly, the Yugoslav Fulbright program was a matter of Cold War strategy. To 
Washington’s right wing anti-communist hard liners, Senator Fulbright proposed an 
alternative, in which he believed with profound personal commitment. Johnson’s 
opponent in the election race, Senator Barry Goldwater, a convinced anti-communist, 
was defeated in the 1964 elections. The agreement with Yugoslavia of November 1964 
symbolically pointed to peaceful negotiation as the solution of the Cold War 
binaries.1042 The Fulbright’s visit to Belgrade seems to hide much of this intention and 
the Yugoslav Cabinet reports sustain this interpretation. Finally, the Fulbright program, 
as part of the U.S. public diplomacy agenda that operated in Yugoslavia, exerted its soft 
power on the Yugoslav leadership (and leaderships), opinion molders and public. How 
the two major U.S. state programs, the Leader’s Exchange Program and the Fulbright 
program, intersected the so-called state-private network in the binaries between public 
and cultural diplomacy, will be addressed in the conclusive part of this chapter. 
6.5 The Role of the State-Private Networks in the Public 
Diplomacy Agenda 
 
The private exchanges contributed significantly to CU objectives [since they] 
strengthen ties between institutions, and reach key intellectual government 
officials who play an important role in development and progress in 
Yugoslavia. Private exchanges have the added impetus of indicating to the 
Yugoslavs the amount of American voluntary interest in their country.1043 
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According to the “Summary of educational exchange between Yugoslavia and the 
United States,”1044 there were 13 state-based programs and some 37 to 40 private and 
semiprivate cultural exchange programs undertaken in Yugoslavia by the U.S. 
government, private foundations and associations. Sometimes, even the state-based 
programs involved private actors too, as we observed in the case of the Fulbright 
program when the U.S. universities provided allocations for the Yugoslav grantees. 
Recent historiographical work has exposed the irreplaceable role of the state-
private network in the Cultural Cold War in which the U.S. cultural strategy elaborated 
a “system of ‘gray’ propaganda disseminated by witting the ‘private’ allies of the 
State.”1045  Many new bright historiographical accounts have framed the role of the 
private “players” and intelligentsia as autonomous subjects but also their interference 
with the State power network as in the case of the European Congress for Cultural 
Freedom (CCF). 1046  The intention of many private organizations dealing with the 
European nations and societies was to enhance “person-to-person familiarization of 
Americans and Europeans of all strata of society”1047 and to prevent the spreading of 
communism. The private involvement seemed natural in a society with a strong 
philanthropic and individualistic tradition and many were convinced that the “victory in 
the battle for men’s minds demands the cooperation of individual American citizens, of 
business groups, and of all our many private organizations.”1048 
The network of private and semi-private actors managing the cultural cooperation 
and the exchange programs in Yugoslavia was extensive and differed by methods, 
personalities and universities, involvement and time range. It is not the intention of this 
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study to give a comprehensive account of it, since it would necessitate a different 
methodological approach, but rather to evidence its range from a quantitative and 
qualitative perspective, and its interconnection with the public diplomacy dimension 
and power, namely the U.S. governments, and ultimately the interconnections of foreign 
relations and philanthropy in the Cold War context. 
Among those defined as “state programs,” the Fulbright and the Leader’s Exchange 
Program were the leading ones, nevertheless coexisting in collaboration with the 
Yugoslav Commission for Cultural Relations Grants that provided the U.S. scholars 
fellowships for specialization in various fields, while the Fulbright Commission 
arranged for the travel grants. Another state program was the Inter-Agency Foreign 
Journalist Program, a platform sponsored and financed jointly by the White House, the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense and the USIA and which offered 30-
day tours of the United States. On the other hand, the Inter-Country Lecture Program, 
financed from the general operating expenses of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, the 
Inter-Foundation Lecture Program, operating under the Fulbright, as well as the 
American Specialist Program, were all bringing lecturers to Yugoslavia for short 
periods. Similarly, the American Professor Program sponsored directly by the State 
Department, arranged for U.S. professors to lecture for a semester or on a yearly basis at 
a Yugoslav university. 
The Textbook Translation Program, based on a P.L. 480 agreement for translating 
and publishing American authors’ works into Yugoslav languages, supplied scientific 
and bestseller literature free of charge to universities, libraries, schools, and scientific 
institutions  (for instance the 1966 agreement included the translation, printing and 
distribution of up to 250 new works over a five-year period). The other two book 
programs were the Library of Congress and the Yugoslav Institute of Bibliography 
Agreement and the Information Media Guarantee Program. The first one, established in 
1960, provided an exchange of bibliographic information and materials, which were 
therefore made more easily available in both countries. The latter one was a very early 
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one, agreed already in 1952, and permitted American books, periodicals, newspapers 
and authors’ rights to be imported and paid in dinars.1049 
Besides these state-based programs directly pertaining to the cultural and academic 
sphere, Yugoslavia was assisted by several aid programs, which consisted in technical, 
technological and scientific support of its internal development. The foremost was the 
International Technical Cooperation Program, otherwise known as the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (TCA) or International Cooperation Administration (ICA). 
Under these programs, initiated in the early 1950s, Yugoslav engineers and other 
experts were trained in the United States, while American and European specialists 
were sent to Yugoslav production facilities, construction sites or energy production 
centrals, where they provided consultancy and technical assistance. On similar grounds 
and methods the Agency for International Development (AID), the Counter-Part funds 
program, the CARE program, the AID program with Pittsburgh University, the Foreign 
Operations Administration and the Kentucky University exchange program on 
agriculture, forestry and technologies operated. 1050  In a similar way, the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), financed again by the P.L. 480 
funds, supplied a number of medical and public health research projects, administered 
jointly by U.S. and Yugoslav institutions, generally involving research carried out in 
Yugoslav institutes with facilitative assistance given by the U.S. personnel and 
institutions. According to the CU statistics, the program of the U.S. Department of 
                                                 
1049 Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966.For the 
initiation of the book and translation program in Yugoslavia in the 1950s, see Chapter 2, Book 
Translations, IMG and the P.L. 480 Programs. 
1050 This area of study remains today a highly neglected one in historiography. To date, only John R. 
Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since 
World War II (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990) have partially dealt with these issues. The number 
and extension of the U.S. technical assistance to Yugoslavia during the first two decades of the Cold War, 
seems extremely variegated and far-reaching. The Pregled review reports for instance that between 1952 
and 1961, 768 Yugoslavs went to the United States where they specialized in agricultural technologies 
through the TCA program, while in the same period 34 specialists offered their expertise and knowledge 
to Yugoslav industrial facilities (“Jugoslavija – SAD,” Pregled Nov. 1962, 63). Reports of American 
engineers and technical consultants on industrial production organization, hydroelectric centrals, hybrid 
corn production, nut crops, nursery program, fish culture, mining, road construction, highway, and 
transportation, can be found in Boxes 2705 and 2706, Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP 
and in Boxes 238 and 240, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i 
kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
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Agriculture ensured approximately 20 projects, including research on peppers, cereals, 
fruits, trees, plant pests and parasites.1051 
The widest and all-encompassing private program in Yugoslavia was certainly the 
one of the Ford Foundation. The Ford representative, Wallace Nielsen, visited 
Yugoslavia in 1958 and initiated negotiations with the Yugoslav government. 
According to his commentary to the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, he found 
“overwhelming interest among high-ranking Yugoslavs to his suggestion that the 
foundation might set up a program here.”1052 The setup of the Ford program occurred in 
1959 and enabled the Yugoslav students to study in the United States or provided 
research grants for senior scholars focused mostly on education, business economics, 
social and human studies, art, journalism, television, urbanism and linguistics.1053 From 
1959 to 1968, the Ford Foundation gave grants to 188 Yugoslavs to specialize in the 
United States for six to ten months periods.1054 Following the Skopje earthquake of 
1963, the Foundation invited ten engineers, architects, and planners to the United States 
and financed visits to American and European universities by the representatives of the 
University of Skopje who were planning the redevelopment of the destroyed city.1055 
Many famous Yugoslav politicians, intellectuals, artists and scientists completed a 
Ford experience in the United States during the 1960s. Among them were Miladin 
Životić, Gajo Petrović, Mihailo Marković and Veljko Korać, part of the group of 
philosophers and supporters of an anti-dogmatic Marxism, dissenters with the official 
political party Marxist dogma, founders of the Korčula Summer School and editors of 
the Praxis review that lasted from 1964 to 1974.1056 Others, such as the famous Serbian 
vanguard artist, Olja Ivanjicki, and Miodrag Protić, the founder of the Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Belgrade, represented the most renowned Yugoslav art 
personalities. Finally, one of the famous Ford grantees was Savka Dabčević-Kučar, a 
                                                 
1051 Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966. 
1052 Despatch 415 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Feb. 24, 1958, 
511.683/2-2458, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
1053 Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966. 
1054 Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih,” 167. 
1055 Private Sector Forum, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
1056 On the interconnections of the Praxis school of reformation Marxism and the U.S. public diplomacy 
agenda, see Chapter 7. 
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Croatian party leader, president of the CC of the League of Communists of Croatia, 
president of the Republican government from 1967 and a dissident during the 1971 
Croatian Spring.1057 
The personal accounts of Protić and Dabčević-Kučar have a special meaning in the 
aftermath of their return to Yugoslavia. In fact, Protić wrote to the Ford representatives 
in Yugoslavia stating, “America changed my personality and in some way completed 
it.”1058 He stayed in the United States in 1963 where he visited the New York museums 
and engaged in a lifelong friendship with Alfred Barr, the founder and first director of 
the Museum of Modern Art. After his return, he implemented what he learned on the 
other side of the Atlantic: he projected the Yugoslav Museum of Contemporary Art on 
the New York example, both externally in the majestic vanguard cubic architecture, and 
internally in the thematic and non-chronological artworks sequence. Symbolically, the 
Museum opened on October 20, 1965, on the Yugoslav Liberation Day, in the presence 
of Aleksandar Ranković, the head of the Yugoslav secret services that was to be 
dismissed in 1966.1059 It was the Yugoslav oxymoron palpable in real life and historical 
events.  
The story of Dabčević-Kučar is not symptomatic only for the 1971 outcome.1060 
Savka Dabčević went on a Ford grantee as professor of economics and was one of the 
first women who obtained a PhD. in Economics in Yugoslavia. Her dissertation theme 
on “J. M. Keynes: the Theorists of State Capitalism” was certainly an unconventional 
one. In 1960/1961, she stayed in the United States and France on a Ford grant. In the 
aftermath of her return, she authored and co-authored many books on capitalist 
economy and the Yugoslav integration into the market economy, such as “Decentral and 
socialist planning: Yugoslavia” as a chapter of “Planning Economic Development” 
(1963) and “The Political Economy of Capitalism” (Politička ekonomija kapitalizma) 
(1967). Moreover, during the 1960s she contributed to the “White Book” (Bijela 
knjiga), a first study in economic reform, jointly with Većeslav Holjevac, Zagreb’s 
mayor and another Croatian dissident in the 1971 Spring, and other leading Croatian 
                                                 
1057 Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi.” 167. 
1058 Ibid. 
1059 Radina Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam. Amerikanizacija jugoslavenske popularne kulture šezdesetih 
godina XX veka (Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2012), 234–237. 
1060 For more details on the Croatian Spring, see Chapter 7. 
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pro-market economists.1061 Whether she was chosen by the Ford Commission for her 
innovative points of view on economic matters or for her high position in the Croatian 
republican government, it is undisputable that her permanence in the United States 
shaped her views on Western capitalism and her interests in market-led reforms. 
Besides the Ford Foundation, the other private programs running in Yugoslavia 
were related either to university cooperation or to cultural or philanthropic associations. 
The list is long, although the most relevant were certainly the Eisenhower Exchange 
Fellowship,1062 the Cornell University Regional Planning Project,1063 the University of 
Indiana Project,1064 the Oak Ridge Associated Universities,1065 the Regional Council for 
International Education Project,1066 the University of Minnesota Project,1067 the Harvard 
University Milman Parry Collection Project, 1068  the Experiment in International 
                                                 
1061 Savka Dabčević-Kučar, ’71. – hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol. 1, (Zagreb: Interpublic, 1997), 254 –
283. 
1062 This program provided Yugoslav leaders, of outstanding leadership achievements, six to eight months 
of professional consultations, seminars, field trips, and on-the-job assignments in all parts of the United 
States (John Richardson Jr. to the Department of State, Sept. 12, 1969, Folder 10, Box 21, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). In 1959 and in 1960, it enabled a 
member of the National Assembly of Slovenia and a member of the Executive Council of NR Serbia, 
respectively, to visit and conduct research in the United States. If not otherwise specified, the reference 
for notes 1062 to 1085 are indicated in note 1086. 
1063 Beginning in 1965, the Cornell University and the Urban Institute of Slovenia engaged in a program, 
co-financed by the State Department and the Ford Foundation, for developing urban and regional 
planning. The project consisted of four parts: yearly summer workshops in Ljubljana, yearly training of 
Yugoslav professionals at U.S. universities, a joint research project in Ljubljana, which included three 
American specialists, and the establishment of regional planning research centers in Yugoslavia and the 
United States. 
1064 Financed by the Department of State, this three-year program began in the fall of 1965 between the 
University of Indiana and the Ljubljana Faculty of Economics where it established a graduate business 
administration program. It also included a mutual exchange of professors. This program developed on an 
earlier established annual seminar, held both in Yugoslavia and alternatively in the United States, dealing 
with political and social issues such as regionalism, nationalism and federalism. 
1065  The project, active from 1965 and financed partly by the State Department, included a yearly 
“International Conference on the Development of Science and Technology and their Impact on Society” 
held at Herceg Novi (BIH), and sponsored jointly by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies and the 
Federal Council for the Coordination of Scientific Activities. 
1066  The Regional Council for International Education at Pittsburgh and the Yugoslav Institute for 
Educational Research sponsored a summer seminar in Yugoslavia on the “Educational Trends in 
Yugoslavia and America,” which was financially sustained by the State Department, and covered 12 
American professors’ travel grants to Yugoslavia. 
1067 The project, sponsored partly by the Department of State, developed studies on immigrations from 
Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, which included considerable microfilming of important Yugoslav 
documents and newspapers. The project went into effect on June 1, 1966. 
1068 Co-financed by the Department of State, the project engaged in adding new materials to the Milman 
Parry Collection of South Slavic oral traditional texts at Harvard University. It included the microfilming 
of epic texts and songs with a tape recorder during the summers of 1963 and 1964. 
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Living, 1069  the Great Lakes College Association (GLCA), the Ljubljana University 
Project,1070 the Portland State College and University of Zagreb Agreement,1071 and the 
Salzburg Seminar for American Studies.1072 
A large group of private and semiprivate programs in Yugoslavia was related to the 
social sciences. Carried out by the Ford Foundation and jointly administrated by the 
American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, the 
Foreign Area Fellowship permitted American doctoral and post-doctoral candidates to 
conduct “research interests of imaginative and highly competent social scientists and the 
frontiers of their fields.”1073 Many other programs covered the social sciences area of 
study: the Council for International Programs for Youth Leaders and Social 
Workers,1074 the University of Pennsylvania Program in cooperation with the Yugoslav 
Institute of Social Sciences,1075 the Western Michigan University and the University of 
                                                 
1069  Founded in 1932 and to some extent financed by the U.S. government, the Experiment in 
International Living was a private, non-profit organization engaged in educational exchange, designed to 
develop “mutual respect among the peoples of the world.” In 1965 and 1966, 22 Americans and 5 
Yugoslavs were exchanged each year.  
1070  A yearly seminar held in Ljubljana beginning with 1965 that examined selected aspects of the 
political and social structure of Yugoslavia and the United States. It was sponsored jointly by the 
University of Ljubljana, the Great Lakes College Association and the Department of State, and it included 
American professors, lecturers and students. 
1071 Under this agreement, a group of 25 students were provided with grants to enroll in the University of 
Zagreb to study Serbo-Croatian, Yugoslav history and literature, and a two-year course in Serbo-Croatian 
at Portland College. 
1072  As an independent private organization founded in 1947, it was financed for the most part by 
foundations and individuals from the U.S. and Europe. American professors conducted the series of 
yearly seminars, which continue until today, in order to present “a comprehensive and objective picture of 
the contemporary United States to Europeans.” The first invitation for Yugoslav candidates was released 
in 1958, when the major topics of discussion spanned from the “American Law and Legal Institutions,” 
“American Literature and Criticism,” to “Race and Minorities” (Predlog kandidata za učestvovanje na 
Salešburskom seminaru, March 1, 1958, 0602-113, Box 93, Savjet za kulturu i nauku NRH 1956-1961, 
RG 1599, HDA). 
1073 Summary of Educational Exchange between Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966. 
1074 It provided foreign youth leaders, social workers and specialist teachers with a one-month training in 
social work methods in the United States (Katie Louchheim to the Undersecretary, Jan. 10, 1969, Folder 
9, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). 
1075 Co-sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the State Department jointly, this international project 
carried out both in Poland and India, was conducting a research project “to identify and measure social 
values influencing local political responsibility” in a perspective of cross cultural comparison and 
political integration. 
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Zagreb Educational Research Project,1076 and the Michigan University and the Ljubljana 
University Institute for Sociology and Philosophy. 
The California State College Project, the Iowa Wesleyan Project, the Louisiana 
State University and Belgrade University Seminars Program, the Yugoslav Institute of 
School and Pedagogical Research Project, the American Association of College for 
Teachers in Education, were on their side financed by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare. Several other programs were particularly targeting the younger 
population: the New York Herald Tribune Youth Forum Project (NYHT),1077 the Youth 
for Understanding Teenage Exchange Program,1078 the Multi-Area Educational Travel 
Project 1079  and the Interlochen Michigan Music Camp. 1080  Other minor cultural 
programs for cooperation were the Indiana and Ljubljana University Agricultural 
Seminars, the Samuel Rubin Foundation Agreement, the University of Pennsylvania 
and the University of Zagreb Electrochemical Project, the Hemingway Fund, 1081 the 
Baloković Fund,1082 the Annual Slavic Seminar in Zagreb and Zadar, the International 
Dubrovnik Seminar,1083 and the collaboration of Michigan University and the Biological 
Institute of Ljubljana University. 
                                                 
1076 The Institute of Social Research of the University of Zagreb negotiated with Western Michigan 
University a mutual research in the field of education, which began in 1965 with seminars covering 
social, political and cultural Yugoslav problems. 
1077 This yearly project brought foreign students to the U.S. and sent American students abroad for home 
stays, school visits, seminars and public discussions. There was one Yugoslav student participating every 
year. After the demise of the NYHT, the project passed to be under the World Journal Tribune. 
1078 Operating within the state of Michigan, this reciprocal project brought foreign teenage students to live 
in American homes while attending American high schools. 
1079  Sponsored by the U.S. National Student Association and the Department of State, to provide 
opportunities for students and youth leaders from abroad to see the many different aspects of the U.S. It 
included conferences, travels and home stays. One Yugoslav youth leader participated each year. 
1080 One of the very few projects without federal assistance, it consisted in yearly meetings promoting the 
cause of music in education. In 1966, one Yugoslav representative participated after screening of the 
Federal Secretariat for Education and Culture. 
1081 On June 20, 1966, Mary Welsh Hemingway donated 5455 new dinars to the Yugoslav Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, in order to establish a fund to assist young gifted students dedicated to creative 
writing. 
1082 Joyce Borden Baloković, wife of the later Croatian violinist and political activist, established the fund 
at the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts for young Yugoslav post-graduates wishing to study at 
Harvard University. 
1083 Also known as the Summer School of Hope College, it was initiated by Michael Petrovich in 1972, an 
assistant professor of history and director of the Balkan Area Studies of the Hope College, Michigan 
(Hope College Summer School, 1972, 51/1856, Box 150, Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i 
fizičku kulturu 1965-1979, RG 1415, HDA). 
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A special project of academic collaboration between the U.S. National Academy of 
Science (NAS) and the Council of Yugoslav Academies was created on June 1 1966, 
with a Memorandum of Understanding that provided exchange visits to scholars in the 
field of natural science, especially mathematics. 1084  Another two programs were 
specifically related to journalists and theater actors: the National Association of 
Broadcasts and Foreign Radio Television Journalist Project; and the Kansas University 
Theater Exchange Program. The first one was a 30-day program in the United States 
designed to familiarize foreign broadcasters with the American radio and television 
system with particular emphasis on the news gathering and dissemination process.1085 
The latter had the characteristics of both the Cultural Presentation Program and of an 
exchange program, financed by the State Department, and that comprised of a student 
theater and demonstration team that from summer 1963 had yearly appeared at 
Yugoslav institutions giving presentations on the style and history of American theater. 
Under this program, several Yugoslav students visited the University of Kansas to 
examine the theater program there. 1086  In addition, the MECEA funds assisted in 
carrying out many private exchange programs, like those under the auspices of the 
American College of Cardiology, the Council on Student Travel, the Experiment in 
International Living, the Harvard International Seminar, the International Marketing 
Institute, the U.S. National Student Association and the Youth for International 
Understanding.1087 Under the MECEA umbrella, some 433 exchanges, of whom 344 
were Americans and 89 Yugoslavs, were carried out from 1961 to 1966.1088 
                                                 
1084 The NAS as a private organization of scientists and engineers and the National Science Foundation 
jointly financed the program. 
1085 The program, while officially sponsored by the National Association of Broadcasters, was in fact 
hardly promoted and co-financed by State Department funds. 
1086 This list of private and semi-private actors in Yugoslavia has been created by the intersection of 
several archival resources: Izvještaj Dvonacionalne savetodavne komisije za dugoročno planiranje 
obrazovne, naučno-tehničke i kulturne saradnje između Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije i 
Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, Dec. 2, 1966, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, 
Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ; Summary of Educational Exchange between 
Yugoslavia and the United States, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL; and Private Sector Forum, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
1087 MECEA is the acronym for Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Activities that ensured regular 
annual appropriations by the State Department under the authority of the Public Law 87-256 approved on 
September 21, 1961 (Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1978: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
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As we could observe from the extensive list below, the first half of the 1960s were 
characterized by mounting trends of American private programs involved in 
Yugoslavia. Many of them were focused on enabling Americans to conduct research in 
Yugoslavia in anthropology, linguistics, community development, and industrialization. 
They assisted Yugoslav universities in establishing centers for urban planning, graduate 
MBA programs, university chairs in American Literature and continuing workshops in 
American Studies. Others organized conferences on macroeconomics, legal and 
economic aspects of federalism and educational trends. 
The analysis of the role of the state-private cultural network in Yugoslavia conveys 
three central conclusions. Firstly, the majority of the programs took an intensifying path 
in the biennium 1965-1966, because of the mediation of the Fulbright Commission, 
with the Yugoslav government and institutions, in canalizing those networks. As 
happened in the case of the Fulbright program, most of the exchange networks were 
again concentrated on the three major university capitals: Belgrade, Zagreb and 
Ljubljana. Secondly, the State Department partially financed almost all of these projects 
and programs together with private funding. What is more, some of them, such as the 
Salzburg Seminar in American Studies, commenced as an independent initiative of the 
Harvard University Council, but ended up under the informal control of the U.S. Army 
stationed in Austria, “which amounted to, more or less, ideological conformity.”1089 
Thirdly, we can conclude, by deduction, that these programs involved most of the 
Yugoslav scientific and academic leaders, and many young professionals and party 
ranks; even if we cannot measure quantitatively their impact in detail, still their 
broadness and involvement point to their success. 
                                                                                                                                               
Appropriations, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session (U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1977), 420. 
1088 Private Sector Forum, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
1089 Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United 
States in Austria After the Second World War (University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 165. See also 
Richard Purcell, Race, Ralph Ellison and American Cold War Intellectual Culture (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 75–80. 
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6.5.1 The GLCA Exchange and Danica Purg’s Account: Some Grey 
Sides of an Exchange Story 
The State Department also contributed to the project of the Great Lakes College 
Association and Ljubljana University. Beginning in 1965, the project organized 
seminars on political and social issues in both countries, and study trips to the United 
States for individually selected students.1090 In 1968, Danica Purg, a Slovenian student 
enrolled in the fourth year of the High School of Political Science in Ljubljana, was 
residing in the United States on her GLCA grant. In April 1968, she met the Yugoslav 
Vice Consul in San Francisco, and then sent several complaints and letters to Cvijeto 
Job, who at that time was the Cultural Affairs Officer at the Yugoslav Embassy in 
Washington D.C. In her long reports, she vigorously complained of the treatment she 
was given during her stay at the Kalamazoo College in Michigan1091. She animatedly 
criticized their group escort, Mike Petrovich, who, according to Purg, was a CIA agent 
and a “Chetnik.”1092 The questions she and her fellows from Ljubljana were posed at the 
VOA headquarters in Washington D.C. (during a radio interview), Purg considered 
“provocative and unpleasant.” When her group visited the State Department from April 
4 to 8, 1968, “one of the officials stated that, when President Tito dies, there will arouse 
national conflicts in Yugoslavia […] to which Boris Bergant [one of her fellows] 
responded «I’m sorry but I won’t answer these questions because you are 
provocative».” During her extensive travels throughout the American continent (San 
Francisco, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Kalamazoo, Canada, and New York), Purg 
reported to have felt surrounded by CIA agents.1093 “My feelings here are more a protest 
                                                 
1090 In September 1965, for example, an 18-day seminar was held in Ljubljana with the participation of 5 
American professors, 10 Yugoslav lecturers, and 17 American and 16 Yugoslav students (Guy E. 
Coriden, CU/EUR, to John Richardson Jr., CU, Jan. 27, 1970, Folder 12, Box 21, Bureau of Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). 
1091 The Kalamazoo College in the homonymous city was part of the Great Lakes College Association on 
which grantee Purg was staying in the United States. 
1092 Originally, Chetnik indicated a Serbian nationalist belonging to a group that fought against the Turks 
before World War I and engaged in guerrilla warfare during both World Wars. In the post-War Yugoslav 
context, the Chetnik group (Četnici in Serbo-Croatian) comprised a World War II non-homogenous and 
anti-Axis movement led by Draža Mihailović, who pursued a policy of “Great Serbia” and the restoration 
of the monarchy. After the War, Chetniks was the common name for a political enemy for the Yugoslav 
communist regime, for which accusation the outcome was always capital execution. 
1093 Zabeleška o razgovoru Bogomira Liovića, vicekonzula Generalnog konzulata SFRJ u San Franciscu 
sa Danicom Purg, July 5, 1968,26/68, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-
1990, RG 280, HDA. 
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than a paranoid sickness. A protest because for the first time in my life I feel what it is 
like when the «big power» dominates […]. [At the State Department] our whole 
discussion was about Yugoslav nationalism. My fellows and I were very angry,” 
reported Purg to Cvijeto Job. And she continued:  
When we had a meeting at the Hope College, we were disappointed from the very start. They 
showed two movies about Yugoslavia. […] The first one was about the natural beauties of our 
country (made by Pan American).1094 The other one was a ten-year-old documentary […] with a 
lot of biased statements such as that the state controls people who practice any religion, […] that 
it is a dream to have an electric kitchen-range […] and a fridge in Yugoslavia. […] The next day 
we had another discussion and were attacked again.”1095 
Cvijeto Job, a pro-Western oriented Yugoslav diplomat with a large experience in 
the DSIP and the United States, and who brought the issue to Guy Coriden (at the time 
Deputy Director of the Soviet and East European Division at CU), responded very 
cautiously to Purg’s accusations. “Of course, without understating […] we don’t have to 
exaggerate and create a frightening, unusual […] hypertrophied show that everyone 
with whom they [the Yugoslavs] get in contact […] are CIA and FBI agents and 
immigrants with hostile intentions,” but then, he concluded, “it is hard to evaluate the 
«provocative» questions […]. It happens sometimes that our citizens, coming from 
another environment, with different habits and traditions, consider as provocative what 
is here […] pretty normal.”1096 
Revising ones memory after more than half a century and by a final viewpoint, can 
never be an accurate perspective. Nevertheless, the recalled memories of Danica Purg, 
today founder and president of the IEDC-Bled School of Management, Slovenia, and of 
CEEMAN,1097 can be of precious help in reframing her experience in the 1968 United 
States. Purg’s experience is valuable because it represents an exception rather than a 
rule, albeit its suggestiveness rests in revealing the weak points of intercultural 
communication, the perception of and interaction with the Other, and the translation of 
                                                 
1094 The popular Pan American documentary film on Yugoslavia was Wings to Yugoslavia - a Rare 
Kodachrome Film for Pan Am Airways, 16 mm (U.S.: Kodachrome, 1964), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5B6eBAuhvEY. 
1095 Danica Purg to Cvijeto Job, Cultural Adviser at Yugoslav Embassy in Washington DC, May 25, 
1968, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
1096 Povodom zabeleške Generalnog konzulata SFRJ u San Franciscu od 28. maja 1968., Aug. 5, 1968, 
09/592, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
1097  CEEMAN is an association of 219 management development institutions from 54 countries, 
established for the very aim of enhancing managerial business and other practices in Central and Eastern 
Europe (http://www.iedc.si/about-iedc/faculty/danica-purg). 
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political identification into ordinary life. Here are the extracts from Danica Purg’s 
account of her American experience in 1968, as she remembers them today: 
I like to remember my stay in USA with other colleagues from Slovenia. I like to think of the 
fact that I essentially improved my English, I met some great people there, and I learned a lot. I 
heard about the scholarship at the Faculty of Political Sciences, where I studied. […] With 200 
USD that we got as pocket money and a travel check for the same amount, I succeeded, after my 
studies, to travel extensively by plane throughout the USA. I have seen San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, San Diego, Jackson, Dallas, New Orleans, Boston, Chicago and Detroit, as well as 
Washington (the last one together with the entire group). I mention this particular stay in the 
USA very often in my interviews and articles, because it was an unbelievable opportunity I got 
from the USA government. […] Since I was very proactive, I had many great U.S. friends, and 
wherever I went, I had a “friend of a friend” where I could spend some days free of charge.  
Now that you remind me, I am thinking also of the other part of the story: I was shocked by the 
violence in the USA from the beginning to the end of my stay: When our group arrived […], we 
had to stay for four days in a hotel in Washington because of the murder of Martin Luther King. 
This was for me very sad, because I studied political science, […] and I realized what a loss the 
death of Martin Luther King was. During my stay, I had another bad experience: a young black 
person threw a bottle at my head, while I was walking in the park.  
Travelling through the USA, I met (sat together in the plane) with some soldiers returning from 
Vietnam war. This was another thing that shocked me. Some of them had a nervous breakdown 
and travelled home to rest, the others told me with great hatred for communism that they were 
in Vietnam fighting against communism. I was offended to hear that and sorry to see what the 
Vietnam war did to American soldiers. Thus, another frustration. 
At the end of my stay in the USA, Mr. Robert Kennedy was killed. I was active in the group of 
young people – students from Kalamazoo College, preparing his visit to the town for the 
election campaign, going around the private houses to convince people to vote for him, and 
finally even giving him a present from Yugoslavia. […] All these sad events provoked in me 
some doubts about the American democracy, and being an open person, I showed my 
disappointment and emotions. 
Another incident happened when our group was invited to the State Department and there we 
had a long session on Yugoslavia. I still remember the questions “what will happen after Tito 
dies,” which were for me somehow brutal. We lived in a pretty “romantic” environment, we 
liked president Tito, we didn’t feel oppressed by the regime and though that these were not 
questions for “guests.” […] My expectations were different visiting USA the first time, and the 
disappointment was a consequence of that. Visiting USA later again, I liked it much more. I 
started to see other things, like high-class management education, great professors at Harvard 
Business School, great artworks, etc. […] and later on I visited many universities and 
management schools. I developed a great cooperation with Darden Business School at Virginia 
University, Harvard Business School, MIT Sloan School of Management, Boston University, 
Babson College, Claremont University …  
[Was I] a member of the Communist Party [?], Yes, I was a member, but I was accepted in the 
“party” because I was an exemplary good student, and not out of fanatical, ideological reasons. I 
believed in justice, in equal opportunities for the development of people. The fact that I got such 
a scholarship to the USA was also reflecting that. […] Today, I treasure only good memories of 
my first trip to the USA. I like to remember nice friends, great professors, the great trips I made 
throughout the USA […]. And I don’t think it was necessary to forward my complaint to the 
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USA authorities. I was young, full of ideals about the world and I needed somebody who could 
understand and comfort me by talking about that.1098 
 
This controversial memory and experience emphatically evaluates two fundamental 
points: the extensive contributions of these exchange programs to individual successful 
career paths and the specific intercultural and cross-cultural communication relations 
that opened up not only mutual understanding, but misinterpretations, confusions and 
misapprehensions. 
Apart from these exceptional stories in cultural exchanges, discussions and 
meetings on cultural cooperation at the highest levels continued intensively in the 
second half of the 1960s. From November 21 through December 2, 1966, a special, ad 
hoc, Bi-national Advisory Commission between Yugoslavia and the United States met 
in Belgrade to discuss past cooperation and establish new goals.1099 The Yugoslav group 
included some outstanding representatives of the educational and cultural scene. 1100 
Charles Frankel, the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
remarked in the aftermath of the visit, “the results are encouraging […]. The Yugoslavs 
were well prepared […] and […] reached ready agreement for major priority fields for 
exchange for the next five to ten years.”1101 The Commission concluded that “these 
activities [educational, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation] had been both 
successful and useful and had played an important part in the relations of the two 
                                                 
1098 E-mail Interview with Danica Purg, June 6, 2014. 
1099 Not to be confused with the Fulbright’s Bi-national Commission.  
1100 The six Yugoslav members were Dragutin Franković, professor and director of the Yugoslav Institute 
for Educational Research; Tošo Tišma, professor and rector of the Novi Sad University; Slavko Makarol, 
professor and pro-rector of Zagreb University; Dušan Breznik from the Institute of Social Sciences in 
Belgrade; Živorad Teofilić, adviser at the office of the President of the Federal Council for Coordination 
of Scientific Activities; and Miloš Rajačić, head of the department for Western Countries in the Federal 
Institute for International Technical Assistance. The four American members of this Advisory 
Commission were Paul R. Hanna, professor and director of the Stanford International Development 
Educational Center (Stanford University); Merle Curti, professor of History at the Wisconsin University; 
Frederick D. Rossini, professor and Dean of College of Science at the University of Notre Dame and John 
C. Campbell, senior research fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and author of the internationally 
notable study Tito’s Separate Road: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1967) (Airgram A-374 from Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 13, 1966, Box 17, Folder 17, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL). 
1101 Charles Frankel to Katzenbach, Dec. 23, 1966, Folder 5, Box 21, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
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nations.”1102 Both sides agreed to continue cooperation in the areas of mutual interest. 
Firstly, in the cultural fields such as geography, archeology, history, cultural heritage, 
languages, literature, art, political and social institutions, and education, including 
libraries and museums. Secondly, in the area of economic development, management 
and technical training, as well as in the natural sciences and technology. Lastly, in 
topics such as medicine and public health, education, social problems such as 
urbanization, industrialization, and pollution, as well as law and political institutions, 
which were placed among the priority issues. The Commission approved the expansion 
of existing forms of cooperation in the state-private network. Consequently, the 
exchange of individuals (undergraduate and graduate students, lecturers, researchers, 
teachers, artists, musicians and professionals), the cooperation by institutions and 
research centers, the exchange of printed materials such as books, journals, and 
documents but also media devices such as microfilms and tapes, and formal symposia, 
conferences and congresses, would continue to distinguish the next decade of cultural 
cooperation.1103 
 
 
 
6.6 A Win-Win Position or a Cold War Experiment? 
 
[The unique position of] Yugoslavia as a funnel for infusing new ideas and 
concepts into the socialist world warrants special consideration.1104 
 
[The] Yugoslav leadership is avidly absorbing Western management ideas and 
technology as it develops its own socialist self-management system 
increasingly according to market principles.1105 
 
                                                 
1102 Report of the Bi-national Advisory Commission for long term planning of educational, scientific-
technical, and cultural cooperation between the SFRY and the USA, Dec. 2, 1966, Folder 17, Box 17, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL (hereafter Report of the 
Bi-national Advisory Commission, Dec. 2, 1966): i-ii. 
1103 Report of the Bi-national Advisory Commission, Dec. 2, 1966. 
1104 Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4. 
1105 Airgram 366 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Oct. 8, 1970, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. 
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Radina Vučetić suggests that the Yugoslav – U.S. attitudes and policies on and 
towards cultural issues, propaganda, exchanges and cooperation, was a win-win where 
everyone got what they wanted and were therefore satisfied with the outcomes. 1106 
Nonetheless, the insights into how both the leaderships considered and consequently 
treated the cultural cooperation generally, shows us many shades of grey. The Yugoslav 
side struggled for its prevalence in the Bi-national Commission (which profoundly 
irritated the U.S. officials at the early stages of negotiations), maximized the utilization 
of American expertise, but remained extremely dissatisfied and contrary to the U.S. 
cultural propaganda in the field. As we observed, the U.S. Embassy and the USIS post 
in Belgrade provided the U.S. private agencies and networks with a follow-up and 
mediation with the Yugoslav authorities. The Embassy also utilized its personal 
contacts to facilitate the negotiations. After the establishment of the Bi-national 
Commission, the mediation process became easier and the Embassy reports proudly 
emphasized these increasing trends in the second half of the 1960s: stronger cooperation 
between universities from both sides of the Atlantic, new linkages in educational 
disciplines, face-to-face student contacts and especially long-term friendships. “The 
intellectual curiosity and disarming friendliness of the American students [are] positive 
factors in building better relationships among Americans and Yugoslavs” 1107 
commented a 1966 Embassy report. Such an element of mutual friendliness was 
symbolically expressed by Hoyt C. Franchere, Dean of the Department of Arts and 
Letters from Portland State College, to Vida Marković, Head of the English Department 
at the University of Zagreb, when stating “Vida, the hillsides out here are just like those 
in Oregon and your people are just like Americans to me,” to which she replied: “Hoyt, 
why shouldn’t it be like that  all over the world?”1108 Still, more than just creating 
friendships, the exchange programs were involved in a nation building process in which 
the U.S. grantees were “expected to maintain a high image of technical and scientific 
superiority, but at the same time raise the image of personal, moral, humanistic values 
                                                 
1106 Vučetić, Koka-kola socijalizam. 
1107 Airgram 119 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1966, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. 
1108 Hoyt C. Franchere to Cvijeto Job, July 2, 1970, 09 552, Box 43, Republički protokol, Izvršno Vijeće 
Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
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in the United States, which years of propaganda in this part of the world have helped 
distort.”1109 
The analysis of the Leader’s Exchange Program, the Fulbright Program and the 
state-private network in Yugoslavia has illuminated many paths by which soft power 
public diplomacy policies have been implemented. Joint efforts by the State 
Department, the USIA and the CU, were intended to exert political and cultural 
influences on Yugoslav leaders, academics, and specialists. They opened up career 
advancements and channeled Western cultural and political ideas. Moreover, the U.S. 
strategy contemplated and used the Yugoslav special “bridge” position as a lever into 
other Eastern European socialist countries, which looked to Yugoslavia as a mirage of 
freedom and welfare.1110 
The main difference between the Leader’s Exchange and the Fulbright program 
was that, while the first was a unilateral one with all the vital decisions relying on the 
Embassy and the State Department, the Fulbright program was “a more truly bi-national 
project.” Moreover, while the first was concerned with short term academic and leader 
exchanges, the Fulbright program was more appealing for academics interested in long-
term stays abroad.1111 Furthermore, while the Leader’s program relied completely on the 
U.S. budget support, the Fulbright program involved U.S. private institutions, foremost 
universities, and had to be planned an academic year in advance.1112 
As for the Fulbright program, it represented a breaking point in the cultural 
exchange cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States, and was the most 
appreciated exchange program by the Yugoslav highest leaders and party ranks. The 
sign of the Fulbright agreement in Yugoslavia was an unprecedented event in the 
history of the program: Yugoslavia was the first communist country involved, it was the 
                                                 
1109 Airgram 969 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 15, 1968, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC. 
1110 Airgram 969 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 15, 1968, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 14; Airgram 
413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, Eastern 
Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1–4. 
1111 This was in fact a practical outcome of the program targets: while the academics could take a year off 
visiting professorships or research at some American universities, the Yugoslav leaders could not leave 
their political responsibilities for a long period. 
1112  Instruction A-110 from the Department of State to American Embassy Belgrade, Feb. 3, 1958, 
511.683/2-358, Box 2205, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NACP. 
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first communist country whose government financed the program (from 1969), and it 
was the only country where Senator Fulbright came to presence the celebration of the 
agreement. For the Yugoslav government the benefits of the exchange programs seemed 
to be unquestionable. The Yugoslav scientists, who were trained in the United States, 
had considerably advanced Yugoslav technological development, affirmed the Embassy 
from Belgrade in 1969. “A concrete indication of the [Yugoslav] Government’s attitude 
is the fact that, at considerable cost and with little internal struggle, it is contributing 
eight scholarships for Americans to study in Yugoslavia.” 1113  Many memos of the 
Federal Secretariat for Education and Culture confirm this policy direction as this one of 
1969: 
We give a special attention to these relations because of :a) the obvious necessity of using the 
results of American science and technology for our development, especially in the context of 
reforms; b) the stability of these relations that are not directly subject to political oscillations 
[…]; c) the maintenance and exchange of scientific, educational and cultural relations with the 
American intellectual and influential elites (especially at the American universities), which is 
mostly liberal and has a positive attitude towards us and our relations with the United States, 
strengthens and safeguards our valuable political position in the public and political life of the 
United States.1114 
 
This Yugoslav position was expressed following Ambassador William Leonhart’s 
visit to the City Council of Zagreb and the Croatian republican institutions in November 
1969. The talks underlined how the political relations between the two countries were 
“in full equality and mutual respect” and how, after the Soviet occupation of 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia had been further affirmed as an “independent […] factor of 
stability in Europe, in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.” The discussion also 
confirmed the increase of good mutual relations following the Johnson’s administration, 
while the Yugoslav government highly appreciated the halt of bombing of North 
Vietnam and the SALT talks in Paris on anti-proliferation policies. “The active equal 
relations with the United States represent our very interest. They also confirm the 
necessity and possibility of an execution of our concept of peaceful and active 
                                                 
1113 Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4. 
1114 Program posjete ambasadora SAD Williama Leonharta i supruge, Nov. 26, 1969, Box 43,  Republički 
protokol, Izvršno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
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coexistence with countries of other social orders, equal in strength.”1115 The fact that the 
Yugoslav government pursued the cultural exchange programs with the United States to 
affirm its presence and lobby for its interests among the American liberal intellectual 
elites seems an element of great novelty. At the time, the Yugoslav Ambassador in the 
U.S. (1962-1967), Veljko Mićunović, similarly asserted: 
the development of our country, especially in the aspects of economic reform, the reform of the 
education system […] and the full openness of our country, requires […] the use of the highly 
developed science, technology and culture of the United States. The improvement of our 
political relations, which conditions and allows the liberalization of contacts and travels, gives it 
a real foundation.1116 
As Mićunović underlined to Rusk, the cultural exchange programs between the two 
countries were favoring the bilateral relation processes because they were not subject to 
political fluctuations. Moreover, they acted as a corrective of political inclinations and 
crises moments. In addition, for these needs, the Yugoslav government insisted in 
expanding the exchange programs for technological modernization of the national 
human resources. 1117  Undoubtedly, the impact of the exchange programs on the 
economic life of Yugoslavia and, more specifically, on the development of the U.S. – 
Yugoslav trade was beneficial. As the U.S. Embassy reported, the 1968 LEP visit to the 
United States of the director of the Novi Sad International Agricultural Fair was 
responsible for new initiatives, for increased American commercial participation and 
substantial volume of sales.1118 
Looking at the 1960 Yugoslav Press Law, which, by reducing the USIS margins of 
liberty, urged the realization of the Fulbright agreement as well as the increase of the 
LEP, it can be argued that the realization of the cultural exchanges in the 1960s between 
Yugoslavia and the United States, actually realized the goals they were created for. 
These apparently non-political collaborations substantially improved bi-national 
relations and contributed to overcoming misunderstandings and diverging foreign 
relations strategies.  
                                                 
1115 Ibid. 
1116 Materijal i neke sugestije u vezi programiranja saradnje sa SAD u prosvetno-naučnoj i kulturnoj 
oblasti, Nov. 15, 1966, Box 237, SAD, Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za 
obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ. 
1117 Ibid. 
1118 Airgram 413 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 16, 1969, Box 2, 
Eastern Europe, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Microfilm Collection, RSC: 1-4. 
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Aided by the Paris peace talks, the U.S. decision to halt bombing and the effect in Yugoslavia of 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, earlier criticisms of United States foreign policy have all but 
withered away. The […] visit of President Nixon to Asia and Romania has been favorably 
received. Additionally, the recent U.S. space successes have galvanized pro-American 
sentiments in this country and provided a favorable climate for increased cooperation.1119 
Why did the U.S. policymakers accept the Yugoslav predominance in the Bi-
national Commission policy decisions? Why did they invest large amounts of capital in 
so many different exchange programs with an extended private involvement? The 
hermeneutical key relies on the presumption that the U.S. administrations had a political 
calculation based on an investment-return advantage over the expenses undertaken in 
Yugoslavia. Since the early 1960s, they perceived that the Yugoslav leaders were 
changing attitudes and policies, while not giving up on the U.S. field propaganda. They 
recognized positive feedback from the Leader’s, the Fulbright and the Ford Foundation 
programs. They increased personal contacts and counted the results. 
As an intense decade for Yugoslavia’s internal reformation, the 1960s involved 
torrid political debates of Party leadership over three critical issues: the decentralization 
and federalization process and the consequent splitting of political power; 1120  the 
economic reform towards a market-led socialism; and the degree of democratic 
expression permitted to heterodox Marxist political and cultural elites. The U.S. 
diplomats and public diplomacy officials in Belgrade and Zagreb observed these events 
with immense interest and interpreted many of them as being inspired by the U.S. “soft 
power” diplomacy, its private agents and networks, as we shall observe in the last 
chapter of this study. 
                                                 
1119 Ibid. 
1120 This debate profoundly concerned the Croatian communist leaders over the question of national 
autonomy as well as over the independent status of the Croatian language among Yugoslav languages 
(Dragutin Lalović, ed., Hrvatsko i jugoslavensko “proljeće” 1962-1972 (Zagreb, 2015)). 
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7 MEASURING THE IMPACT: 
THE U.S. SOFT POWER AND 
THE YUGOSLAV COLD WAR 
ADJUSTMENT 
Perhaps [the] best [way to] describe the situation in Yugoslavia is by a story 
that I told a USIA director when he asked me: “How is it to work in 
Belgrade?” And my answer was, at the time, if you travel from Sofia to Rome, 
Belgrade looks like Rome. But if you travel from Rome to Sofia, Belgrade 
looks like Sofia. […] At the time I came [in 1960], I had the distinct feeling 
that while of course I worked in a Communist country, in many respects our 
USIS program in Yugoslavia was more like a USIS program in Austria than in 
Budapest. 
Walter Roberts, USIS PAO in Belgrade (1960-1966)1121 
 
Joseph Nye argues that, “in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power,” while 
in terms of resources, “soft-power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.” 
So, if the attractiveness of a soft-power resource can be measured “through polls or 
focus groups,” how can we evaluate if “that attraction in turn produces desired policy 
                                                 
1121 Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- ‘We Had 
Quite a Program There,’” accessed February 22, 2016, http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-
roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html. 
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outcomes”? Nye’s answer is that results have to be judged case by case. Certainly, 
admits Nye, there is a persistent gap, both for hard and soft power, “between power 
measured as resources and power judged as the outcome of behavior.” 1122  Finally, 
similarly as with hard power, soft power attraction “often has a diffuse effect, creating a 
general influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action.”1123  
Put in simpler terms, the impact of soft-power practices and resources is not easy to 
measure. Sometimes because its diffusion is spread and involving way too many actors; 
other times because attractiveness may be both the cause and consequence of certain 
behavioral outcomes; or, simply because, while culture could be “a tool of diplomacy,” 
possibly “instrumentalized to achieve a state’s goals in foreign policy,”1124 the reverse 
could happen, namely culture to exploit diplomacy networks for its own affirmation. 
Yet, both the transmitters (the State Department and its Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, the USIA and its USIS in the field, and their private encounters), the 
receivers (the Yugoslav elites, intellectuals, and students) and the observers and 
receivers (the Yugoslav Central Government, its Foreign Office, and other massive 
organizations) of the U.S. public diplomacy in Yugoslavia, recognized quantitative and 
qualitative criteria by which they evaluated, positively or negatively, the impact of 
American cultural policies and practices, thus contextualizing them in current Yugoslav 
                                                 
1122 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics, 2nd ed. (Public Affairs, 
2009), 23. This means that “public polls can measure the existence and trends in potential […] resources, 
but they are only a first approximation for behavioral change in terms of outcomes. Where opinion is 
strong and consistent over time, it can have an effect, but its impact in comparison to other variables can 
only be determined by careful process tracing of the sort that historians do.” (Joseph S. Jr. Nye, 
“Responding to My Critics and Concluding Thoughts,” in Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: 
Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox 
(Routledge, 2010), 218). 
1123  Nye, Soft Power, 34. This definitional flexibility of soft power – as being rather an ‘analytical 
concept’ or “ideograph for non-coercive influence,” and not a theory – has opened up critics by sceptics 
such as Niall Ferguson and Janice Bially-Mattern, since the lack of specification on the concept has 
produced re-articulations and re-interpretations of its meaning (Niall Ferguson, “Think Again Power,” 
Foreign Policy, February 2003; Janice Bially Mattern, “Why ‘Soft Power’ Isn’t So Soft: Representational 
Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics,” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies 33, no. 3 (June 2005): 583–612, doi:10.1177/ 03058298050330031601). In 
Hayden’s perspective, “soft power should be understood in terms of how certain resources and capacities 
are seen by international actors as both available to them and likely to be effective in persuasion or some 
form of influence” (Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), 36). For the scholarly debate on soft power in public diplomacy, 
see Introduction. 
1124  Volker Depkat, “Cultural Approaches to International Relations: A Challenge?,” in Culture and 
International History, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher (New York; Oxford: 
Berghahn Books, 2004), 177. 
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political and social developments of the 1950s and 1960s. Besides the contemporary 
reports, surveys, analysis, and the oral and written interviews, some of USIA’s core 
ideas – on participatory democracy, individual responsibility and creativity, the 
regime’s critiques, and the multiparty system – entered the Yugoslav public sphere in 
the 1960s, through opposite, unlinked channels and personalities. This conclusive 
chapter aims to analyze the impact of U.S. cultural policies from two points of view: the 
contemporary observers and social science surveys; and the dissident, dissonant, and 
pro-reform voices of the Yugoslav public sphere in the 1960s. 
7.1.1 The Party Measures Impact… 
Attractiveness for a numerous audience, eagerness of the reception of messages, 
and inclusion of participants from all over Yugoslavia, are common to both the USIS 
libraries and its field activities: the presentations of the American way of life at the 
Zagreb and Belgrade trade fairs; the American performers on Yugoslav stages; the 
Voice of America broadcasts; and the cultural involvement of Yugoslavs in the 
exchange programs with the United States. 
70 percent of all foreign propaganda in Yugoslavia, reported the SSRNJ 
Commission for Political and Ideological-Educational Work in 1966, was of U.S. 
origin, while the rest, in decreasing order, of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, 
and France. The foreign centers, by being stocked with newspapers and magazines, 
located in “bourgeois” and fancy districts, attracted, by their high appeal, “many 
hundreds of daily visitors.”1125 Depicted by “bloc and Cold War” representations, the 
U.S. propaganda, while being affected by anti-communist notes, was generally avoiding 
any hostile and direct criticism of Yugoslavia. Ideologically, continued the report, the 
U.S. messages were trying to prove that Yugoslavia, because of the U.S. economic aid 
and its subsequent rapprochement with the “free world,” was abandoning Marxist 
ideology, applying principles of free enterprise market economy, and raising its living 
                                                 
1125 Informacija o problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandnu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-
1966, Box 256,  Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 5. 
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standard and individual liberties.1126 From what we saw in the previous chapters, the 
SSRNJ evaluation was completely correct. 
Pregled, the U.S. major circulating periodical, reported the Secretariat of 
Information in 1969, “ha[d] perfect illustrations,” and “besides being a technically high-
level magazine, it [was] interesting and meaningful. It included topics from various 
fields of science, culture, art, etc., and did so in order to arouse the interest of an 
intellectual audience.” Pregled topics, continued the report, were chosen from among 
those currently under discussion in the Yugoslav public opinion, such as the pension 
system, education, and the welfare state. They were “presented in such a manner, that 
readers could get the impression that these issues had long before been resolved in the 
United States, thanks to its ‘free society’ and the ‘American way of life.’” Not to 
mention that Pregled was printed on glossy and shiny paper by the “most modern 
American printing shop abroad; only the American Embassy in Beirut possessed a more 
modern one.”1127 Indeed, the impact of appealing illustrations and glossy paper cannot 
be underestimated. As Slavenka Drakulić put it, “Once you’ve seen it, it immediately 
sets not only new standards, but a visible boundary.” On the example of Vogue, she 
emphasized, 
For us, the pictures in a [U.S.] magazine were much more important: we studied their every 
detail with the interest of those who had no other source of information about the outside world. 
We tried to decode them, to read their message. And because we were inexperienced enough to 
read them literally, the message that we absorbed was that the other world was a paradise. Our 
reading was wrong and naïve, nevertheless, it stayed in the back of our minds as a powerful 
force, an inner motivation, a dormant desire for change, an opportunity to awaken.1128 
                                                 
1126 Whilst, on the other hand, French propaganda was, by methods and vocabulary, less intrusive and 
political; objective, flexible, and diverse was the British one, mainly propagating the British way of life, 
culture, art, science and the English language. As for the USSR, it transmitted Soviet foreign policy 
views, and its economic, scientific, and technological conceptions and achievements (Informacija o 
problemima vezanim za inostranu propagandnu u našoj zemlji, April 15, 1966, 16/2-1966, Box 256, 
Komisija za politički i idejno-vaspitni rad 1966, SSRNJ, RG 142, AJ: 4). 
1127 Informacija o inostranoj pisanoj informativnoj-propagandnoj delatnosti prema Jugoslaviji, June 17, 
1969, 01-624, Box 565, SIV 1953-1990, RG 130, AJ. In 1966, the Institute of Public Opinion Research of 
Belgrade engaged 16 social scientists and 102 trained interviewers, in order to analyze the impact of the 
publications of foreign embassies. The result was that they had little influence, except Pregled that was 
largely mentioned by the respondents (Memorandum of Conversation, 67049, Jan. 13, 1967, YO6601, 
Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, 
NACP). 
1128 Slavenka Drakulić, How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed (New York; London: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1991), 27–28. 
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That images and messages were a powerful means of propaganda was clear as 
daylight to Yugoslav policymakers. Somehow, and not unexpectedly, discussions over 
foreign propaganda and counteracting plans, appeared on their agendas when bilateral 
relations with the United States were in recession (as between 1961 and 1964), or when 
an internal manifestation of dissidence, such as the student 1968 demonstrations in 
June, suggested possible western and anti-socialist influences. In fact, in mid-1968, the 
Presidency of the Party commissioned Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, scholars from 
the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, to carry out research on foreign propaganda, 
which resulted in a 70-page monograph published in 1970.1129 Discussed before the 
Fifth plenary session of the Presidency of the SKJ, in September 1968, it condemned 
“hostile, illegal propaganda,” that attacked “our country, values and societal traditions.” 
It recognized the strategy of “psychological warfare” towards Yugoslavia, whose main 
protagonists and organizers were “the USIA, the CIA, and NATO’s Atlantic Institute, 
then various emigrational organizations of ‘ustasha’, ‘chetniks’, and 
‘volksdeutchers.’”1130 The discussions on U.S. and Soviet propaganda went on and, after 
the Fifth plenary session in 1969, it deliberated that such propaganda was an 
“imposition of ideological and political concepts and interests of either one or the other 
Bloc;” and that, by being “anti-communist and anti-socialist,” contrary to the principles 
of Yugoslav self-management, interfering with its internal affairs, and linked to foreign 
secret services, it necessitated of an organized opposition as “a sort of self-protection of 
our self-management socialist society.”1131 
Several key points were, therefore, emphasized, namely that foreign propaganda: a) 
intensified in moments of international and internal conflicts, such as the Six-Days 
Israel-Arab war of 1967, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the student and Kosovar 
nationalist protests in 1968;1132 b) was oriented towards “long term goals,” and all social 
                                                 
1129 Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, Kako deluje inostrana propaganda (Beograd: Komunist, 1970). 
1130 Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji – Materijal za razmatranje na 
petoj sjednici Komisije, Sept. 1968, 15-143/10-69, Box 2, XXVI-K.2/1-5, Komisija PSKJ za političku 
propagandu i informativnu delatnost 1965-1978, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ: 31-32 (hereafter Oreč and 
Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, Sept. 1968). 
1131 Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, organiziranje našeg društva u vezi s tim i zadaci SKJ, Dec. 
1969, Box 2, XXVI-K.2/1-57, Komisija PSKJ za političku propagandu i informativnu delatnost 1965-
1978, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ: 3 (hereafter Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, Dec. 1969). 
1132 Kosovo nationalists demonstrated against the Yugoslav government on November 29, 1968. 
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groups, with predominant interest in the humanist intelligentsia, the youth and students; 
c) was successfully exploiting its connections with Yugoslav cultural, scientific and 
educational institutions, and mass communication channels, hence dangerously 
“yugoslavizing” its propaganda; 1133  d) exploited the Yugoslav social and political 
problems (unemployment, foreign debt and investments, etc.) to glorify the political 
assets of its country of origin;1134 and e) gained “larger political influence” through 
broad, indirect and supposing “neutral” cultural contacts, than through its “secret 
agents.”1135 Interestingly, the Oreč-Mićović study recommended three counteractions, 
of which only one gave considerations to the activities of foreign cultural centers. 
Firstly, to develop Yugoslav information and propaganda efforts worldwide; secondly, 
to extend the propaganda activity of the SKJ and other mass organizations towards 
Yugoslav people; and, only as a last measure, to limit the administrative and diplomatic 
actions of the foreign propaganda centers.1136 
But were not these Party propositions conflicting with the Yugoslav open-border 
and non-aligned policy? “The openness of our community to the outside world and our 
willingness to enter into free trade with all countries and, above all, the free circulation 
of people, ideas and experience – is an expression of the strength of our free self-
governing society,” stated the Ninth resolution of the 1969 SKJ Congress. Although, 
such openness held the risk “of various non-Socialist and ideologically reactionary 
attitudes, and covert or openly hostile activities.”1137 Certainly, a discrepancy existed 
between the treatment of foreign propaganda arriving through the cultural exchanges 
and those of the cultural centers, as suggests a comparison between documents coming 
from different agencies. For instance, the Yugoslav Foreign Office positively declared, 
in 1967, that the U.S. universities highly appreciated the Yugoslav grantees, although 
“our people cannot avoid the exchange of political opinions so frequent in the American 
                                                 
1133 Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, Dec. 1969, 4–5, 7. 
1134 The U.S. propaganda, correctly reported the Yugoslav policymakers, was critical towards socialism 
by suggesting that the “the lack of complete freedom and individual liberties as in the West, were the 
weak points of the Yugoslav social system.” (Inostrana propaganda prema Jugoslaviji, Dec. 1969, 8–10). 
1135  Stenografske beleške Pete sednice Komisije Predsedništva SKJ za političku propagandu i 
informativnu delatnost, Oct. 23, 1969, 15-143/10, Box 2, XXVI-K.2/1-5, Komisija PSKJ za političku 
propagandu i informativnu delatnost 1965-1978, CK SKJ, RG 507, AJ: 4/2 SJ. 
1136 Oreč and Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, Sept. 1968, 42. 
1137 Mate Oreč and Vojislav Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, Sept. 1968, 2–3. 
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university circles.”1138 Dragutin Franković, director of the Yugoslav Institute for the 
Study of School and Educational Issues, affirmed, “The open-policy of Yugoslavia 
towards all the countries of the world was not only a far-reaching and wise gesture, but 
has already had long-term results in all areas of economic and social life. […] Science, 
culture, and education, should not remain on the sidelines in this entirely progressive 
process.”1139 Moreover, in 1970, the Federal Commission for Cultural Relations with 
Foreign Countries released an extensive report stating that cultural cooperation with the 
United States was on high-grounds, with more than 50 professors and students on a 
Fulbright, Rubin and Eisenhower foundations’ grant, and more than 400 Yugoslavs 
staying abroad under some exchange program. The fact that the “Americans acted 
coordinately to include their political and ideological goals […] in order to influence the 
education of our future leaders and educational system as whole,” even though their 
system of cultural exchanges seemed decentralized and private, did not bother the 
SKKV officials too much.1140 
The balancing of propaganda and openness was of foremost importance in the 
Yugoslav regime. Yugoslav exceptionalism and international prestige was built upon 
the porosity of its borders. 1141  That different representatives of the Yugoslav 
establishment (from the top Presidency of the SKJ, the massive SSRNJ, to the Federal 
and Republican Commissions of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries), expressed 
diverse positions over foreign propaganda was, what Zimmerman called, “a more 
conciliatory and consensual strategy” evolving in Yugoslav regime-society relations. 
Resulting from a “genuine devolution of power and authority” of the central party 
                                                 
1138 Informacija o naučnoj i kulturno-prosvetnoj saradnje Jugoslavija-SAD, Dec. 14, 1967, 5, Box 61, 
Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ. 
1139 Elaborat o međunarodnim vezama nekih kulturnih i prosvetnih organizacija i institucija, May 1968, 
US 4 BJ, Box 34, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ: 6. 
1140 Pripremanje razgovora o kulturnoj suradnji sa SAD, 1970, file SAD (unregulated files), Komisija za 
kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 1410, HDA. 
1141 By regional socialist standards,” argued Valerie Bunce, Yugoslavia was “unusually decentralized, 
unusually liberalized, and unusually situated with respect to East-West economic and political-military 
rivalries.” (Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999), 53. For references on Yugoslav exceptionalism, look into Armina 
Galijaš, Rory Archer, and Florian Bieber, Debating the End of Yugoslavia (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 
2014); Hannes Grandits, Yugoslavia’s Sunny Side: A History of Tourism in Socialism, ed. Karin Taylor 
(Budapest ; New York: Central European University Press, 2010); and, particularly, the excellent volume 
of Vesna Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History (London; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010) where she exposed as “hollowness” the exceptionalist approach to Yugoslav history.  
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leadership towards an authentically federal system, the SKJ invested “formal state 
institutions with functions associated with such institutions in the Western institutional 
system,” 1142  hence permitting parallel, even conflicting, stances over propaganda. 
However, such devolution of central Party power would not pass the test of dissidence, 
and repeatedly reacted when its legitimacy was somehow questioned. 
7.1.2 The USIA Measures Impact… 
“The soft power of a country rests heavily on three basic resources: its culture 
(in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at 
home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and 
having moral authority).”1143 More crucially, “power depends on context,” but, more 
than hard power, soft power depends “upon the existence of willing interpreters and 
receivers.”1144  Thus, to what extent was the USIA attractiveness recognized among 
Yugoslav “willing interpreters and receivers”? 
As the USIA research correctly emphasized, Yugoslavia was a different case from 
other Eastern European Communist countries. Here communism was imposed by an 
internal and not an external force. This gave Tito a large political legitimation and 
provided his regime with a highly effective weapon in combating internal subversion 
and neutralizing overt opposition. The Marshall’s legitimacy depended on several 
factors: the regime’s identification with a successful war against the German and Italian 
occupation; Tito’s defiance of Soviet efforts to dominate Yugoslavia that made him a 
sort of national hero, “even in the eyes of anti-Communists;” the general feeling of 
Yugoslavia’s international prestige, though much greater than the actual power and 
resources of the country; the abandonment of collectivism; some sort of religious 
toleration; and the popularity of some Yugoslav economic features such as the workers’ 
councils, industrial decentralization, and the expansion of free educational facilities. 
Nevertheless, “it could hardly be said that the Yugoslav people are enthusiastic about 
their government,” commented the USIA. The motives for such an attitude were 
                                                 
1142 Zimmerman defined this devolution of Yugoslavia a departure from the Leninist state-society model 
(William Zimmerman, Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia, 2nd ed., 
Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 44. 
1143 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power, Reprint ed. (Public Affairs, 2011), 123. 
1144 Nye, Soft Power, 34. 
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threefold: a traditional distrust against the government inherited from the Turkish 
domination, the Serbo-Croat national controversy always “in the air,” and “dire poverty 
and discontent,” especially of young people and the higher educated. 1145  That 
dissatisfaction was common among Yugoslav youth is suggested by a 1961 Zagreb poll 
of thousands of Yugoslav university students, which reported that a large percentage of 
students had serious doubts about the validity of Marxist ideology. While 44 percent 
considered the Yugoslav system the best contemporary form of democracy, one third 
replied that Yugoslavia, did not have a genuine democracy like the Western one.1146 
A 1962 poll of 395 Yugoslav refugees, conducted by the Italian Institute for Public 
Opinion of Milan at the San Sabba reception camp near Trieste,1147 and whose U.S. 
origin was purposely obscured, corroborated the widespread economic dissatisfaction in 
Yugoslavia, particularly among the working class. Spiraling prices, housing scarcity, 
and excessive taxes peaked among the refugees’ reasons for discontent. Besides 
economic grievance, they accused the regime of restricted personal freedom and 
privileged treatment for Party members. 1148  Interestingly, while citing the denial of 
fundamental personal freedom as one of the regime’s most harmful acts, few 
respondents were able to name specific losses. They described an atmosphere (“the 
individual has no freedom”) rather than catalogued the acts of repression. 1149  This 
                                                 
1145 Public Opinion in the Satellites and Yugoslavia, Feb. 10, 1961, RN-6-61, Box 4, Research Notes 
1958-1962, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. On the lack of an organized, anti-
communist opposition in Yugoslavia, see Katarina Spehnjak and Tihomir Cipek, “Disidenti, opozicija i 
otpor - Hrvatska i Jugoslavija,” Časopis za suvremenu povijest 39, no. 2 (2007): 255–97. 
1146 A Review of USIA Research, April 1963, R-34-63 (P), Box 13, Research Reports 1966-1990, USIA 
Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP: 7–8. 
1147 The San Sabba facility welcomed the Italian exiles from Yugoslavia, but also refugees of Slovenian, 
Croat and Serbian nationality. The interviews in question were conducted in Serbo-Croatian and 
Slovenian.  
1148 Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, R-27-63, Box 13, Research Reports 1966-
1990, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP  (hereafter Refugee Views on Life 
in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963). The survey report took into account some sampling anti-communist bias, 
but considered the Yugoslav escapees quite representative, since most left the country for economic rather 
than ideological or political reasons (1–2). Among the sample, the proportion of males, young persons, 
Croats and Slovenes was much higher than in the Yugoslav population as a whole, and consisted in urban 
manual workers, professionals, students and white-collar workers. They were more educated than the 
Yugoslav average (3). 
1149 The few who did express specific grievances focused on the workers’ impotence to appeal against 
arbitrary rules and decisions, curbs on communication with foreign countries, and the presence of 
political prisoners (Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, 13). 
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parameter is noteworthy in order to understand the often invisible, unpredictable 
boundaries of coercion in Yugoslav society. 
More importantly, they cited VOA as their main informational source on conditions 
in the United States and other Western countries. Certainly, as explained in the previous 
chapters, the Yugoslavs were better informed than other citizens under communist rule 
about the outside world, the Western broadcasts were not jammed, and the USIS 
reading rooms in Belgrade and Zagreb were almost unique in their extension. In the 
opinion of the USIA analysts, the fact that Yugoslavia had a “relatively heavy flux of 
Western tourists and the feedback from the increasing number of Yugoslav workers 
employed in West European countries,” made many Yugoslavs “acutely aware of their 
deprivations.” 1150  The majority of the poll respondents felt that Yugoslavia was 
undemocratic, and ranked the leading Western nations as democratic, first and foremost 
the United States and Italy. 1151  Among the respondents, their images depended on 
elements that they considered absent in Yugoslavia.1152 
Aware of their crucial place in Yugoslav society and the Communist Party, the U.S. 
public diplomacy agents were mostly interested in gaining influence on the Yugoslav 
intelligentsia. The program purpose of the State Department’s LEP/IVP was to provide 
government leaders and head academics “with exposure to American life and 
institutions,” to “increase Yugoslav knowledge and appreciation of U.S. tradition and 
accomplishments,” and “to demonstrate that the U.S. policies coincide with the best 
interests of Yugoslavia.” As by-products, the exchange programs “would foster mutual 
understanding between key persons of both countries, […] strengthen Yugoslav ties 
with the West and demonstrate U.S. continued interest in cooperating with Yugoslavia.” 
The exchanges of communication and mass media leaders would enable “Yugoslavs to 
observe the U.S. democratic system of dissemination news and information” and “bring 
mutual understanding through free and open communication.” The student exchanges 
would introduce “Yugoslav student leaders to the democratic process of student life,” 
                                                 
1150 Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, 13–14. “Contact between the Yugoslav people 
and the much more prosperous countries of Western Europe is so frequent that it would be difficult for 
them not to be aware of the contrast. Inferences can be drawn with more confidence about the relative 
importance of different sources of discontent,” emphasized the report (20–21). 
1151 The mentioning of Italy was a courtesy reaction towards the asylum country, asserted the USIA 
analysis. 
1152 Refugee Views on Life in Yugoslavia, April 30, 1963, 16–18. 
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while Yugoslav educators would convey “not only a greater appreciation of American 
education, but also an insight into its broad philosophy and atmosphere.” As for the 
Cultural Presentation Program, its final aim was, given the “ready and enthusiastic 
audience in the Yugoslav community,” to enable “us [the Americans] to assure 
Yugoslavs of our continued interest in maintaining contact with its people through non-
political activities.”1153 
Scholars of public diplomacy and soft power agree that the more an exchange and 
cultural program functions as though its intent is nonpolitical the more it can achieve a 
political effect. When ideas travel through public diplomacy channels (i.e. the exchange 
programs), they can be directed to targets with specific political goals (i.e. the leaders). 
By bringing up Gramsci’s idea of the hegemony, or “intellectual-moral leadership,” as 
“the entire social stratum which exercises an organizational function in the […] field of 
production, or in that of culture, or in that of political administration,” Scott-Smith 
claims that a hegemony group can project a set of norms and embrace the leaders of 
other nations.1154 In line with his research outcomes, he underlines that the IVP, for 
example, worked very well in Europe and Latin America, while it was less effective in 
Asia where status, hierarchy, and tradition were resistant to outside intervention.1155 
Moreover, he argues that:  
Individuals from sectors where results are judged in terms of policy decisions or political 
leadership are entirely dependent on the structure of political power and the freedom they have 
to apply their views within the political culture of their home country. […] The judgment of 
success or failure with an exchange program therefore has to be clarified as to whether it leads 
to simply a more favorable image of the United States abroad or whether it leads to an 
expanding group of participants who see their interests (and their nation’s interests) as being in 
alignment with those of the United States (with identifiable policy outcomes being the 
result).1156 
In observing the political framework of Yugoslav leaders, we should bear in mind 
this second assumption, and how it is applicable to these young, expanding groups of 
                                                 
1153 Program Plan for Yugoslavia, April 27, 1967, Folder 18, Box 17, Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, MC 468, Special Collection, UAL. 
1154  Giles Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable: Some Thoughts on the Relevance of Exchange 
Programs within the International Relations Theory,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 616 (March 2008), 184.  
1155 Giles Scott-Smith, Networks of Empire: The US State Department’s Foreign Leader Program in the 
Netherlands, France and Britain 1950-1970 (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang S.A, 2008). 
1156 Scott-Smith, “Mapping the Undefinable,” 189.  
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Yugoslav leaders whose pro-reform stances would enhance the Yugoslav institutional, 
political and human linkages with the United States or some of the U.S. values. 
The Yugoslav intelligentsia consisted, according to a 1965 USIA study, of some 
620,000 individuals, mostly high school and college graduates, like doctors, lawyers, 
engineers, school teachers, university professors, artists, writers, journalists, and 
students; but also managers, higher governmental bureaucrats, military and police 
officers; and leaders of political and social organizations. With more than two-thirds 
being under the age of 40, the intelligentsia was predominantly urban in character and 
middle-class in origin (only one-third of its membership was of working class or 
peasant origin). 1157  With higher incomes and fringe social benefits, the Yugoslav 
intellectuals and leaders were a highly privileged group, economically and socially. 
They were the backbone of the SKJ, the future leaders who would take over the 
“Communist Old Guard” leadership. Although the majority of them were hard-boiled, 
dogmatic and orthodox Marxists, a sizable number harbored un-Marxist and even anti-
Marxist ideas, many of them with liberal and national tendencies, and pro-Western in 
outlook.1158 “Some of them,” stated the study, were:  
increasingly demanding a more liberal handling of domestic problems and an ending of Party 
control over the country’s economic, social and cultural life. Artists and writers are demanding 
more literary and artistic freedom of expression. There are also increasing tendencies toward 
self-identification with Western culture and toward what is called “chauvinistic local 
nationalism.”1159  
Indeed, in October 1964, Party leader, Marijan Cvetković, said that many 
intellectuals, “start from the position of liberalistic pseudo-democracy and favor the idea 
of a multiparty system.” 1160  At the VIII Congress of the Party (Dec. 1964) Vice 
President Alexandar Ranković spoke harshly of “various demagogues who, with 
increasing insolence, raise their voices advocating various petty bourgeois liberal 
                                                 
1157  The USIA report emphasized other very interesting parameters on Yugoslav intelligentsia: men 
constituted the majority of it, but women were playing an increasingly important part in the professions 
previously dominated by men (especially among elementary and high school teachers, librarians and 
economics). Female representation was lowest, however, among university professors, artists, and 
journalists (The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, R-67-65, Box 25, Research Reports 
1966-1990, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP: 7 (hereafter The Yugoslav 
Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965)). 
1158 The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965. 
1159 The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, 15. 
1160 “Vodeću ulogu SK ostvariti svakodnevnom aktivnošću,” Vjesnik, Oct. 14, 1964, 1, 3. 
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concepts of democracy.” 1161 Veljko Vlahović addressed the “anti-socialist […] bacilli 
of Western political ideas.”1162  
The infatuation of a sizable segment of Yugoslavia’s literary and artistic circles 
with Western culture was not only a source of considerable concern to the ruling elites 
but also effective proof that many intellectuals were Western-oriented. As far back as 
June 19, 1960, Borba complained that Yugoslav publishers had ceased to deal critically 
with Western literature and that they approach “everything European with almost 
religious awe.”1163 In his 1962 New Year’s Eve message, Tito himself complained that 
much in present-day Yugoslav art and literature “is alien and incompatible with socialist 
ethics.” Many Yugoslav writers and artists, he stated, had succumbed to Western 
literary trends and supported abstract art. 1164  As we shall see in the next pages, 
intellectual circles differed in their reactions. Some of them meekly accepted the 
indictment and openly repented; others interpreted them as merely a passing phase in 
Yugoslav official cultural policy and decided to lie low for a while. A few, however, 
dared to defend their positions. The literary magazine Telegram, the one that in 1967 
would publish the “Declaration on the Status and Name of the Croatian Standard 
Language,” compared the official Yugoslav criticism of abstract art to Nazi Germany’s 
campaigns against modern artists. “The same artists,” the magazine reported, “who had 
been castigated by Hitler for their alleged decadence are now eagerly sought by art 
lovers.”1165 
For the USIA policymakers, however, the Yugoslav intelligentsia was seen as a fast 
growing group destined to become a leading, perhaps dominant, force in Yugoslav 
society. The fact that the Yugoslav intellectuals, unlike their counterparts in other 
Eastern European countries, had managed to preserve their predominantly urban, middle 
                                                 
1161 “Referat Sekretara CK SKJ druga Aleksandra Rankovića,” Vjesnik, Dec. 14, 1964, 2. 
1162 “Referat člana Izvršnog komiteta CK SKJ druga Veljka Vlahovića,” Vjesnik, Dec. 14, 1964, 8. 
1163 Dragan Nedjeljković, “Izdavači i kritika,” Borba, June 19, 1960, 10. 
1164 Vjesnik, January 1, 1963; The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, 16. The anti-western 
campaign against distortions of socialist reality and “alien” influence in Yugoslav arts, press and literature 
gained momentum after Tito’s return from Moscow in December 1962. Speaking at a working factory on 
December 29, he declared, “various things have infiltrated from abroad and have thus troubled and 
obscured the purity of the spirit of socialism” (“Tito: Moramo ukloniti sve što smeta našem pravilnom 
razvoju,” Vjesnik, Dec. 30, 1962, 1–2; Chronology of Cultural Policy in Yugoslavia, enclosed in 
Alexandar G. Park, IRS/S, to Cody, IAE, March 27, 1963, M-32-63, Box 1, Research Memoranda 1963-
1999, USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction, RG 306, NACP). 
1165 “Degerirana umjetnost jača od nacizma,” Telegram, January 25, 1963, 12. 
Chapter 7: Measuring the Impact: the U.S. Soft Power and the Yugoslav Cold War Adjustment 
Carla Konta - April 2016   301 
class, and privileged character, and a higher political influence than that of workers and 
peasants, fostered the U.S. aspiration that they could “prove to be a potent force for 
erosion of the Communist status quo in Yugoslavia and its eventual replacement by a 
new orthodoxy, one marked by pro-Western sentiments and the ‘bourgeois nationalist 
deviations.’”1166 Whether or in which forms this prediction became a reality, we shall 
see in the final section of this chapter. 
7.2 The ‘Yugoslav 1960s’ and the U.S. Public Diplomacy 
Networks 
 
Take two or three dry wafers of the five-year plan and be sure that all 
agriculture has been completely squeezed out of them; smear them with the 
stuffing of industry which is prepared in the following way: pass through a 
masher the unlimited amount of cheap workers and at least the same amount 
of slightly more expensive administrators; add one gram of expensive 
leadership to this; dilute to 50 percent liquid using economic criminality. 
Afterwards mix this with a reliable foreign currency expert of no morals; then 
roll it flat with the dependable director with no school education. Take care 
that the mass remains flexible and manageable, adding fresh slogans all the 
time. Shape the cake as self-management and put it into the oven. In order to 
prevent over-cooking – dampen it with the juice of American aid. Since the 
baked cake does not have a special appearance, you will have to glaze it with 
the economic reform. The icing is prepared from crushed standard of living, 
chopped culture and peeled education. If the icing cracks, touch it up with new 
measures or pretend you don’t notice it. Decorate the cake with flowers of 
economic experts and models of cars, villas and cabins. Serve and eat in the 
darkness. Remark: If you want it to taste better, drink the juice of the glorious 
past with it and in case of bad digestion take some pills of Marxism which will 
attack your heart. Vomiting is forbidden. 
“Economic Cake à la Yugoslavia,” Paradoks, satirical monthly youth 
magazine, banned in summer 1966, Zagreb1167 
 
Historian Dušan Bilandžić described the years following the approval of the 1963 
Constitution as the “offensive of reform forces.”1168 Adopted on April 7 1963, the new 
Constitution renamed the state as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
defined the self-management governing structures. The Preamble mentioned the 
                                                 
1166 The Yugoslav Intelligentsia: An Appraisal, June, 1965, 18. 
1167 Quoted in Airgram 13 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, July 19, 
1966, PPB 10-2 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. 
1168 Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 451; John R. Lampe, 
Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 276–298. 
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sovereign rights of the working people and the nationalities making up the Federation, 
exercised through both federal and republican institutions, and protected by a newly 
established Constitutional Court. This “complicated formula denied sovereignty to the 
republics as territorial entities, whilst opening the door to a degree of polycentrism in 
the governance of the federation, by allowing them to enter into agreements on specified 
social and economic questions without federal interference.” Slovenian Party leader 
Edvard Kardelj, the regime’s major ideologist and author of the Constitution, declared 
that the working class was to be incorporated into the state, “by bringing ‘working 
people’ into the assembly system, and introducing new rules on the rotation of 
offices.”1169 Kardelj replaced Ranković at the Vice Presidency – the relations between 
the two leaders were already strained for years – hence increasing Ranković’s isolation 
among the establishment. Kardelj favored a decentralization stance, and an economic 
reform that would withdraw central planning in favor of a free-market competition, 
endorsed by Vladimir Bakarić, president of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and the 
Zagreb’s “economic school.”1170 
The international situation was delicate as well, with the USSR sliding towards the 
neo-Stalinism of the Brezhnev era, and Tito not wishing to offend Moscow, for reasons 
of both strategy and ideological conviction. While often reluctant on the reforms, Tito 
finally decided to take the gamble and the Eighth Congress of the SKJ, in December 
1964, endorsed the principles of market socialism (though accompanied by 
contradictory statements about the role of the Party in controlling inequalities and heavy 
warnings against ideological and nationalist deviations). So, as Benson emphasized, 
while Tito held talks with the Soviet leadership in Moscow in June 1965,,  the Federal 
Assembly in Belgrade brought in the first of a series of economic reform measures, at 
the “the very moment at which the Kosygin plans for economic reform in the USSR 
                                                 
1169 L. Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, 2nd ed. (Hound mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 108. In line with the New Constitution, in the spring of 1963 the 
Republics, provinces and municipalities approved their constitutions and status and held elections for all 
levels of government, even though the executive committee of the CK SKJ ratified the name proposals on 
the electoral lists (Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 452). 
1170 Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 452–453. 
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were in the process of being shelved, and the Soviet leadership had to be reassured that 
Yugoslavia was not straying into the capitalist camp.”1171 
The 1965 economic reform, that Rusinow defined by the oxymoron “laissez faire 
socialism,” and that was promulgated and signed on July 24 1965, increased the role of 
the market in the industrial sector, reduced the scope of secondary redistribution by the 
State, simplified and rationalized foreign trade, and increased its impact on the domestic 
market. A drastic revision was applied to the existing price ratios that were left free to 
increase in accordance with supply and demand. The tax reductions were to be made 
possible by the virtual elimination of the State’s role in investment, of subsidies and 
rebates for exports, of support of weak industries whose unrealistically low prices made 
them unprofitable, and by a reduction in indirect income, such as subsidized holidays, 
travel, and housing. 1172  To simplify and liberalize foreign trade, the dinar was 
devaluated, while the International Monetary Fund supported the changes with $80 
million in drawing rights, and in August 1966 Yugoslavia finally achieved full 
membership in the GATT.1173  
The economic reform found its most firm opponents in the old guard pro-centralist 
communists, many of whom saw the decentralization as a sign of the country’s path to 
disintegration, a country they had fought for. The fall of Ranković at the Fourth Plenum 
of the Central Committee (July 1, 1966), the “Brioni Plenum,” and the following 
reorganization of the secret services, weakened the centralistic power, without 
diminishing it. In some cases, the centralization trend at the federal level transferred to 
the republics, sometimes even intensifying the intra-national grievances.1174 
                                                 
1171 L. Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, 108–110; Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest 
(Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 451–452. 
1172 The tax reform reduced the State’s share in the net income of the country’s enterprises from 49 to 29 
per cent; turnover tax was reduced to a sales tax on final consumption; taxes on gross personal incomes 
and social insurance contributions were reduced, the former from 17.5 to 10.5 percent. (Dennison I. 
Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 176–
177; John R. Lampe, Russell O. Prickett, and Ljubiša S. Adamović, Yugoslav-American Economic 
Relations Since World War II (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990), 72–103. 
1173 Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 178–179. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
was a multilateral agreement, established in 1947, that regulated international trade by a substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. Today, GATT is an act under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
1174 As Dejan Jović has argued, “the new Yugoslavia aimed at a radical decentralization of the state [that] 
was not only […] a result of pressures by those who pointed to the continued existence of the ‘national 
question.’” It was “an inevitable task if socialism was to succeed in replacing the state with a ‘self-
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The new Constitution lay the groundwork for the decentralization of the cultural 
institution as well, especially from 1965 onwards, in line with the new economic 
reform. In February 1966, the SKKV transmitted the responsibility for cultural 
exchanges to the Republican Secretariats for Education, Culture and Physical 
Culture.1175 In May, the Commission discussed the gradual passage of financial duties 
to the republics, an act that would leave major room for maneuver to museums, 
galleries, municipalities, associations and artists, but engrave their financial 
sustainability. The function as an intra-national link and coordinator rested on the 
SKKV. 1176  Decentralization of cultural institutions gave wings to further Yugoslav 
experimentations in pop, op art, and abstract art, expressionism, situationalism, 
conceptualism, feminism, and modernism. The regime, while approving the vision of 
Tito as “pop art icon,”1177 ambiguously related to the dominant role of modernism in 
Yugoslav art, often referred to, in the words of Croatian party leader Miko Tripalo, as 
“the remaining element of the old capitalist system,” an “outside influence,” and 
“decadent bourgeois culture.”1178 
                                                                                                                                               
governing society,’” because “decentralization and de-etatization was a conditio sine qua non for 
democracy.” In the Yugoslav political narrative, “democracy did not mean ‘liberal democracy’ but direct, 
or semi-direct, economic and political democracy via a complex system of delegates and delegations. Its 
focus was not on political power but on the distribution of goods and services produced by the ‘working 
people.’” In fact, as Jović further explains, “From the discourse of liberal democracy, such an equation of 
decentralization with democratization does not make much sense [since] the demos cannot be created 
through decentralization, but only through centralization, via, for example, the construction of a 
nationwide ‘electorate.’” (Dejan Jović, “Communist Yugoslavia and Its ‘Others,’” in Ideologies and 
National Identities : The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe, by John Lampe and Mark 
Mazower, Hors Collection (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2013), 277–302, 
http://books.openedition.org/ceup/2438. 
1175 Republičkom sekretarijatu za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, March 16, 1966, 06-10, Box 226, 
Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA. 
1176 Komisija za kulturne veze sa inostranstvom, July 27, 1966, 06-23, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za 
prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA; O likovnoj saradnji sa inostranstvom, July 19, 1966, 
652-6, Box 226,  Republički sekretarijat za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA; Sredstva 
za strane nastavnike i lektore, Dec. 12, 1966, 01-638-1/1966, Box 226, Republički sekretarijat za 
prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu, RG 1415, HDA. 
1177  Radina Vučetić, “Između avangarde i cenzure. Tito i umetnost šezdesetih,” in Tito - viđenja i 
tumačenja (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije - Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2011), 684–706. For a broad 
perspective on how artists in Europe and America shaped avant-garde visions of the Civil Rights 
movement, the Vietnam War, and the counterculture, see Thomas Crow, The Rise of the Sixties: 
American and European Art in the Era of Dissent (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). 
1178 Despatch 111 from the American Consulate Sarajevo to the Department of State, April 25, 1961, 
868.46/4-2561, Box 2708, CDF 1960-1963, RG 59, NACP. 
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7.2.1 Mihajlo Mihajlov, Perspektive, Praxis and the U.S. Public 
Diplomacy Network 
The economic reform, however, had some disappointing outcomes: the prices 
increased by 35 percent and the managerial establishment resisted in implementing the 
reform guidelines. Many enterprises could not properly handle the new maneuver 
spaces, and protest voices were aroused over unemployment rates and “growing 
inequalities” among the workers. For the first time, by the mid-1960s onwards, as 
suggests Hrvoje Klasić, the critics of Party politics, its bureaucratic elements, and self-
management itself, came not only from the inside political elites, but also from the 
cultural intelligentsia (as the Praxis group was) and ordinary citizens.1179 The Yugoslav 
liberalization processes in the 1960s included a balance between decentralization, harsh, 
from time to time, criticism of Western influences, the imprisonment of Mihajlo 
Mihajlov, the ban of Perspektive and the toleration of the Praxis philosophical 
movement (at least until 1973/1974).  
Neither the U.S. State Department nor the USIA agents openly supported any 
Yugoslav dissidence movement (which would lead to a harsh foreign relations crisis), 
but they certainly highly approved their pro-reform stances and contemplated them as a 
proof of Yugoslav internal liberalization (and democratization from below). The 
“dissidence” protagonists were not primarily inspired by U.S. and Western liberal 
democratic ideologies and values, at least not directly. Nonetheless, they were strongly 
involved in the cultural exchange programs with the United States, were in good 
relations with the U.S. representatives in Yugoslavia, and their public polemic, based on 
Marxist assumptions, was in debate with Western philosophical, ideological values. 
Crucially, as Radina Vučetić suggests, these anti-SKJ movements gained huge press 
attention in the United States and were used as political pressure from Washington – as 
                                                 
1179 Hrvoje Klasić, Jugoslavija i svijet 1968. (Zagreb: Ljevak, 2012), 28–29. Increase of prices led to a 
series of strikes all over the country between 1966 and 1968. One of these was the teachers’ strike, started 
in Titovo Užice in late 1966, when the strikers demanded “more pay and more say in the administration 
of education” (Airgram 418 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Dec. 30, 
1966, EDU 9 YUGO, Box 382, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP). 
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in the case of Mihajlo Mihajlov (and earlier that of Milovan Djilas in the 1950s) – to 
criticize the lack of individual freedom in Yugoslavia.1180 
The “Mihajlov case” exploded in early 1965 and was a real case of purposely 
planned anti-SKJ dissidence. Mihajlo Mihajlov (1934-2010), born into a family of 
Russian emigrants, was a professor of Russian literature at the University of Zagreb 
campus in the Croatian coastal town of Zadar, in the early 1960s. In 1964 he went on a 
cultural exchange trip to the Soviet Union, where, thanks to the “thaw that accompanied 
Khrushchev’s destalinization campaigns, he collected an astonishing outpouring of 
literature, novels, stories, memoirs and songs about the camps by survivors and others.” 
In its first two issues of 1965, Belgrade’s literary magazine Delo published two of his 
articles entitled The Moscow Summer 1964 (Leto moskovsko 1964), in which he 
reported on his journey and argued that the first concentration camps were not the 
Nazi’s but the Soviet’s in 1921. 1181  Its appearance angered Soviet diplomats in 
Belgrade. The issues containing the articles were withdrawn. Accused by Tito with 
Djilasism and “reactionary thought,” Mihajlov was expelled from Zadar University 
soon after. 1182  On March 26 1965, he was brought to court by the Zadar Public 
Persecutor.1183 The March issue of Delo brought an apology for the Mihajlov articles 
(the Board disassociated itself from “politically untrue and ill-intentioned interpretations 
with which Mihajlov’s travelogue was partly burdened”).1184 Mihajlov ended up in jail 
for a year. When released in summer 1966, he tried, together with a group of 
intellectuals from Zadar, Zagreb, Ljubljana, Belgrade and Novi Sad (among them 
Danijel Ivin, Francis Zenko, Marijan Batinić, Leonid Sheikh, Mary Čudina, Davor Aras, 
Jovan Barović, and Predrag Ristić), to start the first legal opposition journal in 
                                                 
1180 Radina Vučetić, “Amerikanizacija u Jugoslavenskoj popularnoj kulturi ’60-ih” (PhD. dissertation, 
University of Belgrade, 2011), 109–118. 
1181 Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Now It Can Be Told -- By the Russians; Now It Can Be Told,” The New York 
Times, March 14, 1965. 
1182 Telegram 1593 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, March 8, 1965, PPV 12, Box 434, CFPF 
1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. 
1183 He was tried under Article 175 of the Criminal Code for “damaging the reputation of a foreign state,” 
and under Article 125 of the Press Law, which prohibited “written material in contravention of an 
already-announced ban” to be distributed, which is what Mihajlov did when he sent the copies of the 
articles to Giovanni Volpe, an Italian right-wing editor (Telegram 1608 from Belgrade to the Secretary of 
State, March 29, 1965, PPV 12 – PPV 1-2, Box 434, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP). 
1184 Telegram 1593 from Belgrade to the Secretary of State, March 8, 1965, PPV 12, Box 434, CFPF 
1964-1966, RG 59, NACP; Srđan Cvetković, Portreti disidenata (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju 
Srbije, 2007), 239–312. 
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Yugoslavia, The New Thought, intended to deal with a critical reexamination of the 
lawful conduct of the ruling elites. He failed, and some participants were arrested, but 
only Mihajlov was brought to trial and sentenced to prison.1185 As an Embassy report 
emphasized in August 1965, Mihajlov was Western-oriented, connected and invited to 
U.S. universities such as the Columbia and the University of California at Berkeley, and 
strongly in conflict with the SKJ and its elites.1186 When he was finally released in 1975 
and permitted to leave Yugoslavia, he resided in the United States and, until 1985, 
taught Russian literature and philosophy at Yale, Ohio State University and the 
University of Virginia, as well as in Western Europe. Moreover, he worked as an 
analyst at the Radio Free Europe before returning to Serbia in 2001, after the removal of 
President Slobodan Milošević.1187 
The case of the Perspektive and Praxis journals were somehow different, since they 
involved a larger network of intellectuals, the first active in Slovenia, and the second in 
Croatia. Perspektive was a cultural review from Ljubljana, founded in 1960 by Taras 
Kermauner, a Slovenian literary historian, philosopher, essayist, playwright and 
translator, and published by the Slovenian National Publisher in 170 pages. When, in 
1964, the magazine began to criticize the Party deviations and demanded more open 
discussions, Vida Tomšič, the President of the League of Communists of Slovenia and 
former President of the Slovenian Assembly, defined it as “a call for a return to a multi-
party system” and an attack on “the principle of democratic centralism in the League of 
Communists.”1188 The editorial board was dismissed, but the new one, selected in April 
1964, unwilling to cease with criticisms of the regime, forced the journal to shut down 
in May. Soon, Perspektive became a cause célèbre because of a satirical poem which 
                                                 
1185 Mihajlov was imprisoned in 1967 to 1970, then for shorter periods in 1970, 1972-1973 and 1975-
1978. In 1978, he was awarded the annual award from the International League for Human Rights. On 
these issues, see Richard Eder Special To The New York Times, “Mihajlov Is Given New 4 -Year Term 
By Belgrade Court; Belgrade Court Gives Mihajlov New Prison Term of 4 Years,” The New York Times, 
April 20, 1967; Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Punished for Publishing Abroad,” The New York Times, February 12, 
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York Times, February 10, 1972; Mihajlo Mihajlov, “Rights Come First,” The New York Times, April 8, 
1978. 
1186 Airgram 177 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, Aug. 24, 1965, POL 
29 YUGO – EDU 9-3 YUGO, Box 382, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP.  
1187 “Mihajlo Mihajlov, 76; Writer and Dissident in Yugoslavia,” The New York Times, March 8, 2010. 
1188 Airgram 139 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, April 7, 1964, INFO 
12 YUGO, Box 417, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. 
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defined Yugoslav Communism as “socialism à la Louis XIV,” and its Party as 
“proprietors of soul torments.”1189 Three weeks after Perspektive was suppressed, the 
new editor-in-chief Tomaž Salamun and regular contributor Jože Pučnik were arrested 
for “fomenting hostile propaganda.”1190 On June 9, ten former editors and contributors 
of Perspektive (among them Petar Božič, Taras Kermauner, Vital Klabus, Lojze 
Kovačić, Primož Kozak, Mirjan Rozanc, Domenk Smole, Rudi Seligo, Dane Zajc), 
signed a declaration asking for reduction in coercion over culture, less bureaucratic 
monopoly, more democratization of the cultural field, and restoration of Perspektive. 
Another 87 Slovenian poets, writers, essayists, critics, and scientists joined the list. 
However, the action passed “in silence and contempt,” and the ban was not retreated.1191 
While the U.S. representatives at the U.S. Consulate Zagreb acted as mere 
representatives of the Perspektive events, they, nevertheless, observed them as a sign of 
change and a request for liberal critiques of Yugoslav society. 
Among all the Yugoslav dissidence journals, Praxis holds a special place, both for 
its transnational character, its international impact and prestige, and its long term 
consequences in the Yugoslav intellectual circles and public narratives. Founded by a 
group of Zagreb’s philosophers (subsequently extended to Belgrade) in 1964, the main 
editors were Gajo Petrović and Rudi Supek, while members of the editorial board 
included Branko Bošnjak, Danko Grlić, Milan Kangrga, Ivan Kuvačić, Danilo Pejović, 
and Predrag Vranicki.1192 Praxis had two editions, the Yugoslav (1964-1974) and the 
foreign one (Praxis International, 1965-1973). Both versions were suppressed in the 
                                                 
1189 Airgram 166 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, May 20, 1964, PPV 12 
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wave of expulsions followed by the Croatian Spring (1971) and the Downfall of Serbian 
liberals (1972). 
Praxis advocated a type of philosophy aimed at the affirmation of an “authentic” 
Marxist theory and praxis, and its humanistic and dialectical aspects, resolved to fight 
Stalinism and bureaucracy. 1193  In its first phase, the emphasis was on general 
philosophical matters; however, from the mid-1960s, social and political questions 
arose, together with ontological and anthropological inquiries. 1194  The Praxis 
philosophers remained sufficiently opened-minded to experience other ways of 
thinking, in particular Western ones. As Mihailo Marković asserted, Praxis was a 
“remarkable, courageous, creative magazine” that enriched the “philosophical 
anthropology with ideas about the essence of man and his activities, the nature of 
alienation and re-alienation, the universal human emancipation,” and contributed to 
debates on “political philosophy, the theory of revolution, democracy, nation and ethnic 
relations.”1195 From the point of U.S. public diplomacy outcomes, the Praxis journal, 
but more than anything the Korčula Summer School, represent a case of relevant 
impact. Miladin Životić, Gajo Petrović, Mihailo Marković and Veljko Korać, were all 
Ford grantees in the 1960s and spent time at the U.S. universities. The vivid 
philosophical and political debates with the American, mainly leftist, university elite 
and students, certainly had an intellectual impact on these philosophers.  
The Korčula Summer School, which prepared the launch of the journal, was first 
organized in 1963 (though not on the island of Korčula but in Dubrovnik). Soon it 
became a modern Agora between philosophers and intellectuals along the Cold War 
                                                 
1193  The group of Zagreb’s and Belgrade’s philosophers broke with the Stalinist tradition at the 
philosophical Bled Conference in 1960 (Mihailo Marković, “Neobjavljenji intervju: Praxis - Kritičko 
mišljenje i delanje,” Filozofija i društvo, no. 1 (2010): 3); Predrag Vranicki, Historija Marksizma, vol. 2, 
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1194 Gajo Petrović, “Čemu Praxis,” Praxis, no. 10–11 (1971); Borislav Mikulić and Mislav Žitko, eds., 
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(Gajo Petrović, “Na početku novog godišta,” Praxis, no. 1–2 (April 1967), 5. 
1195 Marković, “Neobjavljenji intervju,” 4; Mikulić and Žitko, Aspekti Praxisa, 32, 39. 
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divide.1196 That for the State Department it could be a place of soft power interference, 
is proven by the fact that the participation of Marxist philosophers from the United 
States, such as Herbert Marcuse, Howard L. Parsons, and A. W. Levy, at the second 
Summer School of July 1964, was sponsored by a State/CU grant. 1197  Indeed, the 
Korčula School, financed by the Croatian Republican funds, gathered both the Yugoslav 
“liberal Marxists” and Western non-Marxist philosophers. Held in quite a rudimentary 
environment (for the 1965 session the Consulate reported the lack of water and 
electricity for a few days, a quite disorganized schedule, no newspaper coverage, and no 
Soviet and Czechoslovak presence), the School proved a fantastic network-building 
community. “The primary interest from the viewpoint of non-Marxists present at the 
Korčula Summer School,” emphasized the Consulate’s report, “was the desirability of 
such contacts between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers,” as was the presence of 
father Giuseppe Wetter, a Jesuit from the Vatican. Allan Gouldner, a Ford research 
fellow from Washington University, St. Louis, came to Korčula to explore possibilities, 
which were immediately denied, for the Ford Foundation’s financial support.1198 
Accused by the Croatian Party leaders and Vjesnik of establishing “a philosophical 
elite and to set themselves up as the arbiters of Yugoslav destiny,”1199 the criticism of 
the Praxis writers exceeded, in the words of the Consulate’s reports, “the customary 
bounds of self-criticism in communist countries.” For the Praxists themselves, that was 
a “loyal opposition […] within the Marxist-Leninist framework.”1200 And even within 
this framework, Praxis entered into debate with Western, and U.S. values and 
ideologies, as never an intellectual group did before in Yugoslavia. Basically, Praxis 
authors engaged in the “necessity of scrupulous criticism of everything existing.”1201 
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They underlined that socialist societies gave too little attention to civil rights and failed 
to achieve the degree of democracy and freedom attained by more liberal bourgeois 
states. For them, the right to strike was to be regarded as a symbol of strength rather 
than as a symbol of weakness. While for the Praxis philosophers the future of socialist 
societies lay in the withering away of the party, and not the establishment of a multi-
party system, they nevertheless considered worthy of discussion the advantages of the 
multi-party system and the choice between parties. In the second issue of 1964, they 
underlined that the democratic institutions in Yugoslavia could not ensure real 
democracy without people’s participation and their exercise of dissent.1202 
Besides their transatlantic connections with U.S. intellectuals such as Marcuse and 
Parsons, the Praxis philosophers entertained personal relationships with the U.S. 
representatives in Zagreb. From the Consulate’s reports we get to know, for instance, 
that in May 1966, Gajo Petrović and Danilo Pejović announced to the officers that they 
would spend some weeks in Moscow with “more liberal Soviet philosophers who are 
not given as free a rein as their counterparts in Yugoslavia,”1203 while on July 19, 1966, 
Mihailo Marković, dined with an Embassy officer (name not reported) where he 
discussed the future of Praxis. 
Certainly, the Praxis group represented the most avant-garde and radical Marxist 
criticism against the Yugoslav Communist Party during the 1960s and 1970s. But in 
spite of its radicality, argues Rei Shigeno, the group never became a political opposition 
to the Party, because they hesitated in establishing their criticism on political grounds. 
While claiming the necessity of abolishing the Party, because it was a monopolizing 
decision-making power and the alienation of universal human being (which they called 
praxis), they did not predict any universality that could be incarnated in some particular 
political body.1204 Or, as Renata Salecl put it: 
                                                 
1202  See Howard Parsons, “Sloboda i demokracija” (189–202), Slobodan Stojanović, “Sloboda i 
demokracija u socijalizmu,” (203–213), Danilo Pejović, “Socijalizam i inteligencija,” (214–227), in 
Praxis, no. 2 (1964). Nonetheless, Praxis philosophers were critical both towards the evils of capitalism, 
as consumer and mass culture materialism (Miladin Životić, “Socijalizam i masovna kultura,” Praxis no. 
2 (1964), 258–268. 
1203 Airgram 241 from the American Consulate Zagreb to the Department of State, May 17, 1966, PPB 7 
YUGO-USSR – PPB 9 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP. 
1204 For Shigeno, the Praxis political strategy was largely a consequence of their particular interpretation 
of Marx’s philosophy (Rei Shigeno, “On the Conception of Politics of the Praxis Group--Exposing the 
Limits of Its Universalism,” European Studies 1 (2001): 81–98. 
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According to the Praxis philosophers, the predominant ‘etatistic bureaucratic’ conditions in 
Yugoslav society prevented the emergence of the ‘proper self-management socialism.’ They 
called for a programme to abolish the gulf between the ideal and the real and to put into effect 
the concept of self-management. In other words, the opposition criticized the establishment, in 
the name of a purified version of the establishment’s own ideology.1205 
 
7.2.2 ‘Network is Power’ or the Power of Networks 
 
Aleksandar Nenadović: Apart from these arms negotiations, what was your 
impression of the American civilization? 
Koča Popović: It was sobering, I felt as it was a dynamic, modern society with 
powerful technology and a highly democratic culture. 
Koča Popović on his first visit of the United States in spring 19511206 
 
The Yugoslav attitudes towards foreign propaganda, U.S. public diplomacy actors, 
and the dissident voices within the regime’s intelligentsia, show us to what extent Tito’s 
regime was a delicate balancing act, and Titoism less a philosophy of politics than a 
response to changing circumstances and pressures as they arose. It was a “synthesis of 
communism and Yugoslav nationalism,” a calculation between ideology, expediency, 
self-interest and maintaining peaceful relations within centralistic and federalization 
forces, and externally with the United States and the Soviet Union.1207 The generation 
revolt of the 1960s left its mark in Yugoslavia as elsewhere. The regime repressed the 
students’ disorders in Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana in 19681208 and violently quelled 
the social and political fermentation in Croatia which became known as the Croatian 
Spring (1970/1971).1209  
                                                 
1205 Renata Salecl, The Spoils of Freedom: Psychoanalysis and Feminism After the Fall of Socialism 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 1994), 60. 
1206 Aleksandar Nenadović and Koča Popović, Razgovori s Kočom (Globus, 1989), 117. 
1207 Vesna Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 227. 
1208 While transnational in its inspirations, Yugoslavia’s student movements in 1968 were not uniform. 
The student movement in Zagreb was led by national, more than social demands. At the same time, 
Serbian leadership discretely criticized their students’ leftist radicalism (Predrag J. Marković, “Studentski 
pokret u Jugoslaviji 60-tih godina 20. veka: između nacionalizma i internacionalizma, između reformizma 
i dogmatizma,” in Dijalog povjesničara/ istoričara 7, ed. Hans-Georg Fleck and Igor Graovac (Zagreb, 
2003), 393–412. 
1209 The background to the Croatian Spring was the 1967 Declaration on the Status and Name of the 
Croatian Standard Language that, signed by Croat communists, intellectuals, writers and politicians, 
called for the recognition of Croatian as a separate language. Both the Novi Sad agreement of 1954, 
which denied the existence of the language, and the publication in 1967 of the first volumes of a national 
dictionary that ignored the specificity of Croatian variants, roused the indignation on the political 
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In October 1972, a political leadership of Serbia, and some of its representatives in 
the Federation, entered into conflict with Josip Broz Tito and were removed from 
political life. Formally they resigned, practically they were dismissed. It was the 
downfall of the Serbian liberals. The informal leader of the group was Marko Nikezić, 
President of the Central Committee of Serbia, and among his supporters there were 
younger politicians such as Latinka Perović, Mirko Čanadanović, Orhan Nevzati; and 
also older and experienced communist leaders such as Koča Popović, Milentije 
Popović, Mijalko Todorović, Mirko Tepavac, Pal Šoti, and many more. Their formal 
newsletter was Ekonomska politika (Economic Policy), a weekly magazine founded in 
1952, considered to be a forum on Western-type economic solutions. Some of their 
critics suggested that, under economic analysis, they were smuggling political 
liberalism. The fall of the liberals in Serbia marked the definitive end of the reformist, 
pro-capitalist alternatives in Yugoslavia. Soon, an entire generation of pro-western 
liberal politicians were replaced: Slovenian Stane Kavčić, Croatian Savka Dabčević and 
Miko Tripalo; Macedonian Slavko Miloslavevski and Krsto Crvenkovski. 1210  Many 
members of this non-homogenous group, had been somehow involved in the U.S. soft 
power network in Yugoslavia. Koča Popović, long serving Foreign Affairs secretary 
(1953-1965), was meritorious, from the strong Yugoslav-U.S. partnership in the 
Eisenhower era; Marko Nikezić, secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1965 to 1968, served 
in Washington as ambassador between 1958 and 1962 and played a crucial role during 
the Fulbright talks; Krste Crvenkovski, on a Leader’s Exchange in 1959, proved an 
                                                                                                                                               
spectrum. The Croatian Spring, while recalling the 1967 Declaration, was a call for social and democratic 
reform. Its most prominent protagonists were Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Miko Tripalo, Pero Pirker, Ivan 
Šibl, Dragutin Haramija, intellectuals such as Vlado Gotovac, Marko Veselica, students Dražen Budiša 
and Ivan Zvonimir Čičak. The repression of December 1971 led to the purging of the Croatian communist 
leadership, expulsions from the party and arrests. The harassment of the movement continued through to 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some of the “springers” (proljećari), including the future President of 
Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, were prominent in the democratic movement in the late 1980s and the 1990s 
(Vesna Drapac, Constructing Yugoslavia, 230–233; Miko Tripalo, Hrvatsko Proljeće, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: 
Globus, 1990); Savka Dabčević-Kučar, ’71. - hrvatski snovi i stvarnost, vol. 1, 2 (Zagreb: Interpublic, 
1997)). 
1210  Also dismissed were a number of editors-in-chief: Aleksandar Nenadović from Politika, Frane 
Barbieri from NIN, Mirko Stamenković from Novosti, Ljubomir Veljković from Ekonomska politika, 
Draljub Era Ilić, director of RTV Belgrade, Slobodan Glumac from Borba (Mijat Lakićević, Ispred 
vremena (Beograd: Fond za otvoreno društvo, Srbija, 2011). 
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excellent linkage for the U.S. establishment in the Fulbright talks as well. 1211  For 
Popović, the downfall of the liberals was a “showdown of the legitimate representatives 
of the democratic orientation in the League of Communists in Serbia and 
Yugoslavia.” 1212  Latinka Perović, Secretary of the Serbian League of Communists 
before her retreat in the 1972 liberal wave, asserts that Yugoslav communist elites 
struggled between two political paradigms. The first was the dominant centralistic one 
embodied in personalities like Dobrica Ćosić; the second, represented in leaders such as 
Marko Nikezić, Koča Popović, Milovan Djilas, was a progressive alternative of the 
“unwanted” elites, which endorsed the autonomously led market economy and political 
federalism and liberalization as its reform package. The latter elites ultimately failed in 
making these instances a dominant pattern, but their legacy remained as a foundation 
stone in the tradition of Serbian liberal democracy.1213 
7.2.3 Instead of a Conclusion 
Network is power, argues social scientist Marcel Castells, and indeed the U.S. 
public diplomacy networks proved be a strong catalyzer for attracting the Yugoslav 
elites towards the United States, its messages and values.1214 For Mihajlo Mihajlov (and 
Milovan Djilas before him), the U.S. press was a reference point, a sort of loudspeaker, 
an international launcher of his agenda. The Praxis movement, on the other hand, relied 
on U.S. university connections to internationalize their philosophical discussions and 
entered into debate with Western values implied in democratic traditions. The 
involvement of the Yugoslav leaders in the U.S. exchange program, while impossible to 
reduce to simplistic causes, proved to be an inspiration and powerful network of ideas. 
As many analyses from the Yugoslav side emphasized, the Yugoslav grantees in the 
                                                 
1211 Ranko Petković, Subjektivna istorija jugoslovenske diplomatije: 1943-1991 (Beograd: Službeni list 
SRJ, 1995); Tvrtko Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici (1948-1963) (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 
2003), 59–60. 
1212 Nenadović and Popović, Razgovori s Kočom, 190. 
1213 Latinka Perović, Dominantna i neželjena elita. Beleške o intelektualnoj i političkoj eliti u Srbiji (XX-
XXI) (Beograd: Dan Graf, 2015); Latinka Perović, Zatvaranje kruga: ishod političkog rascepa u SKJ 
1971./1972. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991); Snaga lične odgovornosti, Svedočanstva 32 (Beograd: Helsinški 
odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2008); Olivera Milosavljević, Činjenice i tumačenja. Dva razgovora sa 
Latinkom Perović, Svedočanstva 37 (Beograd: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2010). 
1214 Manuel Castells, ed., The Network Society: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub, 2005). 
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United States were selected within the most liberal, pro-Western framework of the 
students. “The American reality is skillfully presented and impresses our people. They 
are often fascinated with what they see and underestimate our achievements.” 1215 
Nevertheless, as Scott-Smith pointed out, the exchange programs, whatever their 
political intent, “can never be said to be a decisive factor in terms of political effect,” 
because “too many other variables are involved to make such a claim.”1216 
The Yugoslav elites were very much involved in the U.S. public diplomacy 
networks through the channels we examined in the previous chapters: federal 
legislators, administrators, mass organization leaders (of the SKJ, SSRNJ, SSJ, etc.), 
economic administrators, mass communicators (directors, chief editors of newspapers, 
RTV, and publishing houses; leading journalists and commentators from the above 
institutions), and, finally, the Yugoslav intellectuals (university professors, editors of 
intellectual journals, leading literary writers, theatrical and film directors and writers 
artists).1217 Certainly, it is not possible to claim that the U.S. soft power directly inspired 
the Yugoslav dissidence movements of the 1960s, such as the Mihajlov case, Praxis or 
the 1972 Downfall. It is, notwithstanding, evident that these foreign channels of U.S. 
“benevolent” propaganda projected values, messages, ideas and lessons, which acted as 
external sources of attraction.  
Crucially, these channels of public and cultural diplomacy evinced, as did the 
dissidence movements in other contexts, the limits and the balancing of the Titoist 
regime between acts of coercion and benevolent tolerance. Finally, they pointed to 
unresolved dilemmas of the regime’s internal elaboration on how political reforms 
                                                 
1215 Oreč and Mićović, Inostrana propaganda u Jugoslaviji, 28; Zapisnik sa sednice Komisije za ideološka 
pitanja, Sept. 11, 1965, Box 209, Zapisnici i materijali ideološke komisije GK SKS Beograd 1965-1967, 
Gradski komitet SKS Beograd, IAB: 7. 
1216 Indeed, “Examining the political effect of exchanges falls into a gap between quantitative analysis 
(statistical assessments and hard data) and qualitative analysis (personal judgment)” (Scott-Smith, 
“Mapping the Undefinable,” 191). 
1217 Yugoslav Opinion Leader Study, 1968-1969, YO6801, Box 41, Africa, Eastern Europe and Multi-
Areas, USIA Office of Research and Analysis, RG 306, NACP. In 1966, for example, a group of 
Yugoslav journalists vividly discussed at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade the fact that the Yugoslav press 
was not free in the Western sense. They underlined how, even if they were “all young and communists,” 
their generation appeared critical of the “current condition of the Yugoslav press and impatient for 
change” (Airgram 935 from the American Embassy Belgrade to the Department of State, May 31, 1966, 
PPB 9 YUGO, Box 433, CFPF 1964-1966, RG 59, NACP). 
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would stick to the Yugoslav way to socialism and its proper “democratic,” self-
management society. Or, as Hrvoje Klasić suggests,  
The lack of understanding and willingness of the establishment to implement substantial and 
comprehensive changes were the biggest obstacle to the development of Yugoslavia. Without 
respecting and encouraging pluralism, with a growing gap between theory and practice, the 
reform, of which much was expected, only intensified the already present antagonisms. As a 
result, all attempts of political, social and economic decentralization, directed at the 
development and modernization of the country, deepened its disintegration.1218 
                                                 
1218 Klasić, Jugoslavija i svijet 1968., 450. 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
I never wanted an independent Bosnia. I wanted Yugoslavia. That is my 
country. 
Emir Kosturica, Serbian/Bosnian film director 
 
Political power may change hands overnight, economic and social life may 
soon follow, but people’s personalities, shaped by the communist regime they 
lived under, are slower to change. Their characters have so deeply 
incorporated a particular set of values, a way of thinking and of perceiving the 
world, that exorcising this way of being takes an unforeseeable length of time. 
[…] Democracy is not like an unexpected gift that comes out without effort. It 
must be fought for. And that is what makes it so difficult. 
Slavenka Drakulić, Croatian feminist activist and writer1219 
 
I never quite understood why the Yugoslavs allowed us to do that. 
Walter Roberts1220 
 
In the name of a country’s right to pursue in its path to socialism, Tito harshly 
condemned the Soviet’s invasion of Czechoslovakia of August 1968. As 20 years 
before, the Yugoslav “No” to the Soviets and the threat of the Brezhnev doctrine of 
restricted sovereignty, made the Yugoslav Foreign Office discuss once more a possible 
Soviet military invasion on Yugoslavia. Ambassador Elbrick in Belgrade assured the 
                                                 
1219 Slavenka Drakulić, How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed (New York; London: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1991), xvii. 
1220 Mark Taplin, “Global Publicks: Walter Roberts: U.S. Public Diplomacy in Yugoslavia -- ‘We Had 
Quite a Program There,’” accessed February 22, 2016, http://globalpublicks.blogspot.hr/2015/02/walter-
roberts-us-public-diplomacy-in.html. 
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U.S. backing in such a case.1221 The Yugoslav advocacy of Prague’s Spring helped to 
bring ‘back on track’ the Yugoslav-U.S. bilateral relations, which had been in a 
downturn after the Six-Day War of June 1967 fought between Israel and the 
neighboring states of Egypt (at the time the United Arab Republic), Jordan, and 
Syria.1222 The U.S. 1968 endorsement of Tito’s regime made “all doors open for those 
American enterprises” willing to establish their affiliates in Yugoslavia.1223 In the spirit 
of this cooperation, in May 1969, the Yugoslav Secretariat for Foreign Trade sent its 
first economic delegation to the United States to meet the Federal Reserve and the 
EXIM bank,1224 whilst a U.S. economic delegation visited Yugoslavia in November of 
the same year.1225 
Not surprisingly, these excellent economic investment relations returned in high-
level meetings on cultural cooperation between the two countries. In September 1969, 
Frank Shakespeare, the new USIA director established by the Nixon administration, 
visited Yugoslavia and reassured the Federal Assembly that the new administration 
would continue fighting Congress for the continuation of the cultural program with 
Yugoslavia.1226 During his brief visit, Shakespeare intensely lobbied for the opening of 
the American Libraries in Ljubljana, Skopje and Sarajevo,1227 an issue that, only seven 
years before, Bogdan Osolnik, Secretary of Information, discarded as “absolutely out of 
the question.”1228 The visits of John Richardson, the new Assistant Secretary of State for 
Cultural and Educational Affairs, and Guy Coriden, the director of the Office of 
                                                 
1221 Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavensko-američki odnosi 1961.-1971. (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 
2012), 258–267. 
1222 Dragan Bogetić and Aleksandar Životić, Jugoslavija i Arapsko-Izraelski Rat 1967. (Beograd: Institut 
za savremenu istoriju, 2010). 
1223 Bilješka o razgovoru Milan Kovačević – Steven E. Steiner, June 12, 1969, 04-332/1-1969, Box 43, 
Republički protokol, Izvrsno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
1224 Izvještaj o poseti privredne delegacije SFRJ Kanadi i SAD-u, May 1969, 1964, Box 43, Republički 
protokol, Izvrsno Vijeće Sabora SRH 1953-1990, RG 280, HDA. 
1225 Delegacija privrednika iz Sjedinjenih Američkih Država – posjet Zagrebu, Oct. 27, 1969, XXV-
10/773-1969, Box 43, Sjeverna i Južna Amerika 1967-1969, Savjet IVS-a za odnose s inozemstvom, RG 
1409, HDA. 
1226 Zabeleška o prijemu g. Frenka Šekspira, direktora USIA, kod druga Marka Bulca, člana SIV-a, Sept. 
10, 1969, 432742, Box 61, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ. 
1227 Frank Shakespeare to Edward J. Derwinski, House of Representatives, Jan. 9, 1970, Box 13, USIA 
Director’s Subject Files 1968-1972, RG 306, NACP. 
1228 Neka pitanja informativne-propagandne delatnosti SAD u FNRJ, Oct. 24, 1962, Box 240, SAD, 
Kanada i Latinska Amerika 1953-1967, Savezni sekretarijat za obrazovanje i kulturu, RG 318, AJ: 36–37. 
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European Exchange Programs, to the Yugoslav DSIP in September 1969, strengthened 
per se the U.S. position in the negotiations.1229 
Indeed, on June 5 1970, the Yugoslav and U.S. government signed the agreement 
for “the establishment of the United States Center in Ljubljana,”1230 a final point of 
years-long negotiations. On May 11 1972, the two governments agreed on the opening 
of the American Center in Skopje,1231 and, on July 18 1973, on the American Center in 
Sarajevo.1232  From the U.S. perspective, it was a victory of two decades of public 
diplomacy in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav eagerness in entertaining durable and solid 
cultural relations with the United States, as suggests a 90-page “Report of the Yugoslav 
Delegation for the Talks on Cultural Cooperation with the United States” of November 
1973,1233 is indicative in many ways. It certainly stemmed from stable political relations 
of the early Nixon era and Yugoslav approval of the détente strategy. 1234 Yet, this 
outcome was, more than anything, a result of long-lasting, extensive and attractive 
public diplomacy efforts that Washington waged in Yugoslavia between 1950 and 1972. 
The American endorsement of Tito’s regime, from 1950 on, involved a calculated 
risk both in political and economic terms. Its position was repeatedly subject to strong 
attack from both Congressional and public critics, particularly at times when the 
Yugoslav leadership took positions on vital international issues that appeared identical 
with or very close to those of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the U.S. administration, 
either Republican or Democratic, pursued in, what Foy D. Kohler as Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs defined as, the long-term objectives of U.S. policy in 
Yugoslavia, namely 
                                                 
1229 Informacije i predlozi za posetu J. Richardsona, pomoćnika DS SAD za kulturu i prosvetu, Sept. 17, 
1969, 432890, Box 61, Savezni savet za obrazovanje i kulturu (1960-1971), RG 319, AJ. 
1230 Sporazum između vlade SFRJ i vlade SAD o osnivanju američkog informativnog centra u Ljubljani, 
June 6, 1970, 133/2-01, Box 44, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA. 
1231 Sporazum između Vlade SFRJ i Vlade SAD o osnivanju informativnog centra SAD u Skopju, May 
11, 1972, 09-424/1-1972, Box 45, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA. 
1232 Sporazum između Vlade SFRJ i SAD o osnivanju Informativnog centra SAD u Sarajevu, Sept. 13, 
1973, 226/2-01, Box 46, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA. 
1233 Izvještaj jugoslavenske delegacije za vođenje razgovora o kulturnoj saradnji između SFR Jugoslavije 
i SAD, Nov. 1973, Folder SAD (unregulated), Komisija za kulturne veze s inozemstvom IVS-a SRH, RG 
1410, HDA. 
1234 Osnovna pitanja i koncept razgovora o kulturnoj saradnji SRF Jugoslavije i Sjedinjenih Američkih 
Država, 1972, 9.624/72, Box 45, Savjet IVS za odnose s inozemstvom 1967-1973, RG 1409, HDA; 
Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslovensko-američki odnosi u vreme bipolarnog detanta 1972-1975 (Beograd: Zavod 
za udžbenike - Institut za savremenu istoriju, 2015). 
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1. To assist Yugoslavia […] build a firm secure base of national independence and to support 
the determination that Yugoslavia has shown to preserve and strengthen its independent status; 
2. To exert an influence upon Yugoslavia’s present and future leadership for the evolution of 
Yugoslav political, economic, and social institutions along more democratically representative 
and humanistic lines with increasing ties to the West; 3. To follow a course which would bring 
the U.S. maximum benefit from the significant role of Yugoslavia as an independent socialist 
state […] which exerts a disturbing influence upon the political and ideological unity of the 
Soviet-dominated international Communist movement and tends to stimulate the Soviet-
dominated Eastern European governments to seek greater freedom of action from Moscow in 
shaping their own institutions and policies.1235 
We shall conclude where, in fact, we started, on soft power. In soft power 
interactions, Nye argues, we cannot “underestimate the importance of pull, rather than 
push.”1236 Speaking in Lundestad’s terms, Yugoslavia entered neither the “empire by 
invitation” nor the “empire by imposition.” 1237  The establishment of U.S. public 
diplomacy in Yugoslavia coincided with, and actually stemmed from, a profound 
transformation of the nature of the U.S. foreign relation strategy towards Yugoslavia. 
The USIA-USIS couple in Yugoslavia, with its wide network of appealing publications, 
such as the Pregled and the Bilten, and its crowded reading rooms, its cultural 
presentation programs of classic, jazz and rock artists, and its exhibitions on the 
American way of life at the Yugoslav International Fairs and USIS posts, proved to be a 
reference point for Yugoslav intellectuals, students, intelligentsia and the wider public. 
The Voice of America attracted the largest audience among all the foreign radio stations 
in Yugoslavia, and its Transistor Contests found keen listeners among workers, women, 
students, professionals, academics and even Communist Party members. Although these 
activities continued to act as disturbing factors for the Yugoslav ideologists, they were 
tolerated in the name of the Yugoslav openness to the world. 
From the mid-1950s on, the U.S. public diplomacy soft power engaged in lobby 
operations and, by the mid-1960s, they achieved that more than fifty different U.S. 
cultural exchange programs were operating in Yugoslavia. Every year, hundreds of 
                                                 
1235 Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia (Kennan), October 12, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 213 (hereafter FRUS 
1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 213). 
1236 Joseph S. Jr. Nye, The Future of Power, Reprint ed. (Public Affairs, 2011), 121–122. 
1237 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 284–86 and Geir Lundestad, The 
United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From Empire by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford 
University Press, 2005). Geir Lundestad, The Rise and Decline of the American “Empire”: Power and Its 
Limits in Comparative Perspective (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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Yugoslav leaders, academics and students visited the United States and stayed within its 
universities. The leaders, who went on an exchange program in the United States, 
returned with changed, more positive and enthusiastic, attitudes. While coming from 
diverse intellectual, national, and personal backgrounds, the Yugoslav communists who 
studied in the United States, such as Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Većeslav Holjevac, 
Latinka Perović, and Krsto Crvenkovski, or who had personally served there, such as 
Marko Nikezić, Koča Popović, and Cvijeto Job, endorsed pro-western, liberal market 
economy views and reforms. For the Yugoslav dissidents, as the Praxis philosophers, 
the United States embodied the liberal ‘Other’ with whom they eagerly communicated 
and trusted. 
The U.S. cultural penetration contributed to shape the Yugoslav experiment. The 
mutual distrust between the two partners over the decades covered in this study, evinced 
from their ideological belonging to opposite factions that, ultimately, would be 
overcome by pragmatism, realpolitik and, to some extent, shared appreciation. Though 
for the founders of its way to socialism, Yugoslavia was a product of Marxist 
exceptionalism, for the U.S. policymakers, it was an experiment worth gambling with. 
While domestically the USIA struggled in making its policy prerogatives a matter 
of executive strategy, in Yugoslavia the USIA’s public diplomacy efforts became a key 
feature for the attainment of Washington’s short, middle and long-term policy goals. In 
fact, the cultural exchange programs involving Yugoslav leaders proved capable of 
balancing bilateral relations between the two countries, and the exchanges became a 
framework of soft power practices in which both sides were involved. Senator 
Fulbright’s advocacy in Congress for the Yugoslav case and Yugoslav lobbying in the 
Fulbright Commission attest to how both actors, the Americans and Yugoslavs, were 
ready to gamble their own ideological stances for issues of realpolitik shrouded in 
“mutual understanding” and “active peaceful coexistence.” 
Moreover, the Yugoslav’s balanced eagerness in accepting the U.S. public 
diplomacy agents and programs, as well as the unexpected retreat of concessions, allude 
to the Yugoslav search of its ‘Cold War’ identity as an opened, non-aligned, socialist 
country. The imposed, often arbitrary, limits to the public and cultural diplomacy 
display the regime’s invisible boundaries of coercion and the American keenness to 
surpass them. What is more, these margins of freedom partly illuminate the wide 
discrepancy between the perception and the reality of Tito’s dictatorship, that remains, 
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today, largely contested in the debates over Yugoslav memory, Tito-nostalgia and 
Yugo-nostalgia.1238 
Finally, while the Library and Cultural Presentation Program provide easier 
measurable criteria for quantification and qualification of the American impact in 
Yugoslavia, the personal paths and experiences in the private lives of Yugoslav leaders 
are harder, but not impossible, to track and evaluate. While we have traced the impact, 
only further historical investigations can explore the breadth of the U.S.-Yugoslav 
personal leadership networks that, ultimately, led to power or took it away, as in the 
case of the Serbian Liberals’ Downfall in 1972. 
“Nothing in the Balkans,” wrote U.S. diplomat Walter Roberts, “is ever black or 
white – there are only shades of grey.” 1239  Studying these shades improves our 
understanding of the complex and tumultuous history of Yugoslavia, a history that 
evolved on the binaries of the Cold War, and eventually shaped its distinctiveness on 
the relations, cultural and political, with the United States and the Soviet Union. What is 
more, it is essential to understand that “Cold War” exceptions, as was the U.S. strategy 
towards Yugoslavia, were mostly viable through cultural interactions and interchanges. 
Finally, it proves it was a successful cultural strategy that was able to tie Yugoslavia, its 
leaders and institutions, “along more democratically representative and humanistic lines 
with increasing ties to the West,”1240 and this might be the best lesson from the U.S. 
cultural engagement in Yugoslavia. 
                                                 
1238  See on these issues, Maria Todorova, Augusta Dimou, and Stefan Troebst, eds., Remembering 
Communism: Private and Public Recollections of Lived Experiences in Southeast Europe (Budapest: 
CEU Press, 2014); Maria Todorova and Zsuzsa Gille, Post-Communist Nostalgia (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2012), and Breda Luthar and Maruša Pušnik, eds., Remembering Utopia: The Culture of Everyday 
Life in Socialist Yugoslavia (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, LLC, 2010). 
1239 Walter Roberts, Tito, Mihailovic, and the Allies 1941-1945, (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 
1987), Kindle edition, Foreword; see also, John B. Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000). 
1240 FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. XVI, doc. 102, 213. 
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